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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how economic transition affected earnings 
differentials in Eastern European economies. In particular, as the public sector was the 
sole employer in the pre-transition period, the analysis of public sector pay setting is 
crucial to understanding how privatisation affected the labour market during the 
transition. 
The central idea of the first essay is to develop a theoretical model that 
explains the pay setting behaviour of the employer in the public sector. We argue that 
changes in wage differentials unrelated to productivity differentials may arise from 
changes in the degree of public sector market power during the transition. 
The second essay estimates public-private sector pay differentials across the 
entire pay distribution in Serbia from 1995 until 2008 for men and women separately. 
It demonstrates the importance of a proper measurement of pay to account for 
differences in the structure of total remuneration between sectors. The economic 
transition is found adversely to affect public sector pay gap relative to private sector 
pay at the beginning but public sector wages increase faster than private sector wages 
in later stages. The essay adopts a number of statistical procedures including a 
quantile regression approach. The estimates show more negative or less positive 
(depending on the time interval) public-private sector earnings differentials among 
high earners than among low earners. 
The third essay estimates public-private sector pay differentials across the 
entire pay distribution in Hungary from 1992 until 2003 for men and women 
separately. The results show an increasing public sector pay 'penalty' at all the 
percentiles of pay distribution during first years of transition and a decline later on. 
However, the pay differential is found to vary across the earnings distribution 
significantly. Particularly, the essay provides striking evidence of public sector pay 
compression during transition. Whereas the public-private sector pay gap for workers 
below the median was rather small, the gap was substantial for workers at and above 
the median over the whole period considered. 
The three essays are preceded by an overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on pUblic-private sector pay differentials in i) developed market economies 
and ii) transition economies of Eastern Europe. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
Motivation 
Does it pay to work in the public sector? Twenty years ago this question was 
unthinkable for workers in Eastern Europe for at least two reasons. First, because the public 
sector was the employer of almost the whole work force. Second because pay equality was 
one of the major social principles in pay detennination. However, things have changed 
rapidly. Today the public and private sectors compete for workers. Wage differentials are one 
of the key variables in labour markets in transition economies. 
The increasing pay inequality in transition economies has attracted numerous research 
attention. In this context, Keane and Prasad (200 I) point to the importance of the reallocation 
of workers from a low wage public sector to a high wage private sector in driving up 
inequality. Newell and Socha (2007) talk about the 'wage inequality explosion'. They claim 
that sharp increases in hourly wage inequality in Poland after 1998 were similar in magnitude 
to the much-studied increase in British wage inequality during the 1980s (for example Machin 
(1996), Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000». Empirical evidence presented in Newell and 
Socha (2007) shows that these increases are associated with differenceg in pay-setting patterns 
between the public and private sector as well in the rapid increase in the demand for educated 
labour. 
11 
How can we explain these changes? Economic theory suggests t h a ~ ~ long term 
divergences between pay and productivity for similar workers could only arise due to market 
power (either of workers or employers), relative to the competitive outcome. We hypothesise 
that changing employer market power is one reason for the emergence of these changing 
differentials. 
But whereas the private sector monopsony model derives from profit-maximising 
behaviour by an employer facing an upward sloping supply curve of labour, an alternative 
model is needed for a public sector employer with some degree of monopsony power. Such a 
model can arise from the public sector manager facing an exogenous budget constraint and an 
upward sloping supply curve of labour. Understanding this wage-employment relationship is 
important for analysis of the effects of restructuring the public sector on the labour market. 
Leaving market power aside, Disney and Gosling (1998) point out that any change in 
the composition of the public sector driven by privatisation will affect relative wages even if 
the 'true' (i.e. holding all else constant) public sector pay gap does not change. Indeed, the 
public sector in transition economies has been restructured such that job composition in the 
public sector is comparable to developed market economies. This means a lower manual 
composition of workforce than before transition. 
In the context of changing composition and changing market power, it seems natural to 
ask how does/did economic restructuring affect various groups of workers? Hence, this thesis 
examines trends in pay over the period of economic transition, looking both at wage inequality 
in general and at public-private sector wage differentials in different parts of the labour 
market. 
However, a 'true' public sector pay gap is not easy to estimate. Simply comparing 
mean wages between public and private sectors may produce a biased estimate because 
workers may be self-selected. Although one can argue that worker self-selection at the start of 
large-scale privatisation in a transition economy is likely to be negligible at least because of 
limited worker mobility in the short run, it may be a more important factor during the later 
p ~ r i o d d (Brainerd, 2002). Ideally, one would need data tracking the same individuals over a 
given period. However, in many cases panel data is not available and the lack of strong 
instruments limits 'precise' estimates. 
12 
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Moreover, a bias in the coefficient estimates may also arise from measurement error in 
ownership status given by workers' confusion or by ambiguous ownership status of their firms 
during the privatisation process itself (as discussed in Brainerd (2002) and Disney and Gosling 
(2003)). Measurement error in individual level data may also emerge from self-reported 
information on hours of work or simply because hours of work may not necessarily reflect 
productive efforts (as discussed by Bargain and Melly, 2007). 
Researchers wishing to understand public sector pay determination face other 
problems. For example, one would like to control for non-wage job compensations (such as 
meal and transportation allowances, housing, medical services, vacations, day care, etc.) as 
well as social insurance, in particular pensions among public and private sector workers. 
Finally, in order to obtain accurate estimates of the public-private sector pay differential it is 
also important to allow for life-cycle effects due to differences in workers' age-wage profiles 
curvatures between sectors as showed by Disney, Emmerson and Tetlow (2009). 
To summarise, care should be taken in interpreting empirical estimates of wage 
inequality, especially between public and private sector workers, for a variety of reasons: data 
limitations, measurement error, sampling bias, selection issues, omitted variables etc. Despite 
these reservations concerning simple pay comparisons, the purpose of the empirical essays in 
this thesis is to analyse changes in public-private sector pay differentials over the course of 
economic transition. The aim is to relate the empirical results to theoretical foundations 
developed in the first essay. 
1.2 Research Questions 
This thesis aims to examine the effects of public sector restructuring on the wage and 
skill distributions during the economic transition in Eastern Europe by considering three 
research questions. Firstly, how can we model public sector pay and employment-setting 
behaviour during the three stages of economic restructuring: pre-transition, transition and 
post-transition? Secondly, is there evidence for lower pay inequality in the public than in the 
private sector as suggested by the public sector monopsony model? Could growing inequality 
during transition therefore simply reflect the weakening bargaining power of the public 
sector? Does the empirical evidence indicate that there was an average pay differential 
13 
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between the public and private sector and, if so, how has this pay differential changed during 
the economic transition? Finally, does the empirical evidence indicate that there were pay 
differentials across the wage distribution and, if so, how have these pay differentials changed 
during the economic transition? 
Examining the implications of changes in public sector pay-setting arrangements due 
to privatisation is a relatively new area of research in the economics literature. Rather few 
studies in developed OECD countries have analysed the effects of public sector restructuring 
on labour market outcomes such as changes in the relative wages and employment. Such 
studies as exist comprise Card (1986) for the US, Haskel and Szymanski (1993) and Disney 
and Gosling (2003) for the UK and Monteiro (2004) for Portugal. On the other hand, there is a 
growing (mainly empirical) literature that measures the effects of transition on public-private 
sector pay differentials. 
This thesis makes a claim to originality in both a theoretical and empirical context. 
With respect to the theoretical contribution, this thesis models public sector wage 
determination and the effects of public sector restructuring on wage and skill distributions. 
With respect to the original empirical contribution, this thesis researches public-private sector 
earnings differentials in two transition economies, namely Serbia and Hungary. 
The essay on public sector wage determination sets up a theoretical framework in 
which the public sector is modelled as an employer with some degree of monopsony power in 
setting wages and employment. In this environment, the public sector employs two types of 
workers: skilled and unskilled. With this environment it explains why pay compression 
associated with public sector wage determination may decline alongside the decline in public 
sector monopsony power over the course of the economic transition. 
The essay on public-private sector pay differentials in Serbia presents new evidence of 
the public sector pay gap across the entire pay distribution. Moreover, the essay proposes a 
novel instrument constructed from an additional data source to correct for the measurement 
error in the public sector status. In this context, this is the first study that uses an instrumental 
variable procedures to e s t i m a t ~ ~ public sector pay effects by skill levels during l a r g ~ - s c a l e e
privatisation in Serbia. 
14 
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The essay on public-private sector pay differentials in Hungary presents evidence of 
striking public sector pay compression thoughout the period of transition. This has occured 
while Hungary has been considered as one of the most successful countries in transforming its 
economy from state socialism to market economy. 
While acknowledging different ways of privatisation and public sector definitions in 
Serbia and Hungary the thesis does not attempt to compare them. The research findings in two 
empirical essays are obtained by using different sources of microdata. For Serbia individual 
level data is used from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (LSMS). For Hungary employer-provided microdata sets are utilized from the 
Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS). 
Although the empirical essays are self-contained and focus on two different countries 
with the use of different sources of microdata, a common story can be drawn from the results 
obtained. Both empirical essays find increasing average public sector pay penalties during the 
first years of transition which decline later on. Moreover, both essays find a significant public 
sector pay-inequality reducing effect. This means that the public sector pay distribution was 
more compressed than in the private sector. Although such comparison (and the rise in overall 
wage inequality accompanying privatisation) has often been treated as a political 
phenomenon, arising from a desire for greater equality under communist economies, the 
theoretical model in the first essay suggests a different interpretation. 
1.3 Plan of Thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter Two provides a theoretical and empirical 
literature overview on public-private sector wage differentials. Much of the debate as to 
whether the public sector workers are paid better or worse than their private sector 
counterparts is discussed based on empirical and theoretical evidence in developed market and 
transition economies. Furthermore, this chapter summarises the evidence on the public sector 
pay effect in developed market economies. The chapter ends with a broad summary of recent 
results from transiti0n economies. 
Chapter Three presents the public sector pay-employment theoretical framework. The 
chapter opens with the argument that differences in pay-setting arrangements across the public 
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· sector and the emerging private sector during the process of economic transition may cause 
systematic trends in sector wage differentials. The argument is followed through three stages 
of economic restructuring: pre-transition, transition and post-transition, in the context of 
Eastern European economies. The hypothesis is that public sector market power is one reason 
for the emergence of sector pay differentials observed in empirical literature on transition 
economies. In the model provided by this chapter, public sector monopsony power arises from 
the public sector manager facing an exogenous budget constraint and upward sloping supply 
curve of labour with different elasticities for different types of workers. Some conclusions are 
then drawn for the ensuing analysis of public-private wage differentials, and wage dispersion, 
over the course of the economic transition in the next two chapters. 
Chapter Four presents the first empirical essay. The public sector pay gap i ~ ~ Serbia is 
examined from 1995 to 2008 by using different sources of individual level data. The empirical 
analysis is based on annual as well as on pooled data estimates. The pooled estimates are 
obtained for the periods given by data convenience but which also correlate broadly to two 
different stages of economic transition. Conditional annual average estimates show that 
increasing public sector penalties during the 1990s come down to zero by 2003. From 2004, 
the average sector pay gap translates into a significant and increasing public sector premia for 
both men and women. The chapter argues· that the change in sign of the estimated public 
sector pay gap is caused mainly by privatisation. Moreover, quantile regressions reveal a 
public sector pay equalising effect. This is further confirmed by differences in the returns to 
characteristics obtained. by the decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential 
across the earnings distribution. At the final point of analysis, the chapter proposes an 
instrument to correct for potential measurement error bias in the public sector status. The 
changes in the proportions among industry branches in the public sector, argued to be caused 
mainly by privatisation, are constructed from an employer-provided data set and then used as 
an indicator of the public sector status. The chapter applies instrumental variable procedures 
on groups of workers according to their educational qualification and gender. 
I Chapter Five presents the second empirical essay. ,The public sector pay gap in 
Hungary is examined from 1992 to 2003 by using large cross-sections from employer-
provided microdata. Conditional annual average estimates show that both men and women in 
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the public sector have fared statistically significantly worse than their private sector 
counterparts during 1990s, but this penalty declined to almost zero in 2003. Again, quantile 
regression results verify that the public sector pay distribution was more compressed than in 
the private sector. The same is further reinforced by differences in the returns to 
characteristics obtained by the decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential 
across the earnings distribution. Finally, the estimates for each group defined according to 
highest educational qualification reveal that public sector c.ompresses the pay in two 
dimensions: by reducing between-group inequality and by reducing within-group inequality. 
Both features are particularly pronounced among high-skilled workers. 
Chapter Six concludes the thesis with an evaluation of the findings and the main 
arguments of each essay, together with comments on the prospects for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Literature Revielv 
2.1 Introduction 
Why should pay differ between the public and private sectors in any systematic way? 
This chapter attempts to provide some explanations provided by the theoretical and empirical 
literature. The arguments imply that even as the public and private sectors compete in the 
labour market, wage-setting arrangements as well as workers' measured and unmeasured 
characteristics in each sector usually differ significantly. 
However, although the vast empirical literature provides sophisticated ways to control 
for heterogeneity in relative pay (especially by skill level), the number of theoretical studies 
which have attempted to compare wage-settings across sectors is rather limited. In particular, 
most of the theoretical studies model the attributes of labour demand in the public sector. 
These models will be briefly summarised in the first part of the chapter. In addition, this 
chapter reviews related theoretical models from transition economies. In this context, special 
attention is given to a single model that explains public-private sector pay differentials and 
accounts for heterogenous labour across the sectors. 
The second part of the chapter surveys the public sector pay effects obtained by 
. , 
empirical studies over the period of last two decades in developed market economies. The 
final part of the chapter summarises the empirical findings from transitional economies in 
Eastern Europe. 
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2.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
What makes the public sector workers so different? There is an ongoing debate as to 
whether public sector workers are paid better or worse than their private sector counterparts. 
This section summarises some of the arguments. The arguments are organised into two sub-
sections. The first sub-section presents the ideas as to why public-private pay differentials 
might exist. This aims to motivate the theoretical review in the subsequent sub-section. 
2.2.1 Why there may be a Difference in Pay between the Public and Private Sectors? 
Public sector workers differ in measured and unmeasured abilities from their private 
sector counterparts. For example, they are found in developed countries in recent years to be 
on average better educated, older and more risk averse than private sector workers. 
Also, the composition of jobs in public and private sectors differs. Industry branches 
such as public administration, the police and army, health care and education traditionally 
reside in the public sector. Consequently, these days the majority of jobs in the public sector 
in OEeD countries are clerical while usually a very small fraction of jobs is manual, 
especially since privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, public sector establishments 
are on average larger than the average private sector firm. 
In this context a significant part of the raw public-private sector pay differential may 
be just a statistical artifact arising from the different skills and nature of jobs mentioned 
above. However, most studies empirically confirm the existence of sector pay differentials for 
some groups of workers even after controlling for workers and jobs characteristics. For 
example, Katz and Krueger (1991) find that the public sector is likely to provide rents to less 
educated employees while experiencing difficulty in recruiting skilled professionals. In 
general, comprehensive surveys of estimates of public-private wage differentials by Ehrenberg 
and Schwarz (1986), Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999) find average public 
sector premia for women, for less skilled workers, minorities and veterans. 
In this context, the rational for a public sector 'pay effect' may be related to political 
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factors through the role of government as a "good" employer as suggested in Gregory (1990). 
He argues that the empirical finding on public sector pay compression is because the 
government overpays unskilled workers and underpays skilled workers for egalitarian reasons. 
1 ~ ~
In a closely related vein, Gunderson (1979) argues that the basic difference between 
the public and private sectors with respect to the wage determination process is that the private 
sector is profit-constrained while the public sector is constrained by the public budget. He lists 
political forces that influence public sector wages indirectly through institutional setting such 
as: rights to organise and bargain, the use of comparability in setting pay scales, civil service 
regulations and wage criteria, wage-price guidelines, intergovernmental transfers and 
decisions to restrain the growth of the public sector. 
Considering the politics of wage setting, Fogel and Lewin (1974) point out that the 
public sector demand curve is derived from the voter expressed demand for government 
services and through bargaining between government and unions rather than through the 
marginal revenue product curve. Gregory (1990) also mentions the bargaining power of public 
sector unions as a source of upward bias in wages. 
However, Disney (2009) suggests that whereas the rationale for the existence of a 
uruon wage differential is straightforward, treating public sector wage bargaining as 
equivalent to a 'mark-up' on the competitive wage is over-simplistic. Disney (2009) argues 
that the public sector as a unitary employer with potential monopsonistic power has a capacity 
to countervail the monopolistic power of public sector unions. The existence of potential 
monopsony power in the public sector is supported by Fogel and Lewin (1974)'s and by Boal 
and Ramson (1997)'s survey of evidence on monopsony effect for specific occupations such 
as nursing and teaching, where a worker seeks employment in a relatively small geographic 
region or has few outside options. 
The lack of an outside employment option as a rationale for monopsony power has 
been particularly manifested in countries under central planning. For example, workers across 
Eastern Europe were not able to self-select between public and private sectors simply because 
the public sector was explicitly the sole employer and the scope for worker migration was 
extremely limited .. 
Moreover, using models of 'vocation' developed elsewhere in the literature, Disney 
(2009) efplains why recruitment to the public sector may ,be relatively insensitive to 
fluctuations in public-private sector pay differentials of developed market economies. This 
rigidity can also be linked to Manning (2003),s idea of 'dynamic monopsony' where 
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employers have market power observed through the wage dispersion of identical workers. 
This market power appears due to the fact that workers do not quit immediately when their 
wage is lower than an outside wage. Manning (2003) argues that this disparity, in relation to 
public sector workers, may simply arise from limited information on outside options in the 
standard dynamic search model. 
Considering different incentive designs in the public and private sectors Tirole (1994) 
points out that low powered individual incentives in the public sector may be due to the lack 
of appropriate comparisons, heterogeneity of tastes of principals and career concerns about 
prospects of re-election or promotion. In this context, Disney, Emmerson and Tetlow (2009) 
discuss the backloading of pay as one incentive mechanism. Using total lifetime remuneration 
of a worker employed in the public sector relative to the private sector they find that the pay 
of private sector workers in the highest educational group peaks earlier. They also find less 
evidence of declining wages for older public sector workers in the middle educational group 
and women. This is in accordance with 'backloading' of pay being an incentive mechanism in 
the public sector where 'spot' market productivity cannot be measured. 
In their view of pay compression, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) suggest that the 
public and private sector differ not only in the mean income but also in terms of income and 
job mobility. They find less income mobility and less incidence of employment disruption in 
the public sector and show that the observed relative income compression in the public sector 
may be just due to a lower variance of the transitory component of income. 
Overall, therefore, the theoretical arguments indicate that the magnitude and sign of 
the public sector pay effect in market economies is inconclusive. On the other hand, the 
literature from transitional economies mainly suggests reasons why private sector pay may be 
higher than the public sector pay. 
Brainerd (2002) argues that workers may demand a wage premium for work in the 
private sector if they perceive that job security is lower in the private than in the public sector. 
Next, the private sector may have to pay a higher wage simply to attract workers from public 
sector jobs (Brainerd, 2002). Indeed, the e v i d ~ n c e e that the private sector hired almost 
exclusively from the public sector rather than drawing from the pool of unemployed (which 
has been perceived as a sign of lower ability) is broadly documented by the empirical 
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literature on transition economies (Boeri (1998), Flanagan (1995), Rutkowski (1995), 
Vecemik (1993), Allison and Ringold (1996». 
Complementing these arguments a literature proposes that the private sector may pay 
more to induce harder work in new jobs ('efficiency wage') or to compensate for fewer non-
wage benefits (Jurajda and Terrell (2001), Brainerd (2002». Finally, private sector pay may 
be higher if a regulated public sector and an unregulated private sector co-exist (Disney, 
2007). 
The next sub-section briefly reviews some theoretical models that provide a conceptual 
framework for public sector wage-setting. 
2.2.2 Theoretical Models of Public Sector Wage Determination 
What is public sector wage-setting like? Although the issue of the sector pay gap has 
been intensively empirically explored, there have been fewer attempts to provide a conceptual 
framework for its analysis. Indeed Bender (1998) points out that Holmlund (1993) is the only 
purely theoretical paper on the sectoral wage differential. A model which allows for 
heterogeneity in the workforce and a variation of labour supply responses is laid down by 
Boeri (1998). 
Importantly, none of the literature attempted to provide a careful formal theoretical 
model to explain greater pay compression in the public than in the private sector as a result of 
pay determination. This thesis attempts to fulfill this gap in the literature. 
The sub-section takes a broader view by breaking the literature down into g ~ o u p s s of 
models that attempt to provide a framework for public sector pay determination. It is followed 
. by sub-section on models from transition economies. The focus is placed on a model set out 
by Boeri (1998) because it complements a model that will be developed in the next chapter. 
So, the Boeri (1998) model is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
In the theoretical literature, the first group of models investigates the demand for 
labour and pay determination in the public sector with the latter as a social welfare maximiser. 
Ehrenberg (1973), Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1973) and Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) 
analyse the effects of tax revenues on ability to pay and the effects of unions on pay and 
labour demand determination in the public sector. These theoretical models ignore the labour 
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supply side. For example, Ehrenberg (1973) considers a single decision making unit which is 
assumed to choose the total per capita level of services. The employment demand function is 
obtained by maximising the utility function subject to the constraint that the total employment 
budget is exhausted. This model assumes an infinitely elastic supply of labour. 
Recent social welfare models analyse how managers, workers and investors respond to 
various incentives (Tiro Ie (1994), Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Rodrik (1997». This 
group of models includes adverse selection, moral hazard and incomplete contracting models 
to obtain optimal public sector performance. In this context, Albano and Leaver (2005) 
explore recruitment and retention consequences of rigidities in public sector pay. 
The second group of models is concerned with the personal objectives of politicians 
and bureaucrats. The models build upon the argument of bureaucracy ineffectiveness owning 
to the fact that resources are obtained through 'budget allocation' instead of market 
performance (Niskanen (1975), Tullock (1965». In these models bureaucrats manipulate the 
decision making process to obtain a desired pay and employment combination. This leads to 
oversupply of goods and organisational growth. Budget maximisation models are usually used 
to explain the behaviour of public sector unions bargaining for higher wages and employment. 
In a third group of models, the demand for labour in the public sector, besides 
producing public sector output, is utilised for 'vote-producing activities' (Reder, (1975), 
Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), Freeman (1987». A special treatment of some 
groups of voters or political favouritism and increased hiring by the government that runs 
office are considered to explain public sector earnings' premia or excessive employment. 
In a particular theoretical model of Borjas (1980), the existence of wage differentials 
among similar workers between different administration units within the public sector is 
explained by the government choosing optimal values of wage and employment, subject to an 
exogenously given budget, in such a way as to maximise political support. Hence, pay 
differentials are linked to a number and organisation of constituents and organisation of the 
bureaucracy. Supply constraints on the government's behaviour are not considered. 
A final group of m ~ d e l s s examines the role of public sector trades unions. A. bargaining 
model developed by Leslie (1985) analyses the effect of cash limits on pay settlements in the 
public sector. In this model, a ca,sh limit defined as the fixed amount of money availab.le for 
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the public sector wage bill and known to unions before negotiation, thereby presents a budget 
constraint with a unit constant elasticity. 
Public-private sector wage differentials emerge from the bargaining process between 
sector-specific monopoly unions in the model set by Holmlund (1993). In this model, a 
government with utilitarian preferences decides about public sector employment and the tax 
rate on wages. A public sector pay premium arises from non-cooperative union wage setting. 
This causes two types of externalities. First, in the form of higher taxes for private sector 
workers. Second, in the form of lower public consumption for all workers in the economy 
because a wage increase reduces public sector employment. Under cooperative union wage 
setting the public sector pay premium disappears. 
Haskel and Szymanski (1993) use the right-to-manage bargaining approach to develop 
the first theoretical framework on the impact of privatisation on wages. In this model 
privatisation causes lower wages due to decline in union bargaining power and the firm's 
product market power. However, Haske! and Sanchis (1995) show that wages may increase as 
a result of privati sat ion if the degree of workers' effort is included in the bargaining process. 
2.2.3 Models on Wage Determination in a Transition Economy 
(i) Bargaining Models 
Extending the analysis of the effects of wage determination in transition economies, 
there is a a large strand of theoretical literature that has evaluated the impact of transition - in 
the form of privatisation - on firm's decisions and on aggregate welfare (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995), Blanchard.(1997), Roland and Sekkat (2000), 
Suvakovic and Radosavljevic (2007». 
Brainerd (2002) uses the framework developed by Shleifer and Visny (1994) according 
to which state-owned firms maximise a weighted average of profits and personal benefits to 
the politician or manager of the finn. On the other side, workers maximise a utility function 
that depends o ~ ~ the wage, the probability of employment in the ~ r m m and the wage in 
alternative employment. In the bargaining process between managers and workers the firm 
chooses employment ~ i v e n n wages. In the context of Russian workers, Brainerd (2002) points 
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out that this explains why workers accepted low wages in exchange for relatively high levels 
of employment (a similar argument is highlighted by Blanchard, 1997). The generalized Nash 
bargaining solution of the right-to-manage model in Brainerd (2002) shows an ambiguous 
impact of privatisation on wages: the wage is related positively to the outside wage and 
worker bargaining power and profits ("insider privatisation") and negatively to greater 
emphasis on profits by managers or politicians ("outsider privatisation"). 
Commander and Tolstopiatenko (1998) and Aghion and Commander (1999) develop 
partial equilibrium models of transition considering institutional factors that influenced state-
owned firm restructuring. These models incorporate job-to-job movements from the public to 
private sector as a result of restructuring of state-owned firms rather than as a result of 
workers' choice. A public sector firm is assumed to be governed by a zero profit condition 
subject to the wage bill so that wages are set to equal the average product. A public sector firm 
is assumed to be less efficient than a profit-maximising private firm, where wages are set 
equal to the marginal product. In these models only the private sector hires workers, either 
from unemployment or from public sector firms. Hence, workers reallocate from a low wage 
public sector to a high wage private sector. The public sector firms either face closure or 
restructuring. In the wage-setting the restructured firm becomes equivalent to a private sector 
firm. Therefore, the restructuring implies decline in employment resulting in an increase in 
marginal product for remaining workers. These models do not detail the supply side of the 
labour market. 
Likewise, in Commander (1998) and K5llo (1998) while private firms act as profit-
maximisers, public sector firms make their wage and employment decisions on the zero iso-
profit curve with wages set equal to the average product. Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (2004) start 
from the common argument that in a communist system, planners kept wages low and sought 
to maintain full employment (as in Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). Thus the efficient point for 
a centrally planned system is the one in which workers are paid the minimum acceptable wage 
and planners appropriate the maximum profit. Furthermore, the authors argue that prior to the 
transition, the system had been partially reformed as a result of pressure from workers and j , 
managers. Hence, as in Commander (1998) and K5ll5 (1998) their model uses the McDonald-
Solow bargaining framework between planners, managers and workers. A set of final and 
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intermediate wage-employment outcomes is derived depending on the preferences and relative 
power of these three parties. 
However, Boeri and Terrell (2002) find that unions (as well as minimum wages and 
employment protection) have had only a modest influence on the labour market in transition 
economies. They argue that labour reallocation between the public and private sectors in 
transition can only be explained by adopting a theoretical perspective that allows for 
heterogeneity in the workforce and a variation of labour supply responses. The remaining part 
of the section is therefore devoted to the main implications of a model that considers different 
. types oflabour, since labour heterogeneity will loom large in the next chapter of the thesis. 
(ii) A Worker Reallocation Model 
A model that focuses on the importance of labour supply of heterogenous workers in 
the reallocation between public and private sectors and hence on the sectoral pay gap over the 
period of economic transition is laid out by Boeri (1998). The model explains why private 
employers paid the premium for hiring public sector workers at the beginning of the transition, 
rather than hiring unemployed workers who were ready to work at the lower end of the wage 
distribution. 
Boeri (1998) considers two types of workers: low and high productivity workers. In 
the model, public sector managers ~ a n n o t t disentangle high from low productivity workers and 
hence are assumed to pay all workers the same average wage. However, private employers 
can measure the productivity of each new worker being hired and consequently, offer wages 
equal to productivity. 
In this model, at the launch of the economic transition the total labour force is 
employed in the public sector. The start of transition involves free entry of private firms. The 
model assumes that separation rates in public and private enterprises are comparable, whereas 
significant asymmetries between the two sectors are present on the hiring side. For the reason 
that the public sector can at best offer an average wage and because an average wage is 
increased only by hiring high-productivity workers, the public sector is unable to attract (and 
retain) high-productivity workers, and hence no hiring takes place in the public sector. On the 
other hand, the model assumes a fixed setup cost for creating new jobs and screening 
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applicants as a result of which there are a limited number of jobs that can be offered during 
each period by the private sector. 
The model considers three possible pay options for the private sector. The choice by 
private employers of which wage-job combination to offer will depend on the expected 
surplus resulting from the new hires. First, if the private sector offers pay higher than the 
average pay paid by the public sector, it can hire all the high-productivity workers (either in 
the public sector or unemployed). Under this strategy productivity and wage differentials are 
increasing between the public and private sectors over time, meaning that high productivity 
workers would be better off in the private sector while low productivity workers would be 
better off staying in the public sector. Second, if the private sector offers pay lower than the 
average but higher than the productivity of low-productivity worker, it can hire only high-
productivity workers from the unemployment pool. Third, if the private sector offers a pay 
lower than the productivity of a low-productivity worker it can hire unemployed workers of 
both low and high-productivity type. The choice between pay offers will depend on initial 
endowments of high-productivity workers and public sector lay-off rate. 
2.3 Literature Review of Empirical Studies 
The empirical literature attempting to measure the public-private sector pay 
differential offers various econometric techniques. The methods may be grouped into macro 
and micro econometric techniques. Macroeconometric studies use time-series data with the 
weights given by the time varying proportions of workers in the public and private sectors. 
Microeconometric studies use cross-section and panel data to control for a range of worker 
and job characteristics across public and private sectors in a standard human capital wage 
regresslOn. 
A common microeconometric estimation approach pools data across workers in both 
sectors in the 'single equation' model. The single equation includes a public sector dummy 
variable taking the value one if an individual works in the public sector and zero otherwise. In 
the case when this model is estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) the differences in 
rates of payment between public and private sector are limited to an intercept shift whereas the 
returns to characteristics are constrained to be equal across sectors. This model is given by: 
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for i = 1, ... ,N (2.1) 
where In Wi is the log of real hourly earnings for the i th individual which is explained by Xi 
set of observed worker and job' characteristics with the sector-specific parameter vector f3, r 
is the 'average' estimate of the public sector pay gap equivalent to an intercept shift and Gi is 
an error term uncorrelated with Xi' 
An alternative approach named 'double equation' model estimates earnings equations 
for the public and private sector samples separately and therefore allows different intercepts 
and returns to characteristics across sectors: 
Private sector: In w NP = a NP + f3' NP x. + GNP I I I (2.2) 
Public sector: I P P {3' P P nw i = a + Xi +E j (2.3) 
where NP and P denote non-public (i.e. private) and public sectors respectively. 
Studies using this method usually decompose the sector pay gap into the 'explained' 
part (due to differences in observed characteristics) and 'unexplained' part (due to differences 
in returns to characteristics). Following Oaxaca (1973) a decomposition model can be written 
as: 
lnw P -lnw NP =CxP -x NP)/3NP +[ CaP -a NP )+x Pc/3P _/3NP) ] (2.4) 
where the first bracket represents the effect of differences in characteristics and the second 
bracket represents the effect of differences in coefficients (could be interpreted as public 
sector earnings premium or penalty). 
However, simply comparing mean wages between public and private sector workers 
may produce biased estimates, largely because of selection issues. In this context, a specific 
identification issue plays a key role. In policy evaluation terms this relates to a missing data 
problem: we are not able to observe the earnings of public sector workers had they been 
employed in the same capacity in the private sector and vice versa. 
Hence, an instrumental variable procedures are usually used to correct for non-random 
sector selection. The non-random sector selection can be explained starting from the model: 
(2.5) 
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where sectoral attachment F; might be systematically related to unobserved factor y; such 
that y; = Po + P I ~ ~ and Y2 is an unknown parameter. Therefore: £(YI) = YI + Y2PI which 
implies that the so called omitted variable bias in YI is £(YI)-YI =Y2PI (Woldridge,2003). 
The Y 1 will be unbiased only if Y 2 = 0 or if PI = 0 whereas in other cases the size and 
direction of the bias will be determined by the sizes and signs of Y 2 and PI' Hence, estimating 
(2.1) is not proper if £(8; IF; = 1):;c £(8; IF; = 0) implying that 8; = Y2Y; + v;. 
Instrumental variable methods require plausible instruments that identify the worker's 
sector choice but which are uncorrelated with earnings. This can be written as: 
(2.6) 
where z; are characteristics (Le. instruments) that indicate sectoral attachment F; but are 
uncorrelated with earnings and 8 is the parameter vector. The (2.6) is typically used in the 
first stage of a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) or assuming fi = fi P = fi NP in 
(2.1) in a linear probability model in the first step of a two stage least squares instrumental 
variable procedure. However, such instruments are difficult to find and often rely on 
functional form assumptions rather than theory (see Dustmann and Van Soest (1998) and 
Disney and Gosling (2003». 
Preferably, researchers use 'fixed effects' methods applied to panel data in order to net 
out individual unobserved characteristics y;. The model by which we can track each 
individual i over time t can be written as: 
for i = 1, ... ,N and t = 1, ... ,T (2.7) 
The unobserved effect, fixed over time, y;, disappears by estimating the following model by 
pooled OLS: 
(2.8) 
Therefore, 'fixed effect' (i.e. 'within-group') estimator r is obtained avoiding the problem of 
adequate instruments. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence based on 'fixed effects' methods is 
rare due to a lack of panel data. 
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Finally, all approaches mentioned can be used to obtain estimates not only at the 
conditional mean but across the whole earnings distribution. This is done by using quantile 
regression methods where 9 th is the regression quantile, 0 < 9 .< 1 , computed as in Koenker 
and Basset (1978): 
~ ~ I t { . . ~ ~ 911nw; - P'a x; -raP;I+. ~ ~ (l-9)llnw; - P'a x; -raP;l} (2.9) 
d n w / ~ p p sX,+TaP. dnw/<p sX/+Taf>t 
The next section reviews public sector pay gap estimates reported by the studies that 
utilised different estimation methods. As a point of reference, the first part of the next section 
briefly summarises the main empirical results from developed market economies. The 
subsequent part presents a review of empirical studies from transition economies. 
2.3.1 Main Empirical Results/rom Studies in Developed Countries 
Selected empirical literature on public-private sector pay differentials in developed 
market economies is summarised in Table 2.1. The reviewed studies relate to research that 
was conducted over the last twenty years. 
Elliot and Duffus (1996) used time series techniques to reveal that the relative pay of 
public sector non-manual workers in UK declined in the period after 1980 until 1991 and 
1992. On the other side, they find that manual workers fared better in the public than in the 
private sector. Similarly, Katz and Krueger (1991) find that a sharp rise in skill differentials in 
the 1980s in the US was mainly a private sector phenomenon. This study documents that 
education differentials and wage inequality barely increased in the government sector. 
. Both of these studies used time series models to focus on specific groups of similarly 
qualified workers. Since these models are sensitive to issues of worker and job heterogeneity 
other studies reviewed here used microeconometric methods. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of the selected empirical literature on public-private sector pay gap in developed market economies over 
the last two decades 
Study Oata SOUrl"C \' ea n eovered Methodology Results 
llK 
Rees and Shah (1995) General Household 1983,1985, Decomposition at the Public sector premium annual: 10%,9.8%,11.4% for men and 26.3%,22.3%,25.9"10 for 
Survey . 1987 mean women. Men differ more in characteristics (endowments) and women in returns (coefficients). 
Ell iott and DutTus (1996) New Earnings Surveys 1970-1992 Time series technique Public sector hourly premium declined by 5-20% over the period for nonrnanual and manual 
occupations but increased by 15% in education occupations. 
Blackaby, Murphy, Quarterly Labour Force Autumn 1993 - Decile Decomposition Public sector hourly pay gap falls from 1.5% (3.3%) at the 10th percentile and -1.9% (0.1 %) at 
O'Leary (1999) Survey Summer 1995 the 90th percentile for men (women). 
Disney, Goodman, New Earnings Survey 1979-1994 OLS Public sector pay premium after controlling for occupation: 8% (16%) in early 1980's and 0% 
Gosling, Trinder (1998) (8%) in early 1990's for men (women). 
General Household 1983 GSH and Quantile regression Public sector weekly pay gap for men in 1983: +8% at 10th and +4% at 90'h percentile; 1991-
Survey (GSH) and 1991-1995 95: +10% at lOth and -5% at 90'h percentile. 
British Household Panel BHPS 
Survey (BHPS) 
Disney and Gosling General Household 1983 GSH and Quantile regression Public sector weekly pay premia/penalties differ across educational levels. Pay compression 
(1998) Survey (GSH) and 1991-1995 effect largest for graduates: men in 198325% at lOth and 0% at 90th percentile; in 1991-95 at 
British Household Panel BHPS 25111 percentile and above significant public sector penalty; women in 1983 0% across 
Survey (BHPS) distribution; in 1991-95 premia at the lower end and penalty at the top end of earnings 
distribution. 
1991-1995 OLS 0% (13.7%); 9.1% (21.2%); 8.9% (26.4%); -9.4% (6.6%) for men (women) with no 
. BHPS qualification; 0 level or below; at least one A level; Degree or above . 
1991-1995 Fixed effects 6% (17.7%); 4.6% (7.8%); -6.4% (17.3%); 13.2% (16.6%) for men (women) with no 
BHPS qualification; 0 level or below; at least one A level; Degree or above. 
Bender (2003) Social Change and 1986 Decomposition at the Average hourly pay differential: 8.6% (23.6%) for men (women). 
Economic Life Initiative mean and deciles Without adjustment: 4.9% (11.5%) at 10111 percentile -0.3% (5.6%) at 50111 percentile and 8.9"10 
(SCELI) (17.1%) at 90111 percentile for men (women). 
Adjustment for differences in mean differences: 3.2% (0.1%) at lOth percentile, -2% (-5.8%) at 
. 50'" percentile and 7.2% (5.7%) at 90'" percentile for men (women) . 
. Decomposition at the Instruments: worker attitudes towards unionisation and whether father worked in the public 
mean and deciles sector when the respondent was age 14. 
controlling for sector Average hourly pay differential: 14.5% (41.2%) for men (women). 
selection Without adjustment: 13.4% (34.1%) at 10'· percentile 7.3% (28.9%) at the SO ... percentile and 
18.5% (32.8%) at 90111 percentile for men (women). 
Adjustment for differences in mean differences: 2.2% (1.9%) at 10·b percentile 4% (-3.3%) at 
50'" percentile and 7.2% (0.6%) at 90th percentile for men (women). 
---
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Disney and Gosling British Household Panel 1991-1999 OLS Hourly pay differential: All workers: 5% men; 17.2% women. 
(2003) Survey (BHPS) Graduates: -7% men; 2% women. 
No education: 0% men, 14.3% women. 
New Earnings Survey Fixed effects Hourly pay differential: All workers: 0% men; 9.2% women. 
(NES) Graduates: 16% men; 20% women. 
No education: 0"10 men, 10.7% women. 
Instrumental variable Measurement error instrument: proportion of each occupation in the public sector. Instrument 
procedure for endogenity of job moves: occupation in t-I period. Measurement error and endogenous 
change biases are of the opposite direction. For men measurement error and endogeneity 
cancel out so first differences showed no statistically significant public sector effect. For 
women the measurement error is less crucial and therefore there is a premium. 
Yu, Van Kerm, Zhang British Household Panel 1991-2001 Bayesian quantile Public sector hourly pay gap for men at 10th, 50th, 90th percentile, respectively: 
(2005) Survey (BHPS) regression 1991: 6.050/0, 4.340/0, -3.02% 
1995: 13.19"/0, 10.74%, -6.24% 
1999: 7.07%, 2.49"10, -10.68% 
2001: 13.18%,-1.21%,-11.66%. 
Postel-Vinay and Turon British Household Panel 1996-2003 A model of income and The average public monthly total income premium in terms of present discounted sum of 
t2007) Survey (BHPS) employment dynamics future incomes would be positive (although small) if individuals remain all their working life 
in either sector. The public premium in lifetime values is zero for highly employable 
individuals when job mobility is taken into account. Greater variance of private sector incomes 
due to the transitory component of income. 
Disney and Gosling New Earnings Survey 1975-2006 Fixed person effects by Long run public-private hourly pay differential is not large (i.e. close to zero). Statistically 
(2008) (NES) I Annual Survey using a two step significant public sector penalty for men in 20 out of 32 years and premium for women in 18 
of Hours and Earnings estimator. First stage: out of 32 years of data. 
-
'within groups' model 
(ASHE) panel data . without the public 
sector status. Second 
stage estimates the 
public sector wage 
effect. 
Comparison of nurses Capturing a pay-work quality trade-off predicted wage differentials relatively stable over the 
and those who have ever period. 
been nurses 
liS 
Moulton (1990) Current Population 1988 Double equation Public sector hourly premium declines when detailed occupation variables are included: blue 
Survey (CPS) September to technique collar 8.6%, clerical 4.10/0, administration 0"10. 
. December 
Katz and Krueger (1991 ) Current Population May 1973, Double equation Public sector hourly wages more compressed. Public sector premium highest for women and 
Survey (CPS) 1975 and full technique by examining less educated. ! 
year 1979, different subsamples (by 
I 1983,1988 sector, education, 
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(outgoing experience and gender) 
rotation groups) 
Panel Study of Income PSID: 1970-79; OLS Government hourly wage differential PSID: 0%, CPS: 3.7%. 
Dynamics (PSID) and CPS May: 1979 Decomposition at the Government hourly wage differential PSID: 3.99%, CPS: 2.63%. 
Moore and Raisian (I9? 1) Current Population and 1983 mean 
Survey (CPS) Fixed effects PSID: 2.14%. 
Jacobsen (1992) I % Census Sample 1980 OLS Federal government hourly premium for men: 9% (white), 12% (non white) and women 16% 
(white), 18% (non white). 
Choudhury ( 1994) Current Population March 1991 Heckman corrected Public sector hourly premium: 19% men and 26% women. Sector selection important for 
Survey (CPS) wage equation for sector public and employment selection for private sector. 
and sample selection 
Poterba and Rueben Current Population 1979-1992 OLS Public sector hourly pay gap (state and local government relative to private sector) in: 
(1994) Survey (CPS) 1979: -9.8% (+3.08%); 
1991: -2.4% (+3.6%) for men (women). 
Quantile regression 1979: 0"10 at 10" and -18.3% at 90" 
1991: +7.6% (+9.2%) at JOth and -8.1% (-4.3%) at 90th for men (women). 
Australia 
Birch (2006) Australian Bureau of 2001 OLS Public sector hourly pay premium for men 9.3% 
-
Statistics' Household Quantile regression 20.9% at 10", 8.5% at 50" and -5.4% at 90" percentile. 
Sample File . 
Canada 
Mueller (1998) Labour Market Activity 1990 Quantile regression Public sector hourly pay gap: 2.1% (11.8%) -3.4% (2.4%) for men (women) at JO'b and 90'" 
Survey (LMAS) percentiles respectively. 
Decile Decomposition Differences due to returns to characteristics: 9.8% (22.1%) -5% (-7%) for men (women) at 10'· 
and 90" percentiles respectively. 
France, Italy, llK 
Lucifora and Meurs British Labour Force 1998 Quantile regression Public sector hourly pay premium for low skilled and penalty for high skilled. Differentials 
(2004) Survey (G8LS), Bank higher for female workers. 
of Italy's Survey of For all workers: 
-
Household Income and France: 9.5%, 6.4%, 0% at JO", 50", 90" percentile. 
Wealth (SHIW) and Italy: 11.4%,6.1%,0% at JO", 50'·, 90" percentile. 
French Labour Force UK: 13.7%, 7.3%, 0"10 at JO", 50", 90" percentile. 
Survey (FREE). Decile Decomposition Differences in returns: 
Men: 
France: 8.6%,2.40/0, -5.5% at 10'·,50'\ 90'· percentile. 
-
Italy: 8.1%,2.10/0, -1.9% at JO", 50", 90" percentile. 
UK: 5.8%,3.4%, ·3.3% at JO", 50", 90" percentile. 
Women 
France: 10.70/0, 8.4%, 3.4% at JO", 50",90" percentile. 
Haly: 8%, 5.2%, 1.3% at 10'·, 50",90111 percentile. 
--
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UK: 16.30/0, 8.3%, 0% at 10", 50", 901ll percentile. 
I,'ranee 
Bargain and Melly (2007) French Labour Force 1990-2002 Quantile regression Public sector hourly pay gap: Pooled estimates for men (women): 
Survey. at median: -7.2% (+9.4%); 
901ll _101Il : -18.2% (-14.6%); 
75th_25 th:_9% (-8.6%) . 
. 
Fixed effects quantile Public sector hourly pay gap: Pooled estimates for men (women): 
regressions at median: -0.2% (+0.2%); 
90th -10'" : -3.4% (-2.5%); 
75th-25": -1.1%(-0.5%) 
Germany 
Dustmann and Van Soest German Socio- 1984-1993 OLS Pooled public sector hourly pay premium: -6.5% men and +10.6% women. For men penalty 
(1997) Economic Panel increases and for women premium declines with higher level of education. 
. (GSOEP) 
Dustmann and Van Soest German Socio- 1984 Endogenous switching In the public sector, blue collar workers earn about 7% lower hourly pay than white collar 
(1998) Economic Panel regression workers. In the private sector, this difference amounts to 16%. 
(GSOEP) On average, the public sector workers have a comparative advantage in the public sector. 
Instruments taken from 1986 data set: the labour market status and occupation of the father 
when the child was aged 15, whether the mother participated in the labour market or not, the 
age of father and mother when the individual was born, and the education level of father and 
mother. 
Melly (2005) German Socio- 1984-2001 Decile Decomposition Most experienced and those with basic schooling gain the most from public sector status. 
Economic Panel Public sector hourly pay gap stable over almost 2 decades. In 2001: 
(GSOEP) Men: 5% at 10" percentile and -17.4% at 901ll percentile 
. Women: 29.6% at 10th percentile and -6.9"10 at 90" percentile 
Low education: -2.9; Medium education: -5.4; Higher education: -10.1; University: -13.1. 
Melly (2006) German Socio- 2003 Quantile regression Public sector compresses the hourly pay for men (i.e. positive premium at the low end and 
Economic Panel negative at the upper tail). 
(GSOEP) At the median: -11.5%. 
IV in quantile Instruments: 5 variables related on parents' occupational status (whether a father is a civil 
. regressions servant, blue or white collor worker or self employed and a mother did not work when the ! 
respondent was 16 years old). 
At the median after correcting for endogeneity: +3.3% The public sector pay compression 
remains or is even accentuated. Hence, the different distributions of wages were not caused by 
different distributions of unobserved ability. 
In'land 
Boyle, McElligott, European Community 1994-2001 OLS Public sector monthly gross pay premium all workers: 14.07% in 1994 and 12.98% in 2001. 
O'Leary (2004) Household Panel Interactions between public sector status and level of education showed that there are no 
(ECHP) for Ireland 
-
significant differences in returns to education between sectors. 
L-_______ . ____ ._ 
Quantile regression 1994: 17.4% at 10" and 8.2% at 901h; 2001: 16.88% at lO'h and 9.41% at 9<f' percentile. 
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Netherlands 
lIartog and Oosterbeek Unnamed microdata 1983 Endogenous switching Public sector hourly pay premium for lower and higher educational qualification: OLS (15% . 
(1993) model and 14%) and selection (17% and 13%). Instruments: number of siblings/IOO, father's 
occupation, father's and mother's education. Workers select the better paying sector for them. 
Van Ophem (1993) Dutch OSA Labour 1986 Endogenous switching Public sector hourly pay premium 11.4% O L ~ ~ but penalty after controlling for selection 
Market Survey model (public sector pay gap -38% for high skilled). Sector choice equation includes: 6 education 
levels, age and age squared, gender and country of birth. 
Portugal 
Machado and Mata Quadros de Pessoal by 1982 and 1994 Quantile regression Greater hourly pay compression in state owned firms. 
(2001) the Portuguese Ministry All workers: 
of Employment 1984: 17.60"10 at 10'" and -6.81% at 90'" percentile 
1994: 11.83% at 10'" and -1.63% at 90'" percentile 
Sweden 
Albrecht, Bjorklund, Statistics Sweden 1998 OLS Public sector monthly pay gap -9.5% (-2.9%) men (women) 
Vroman (2003) LINDA data set for Quantile regression -0.9% (+3.7%), -7.9% (2.1%), -15.5% (10.1%) at 10111,50111 and 90'b percentile respectively for 
research purposes men (women). 
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The results from microeconometric methods vary across countries and are sensitive to 
the econometrical methods applied. Starting from a simple OLS dummy variable approach, 
UK researchers estimated that in the early 1980s there was around 10% of the public sector 
wage premium. This premium has changed over time. For example, after controlling for age 
and education, Disney and Gosling (1998) find that the public sector male wage premium 
declined from 5% in 1983 to 1% in the early 1990's. At the same time, the public sector 
female wage premium increased from 11 % to 14%. 
In Germany over the period from 1984 until 1993 only female workers collected a 
public sector pay premium of around 11 % whereas male workers obtained 6.5% public sector 
penalty (as estimated by Dustmann and Van Soest, 1997). In Australia, Birch (2006) points 
that the wage premium appears to be around 10% in early 1980's for male workers and has 
not changed considerably over time (Le. by the end of 1990's). A public sector pay gap of a 
similar order is found by Jacobsen (1992) for federal government male workers in US in 1980 
whereas the pay gap for females was twice as large. However, Poterba and Rueben (1995) 
found that US state and local government male workers obtained a penalty relative to their 
private sector counterparts in the early 1980's which declined towards zero by the 1990's. 
Female workers in state and local government are estimated to gain around a 3% premium in 
the early 1980's and this premium has not changed much over time. 
"-
In general, most of the studies found that the public sector pay effects vary by gender, 
race (Le. whites and non-whites as showed by Jacobsen (1992», occupational level (Le .. 
manual and non-manual as showed by Dustmann and Van Soest (1998» and educational 
qualification (as showed by Disney and Gosling (1998), Dustmann and Van Soest (1997), 
Melly (2005». In particular, females, non-whites and workers in the less skilled occupations 
are round to receive greater 'mark-up's to a public sector status. Moreover, studies that used 
decomposition methods (Moore and Raisian (1991), Mueller (1998), Bender (2003), Lucifora 
and Meurs (2004» mainly found that men differ more in characteristics (endowments) and 
women in returns (coefficients). 
However, simply comparing wages between public and private sectors from cross-
. . 
sectional data may produce biased estimates, largely because of non-random selection. In 
particular, given that workers can choose whether to work for the public or private sector there 
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• 
is a potential for sample selection bias by both 'single' (i.e. dummy variable approach) and 
'double' equation methods estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). For this reason, a group 
of studies attempted to correct for sector selection bias by applying different forms of 
instrumental variable procedures (for example two stage least squares (2SLS), Heckman 
(1979)/Lee (1978) correction for selectivity, endogenous switching regression models). 
The results of these studies suggest less agreement about the size of the public-private 
sector pay differential. This may be largely due to different identification assumptions and 
instruments used in the analysis. For example, Van Ophem (1993) used the level of workers' 
education and age as an identification strategy. He finds that the estimated 11.4% public 
sector premium in 1986 in Netherlands translates into a penalty after controlling for selection. 
On the other hand, also for N'etherlands, but for the year 1983, Hartog and Oostenberg (1993) 
used worker background characteristics such as the number of siblings and parental 
occupation and education variables. As opposed to Van Ophem (1993) they do not find 
considerable differences between the mean estimates before and after controlling for selection. 
In this context, Dustmann and Van Soest (1998) showed that the positive relation 
between education level and public sector choice may be due to unobserved heterogeneity 
rather than a structural effect. In addition, they suggest that the estimates of wage equations 
may be biased because the correction for selectivity is often identified by using different 
specifications of the educational variables in selection and wage equations. In particular, 
Dustmann and Van Soest (1998) using German data in 1984 found that correcting for non-
random selection not based on instruments reflecting parental background characteristics leads 
to significantly different conditional sector pay differentials. Hence, they write: 'Thus the 
main methodological conclusion is that correcting for non-random selection is important, but 
is only useful if appropriate instrumental variables are available which playa role in the 
selection mechanism, but can be excluded from the wage equation', (Dustmann and Van Soest 
(1998), pg. 1419). Using a number of family background variables (such as the labour market 
status of the father when the child was aged 15, whether the mother participated in the labour 
market or not, the age of father and mother when the individual was born, and the education 
, I 
level of the father and mother) the selection models employed in this study suggested that 
workers self-select into the sectors where they have the greatest comparative advantages. 
, . 
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Much of the other studies also explored various instruments to correct for a worker 
self-selection. For the UK, Bender (2003) estimated the public sector premium in 1986 by 
using workers' attitudes towards unionisation and the fathers' occupation as instruments for 
sector selection. She found that the premium was greater after correcting for selection bias 
(Le. estimates increase from 9% to 14% and from 24% to 41% for men and women, 
respectively). 
Another strand of studies avoided identification issues by tracking the same 
individuals over a given period of time. The panel data based methods net out the fixed 
individual effects by differencing sample observations around the individual sample means (so 
called 'fixed effects' or within group estimator). By applying 'fixed effects' methods on 
British Household Panel data for the period during 1990s, Disney and Gosling (2003) find that 
a negative differential for male university graduates previously found in the cross sections (Le. 
in Disney and Gosling, 1998) appeared to have arisen from selection. 
On the other hand a considerable number of studies across different countries used 
quantile regression methods to compare the pay dispersion between the public and private 
sectors. A common finding from these studies, irrespectively of the cross-sectional procedures 
applied ('single equation' approach, decompositions and instruments to control for selectivity) 
is that the public sector pay is more compressed than the private sector pay (Disney and 
Gosling (1998), Blackaby, Murphy, O'Leary (1999), Yu, Van Kerm, Zhang (2004) for UK; 
Poterba and Rueben (1994) for US; Birch (2006) for Australia; Mueller (1998) for Canada; 
Lucifora and Meurs (2004) for Italy, France and UK; Melly (2005) for Germany; Boyle, 
McElligott, O'Leary for Ireland; Machado and Mata (2005) for Portugal and Albrecht, 
Bjorklund, Vroman (2003) for Sweden). 
For example, Poterba and Rueben (1994) found that in the US in 1979 male workers at 
the 10th percentile fared the same across the sectors but those at the 90th percentile had almost 
a 20% pay penalty (after controlling for education, experience, marital status, race and 
residence). The pay gap had changed by 1991. Workers at the loth percentile gained a 7.6% 
premium whereas the penalty for those at the 90th percentile had declined to 8%. 
. . 
In the UK, Disney and Gosling (1998) investigated the role of privatisation and 
compulsory competitive tendering based on the British Household Panel data. They found that 
. . 
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the wage distribution conditioned on age and education increased from 1983 until the early 
1990's in both public and private sectors, but more in the private sector. They also estimated 
that the public sector pay compression was the largest for university graduates. 
Considering the·same period (i.e. 1982-1994) but using Portuguese data, Machado and 
Mata (2001) showed that the wage inequality of state-owned enterprises increased during the 
period of structural reforms and privatisations in Portugal. After controlling for gender, 
education, experience, tenure, firm size and industry they found that the state-owned 
enterprises premium for workers at the 10th percentile declined from 18% in 1982 to 12% in 
1994. For workers at the 90th percentile they estimated a decline in the the state-owned 
enterprises' pay penalty from 7% in 1982 to 2% in 1994. 
Other studies estimated quantile regressions for the public and private sector workers 
separately and presented the estimates by decomposition techniques (Blackaby, Murphy, 
O'Leary (1999), Mueller (1998) Lucifora and Meurs (2004), Melly (2005». Although these 
studies differ in decomposition methods applied (Le. Blackaby, Murphy. O'Leary (1999) 
apply decomposition method outlined in Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) while Mueller 
(1998), Lucifora and Meurs (2004) and Melly (2005) apply decomposition method outlined in 
Machado and Mata (2005» their results in general are quite similar. 
In particular, Lucifora and Meurs (2004) obtained cross-country estimates on public-
private sector pay differentials for UK, France and Italy in 1998 controlling for education, age, 
marital status, occupations, part-time jobs and regions. The same technique is applied on 1990 
Canadian data by Mueller (1998) 1 and on 2001 German data by Melly (2005)2. Conclusions 
from these studies can be summarised as follows. The public sector workers are found to 
collect the largest premia at the lower-end of the earnings distribution. The relationship 
between earnings and' public sector status is negative for workers earning very high wages. 
This pattern holds for both men and women in Canada and Germany but with female workers 
obtaining a greater premium or lower penalty than men. For female workers in the UK, France 
1 after controlling for a large set of characteristics: level of education, province of residence, marital status, age 
group, mother tongue. household head, disability, visible minority, immigrant, occupation, number of employees, 
job tenure, union status, part-time status, and job-related pension. 
2 after controlling for education, experience, occupation, marital status, tenure and part-time status. 
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and Italy the earnings advantage occurs across the whole pay distribution but declines to zero 
as one moves towards the top-end. 
As an improvement to these studies Blackaby, Murphy, O'Leary (1999) include a 
sector selection correction term in wage equations. However, their results are found not to be 
affected by the endogeneity of sectoral choice. They estimated that UK public sector male 
workers earned a 1.5% premium at the 10th percentile and a 2% penalty at the 90th percentile 
after controlling for a range of individual, job specific and demographic characteristics3 based 
on Quarterly Labour Force Survey data from 1993 until 1995. The public sector premium for 
female workers is estimated at 3.3% at the 10th percentile and zero at the 90th percentile. 
Finally, Melly (2006) proposed an instrumental variable method for estimating the 
effects of the public sector status on the entire wage distribution controlling for endogenous 
sector choice. He used variables related to the parents' occupational status (whether a father 
was a civil servant, blue or white collar worker or self employed and the mothers' employment 
status when the respondent was 16 years old) as instruments. These were based on German 
Socio-Economic Panel data for 2003. Melly (2006) found that at the median the public sector 
11.5% penalty translates into 3.3% premium after correcting for endogeneity but that the 
public sector pay compression remained or was even accentuated. Hence, he concludes that 
the different distributions of wages were not caused by different distributions of unobserved 
ability. 
Nonetheless, Bargain and Melly (2007) using the same data set as in Lucifora and 
Meurs (2004) for France but applying fixed effects panel data estimations on quantile 
regressions over the period from 1990 until 2002 found that .the public sector wage 
compression is mainly due to unobserved characteristics. This study showed that the long term 
sectoral differences are essentially zero for both male and female lemployees. Their result may 
be related to Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) who showed that the greater variance of private 
sector incomes in the UK is due to the transitory component of income. In particular, Postel-
Vinay and Turon (2007) estimated that the average total income public sector premium for 
highly employable individuals in ,terms of the present discounted sum of future incomes ~ o u l d d
3 full-time education, work experience and its square, health, marital status, ethnic origin, highest educational 
qualification, region of residence, tenure with current employer, size of workplace, trade union affiliation, . 
occupation, industry and a constructed selectivity term to model sectoral attachment. 
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be positive (although small) if individuals remain all their working life in either sector and 
zero if job mobility is taken into account. 
Similar results are obtained by Disney and Gosling (2007) for the UK, but by using 
different panel data methods, when considering the long term period over the 1970s, 1980s, 
1990s and the early 2000s. They proposed a new method to construct time-varying sector pay 
gap estimates and to control for changing unobservable as well as observable characteristics of 
the workforce. They found that the long run public sector pay differentials do not seem to 
depart strongly from zero but that the fluctuations in the public sector pay gap induce 
compensating changes in workforce quality. 
Summarising the results presented in the Table 2.1, the size of the public sector pay 
effect estimated in developed market economies appears to depend upon gender, educational 
qualification and worker position across the pay distribution. Female workers, lower qualified 
and those at the lower end of the earnings distribution seem to collect the largest 'mark-up' to 
public sector status. Nevertherless, these conclusions have proved relatively sensitive to the 
empirical methods used as well as to the length of time and country considered. 
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence from Countries in Economic Transition 
How big is the public sector pay gap in transition economies? The studies on public-
private sector pay differentials in the countries of Eastern Europe cover the period from the 
earl 1990s when the public sector faced private sector competition for workers for the first 
time after half a century. 
A general concern of the empirical research is related to the quality of the public sector 
workforce due to difficulties to retain and recruit competent workers that were poached to 
, 
private sector by significant pay premia estimated at the start of economic transition. Table 2.2 
summarises the main results in the empirical literature on pUblic-private sector pay differential 
in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. 
41 
Table 2.2: Summary of the empirical literature on pUblic-private sector pay gap in transition economies 
Study 
Flanagan (1995) 
Rutkowski (1996) 
Newell and 
Socha (1998) 
Lehmann and 
Wadsworth 
(2000) 
Adamchik and 
Bedi (2000) 
Country 
Czech Republic 
Poland 
Poland 
Poland 
Russia 
Poland 
Data source 
Survey of 
Expectations 
and Attitudes 
Labour Force Survey 
Labour 
Force Survey 
Labour Force Survey 
Russian 
Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey 
Labour 
Force Survey 
Vtars covered 
1993 
1993 
1992.1996 
1994-1996 
1994-1996 
1996 
Methodology 
OLS 
Unconditional pay ratios 
OLS 
OLS 
OLS 
Endogenous switching 
regression model 
Results 
Workers (owners) in state-owned enterprises earn lower montly after 
tax wage than those in the new private firms: -18% (-43%). The wage 
gap associated with university degree about -30%. 
Public sector after tax monthly pay gap -2% for men and -6.5% for 
women. Workers with university degree penalised the most 
(-12% men and -40% women). 
Public sector after tax hourly wage gap relative to private sector was 
-5.1% (-8.6%) in 1992 and +7.9% (-0.2%) in 1996 for men (women). In 
1996 for men the public sector pay gap was negative only for those with 
university degree (-8%). 
State and private sector firms in Poland offer the same weekly after tax 
wages to new recruits. 
The weekly after tax wage gap between the new state sector jobs 
relative to new private sector jobs in Russia -13% . 
-7% (-10"10) public sector monthly after tax pay gap for full-time men 
(women). Male (female) workers with university degree and 5 years of 
work experience had monthly after tax earnings disadvantage: -22% (-
21%). 
Instruments: age and whether the individual entered post-1989 labour 
market. 
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Newell (2001) 
Jovitic. Nojkovic 
and Paranos 
(2000) 
Brainerd (2002) 
Adamchik. 
Hyclak 
and King (2003) 
Jovanovic and 
Lokshin (2003) 
Reilly (2003) 
Poland 
Serbia 
Russia 
Poland 
Serbia 
Serbia 
Labour 
Force Survey 
Labour 
Force Survey 
All-Russian Centre 
for Public Opinion 
Research 
Labour 
Force Survey 
Labour 
Force Survey 
Labour 
Force Survey 
1994.1998 
1998 
1993. 1994. 
1997.1998 
1994.2001 
2000 
1995-2000 
OLS 
OLS 
OLS 
Quantile Regression 
OLS 
Endogenous switching 
regression model 
Quantile Regression 
Public sector hourly after tax wage gap changed from -12.9"10 in 1994 to 
-8.5% in 1998 for full time employees. 
The public sector pay penalty for men between 35 and 49 years old (and 
proportionately to their education) when compared to their private 
sector counterparts who work long hours and preferably run their own 
businesses. 
Workers in the state-owned relative to the privately-owned enterprises 
earned monthly after tax wage penalty: -27% in 1993; -23% in 1994;-
21% in 1997 and -16.5% in 1998. 
The pay gap for workers in the 1st through 3rd deciles about -16% and 
in the 9th decile -47% in 1993. 
Public sector monthly after tax earnings gap -9% (-6.3%) in 1994 and-
3.4% (-4.5%) in 2001 for men (women). 
Public sector hourly after tax earnings gap -9.4% (-4%) for men 
(women). 
Instruments: marital status and number of jobholders in the household. 
Public sector hourly after tax wage gap for men: 
1995: 0% -17% -19% -25% -65% at 1O'h, 25'b. 50'h, 75"'. 90'" 
respectively. 
1996: statistically insignificant at all percentiles. 
1997:-21%,-18% at 10"'. 25'" respectively; other percentiles 
insignificant 
1998: 0"10 -21% -21% 0"10 -25% at 10'11, 25"'. 50"', 75 .... 9O'h respectively. 
1999: -18% 0% 0% -17% -28% at 10111,25"'.50"', 75'h. 9O'h respectively. 
2000:-26% -37% -33% -31% -28% at lOlli, 25 111• 50111, 75 .... 90111 
respectively. 
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Pooling 1995-2000 data, OLS public sector gap -32.7%. Quantile 
regression estimates: -17% at 2511l percentile and almost -70% • at 90'" 
percentile while workers at other percentiles of the wage distribution 
obtained no significant penalty. 
Positive selectivity in both sectors for men. For women positive 
Integrated Endogenous switching selectivity in the public but negative selectivity in the private sector. Falaris (2004) Bulgaria 1995 Household Survey regression model Instruments: farmland received in the restitution program increases the 
probability of employment in the private sector. 
The hourly after tax pay gap for male workers in the state sector 
-14.3% relative to their counterparts in the private sector on average. 
Jovanovic and Labour Endogenous switching For women: -18.3%. For male (female) workers with university degree: 
Lokshin (2004) Russia (Moscow) Force Survey 1997 regression model -44% (-22%) 
Instruments: industry employment prior in 1991, marital status and 
number of children in the household. 
Separate equations for public and private sectors for each year from 
1994 until 2002 showed lower returns to all forms of post-primary 
Double equation education and white skilled occupations (professional, managerial, 
Newell and 
Poland Labour 1994-2002 Quantile Regression technical) in the public than in the private sector. Positive relationship Socha (2005) Force Survey Heckman corrected between firm size and wages more pronounced in the private sector. 
wage equation for employment Public sector pays higher monthly after tax earnings at the bottom end 
selection of the wage distribution and lower at the top end. 
The pay gap changes from -12% in 1994 to statistically insignificantly. 
different from zero in 2002. 
Public sector penalty in quarterly labour income in 1986: -7.5%,1988:-
Keane and Household 1985-1992 and 5.9%,1989: -6.7%, 1990: -8.2% 1991: -13% 1992: -9"10. 
Prasad (2006) Poland Budget Survey 1994-1996 OLS Monthly labour income gap for public sector relative to small private firms in 1994: 8.7%,1995: 11%, 1996: 10.2%. 
Monthly labour income gap for public sector relative to large private 
firms in 1994: -18% 1995: -19.8% 1996: -18.3%. 
Leping (2006) Estonia Labour Force 1989-2004 Quantile Regression Public sector monthly pay gap in year 1989: -23%, -31.2%, -76.8%; in Survey 1994: 19.2%, -8.6%, -20%; 1998: 13%,0%, -9.4%; 2002: 2.4%, -4.6%, 
-7.1%; 2004:0%, -2.8%, -11.4% at 10lll, 501ll• 901Il percentile 
respectively. 
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Newell and Poland Labour 1994-2004 OLS Public sector hourly after tax pay gap -11 % in 1994, -8% in 1998 and 
Socha (2007) Force Sorvey statistically insignificantly different from zero in 2002 and 2004. 
Quantile regression Public sector hourly after tax pay gap -3%, -5%, -5%, -6 %, -10% on 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile respectively in 1998. 
Public sector hourly after tax pay gap 8%, 5%, 0%, 0%, -6% on 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile respectively in 2002. 
Heckman corrected Public sector hourly after tax pay gap -6% in 1998 and insignificant in 
wage equation for employment 2002. 
selection 
Delteil, Pail he Hungary Harrnonised 1992-1998 OLS State-owned enterprises relative to privately owned: -1.3% pay gap in 
and Redor (2004) Hungarian Wage 1992, statistically insignificantly different from zero in 1994, 1996 and 
Survey 1997, 3.2% and 7.4% in 1995 and 1998, respectively. State-owned 
enterprises relative to foreign-owned: -24.5%, -23.5%, -23%, -25.5%, -
28.4%, -22.7 % in each year observed. 
Harmonised Public sector average monthly gross pay gap: -27% in 2000, -25.7% in' 
Telegdy (2006) Hungary Hungarian 2000-2004 OLS 2001, -20.5% in 2002, 7% in 2003 and 8.4% in 2004. 
Wage Survey Difference in returns:-I3.4% (14%); -13.3% (13.7%); -22% (9.8%); 
-43.2% (-3.7%) for primary school or less; vocational; high school; 
university, respectively in 2000 (2004). In 2000 lower returns to all 
occupations in the public than in the private sector. In 2004 returns to 
all occupations except professional greater in the public sector. 
Hamori (2007) Hungary Harrnonised 1994-2003 OLS and Public monthly gross pay gap for male workers -23% (OLS) (-13% at Hungarian Wage Quantile Regression the bottom quantile and -40% at the top quantile) in 1994, -21% (OLS) 
Survey in 1995, -31 % (OLS) in 1996, -38% (OLS) in 1997 (-25% at the bottom 
quantile and -62% at the top quantile), -37% (OLS) in 2000, -36% 
(OLS) in 2001, (-32%) in 2002, (-14%) in 2003 (24% at 10th, 4% at 
25th quantile). 
Low skilled men: 1.1% (-4.4%); 10% (-14.1%); 0.9% (-14.4%); 11.4% 
(-20%) in 1994;1997;2000;2003, respectively at lOth (90th) percentile. 
Middle skilled men: -7.1% (-2.4%); -3.3% (-17%); -11.8% (10.5%); 
3.4% (-25.7%) in 1994;1997;2000;2003, respectively at 10tb (90th) 
percentile. 
High skilled men: -30.3% (-41.9%); 6.2% (-47.6%); -8.5% (-36.2%); 
12.3% (-48%) in 1994;1997;2000;2003, respectively at 10th (90th) 
percentile. 
----
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The empirical studies apply different econometric techniques on cross-sectional 
data. This is simply because panel data have not been collected in these countries. Nearly 
all empirical studies, irrespective of econometric method applied, found evidence of public 
sector pay penalties which tended to withdraw with the progress of transition towards 
market economy. 
However, it is difficult to make a comparison across studies as the size of the 
public-private sector pay differential may vary depending on: (1) public and private sector 
samples given by data availability (2) earnings definition (i.e. after or before tax, monthly 
or hourly, wage arrears incidence and non-wage compensations) (3) measurement error 
(i.e. employer-provided data or self-reported data) and (4) empirical method applied. For 
this reason we first summarise the main difficulties in public-private sector pay gap 
estimation in transition economies and then we present the main findings of studies 
reviewed in Table 2.2. 
(i) Difficulties in Public-Private Sector Pay Gap Estimation in Transition 
Economies 
Definition of Public and Private Sectors 
The way the public and private sectors are defined varies across countries. For 
example, in the Polish Labour Force Survey used by Adamchik and Bedi (2000), 
Adamchik, Hyclak and King (2003), Newell and Socha (2005 and 2007), a sample of 
public sector workers includes employees of public sector enterprises and local and central 
government civil servants paid out of the government budget. The sample of private sector 
workers includes employees of industrial, service and trade economic entities belonging to 
physical persons or trade co-operatives where the share of private capital is greater than 
• 
50%, co-operatives with foreign capital joint ventures, foreign small enterprises and 
individual agricultural farms. 
Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004), using the Russian Labour Force Survey, classify 
respondents as working in the private sector if they work in a new private enterprise, a 
p r i v a t i ~ e d d enterprise with the majority of ownership in private haryds, or an enterprise with 
another form of ownership (mostly foreign owned and joint-venture enterprises and public 
associations). In this study public sector employees are those employed in state-owned. 
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enterprises' and institutions, municipal services, and privatised enterprises with the 
majority of ownership still under a state control. 
Jovicic, Nojkovic, Para nos (2000), Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) and Reilly 
(2003) using Serbian Labour Force Survey defined the public sector to include state sector 
(central and local administration, education and health care financed from the budget and 
public state and public local enterprises) as well as socially-owned and mixed enterprises 
and co-operatives whereas the private sector includes employees at entrepreneurships, new 
private and privatised firms. 
On the other hand, in Hungarian Harmonised Wage Survey used by Hamori (2007) 
and Telegdy (2006) the public sector includes only budgetary institutions whereas all 
production units (including state-owned) are classified in the private sector. The empirical 
results from these studies indicate a more negative public-private sector pay differentials. 
Other studies such as Flanagan (1995), Lehman and Wadsworth (2000), Brainerd 
(2002), Delteil, Pailh6 and Redor (2004) compare workers' earnings only in the 
commercial sphere i.e. between enterprises of different ownership types (state, state-joint 
stock companies, mixed, private new and privatised and foreign-owned). 
Earnings definition 
Many studies use monthly wages, arguing that the concept of a monthly wage is 
more appropriate for the labour market in transition economies because most workers are 
paid on a monthly basis (Adamchik and Bedi (2000), Adamchik, Hyclak and King (2003), 
Newell and Socha (2005». In addition, studies such as Delteil, Pailhe and Redor (2004), 
Telegdy (2006), Hamori (2007) simply did not have hours of work available in the data 
set. 
In this context, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) point that although the monthly 
wages may yield more accurate assessment of the wage structure, the private sector 
worker's premium may simply arise from longer working hours. Yet, Table 2.2 shows that 
the overall findings between monthly and hourly estimates are not materially altered (for 
example Newell and Socha (2005) and (2007». This is because the studies using monthly 
wages either control for monthly hours in an earnings equation and/or focus on full-time 
employees only. 
Moreover, most of the data sets from transition economies contain the information. 
only on after tax wages (before tax (Le. gross) wages are available only in Hungarian 
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Harmonised Wage Survey). Hence, the estimated sector pay gap by most of the studies 
does not account for differences in social contributions (such as health care insurance and 
pension). This tends to overestimate the negative public sector pay gap. 
Empirical studies also differ with respect to whether they include non-wage 
components into the earnings measurement (such as meal and travel allowances, subsidies, 
payments in-kind, bonuses etc.) or not. For example, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) point 
out that the Russian Labour Force Survey has information on benefit incidence but not on 
their value. This study argues that the private sector wage advantage may be a form of 
compensation for not providing workers with non wage benefits which are more likely in 
the public sector. 
Another difficulty in comparing wages across sectors and countries is the incidence 
of wage arrears. Some data surveys do not provide the information whether the worker 
failed to report earnings or did not receive the payment for the reference period. Moreover 
in transition economies it also may be the case that the worker received the payment with a 
delay but the data do not contain the information for which month and year hislher 
payment was received. Hence, the sector pay gap may be affected by wage arrears if they 
are not randomly distributed between sectors and across the wage distribution (Le. low-
wage earners more likely to be affected by wage arrears than high-wage earners). 
In this context, other sources of biases in cross sectional data should also be 
acknowledged when interpreting public-private sector pay gap estimates. A public sector 
pay effect may emerge simply due to the sampling procedure. For example, the data may 
be disproportionately collected from a predominantly formal sector or salaried (tax-
paying) . earners. Moreover, some surveys may only cover private sector employees 
working for employers above a certain size (as in Hamori (2007» in which case the public 
sector penalty may be overestimated due to the private sector wage-firm size effect. 
, , 
Measurement Error 
Finally, the estimated public-private sector pay differentials in studies that used 
self-reported microdata (all studies in Table 2.2 except Delteil, Pailhe and Redor (2004), 
Telegdy (2006) and Hamori (2007» may be biased due to a measurement error in public 
sector status. In her study on Russia Brainerd (2002) suggested that the measurement error 
is especially possible during economiC transition given the workers' confusion over the 
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employers' ownership status due to the speed with which the mass privatisations programs 
were implemented. 
(ii) Review of the Results from Empirical Literature on Transition Economies 
Having acknowledged the issues in public-private sector pay gap comparisons 
across transition economies the rest of the section presents the main findings of empirical 
studies from Eastern Europe. 
In general, studies using a dummy variable OLS approach find on average 20% 
public sector penalty at the beginning of economic transition. This penalty declined to 
about 10% in the mid-transition and approached zero by the end of economic transition 
(Flanagan (1995), Newell and Socha (1998), Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000), Newell 
(2001), Brainerd (2002) Adamchik, Hyclak and King (2003), Newell and Socha (2007), 
Hamori (2007». 
Using the 'double equation' OLS approach Newell and Socha (2005) find larger 
increases in the returns to all forms of post-primary education as well as to skilled white-
collar occupations (professional, managerial and technical) in the private sector than in the 
public sector from 1994 until 2002 in Poland. This study argued that this was a 
confirmation of greater and faster rising wage dispersion in the private than in the public 
sector. Similar findings are reported by other studies when using this method ( J o v i ~ i c , ,
Nojkovic and Paranos (2000) for Serbia, Brainerd (2002) for Russia, Telegdy (2006) and 
Hamori (2007) for Hungary). 
Consequently, studies applying a quantile regression approach find that the sector 
pay gap differs across the pay distribution. In particular, quantile regression studies 
suggest a greater pay compression in the public sector than in the private sector (Brainerd 
(2002) for Russia, Reilly (2003) for Serbia, Leping (2006) for Estonia, Newell and Socha 
(2007) for Poland, Hamori (2007) for Hungary). 
For example, at the beginning of economic transition in Russia, Brainerd (2002) 
reports 16% public sector penalty at the lower part of the earning distribution and 47% at 
top end in 1993. Leping (2006) provides evidence of an increasing public sector pay 
dispersion over the perioti of economic transition in Estonia. He finds a 23% publiC' sector 
penalty at the 10th percentile and a 76.8% at the 90th percentile in 1989. Ten years later, in 
1998, workers at the 10th percentile are found to enjoy 13% public sector premium 
whereas for those at the 90th percentile the penalty declined to 9.4%. For the same year, 
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1998, but for Poland, Newell'and Socha (2007) estimated a 3% public sector penalty at the 
loth percentile and a 10% public sector penalty at the 90th percentile. By the end of the 
economic transition, in 2002, the same study reports 8% public sector premium at the 
bottom and 6% penalty at the top of the pay distribution. 
In Hungary, the public sector earnings penalty across the male earnings distribution 
is estimated by Hamori (2007) to have increased until the mid-transition point and then 
declined by the end of economic transition. This decline is found to be more pronounced 
for workers at and below the median. Finally, for Serbia, Reilly (2003) suggested no 
settled pattern of public-private sector pay differential across the pay distribution for male 
workers over 1995-2000 period. 
Another strand of empirical literature attempted to correct for sector selection bias 
(Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland, Brainerd (2002) for Russia, Jovanovic and 
Lokshin (2003) for Serbia, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) for Moscow). These studies 
faced issues of weak or absent instruments. For example, as showed in the previous 
section, researchers in developed market economies usually use a worker's parental 
background (such as the labour market status, occupation or sector of employment of the 
parents) to correct for self-selection because these variables can be excluded from the 
wage equation. However, this data is typically not available in cross-sections from 
transition economies. Even if they were available one may argue that this data would not 
be of much use in the analysis. In particular, for the majority of workers in transition 
economies the institutional setting has changed so rapidly and fundamentally from the 
world in which their parents lived and worked (evidence will be presented in chapter 3). 
Nevertherless, some studies faced with the lack of instruments used variables 
whose effect is rather doubtful. Moreover, these variables are usually included with 
different specifications in both selection and the wage equation. For example, Adamchik 
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and Bedi (2000) argued that economic transition allowed younger individuals greater 
access to the private sector and lower entry costs. Hence, their switching regression model 
included education, age and dummy for individuals entering the post-1989 labour market 
as sector identification variables. This study found that those entering the post-l 989 labour 
market were more likely to work in the private sector but the coefficient on this indicator 
variable is statistically significant only for males. Adamchik and Bedi (2000) found 
positive selection of males into the private sector and negative in the public sector. They 
estimated that public sector wages were 7% and 10% lower than in the private sector for 
so 
men and women, respectively, in Poland in 1996. However, the lack of better identifying 
instruments and the change of signs in sensitivity analysis call for caution in interpreting 
selection effects. 
Furthennore, using Serbian data for 2000, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) argued 
that marital status and the number of jobholders in the household might account for the 
importance of a secure job and associated benefits if the fonnal and infonnal sectors co-
exist. Yet, the number of jobholders in the household is found to have a significant and 
positive effect on private sector choice of females but it did not affect the employment 
choice of males. Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) found positive selection of females into the 
private sector and negative in the public sector. The authors reported on average public 
sector penalty of9.4% for men and 4% for women in 2000. 
Finally, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) using data for Moscow in 1997 had at their 
disposal a better instrument. In particular, they used a worker's industry of employment in 
1991 (Le. before the start of the economic reform in 1992) as identification of the sector 
choice. Marital status and number of children in the household are also added into a 
selection equation. Employment prior to economic refonn in all industries, except health 
and education, is found to have a positive effect on the probability of employment in the 
private sector. Rather surprising and opposed to arguments in Adamchik and Bedi (2000) 
and Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003), Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) found that younger 
workers who were not in the labour force prior to economic refonns in 1991 were less 
likely to work in the private sector. 
Overall, estimates showed that the private sector paid 14.3% more for men and 
18.3% more for women than the public sector in 1997. The larger wage gap between the 
public and private sector for women is argued to indicate the greater importance of sector-
specific non-wage benefits for a women's choice of a sector. Moreover, workers with a 
I • 
university education are found to earn a private sector premium of 44% for males (which is 
more than double in Poland based on estimates using the same method reported in 
Adamc!1ik and Bedi, 2000) and 22% for females. 
Therefore, the studies that corrected for sector selection indicated that the public 
• sector penalties may be lower than those estimated by treating the sector selection as 
exogenous. This implies that workers in the public sector may have a lower unobserved 
earning potential than workers in the private sector. However, apart from the lack of good 
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instruments the main weakness of these studies is that they focus on a single year estimates 
rather than considering a period of economic transition as a whole. 
2.3.3 Summary of Empirical Evidence 
This section summarised the empirical evidence from developed market economies 
and transition economies. Two main points can be pinned down. 
First, the literature review showed that the estimated public sector pay effect differs 
in sign between market and transition economies. In particular, whereas in developed 
market economies a public sector pay gap is found to range from positive to zero, in 
countries of economic transition it is mainly negative but becomes to zero by the end of 
economic transition. 
Second, the public sector pay effect differs across the pay distribution. It is more 
negative (or less positive) among high earners than among low earners. This suggests that 
public sector pay is more compressed than private sector pay. This largely holds for both 
transition and market economies. Studies that analysed the effects of privatisations provide 
some evidence of increasing public sector pay distribution towards that of the private 
sector pay inequality. This is an important result for modelling public sector pay 
determination in the next chapter. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter provided broad explanations for differences in pay between public and 
private sector workers. Non-exhaustive answers related to compositional differences, 
worker selection and incentives, objectives and constraints, and market power (either of 
workers or employers) are the most quoted reasons for public-private sector earnings 
di fferentials. 
Much of the same arguments can be applied to transition economies. Nevertheless, 
there are also some additional reasons frequently used to explain why in general the 
private sector was found to pay more than the public sector for similar work during the 
economic transition. These arguments take into account the risk premia for first movers to 
emerging sectors, efficiency wages for harder effort in new jobs, compensating 
differentials for fewer non-wage benefits and reduced job security. Overall, a competition 
for workers seems to be a major argument. 
S2 
Although the theoretical literature reviewed in this chapter did not primarily focus 
only on public-private sector wage differentials, it provided a useful perception of public 
sector pay determination. Theoretical models suggest that public sector pay and 
employment preferences will depend upon the budget available and objective assumptions 
Le. whether the public sector chooses to maximise social welfare or the personal objectives 
of politicians and bureaucrats or whether there are unions engaged in cooperative or non-
cooperative bargaining. In transition economies the effect of privatisations on wages paid 
by privatised firms is suggested to depend on the type of owners: outsiders or insiders. On 
the other hand, the emerging private sector pay strategy to pull workers away from public 
sector jobs may depend on initial endowments of high-productivity workers and the public 
sector lay-off rate. 
The chapter also surveyed empirical literature on public-private sector pay 
differentials. The issues raised showed that these effects are not easy to estimate. In 
particular, common problems facing researchers in this area include data limitations, 
measurement error, sampling bias, selection issues and omitted yariables. The public 
sector pay effects proved sensitive to the empirical method, time period, country and 
sample selected. In general, the main results suggested by empirical literature on 
developed and transition economies are outlined as follows. 
First, whereas in developed market economies a public sector pay gap is found to 
range from positive to zero, in countries of economic transition it is mainly negative but 
grows to zero by the end of economic transition. Second, public ~ e c t o r r pay compression is 
a common feature to both market and transition economies. Third, most of the empirical 
studies from transition economies faced a limited choice of instruments in data available 
and inconsistency of instruments used in different specifications in the switching equation. 
Finally, the fact that a negative public sector pay effect is estimated across all 
, 
surveyed countries in transition indicates that the intrinsic public sector pay determination 
may be an important underlying factor for public-private sector pay differentials in a 
transition economy. Moreover, the empirical results showed evolution of estimated public-
private sector pay differentials over the course of economic transition towards estimates 
obtained in developed m a r k e ~ ~ economies (Le. decline in the public sector pay penalty apd 
increase in the public sector pay inequality). This further reinforces the argument about the 
changes in the public sector pay determination over the course of economic transition. 
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Although there are an expanding number of empirical studies over the last two 
decades in both developed and transitional economies, the literature is rather deficient in 
the theoretical analysis of the implications of different pay-setting arrangements between 
private and public sectors particularly of the consequences for pay of economic reforms. 
This may be because the transition process is complex and hence not easy to model. In 
particular, during the economic transition some workers were transferred from the public 
to private sector simply due to privatisation, but some other workers changed sector 
voluntarily. At the same time, workers who remained in the public sector also experienced 
changes in their wages as public sector pay determination altered due to the workers' 
enhanced private sector options. Moreover, employment alternatives differed across 
workers with different skills and abilities and hence the changes in available options were 
not uniform along the pay distribution. 
Indeed, a single model that considered labour supply during economic transition by 
Boeri (1998) showed that different pay for similar workers may emerge as a result of 
private sector pay strategies to 'poach' workers away from public sector jobs. Yet, this 
model does not consider changes in the public sector pay distribution during the economic 
transition. The next chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature. It provides a 
theoretical framework of public sector pay determination to examine the effects of 
economic transition on public sector pay-setting and its labour market consequences. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Public-Private Sector \Vage Differentials in a Transition 
Economy: The Role of Monopsony 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical model to underpin changes in wage inequality 
over the period of economic transition. These changes are closely related to public sector 
restructuring and its effects on the labour market. Differences in pay-setting arrangements 
across the public sector and the emerging private sector during the process of economic 
transition are argued to cause systematic trends in sector wage differentials. 
One implication of this process of transition is that, over time, wage differentials 
may evolve in a manner that is unrelated to productivity differentials. This chapter argues 
that this may arise from changes in the degree of market power of employers during the 
transition - in particular changes in the degree of public sector monopsony power in the 
labour market. The argument is followed through three stages of economic restructuring: 
pre-transition, transition and post-transition, in the context of Eastern European economies. 
Empirical evidence in the chapter and elsewhere in this thesis indeed confirms that 
different sectors pay similar workers different wages over the period of economic 
transition. We hypothesise that employer market power is one reason for these changing 
differentials. 
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. The chapter is organised as follows. Since the source of wage differentials may be 
employer-market power, the section 3.2 sets out the standard private sector monopsonist 
model to describe a monopsonistic employer's wage-setting behaviour. The next section 
3.3 documents evidence of wage-setting mechanisms by public sector employers which 
demonstrates that they, too, may exploit market power in setting wages. However, whereas 
the private sector monopsony model derives from profit-maximising behaviour by an 
employer facing an upward sloping supply curve of labour, an alternative model is needed 
for a public sector employer with some degree of monopsony power, arising from the 
public sector manager facing an exogenous budget constraint and an upward sloping 
supply curve of labour. Such a model is described in the section 3.4 of the chapter. Some 
conclusions are then drawn for the ensuing analysis of public-private wage differentials, 
and wage dispersion, over the course of economic transition. These are illustrated with 
data from transition economies in section 3.5. 
3.2 The Private Monopsony Model 
3.2.1 Theoretical Background 
In every textbook on labour economics, the perfectly competitive labour market is 
explained as the market where each worker chooses the employment that offers the 
maximum utility across all possible job opportunities. Wage differences across workers 
reflect only variation in individual worker productivity and differences in the nonpecuniary 
attributes of the jobs held. Mortensen (2003) questions the efficacy of the standard 
perfectly competitive model as the accepted mechanism of wage determination, pointing 
out that observable worker characteristics, which are supposed to account for productivity 
differences, typically explain no more that 30 percent of the variation in compensation 
across workers. Mortensen (1990) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) offer the alternative 
proposition that imperfect competition is a necessary explanation for the distribution of 
pay and they formulate a model of the labour market as a non-cooperative price setting 
game played in a market characterised by search friction. Mortensen (2003) and Manning 
(2003), building on Burdett and Mortensen (1998), demonstrate that dispersion in wage 
• 
offers is an equilibrium outcome of imperfect wage competition even when all workers 
and employers are identical. 
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These models assume that the typical emp10yer in an unorganised labour market 
has some degree of monopsony power in the sense that it can set its own wage policy even 
when many competitors populate the market. Therefore, this power is classified as 
monopsony not in the sense of a single buyer of labour services but rather in the sense that 
each finn faces an upward sloping supply curve given the wages paid by competitors. 
These models posit the existence of an equilibrium wage dispersion given that the supply 
of labour to the firm is a function of its position in the wage distribution. Although this 
chapter considers public rather than private sector monopsony,· it is worth spelling out the 
traditional model of monopsony by a profit maximising employer before considering the 
public sector case. 
3.2.2 Monopsony Model 
In the static partial equilibrium model of monopsony presented in Manning (2003) 
and in several textbooks of labour economics (for example in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2004) the finn is assumed to face an inverse labour supply curve, w(E) , that relates the 
wage paid, w, to the level of employment, E. Firm wants to choose E to maximise its 
profit taking the labour supply function as given. FonnaIly, the profit maximisation 
problem of the monopsonist finn is written as: 
Max7r = Y(E) - w(E)E (3.1) 
where 7r is profit, Y(E) is a revenue function and w(E)E are total labour costs (i.e. wage 
bill). The first order condition of (3.1) with respect to E is: 
Y'(E) = weE) + w'(E)E where w'(E) > 0 (3.2) 
The left hand side of the equation (3.2) is the marginal revenue product of labour and the 
right hand side is the marginal cost of labour (Le. the wage that must be paid to the new 
worker hired and the increase in wages that must be paid to all existing workers). In this 
. . 
case equation (3.2) implies that the wage paid to the each worker is less than his or her 
marginal revenue product, because of the extra term w'(E)E. 
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Since the elasticity of the labour supply curve is: SEw = wE'(w)/ E(w) ~ ~ 0, from 
(3.2) we can derive the relationship between wage, w, and marginal revenue product, Y', 
as following: 
Y'-w 1 
--=- (3.3) 
W EEw 
where Y' is the marginal revenue product, w is the wage and SEw is the elasticity of the 
labour supply. 
Therefore, the proportional gap between the wage and the marginal revenue 
product is a function of the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing the firm. The less 
elastic the labour supply curve to the employer, the more market power the employer 
possesses and thus the greater the difference between the wage paid and the marginal 
revenue product. The reverse also holds: the greater the ability of workers to move from 
employer to employer, the more elastic the labour supply curve and faster that wages will 
be driven towards the marginal product by worker mobility. Hence, monopsony power can 
be measured by ratio Y' . It decreases with the elasticity of the labour supply. 
w 
Perfect competition corresponds to the case when the inverse of the labour supply 
elasticity is zero, 11 EEw = O. This means that the elasticity of labour supply approaches 
infinity, S Ew ~ ~ C1J • In this case the wage, which we can denote as w * , is independent of 
the level of employment, which can be denoted as E *, and thus equal to the marginal 
revenue product, because the profit maximisation problem is given by: 
Maxn = Y(E*) - w * E * => Foe: Y'(E*) = w * . 
The monopsony model is presented in Figure 3.1. It is assumed that each employee 
produces an exogenous quantity of Y' of output. The iso-profit curve is given in a form: 
. 
new) = EJ(w)(Y'-w) with the labour supply curve, EJ(w), as a tangent, determining its 
maximum and therefore giving the equilibrium wage and employment. The wage chosen 
by the monopsonist, denoted as wm , is lower than perfectly competitive wage, w* = Y': . 
E E 
wm = Ew Y' because 0 ~ ~ Ew ~ ~ 1 
l+E& ' l+E& 
(3.4) 
where SEw is the elasticity of labour supply, Y' is the marginal revenue product of labour 
(equal to perfectly competitive wage w *) and wm is the monopsony wage. The 
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· monopsony wage, wm and the competitive wage, w* = Y', will be equal only if the 
elasticity of labour supply to the employer is infinitely elastic, C Ew ~ ~ 00. Thus, a profit 
maximising monopsonist exerts negative pressure on both the wage and employment. 
When G Ew < 00 the profit maximising monopsonist obtains a strictly positive profit: 
rr(wm) = Y'E (wm)/(l + cEw ), whereas in a perfectly competitive market, when 11 GEw = 0, 
this profit is zero. 
As noted by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) if the labour supply is inelastic, a 
monopsonist has the opportunity to reduce wages to maximise profit. Because monopsony 
wage differs from marginal revenue product of labour (wm '# Y'), then differences in 
monopsony power of employers may lead otherwise identical workers to be paid different 
wages. 
Figure 3.1: The profit maximising monopsony model 
Employment (E) 
E"{ 
",ES(w) 
Labour supply curve 
.r-------" 
I = = - - ~ / / /
w=Y' 
Competitive wage 
//' 
Wage rate (w) 
Private sector monopsony in the traditional, static, sense is generally held to be a 
rarity (see the survey paper by Boal and Ransom, 1997). In particular, it seems unlikely to 
be of,great importance in economic transition because the emerging private sector is more 
likely to operate under the competitive than under monopsony market structure. However, 
public s e c t ~ r r monopsony power may be more important to u n d e r s t a n ~ ~ wage differentials 
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in transition. In order to justify this argument we discuss the institut'ional background of 
transitional economies in the next section. 
3.3 Qualitative Evidence of Monopsony: Wage-Setting in Eastern 
European Countries 
Intrisically, the public sector has monopsony power in buying certain kinds of 
labour. This fact may be especially important in the era of central planning where 
countervailing power (such as independent trade unions) was weak and where the public 
sector was officially the only existing sector of employment. Examples of the pre-
transition public sector dominance in employment in the countries of Eastern Europe is 
presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Public sector employment as a proportion of the labour force, 1988 
(percent) 
Country Share 
Socialist average 90.0 
Czechoslovakia 98.8 
U.S.S.R. 96.3 
Romania 95.2 
German Democratic Republic 94.7 
Hungary 93.9 
Bulgaria 91.5 
Yugoslavia 78.9 
Poland 70.4 
OEeD average 21.2 
Notes to Table 3.1: all averages are unweighted. Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, 1989; German 
Democratic Republic, 1987. The public sector includes the government, social services run by the state 
(health and education) and state-owned enterprises, including agricultural cooperatives (kolkhozes in 
U.S.S.R.). OECD data from the late 1970s and mid-1980s. 
Source: Milanovic (1998) 
It can be observed from Table 3.1 that, during the period of central planning in 
, , 
CEE countries, nearly all employment was in the public sector. At the same time, and in 
contrast, average public sector employment for OECD countries was one fifth of total 
employment. 
The numbers in Table 3.1 for socialist countries should be treated with caution. 
Mencinger (1983) points that, since it was extremely difficult to dismiss a worker once 
. 
employed, a certain amount of disguised unemployment may be found among those 
formally employed in the public sector. For example, he estimated that around one-fifth of 
the social sector employees in Yugoslavia represented hidden unemployment. Moreover, 
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in Yugoslavia the remaining employment resided I in private agriculture4 offering 
employment as a last resort for mainly unskilled labour. These peasants largely opted to 
move into temporary employment abroad. For example, Primorac and Babic (1989) 
explain that the employment maximisaton objective of the public sector implied that the 
surplus labour in agriculture had to be provided with productive jobs elsewhere. In the 
Yugoslav case this goal was achieved together with more than 700,000 workers finding 
employment abroad (on average during 1965-1984) and nearly half of these were recruited 
from the·private agricultural sector. 
The empirical literature argues that the pre-transition labour markets'in the CEE 
economies shared two similar features: (1) over-employment and (2) egalitarian wage 
structure. We argue that this second characteristic at least, may be explained, in part, as the 
outcome of the public sector exerting monopsony power to control wages of certain types 
of labour. In order to confirm this subsegment argument by qualitative evidence, we 
proceed with a review of the empirical evidence on pre-transition wage determination. 
First, the absence of competitive wage determination can be documented. Wages 
were set centrally and were not directly linked to enterprise performance during the period 
of central planning. Koll6 (1998) explains that, in the short run, firms under central 
planning, instead of profit maximisation, had an incentive to continuously bargain for cash 
budgets to increase employment that was compatible with revenues. Although Krstic and 
Reilly (2003) state that, in contrast to most centrally planned economies, the Yugoslav so-
called 'self-management' model was more reliant on market forces, with worker incomes 
partly linked to enterprise performance, nevertheless, even in this more decentralised 
system, the workers' role in setting individual wages within the firm was strictly limited by 
the boundaries determined by the government. In order to even out differences in pay 
among firms, the government fixed the firm's wage bill at a rate which was called a 
, , 
"socially warranted" wage bill (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003). Thus, competitive 
forces in pre-transition Yugoslavia were extremely limited and the standard communist 
mechanism of enterprise bargaining with central government to maximise cash limits in 
order to increase employment remained. 
4 Primorac and Babic (1989) report that private employment in agriculture in 1980 was 91% of total 
agricultural employment. 
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Vodopivec (1993) provides details of wage determination in the 1970s and the 
1980s in Yugoslavia during the system of 'contractual socialism'. He argues that workers 
actually had little say in the determination of their earnings. He points out that despite the 
proclaimed autonomy of workers, political elites set workers' earnings with the goal of 
massive inter-firm income redistribution in order to avoid consequences of large wage 
differentials such as social unrest and layoffs. The study finds that the personal earnings in 
Yugoslavia followed the same pattern of compression as that in other Central and Eastern 
European socialist economies, as shown by Table 3.2. Although Table 3.2 suggests a 
rather more uneven income distribution in Yugoslavia than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
this was due to the existence of greater inter-regional differences within the Yugoslav 
federation. 
Table 3.2: Comparison of earnings distribution (Gini coefficient) 
Gini Coefficient 
Yugoslavia 
Slovenia 1 
Eastern Europe 
Czechoslovakia 
Hungary 
Poland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
26.8 
22 
19.9 
25.6 
19.7 
33 
34 
Note to Table 3.2: Data refer to net earnings in the public sector for 1989 (for Hungary, 1988) for CEE 
countries and for UK and US Gini coefficient is after ta.xes and transfers in the mid 80s. 1 Slovenia was part 
of the Yugoslavia before 1990. 
Source: Vodopivec (1993) for Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe and http://stats.oecd.org for UK and USA 
Vodopivec (1993) explains how this egalitarian distribution of earnings across 
firms was implemented by directly controlling the wage-bills of enterprises. The 
,methodology for determining the "socially warranted" p e r ~ o n a l l earnings fund of the firm, 
based on Yugoslavia's example, consisted in a determination of an index of the firm's 
relative business success. This index was computed by comparing the firm's actual income 
with the prescribed norm which· was internally calculated by applying the norm for 
personal earnings per worker and the norm for capital accumulation rate to the number of 
workers of the firm and the capital of the firm, respectively. He describes how thest} norms 
were assessed by a special body representing the Republic's government and other 
political and economic agents .. This index was then converted into the "correction factor" .. 
The main purpose of the correction factor was to dampen the index of business success for 
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the above-average firms and'to raise the index for the below-average firms. Therefore, the 
essence of the earnings policy, embodied in the socially warranted personal earnings fund, 
was intended to level the earnings across firms of comparable size and occupational 
structure. The supplementary levelling of earnings among enterprises was achieved 
through soft budget constraints and numerous channels for income redistribution called 
"inter-firm redistribution" (Vodopivec, 1993). 
Furthermore, the pay equalising mechanism was based upon managers' incentives 
to increase employment coupled with political constraints and prohibitive taxes on wage 
increases (Kallo (1998), Flanagan (1995)). Consequently, the risk that some firms set 
wages high above the industry average or lag behind substantially, was actually rather 
small (Kollo, 1998). Moreover, in the so called 'non-productive' spheres such as civil 
service, education, health and administration, traditionally, remuneration levels were based 
on the average wage in the 'productive' enterprise sector (Jovanovic and Lokshin, 2003). 
These examples illustrate that individual wages bore little relation to differences in 
the underlying marginal products of labour. Consequently, centrally determined wage 
grids with minimum and maximum wages (with the latter being a pre-determined mUltiple 
of the latter) created one of the most egalitarian distributions of the income in the world 
(Rutkowski, 1996). 
Furthermore, although wage levels in CEE countries were kept low, the quit rates 
were severely circumscribed by housing shortages (Flanagan, 1995). Labour unions in 
centrally planned economies had no bargaining role and according to Flanagan (1995), 
their main function was to challenge dismissals. This rigid system created over-
employment which is usually called 'hidden' unemployment since the reality of open 
unemployment was not permitted. Firms were restricted in the use and allocation of labour, 
being forced to hire and ensure job security .for every worker. Moreover, there were heavy 
restrictions on part time and fixed term work. The consequence was increased employment 
and falling real wages during the pre-transition period as illustrated by Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: Wage and employment trends during the pre-transition Serbia, 1980-1988 
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Notes to Figure 3.2: Employment and Real Net Wage Index, 1980=100, calculated from the annual average 
of all employed. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Serbia, 1998, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade 
However, under the system of central planning that paid low wages and absorbed 
redundant labour, the importance of non-wage benefits such as health, vacation, housing, 
child care, transport and meal allowances etc. was high (Nunberg, 1999). Estrin (1994) 
records significant role of social welfare provided by enterprises which, for example, in 
Czechoslovakia, amounted to around 5 percent of the total wage bill. 
The structure of wage setting inherited from central planning strongly influenced 
the pay determination process at the start of the economic transition. Compared with other 
fields, relatively little changed in terms of control of wages (K5Ilo, 1998). A link between 
wages, the state budget and money supply remained particularly strong. Lane (1992) 
surveys various wage policies ,that were utilised at the beginning of the economic transitio.n 
such as: a specific wage constraint, a ceiling on the enterprise wage bill, a ceiling on the 
average wage, a wage bill ceiling with adjustment for output, a wage bill ceiling with 
adjustment for value added and adjustments for profits. The wage controls entailed rigidity 
in wages in state enterprises but most of the studies stress their necessity in the absence of 
strong profit motives and the fact that these enterprises were encouraged to emphasise 
employment over productivity (for example Corricelli and Revenga (1992), Allison and 
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Ringold (1996)). Lane (1992) explains that the main rational for these controls was a 
weakness in the governance of state enterprises pending privatisation.s 
Flanagan (1995) discussed the negative consequences of tax-based incomes 
policies which were adopted in Eastern Europe. He explains that a policy that targeted the 
average wage penalised companies that downsized to shed their least efficient workers or 
those that expanded to hire highly skilled workers, which further compressesed the public 
sector wage structure. For that reason, he advocated policies that targeted the enterprise 
wage bill, allowing for downsizing that could be accompanied by an increase in average 
wage to attract and retain skilled workers. 
The wage setting mechanism in sectors under direct supervision of the government, 
public and civil services in transition economies, was founded on a fixed base wage with 
wage scales, obtained by a multiplication of the base with appropriate coefficients, varied 
by educational attainment, seniority, working conditions and level of responsibility 
(Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003). Nunberg (1999) argued that highly structured wages 
in the public sector provided intricate schemes of salary and benefit incentives. The belief 
is that this had crucial implications for the government's ability to hire and retain well-
qualified employees. 
Summarising this evidence: even in 'decentralised' Yugoslavia, central 
management of pay structure was strong, with a tendency towards compression of pay 
differentials, low and falling real wages in the face of a growing labour force and limited 
scope for enterprise pay flexibility, especially in relation to skilled workers. 
, Some of the same arguments have been applied by Leslie (1985) in discussion on the impact of cash 
constraints on public employment and wages in the United Kingdom. But there was no attempt in the United 
Kingdom to influence wage levels directly by cash limits, merely to control wage bills. The 'Review Body' 
system is used to administer wage levels in major parts of the public sector in the United Kingdom. 
· 3.4 The Public Monopsony Model 
3.4.1 The l'rfodel 
In this section we layout a public sector monopsony model that can allow us to 
observe the distributional outcomes of public sector restructuring on wages and 
employment during economic transition. Our hypothesis is that the pay compression 
associated with public sector wage determination in a pretransition economy would decline 
alongside the decline in public sector monopsony power· over the course of economic 
transition. 
As mentioned in section 3.2, because the public sector is the sole purchaser of 
labour it has a degree of monopsony power, which can be exploited according to the 
varying elasticities of supply of different types of workers. However, unlike in the private 
sector monopsony model, the public sector's objective function is not to maximise profit 
but to hire labour until its available budget is exhausted, assuming each sector faces a hard 
budget constraint. Hence, we assume that during central planning the objection function of 
the public sector is output maximisation subject to a budget constraint. This is equivalent 
to maximising total output where profit (or surplus) is zero. We also assume that workers 
have no bargain power (no right to strike etc.) and that the government budget constraint is 
given exogenously by the level of total tax revenues that determine the total wage bill. 
Thus, the budget constraint is defined as the total wage bill wE. 
Now, we assume that the public employer can choose any combination of wage, 
w, and employment, E, to satisfy this constraint. This can be represented in the Figure 
3.3 by the rectangular hyperbola, wE. This inverse relation between employment and 
wage rate, representing the labour demand function in the public sector, is also used by 
Leslie (1985) to describe the union wage-employment combination given by the wage bill 
fixed by the available public budget (Le. so-called 'cash limit'). In our model the public 
sector is an output maximiser that faces two constraints: first the budget constraint and 
second the labour supply curve. 
Each worker of a particular type has a constant marginal revenue product presented 
in the Figure 3.3 as Y'. As in'the private monopsony case, the labour supply curve E S ( ~ ) )
for this type of worker is a function of the wage rate, w. This wage rate can be set b e l o ~ ~
marginal revenue product, Y', depending on the labour supply elasticity, e Ew' Hence, 
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when SEw is some constant number (i.e. SEw < 00), the public sector has some monopsony 
Y'-w 1 power such that --= - > O. 
W EEw 
The intersection of the labour supply curve, £'(w) and labour demand curve, wE 
determines the equilibrium wage-employment combination for the public sector employer 
of this type. This is because we assume no discrimination in the wage between workers 
and that the public sector is maximising employment, rather than profit as in the private 
case. Thus at point B, the total budget wE is exhausted and the public sector is exploiting 
its monopsony power to employ Em of workers at wage wm rather than E· of workers at 
the competitive wage W·. 
Figure 3.3: The public sector monopsony model 
Employment ( E ) 
E1 
E* 
Government bud,_t constraint: 
fixld WO,. bill 
.,-- wE 
E'(w) 
: Competttivesolution 
!OmPltltlVI WO,. 
w'" w· = Y' Wage rate( w ) 
3.4.2 Characteristics of the equilibrium with two kinds of labour 
, 
To understand the implications of this model for wage and employment inequality, 
we now extend this simple model to a case where there are two types of labour, skilled and 
unskilled. If these types of labour have different labour supply elasticities, Es and Ell' 
respectively, this will have implications for the skill premium and for the inequality of pay. 
There ar.e two labour markets corresponding to skilled labour, Ls and unskilled 
labour, LN' Assume that there are the following 'states' in the labour market: Es denoting 
employment of ~ k i l l e d d labour, Us denoting unemployment of skilled labour, Ell denoting 
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employment of unskilled labour and U II denoting unemployment of unskilled labour. Then 
the labour force can be expressed in the following way: 
U 
L. = E. +U. => E. = Ls(l-us )' u. =-' L. 
U 
LII = Ell + UII => Ell = LII (1- uII ), u" =_u LII 
where Us and Uu are the rates of unemployment of skilled and unskilled labour, 
respectively. The model is going to solve optimal levels of employment by public sector 
employer, E. and Ell with no presumption that all workers are thereby employed6• The 
wage of employed skilled labour is denoted by w. and of unskilled labour by Wu • 
The public sector objective function is to maximise employment and therefore 
output as a function of two worker types, such as to exhaust the exogenous budget 
constraint: 
(3.5) 
s.t. wE = w.E. + WilE" 
where wE is the exogenous budget constraint (i.e. fixed wage bill) and w. and Wu are 
wages of employed skilled, E. and unskilled labour Eu ' respectively. The central planner 
chooses the highest possible levels of employment of skilled and unskilled labour that are 
affordable. 
The solution of the problem of output maximisation subject to a budget constraint 
allow us, with the help of a particular form of the production function, to obtain 
I 
conditional demand functions for the two types of labour in explicit form. When we take 
into consideration no more than two different types of labour, skilled and unskilled and 
assume that inputs to the public sector are wholly labour services, the production function, 
6 We therefore abstract from the issue that, in economies where there is ten "open" unemployment, there may 
also be "hidden" or "disguised" unemployment of various forms. The model here is intended to address pay 
compression, not the general reduction in wages arising from oversupply. 
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Y = f(Es,Eu ) can utilise the Cobb-Douglas production function' with constant returns to 
scale (Cobb and Douglas, 1928)7 in the following form: 
(3.6) 
where a is the elasticity of output with respect to skilled labour when unskilled labour is 
held constant: a = ay Es and (1- a) is the elasticity of output with respect to unskilled 
aEs Y 
. ME . 
labour when skilled labour is held constant: (I-a) = __ u. Therefore, a and 
aE,. Y 
(1- a) represent approximately the percentage change in output relative to the percentage 
change in skilled and unskilled labour, respectively. One of the reasons why the Cobb-
Douglas production function is popular is that these elasticities are constant. In the case of 
Cobb-Douglas technology, the elasticity of substitution between Es and E,. is defined as: 
dln( Es) dIne 
a= Eu =--=1 
d In( WU) dIn.!. 
(3.7) 
Ws co 
W 
where the relative wage of skilled workers is expressed by _s = co and the relative 
w,. 
employment of skilled workers is expressed by Es = e . 
Ell 
From (3.7) it follows that: 
de dro 
e ro 
(3.8) -=--
which shows the slope of demand function with unit elasticity of demand. 
The central planner chooses the highest possible levels of employment of skilled 
and unskilled labour that are affordable. Given that the central planner trades wages for 
employment (Le. the lower the wages the greater the employment and output), its market 
• 
7 This is a version of Cobb-Douglas function Y = AE/Ja E,. sp for A = 1, /} = 1 where A is technological 
progress and [} is the degree of homogeneity of the production function. When a + f3 = 1 the production 
function has constant returns to scale. 
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power is given by the elasticity of the labour supply· of each type of labour. Therefore, for 
each type of labour there are two possible solutions of the model: (1) 'Competitive 
Solution' when the central planner has no market power and takes the wages as given by 
the marginal revenue product (point C in Figure 3.3) and (2) 'Monopsony Solution' when 
central planner has monopsony power and can cut wages below marginal revenue product 
depending on the labour supply elasticity (point B in Figure 3.3). 
(i) The Competitive Solution 
The 'Competitive Solution' of the model requires that the wage of each worker 
type is independent of the level of employment: w' (E) = dw. = 0 and 
$ $ dE 
$ 
w'" (Eu) = :u = 0 . Hence, the wage of each worker type is exogenously given and equal 
II 
to marginal revenue product of a worker of each type: 
Y'= d ~ ~ =W Y'= d ~ ~ =W 
$ dE J'. dE II 
. " 
(3.9) 
If the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers is denoted by r = fl. , from 
f' II 
(3.9) it follows that r = OJ and we express the relative wage of skilled workers under 
competitive case by: 
(3.10) 
To bencHmark the monopsony case, consider first the determination of ratios r = w. and 
w" 
e = Es under the 'Competitive Solution'. Here, the labour supply elasticities of skilled and 
Eu 
unskilled workers approach infinity and hence, the public sector has no monopsony power. 
This can be expressed in the following form: 
f'.-w, = ~ ~ = o and Y'U-WII =_1 = 0 
w. 
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given the labour supply elasticity of each worker type: 8 E .. = wE'(w)! E(w). 
The optimization problem given by (3.5) can be solved as: 
(3.11) 
This leads to the first-order conditions with respect to E. and Ey 8: 
w = aEa - 1 E I- a = Y' 
• • u • (3.12) 
(3.13) 
The zero profit condition given by: 
(3.14) 
can be written as: Y = wE . 
The ratio of (3.12) to (3.13) is the relative wage of skilled labour which under competitive 
case equals relative marginal revenue product of skilled labour, r, and is given by: 
(3.15) 
The (3.15) can be re-written in the following form: 
a w.E. _ Y'. E. 
--=-----
I-a wuEu Y'u Eu 
(3.16) 
so that we can express the employment levels of skilled and unskilled labour given by: 
8 of =aE-1+aE I- a _w =0 and af =(l-a)EaE-a-w =0 
aE • u, oE • u u 
• u 
a
2 
f = (-1 + a )aE-,2+a E I- a < 0 and a
2 
f = -(1- a )aEa E-1- a < 0 and 
aE 2 • y oE 2 • u 
s u 
0
2 
f = aE-1+a (l--a)E-a > o. 
aE aE' u-
s u 
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and obtain the relative employment of skilled labour, e: 
E. a Y'u a 1 
e=--=----=---
E l-aY' I-ar 
" . 
(3.17) 
It is easy to verify that the technical rate of substitution between unskilled and skilled 
workers is equal to the ratio of the costs of skilled and unskilled workers. The equalities 
given in formula (3.15) show that ratio of unskilled and skilled workers Eu is proportional 
E. 
to the ratio w, . Since by definition the elasticity of substitution, (j, between unskilled 
w" 
and skilled workers measures precisely the elasticity of the ratio Eu with respect to 
E. 
relative cost w, we will have (j = I. This implies that technological progress has no 
w" 
effect on relative input demand. Moreover, the relation w. = ~ ~ Eu implies that the 
w" I-a E. 
share s of skilled workers in the total cost is simply equal to parameter a . This means 
that: 
w,E. w,E. 
a= = ~ ~
w.E. + w"E" wE 
(3.18) 
The final expression of the steady state conditional demand for skilled and 
unskilled labour can be deduced from relations (3.6) and (3.15). After standard 
transformations we get final expressions for steady state level of employment for skilled 
and unskilled labour: 9 
9 The steady state level of employment for skiJIed labour E. is obtained in the following way: express Ell 
I 
I - -a Y' a E 
from formula (3.6): f=E.aEu -a ~ ~ Ell =f'-aE.'-a and from forn1ula(3.1S): _' = ____ u
fl" I-a E. 
(I-a) Y' . ~ ~ E" == , y.-' E •. Since these two solutIons are equal we express E. and get(3.19). 
a " 
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E. _ [' a Y'u ],-a Y and 
(I-a) Y'. 
E =[(I-a) y,.]a y 
" Y' a II 
(ii) The Monopsony Solution 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
The 'Monopsony Solution' describes the situation when the wage of each worker 
type is a function of its level of employment (Le. dependent on employment). In this case, 
for each worker type, labour supply elasticity, e Ew' is some constant number (i.e. 
EEw < 00), and differs across skills. Hence, the public sector has monopsony power insofar 
as f' - w = _1_ > O. The intersection of the labour supply curve, E(w) and the labour 
w EEw 
demand curve, wE determines the equilibrium wage-employment combination for the 
public sector monopsony. Since public sector monopsony can reduce the wage of each 
worker type below its marginal revenue product, the public sector can hire more workers, 
given the fixed total wage bill and zero profit condition. 
In textbook labour economics, the overall elasticity of supply for unskilled workers 
is usually held to be greater than the elasticity of supply for skilled workers, e. < e". The 
extent of public sector monopsony power depends on the elasticity of the labour supply of 
each worker type. The less elastic labour supply, the lower the wage and the more workers 
can be employed for the given budget constraint. Hence, e. < ell implies greater public 
sector monopsony power over skilled workers. 
To show the relationship between monopsony power and the labour supply 
, . 
elasticity we consider the skilled worker type, in the case when the wage of skilled 
The steady state level of employment for unskilled labour E" is obtained in the following way: express E. 
, 
- ~ ~ Y' aE 
from formula (3.6): f = E. a E/-a => E. = ya Ell a and from formula (3.15): _. = ____ u
f'll l-aEs 
a Y' 
=> Es = I-a Y''' Ell' Since these two solutions are equal Vie exp,ress Ell and get (3.20) . 
• 
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workers is a function of their level of employment: ~ ' . . (E.) = dw. > O. It follows that in 
dEs 
this case, the labour supply elasticity of the skilled workers is not infinite but a constant 
wE' (w) 
number: 0 < E. = s • • < <x). Furthermore, it follows that: 
E.(ws ) 
Y'.-w. = J.. > 0 (3.21) 
W, E, 
Thus, the public sector has monopsony power over skilled workers when 0 < E. < <x). 
From (3.21) the wage of skilled workers can be expressed as: 
E E Ws =--'-Y's(E.) where 0<--'-<1 
I+E. I+E. 
(3.22) 
The same of course holds for unskilled workers when 0 < E" < <X) • 
The inverse of the monopsony power can be expressed by parameters: 
e
s 
= ~ ~ and eu = ~ . . These parameters (es and e,,) indicate the extent to which I+E. I+E" 
wage setting departs from the marginal product rule as showed by (3.22). When e." = 1 
the competitive setting holds, when 0 < e •. " < 1 the monopsony setting holds. 
In order to derive the comparative statics of the optimal shares in employment of 
skilled and unskilled workers, under monopsony setting i.e. when Es and E" are constant 
numbers such that E. < E", we again start from the optimisation problem given by (3.5): 
ma::CE E E: E!-a - (w. (E.)E. + w" (E,,)E,,) 
, . 
(3.23) 
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· Therefore, the public sector wants to maximise employment and as a result 
achieves zero profit, but the wage rate of each worker type depends on its employment 
level. The first order condition of (3.23) with respect to E. 10 is: 
dw. E _ Ea-1E1-a 
--.+w.-a," 
dE, 
(3.24) 
Because E = wsE', (w,) = w, dE, we can write the left hand side of the equation (3.24) 
• E,(w.) E, dw, 
as: dw. E, + w, = J... w. + w, and from (3.12) it follows that the right hand side of the 
dE. E, 
equation (3.24) is: f', = aE:-1E!-a . Therefore, (3.24) is equivalent to: J... w, + w, = f', 
E, 
from which we get the expression for the wage of skilled labour: . 
E 
W =--'-f' =9 Y' 
, 1 + E, ' " 
Because 0 < E, < CIJ it follows that 0 < 9. = ~ ~ < 1 and hence: w, < Y',. 
1 +E, 
(3.25) 
In the same way, the first order condition of(3.23) with respect to Ell 11 leads to the 
expression for the wage of the unskilled labour: 
w = ~ f ' ' =9f' 
/I 1 +E II /I 1/ 
II 
(3.26) 
10 af = aEa-1E I- a _ (dw, E + w ) = 0 and 
aE ,1/ dE' , 
, , 
a
2 I = (-1 + a)aE-2+a E I- a _ d 2w, E _ 2 dw, < 0 
aE 2 '" dE 2 ' dE 
, " 
11 af =Ea (l-a)E-a _(dwll E +w )=0 
aE' II dE II II 
U U 
a
21 (1 ) E' aE-1-a d 2wu E 2 dwu 0 and --=- -a a --- - --< 
aE 2 S II dE 2 II dE 
1/ II II 
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Because 0 < Eu < 00 it follows that 0 < 8u = ~ ~ < I and hence: Wu < Y' •• l+e. 
The zero profit condition given by: 
and can be written as: Y = wE . 
(3.27) 
The ratio of (3.25) to (3.26) gives the expression for the relative wage of skilled workers 
under monopsony, ro: 
I+Eu 
Ws a Eu eu a E: a Lu(1-u:) ro = - = ------- = ---- = ---.::.....;..-...:...:... 
Wu I-a E I+Es I-a Em I-a L (I-um) $__ $ $ S 
(3.28) 
where Es ' Eu denote the levels of employment of skilled and unskilled labour, 
respectively, under competitive solution, whereas Es"', E'; and u;, u: denote the levels 
of employment and rates of unemployment of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, 
under monopsony. 
(3.28) can be re-written in the following form: 
(3.29) 
so that we can express the employment levels of skilled and unskilled labour, under 
monopsony, given by: 
E '" = Y(1-a) and E'" = Ya 
u $ 
Wu W$ 
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The fin'al expression of the steady state conditional demands . for skilled and 
unskilled labour under monopsony can be deduced from formulas (3.6) and (3.28) and 
after standard transformation we get:12 
(3.30) 
(3.31 ) 
From (3.30) and (3.31) we can express the relative wage of skilled and unskilled workers 
as a function of steady state level of employment of unskilled and skilled workers, 
respectively: 
Therefore, the steady state wage rates for skilled and unskilled workers are given by:l3 
12 The steady state level of employment for skilled labour E$ m is obtained in the following way: express 
E" m from formula (3.6) that, under monopsony, can be written as: Y = (E $ m ) a (E" m ) l-a ~ ~
_I ~ " " a E m w (I a) w 
Ell m = Y I-a (E. m) I-a and from formula (3.28): ____ "_ = _' ~ ~ E" m = - _' E$ m • Since 
I-a E$m w" a w" 
these two solutions are equal we express E. /If and get (3.30). 
The steady state level of employmellt for unskilled labour Ell m is obtained in the following way: e x p r e s ~ ~
Esm from formula (3.6) that, under monopsony, can be written as: Y = (E, mt (E" m)l-a ~ ~
I -I-a a Em W 
E.m = y-'; (E/)-a- and from formula (3.28): ____ "_=_"' ~ ~ E.m = ~ ~ W" Ell"'. Since 
I-a E.'" wII I-a w. 
these two solutions are equal we express Eu'" and get (3.3 I). 
\3 Using the formula 
E m I W, = ~ ( _ u ) ; ; ;
Wu I-a Y 
Y == (Es mt (Ell m)o-a) and get (3.32). 
we impute for 
Y 
w =(l-a)-
II Em 
u 
and for 
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Em 
W =a(_U )1-a and 
, Em 
• 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
The relative employment of skilled labour, under the monopsony solution, em, is 
obtained from (3.29): 
m Em, a Wu a 1 
e =--=----=---
Emil I-a w. I-a OJ 
(3.34) 
where em = E ~ ~ is relative employment of skilled workers and OJ = w. is the relative wage 
~ ~ ~ ~
of skilled workers under monopsony. Note that em embeds relative monopsony power by 
containing the terms G. and Gil such that G. < Gu ' Equation (3.34) implies that keeping a 
constant, t h ~ ~ relative employment of skilled workers, given by the ratio ~ ~ , , will be 
II 
greater, the lower the relative labour supply elasticity of skilled workers to unskilled 
workers, e = ~ . . Hence the wage gap w. between skilled and unskilled labour will be 
ell WII 
lower (i.e. the greater the wage compression), the lower the relative labour supply 
elasticity of skilled to unskilled workers. These are the key results of this section. 
This section has therefore demonstrated that compression of wage differentials can 
arise from public sector monopsony with implications for relative employment. Moreover, 
this section showed that if, initially, e. < ell' an increase in the relative elasticity of skilled 
, . 
labour, e, will lead to an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers, (j) and so in 
greater wage inequality, and a decline in the relative employment of skilled workers, em , 
for a fixed public sector wage bill. This will be illustrated next. 
W I-a Em -' y 
Usingtheformu)a _u = __ (_ .• )1-a we impute for w.=a- and for Y=(E.m)a(Eu m)l-a 
w. aYE; 
and get (3.33). 
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(iii) Comparative Statics between Competitive and Monopsony Solutions 
The relationship between the competitive and monopsony solutions can be 
expressed based on formulas (3.17), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28) and (3.30) in the foHowing form: 
m eu a I a eu I e =e-=----=----
Bj I-aro I-aB.r 
(3.35) 
~ ~
where ~ ~ = 1+ E j and E. < Ell' If we think of transition as a decline in the degree of 
Bu ~ ~
I +Eu 
monopsony power of the public sector, then, as we move towards the competitive 
outcome, relative wages and relative employment of skilled workers change with the 
increase in the relative labour supply elasticity of skilled workers i.e. ~ ~ ~ ~ I . 
ell 
The changes in relative employment of skilled workers, em, keeping the relative 
marginal revenue product of skilled workers, y, constant, depends on the changes of two 
parameters: e. ,ell . Comparative statics shows that: 
_ae_m = ___ a _ e ~ u , - - : - _ _
ae. (1- a) e.2y 
a 
-=----
ae" (1-a)e.r 
Similarly, the relative wage of skilled workers can be expressed as a function of the 
relative employment of skilled labour under the monopsony solution, em: 
Ws a I a I e. e. Y'. 0, 
ro=-=---;;;=----=---, =-' r 
Wu l-ae I-aeeu euY u Oil 
(3.36) 
Thus, changes in the relative wage of skilled workers depend on the changes of two 
parameters: es, eu • Comparative statics shows that: 
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00) a 
-=----
00) ae, 
De" = - (I-a) e/e 
Finally, we now consider the overall differential between monopsony and 
competitive relative wages and employments of skilled workers derived from formula 
(3.35): 
(3.37) 
A very strong result now follows from the fact that the elasticity of the skilled 
labour is lower than the elasticity of unskilled labour. Namely, because the monopsony 
implies that o<es = ~ < I I and o<e" = ~ < I I and because G. <G" =>e. <eu' the I+G. I+Gu 
formula (3.37) confirms that the relative wage of skilled workers obtained under 
monopsony solution is lower than under competitive solution: 0) < r and that the relative 
employment of skilled workers under monopsony solution is greater than under 
competitive solution: em > e. In addition, a decline in the relative public sector 
monopsony power over skilled workers may be expressed as ~ ~ -+ 1 implying a decline 
eu 
in the public sector relative employment of skilled workers, em towards competitive e and 
• 
an increase in the public sector relative wage of skilled workers, 0) towards competitive, 
r· 
In summary, this section showed that: 
I. The wage ratio Ws / Wu is lower (more compressed) in the public monopsony case 
than in the competitive market 
2. The employment ratio Ems / Em" is greater in the public monopsony case than in 
the competitive market. 
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The theoretical model derived allows us to observe the distributional outcomes of 
public sector restructuring on wages and employment during economic transition. In the 
pre-transition economy, public sector monopsony power especially towards skilled 
workers, reduces wage inequality and increases the use of skilled workers. Restructuring, 
and the development of a private sector, especially for skilled workers, creates "outside 
options". In transition economies, even though the government may continue to impose 
restrictions on pay, workers may opt to change the sector of employment as there is a 
private sector job alternative. Hence, the pre-transition (command economy) and post-
transition (market economy) may be related to comparison of monopsony and competitive 
outcomes based on the main differences summarized by Vecernik (2001) in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: The main characteristics of the pre-transition and the post-transition 
economies 
Characteristic Command economy Market economy 
General economic goal amount of product productivity, etliciency 
Generator of inequality the state and (marginally) the labour market labour market 
Distribution according to basic needs, loyalty to the regime skills, perfonnance, network appartenance 
Main factors of disparities gender, age, hard manual labour human capital, entrepreneurship 
The role of education state investment generating small disparities individual investment generating large disparities 
The role of age generation, accumulated loyalty (linear increase) career, accummulated experience (concave) 
Preferred branches mining, metallurgy, heavy manufacturing finance, top techologies, professional services 
Managerial premia given for political position, risk aversion innovation, risk taking 
Public/private sector distinction no important 
Source: Vecemik (2001) 
The model derived here therefore demonstrates that the increase in the wage inequality 
during economic transition may be considered as a result of decline in public sector 
monopsony power rather than simply the erosion of an "egalitarian wage policy". This is 
derived from the increase in the relative labour supply elasticity of skilled workers during 
transition, as can be demonstrated by a simple calibration model. 
• 
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3.4.3 Calibration Model 
This part of the chapter illustrates the implications of the theoretical framework 
with a simple calibration model. We simulate the impact of the decline in public sector 
monopsony power on the relative employment and wages of skilled workers. From 
empirical estimates of workers' labour supply elasticities we can derive predictions as to 
the changes in wage inequality and employment that result. 
Comprehensive surveys of the labour supply literature, such as Boal and Ransom 
(1997) and Bashkar, Manning and To (2002) reveal a great deal of uncertainty in the 
estimates of the relevant elasticities. This is in part because the literature considers 
different approaches to measure the market power of the employer, different time horizons 
(short and long run) as well as different types of workers. 
The group of studies starts from the dynamic theory of monopsony by which the 
level of employment in a steady state is the ratio of the recruitment to the separation rate 
(Bashkar, Manning and To, 2002). Hence, the elasticity of employment with respect to 
wages is the difference between the elasticity of recruits with respect to wages and the 
elasticity of separations with respect to wages. Using this approach on US data, Card and 
Krueger (1995) calculate that the upper bound for the overall wage elasticity is 5, implying 
that wages are on average 17 percent below the workers' marginal products. A similar 
estimate is obtained by Manning (2003) using UK data. Van Der Berg and Ridder (1993) 
using data from the Netherlands, apply the Burdett and Mortensen model and measure 
monopsony power as the ratio of job offers and job destruction rates. They find the 
average elasticity of labour supply to be around 7. This is fairly elastic but considers 
workers as a whole. Our model differentiates skilled and unskilled workers. 
More pertinent studies have focused on either skilled or unskilled workers. One of 
the very first studies that considered skilled workers is Scully (1974). He estimated that • 
pay was about 20 and 15 percent of the marginal product for average and 'star' 
professional baseball players in US, respectively. That implies that the elasticity of labour 
. . 
supply for these professionals is only 0.25 and 0.18 respectively. Sullivan (1989) used 
panel data to estimate the employer size· wage effect for nurses, after controlling for other 
i factors (individual hospital effect, measures of hospital dtseload etc). The wage elasticity 
of labour supply of nurses in the short run was estimated to be 1.26 and in the long run 
3.86, meaning that wages were 79 percent of the marginal product. Bashkar, Manning and 
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To (2002) concluded that, while this is not an enormous difference, it IS comparable in size 
to estimates of the union wage markup. On the other hand, Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs 
(1999) estimated a much lower short run wage elasticity of labour supply of 0.1 for 
registered nurses in US hospitals run by the Veterans Administration (V A). Their estimate 
is based on the change in employment at individual VA and non-VA hospitals, relative to 
changes in wages of competitors and other important factors. According to Bashkar, 
Manning and To (2002) this study seems to come closest to the ideal experiment one 
would like to conduct for several reasons. The most important reasons are that the changes 
in the wages were an outcome of exogenous legislated change and that initial wages in VA 
hospitals were low relative to the prevailing level of market wages for nurses. 
In contrast, focusing on the supply elasticity for unskilled labour, Boal (1995), 
estimates that long run inverse elasticities of West Virginia coal miners, are at most 0.03, 
0.05 or 0.09, using discount rates of 5 percent, 10 percent or 20 percent respectively, 
implying that the inverse elasticities are essentially zero. This means that the elasticity of 
the unskilled labour supply approaches infinity which is expected given that workers with 
general skills might be regarded as more mobile. 
While these results suggest a range of estimates of labour supply elasticities, the 
following broad conclusions emerge: (1) results depend on the methods used such that 
inferences from recruitment and separation rates provide greater elasticities than individual 
case studies (2) short run elasticities are smaller then long run estimates and (3) skilled 
workers have a lower elasticity of labour supply than unskilled workers or the workforce 
as a whole. 
The calibration model presented here applies elasticities which are within the bands 
of these estimates to actual data obtained from Hungary as a country in economic 
transition. The public sector employment shares and average wages of skilled and 
I • 
unskilled full-time male workers, during the economic transition, from 1994 until 2003, in 
Hungary are obtained from Hamori (2007) and presented in the Table 3.4. 
The ratios calculated from the actual transition data in Table 3.4 are presented in 
Table 3.5 in the column titled 'real data'. The relative employment em and wage ratios co 
in the public sector are determined distinguishing, between two groups of workers only: 
unskilled and skilled. The unskilled group of workers is created by summing up unskilled 
and low-skilled groups and the skilled group of workers i ~ ~ created from middle-skilled and 
high-skilled groups. The relative employment of skilled workers in the public sector, em, 
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• is the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the public sector in 1994 and 2003. The 
relative wage of skilled workers in the public sector, co, is the ratio of the average wage of 
skilled workers to the average wage of unskilled workers in the public sector in 1994 and 
2003. The ratio of the share of skilled workers in the total cost (wage bill), parameter a , 
to the share of unskilled workers in the total cost (wage bill), parameter (1- a) is 
calculated using the information on employment and average wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers in the public sector in 1994 and 2003. 
Table 3.4: Employee educational composition and wages by ownership type in 
Hungary, 1994 and 2003 
Private sector Public sector 
1994 2003 1994 2003 
Educational composition (%) 
Unskilled (U) 21.67 15.71 15.39 11.54 
Low-skilled (L) 39.37 45.13 12.7 18.29 
U+L 61.04 60.84 28.09 29.83 
Middle-skilled (M) 25.38 25.97 28.08 21.44 
High-skilled (H) 13.58 13.19 43.83 48.73 
M+H 38.96 39.16 71.91 70.17 
Monthly gross earnings for education group U 85,040.96 94,851.91 73,173.08 99,776.24 
Monthly gross earnings for education group L 93,852.98 109,279.80 78,366.44 102,634.20 
Mean monthly gross earnings Unskilled (U+L) 89,446.97 102,065.86 75,769.76 101,205.22 
Monthly gross earnings for education group M 133,642.80 155,430.60 109,814.90 128,143.80 
Monthly gross earnings for education group H 241,730.60 360,113.10 132,077.10 227,658.70 
Mean monthly gross earnings Skilled (M+H) 187,686.70 257,771.85 120,946.00 177,901.25 
Observations 54,138 50,700 7,903 8,659 
Notes to Table 3.4. Monthly Gross Earnmgs are denoted m Hungarian currency HUF and converted to 2003 
earnings by the annual CPI. Source: Hamori (2007) 
For the purpose of assessing the compression of public sector wages we consider 
the wages paid by the private sector in 1994 as a benchmark. Hence, we assume that the 
, . . 
relative wage of skilled private sector workers in the early years of the economic transition 
is the closest to the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers r. In addition, we 
assume that the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers remains constant. 
Hence, knowing the relative wage co and relative marginal revenue product of skilled 
workers r we can calculate the inverse of the public sector relative monopsony power 
over skilled workers in 1994 and 2003: e = ~ . . Then we can calculate the relative 
. r 
employment of skilled workers under a competitive solution: e. = ee m • 
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The next two columns of Table 3.5 'present the calibration models for years 1994 
and 2003. The calibration of the models is based on the equalities derived from the 
theoretical model and given in (3.37): (0 =.!.... = e and ye = (Oem = ~ ~ by fitting the 
y em I-a 
estimates of the elasticity of labour supply for skilled and unskilled workers from the 
literature. 
Table 3.5: Public sector monopsony: real data and model calibration 
Public 
sector 
Real data Model I calibrated values Model II calibrated values 
8.=3;8.=100 8. = 5;8. = 100 8.=3;8.=75 8. =5;8. =75 
Ratios: 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 
em 2.56 2.35 2.52 2.26 2.S1 2.26 
() 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.84 
e 1.95 1.97 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 
(0 1.60 1.76 1.59 1.77 1.59 1.77 
r 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 
a /(l-a) 4.09 4.13 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Notes to Table 3.5: From the Table 3.4 the followmg ratIOs m the column 'real data' are calculated: 
(
_ ) Public 
W(M+H) y. 
- 'y-
- W(U+L) , - r: 
m Em. (M + H)PUhliC W 
e =--= ;(0=_' 
Emu V+L W. (
_ )pr;VQteI994 
W(M+H) d 
= an 
W(U+L) 
a wE m (0 
--= s, whereas () = - and e = ()em • The Model I calibrated by using the labour supply 
I-a wuEum y 
~ l a s t i c i t i e s s of skilled workers 8 !994 = 3 in 1994 and s ;003 = 5 in 2003 and labour supply elasticity of 
unskilled workers S!994 = 8;003 = 100 in 1994 and 2003. The Model II calibrated by using the labour supply 
elasticities of skilled workers 8!994 = 3 in 1994 and 8;003 = 5 in 2003 and labour supply elasticity of 
unskilled workers 8!994 = 8;003 = 75 in 1994 and 2003. In both Models r and a /(1- a) are taken from 
the 'real data' column whereas () = 8. /(1 + 8.)/8. /(1 + 8.) and ro, em and e are calculated using the 
equalities derived from the theoretical model and given in (3.37): (0 = L = e and ye = (Oem = ~ . .
y em I-a 
The only parameters taken from the 'real data' column and used in columns titled 
as 'model I' and 'model II' are the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers, 
y, and the relative share- of skilled workers in the total cost (wage bill), a /(1- a). All 
other parameters are generated by the models. The 'free' parameters are labour supply 
elasticities of skilled and unskilled workers, G. and e u chosen to calibrate the inverse of·· 
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the relative public sector monopsony power () given in the 'real data' column. Therefore, I 
the calibration is carried out by fitting the values for skilled and unskilled labour supply 
elasticities to the corresponding ratio values from the 'real data' column. The resulting 
values for these parameters, chosen to maximise the fit of the model, are the following: for 
Model I, E/994 = 3 and Es 2003 = 5 and Eu = 100 in both years, 1994 and 2003; for Model II, 
E/994 =3 and E/003 =5 and Eu=75 in both years, 1994 and 2003 14• After fitting 
() = &./(1 +&.}/ &u /(1 +&J and knowing r and a we calculate (0, e and em using formula 
(3.37): (0 = em =() and re=coem = ~ . .
r e I-a 
An inspection of Table 3.5 shows that if we take 'transition' as meaning that the 
elasticity of skilled labour supply Es increases from 3 to 5 (both within the range of 
empirical estimates) and benchmark as actual 1994 values for Hungary, we can predict 
2003 rather well. 
3.5 Evidence on Changing Wage Inequalities in Eastern Europe during 
Economic Transition 
3.5.1 Wage Inequalities, Pre-transition 
An implication of the model where transition implies an erosion in the differential 
monopsony power of the state across worker types is that wage inequality should increase 
faster in transition economies than in other OECD economies. This will now be 
demonstrated. 
The literature on transition economies provides the bulk of evidence that planned 
economies limited the extent of inequality through explicit restrictions in earnings 
dispersion. Aghion and Commander (1999) note the perverseness of returns to skills 
14 We have explored the range of values for the elasticity oflabour supply for unskilled workers estimated by 
Boa! (1995). But for the whole range of Eu E {20,1 OO} the skilled workers' labour supply elasticities 
E/994 = 3 and 'E/003 = 5 give the relative wages and relative employments of skifJed workers that are 
consistent to the corresponding ratio values from the 'real data' column in the Table 3.5. Moreover, these 
elasticities of labour supply of skilled workers fit (broadly) with the Sullivan (1989) estimates. 
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pointing to the fact that planned economies combined relatively high leveis of human 
capital investment with extremely low returns to skills, due to pay compression. 
Table 3.6: Wage inequality in the advanced DECD countries, 1979-1990 and in the 
CEE countries, 1988-1995: Log 90/10 wage differential 
(1990)-
Five year (1979) 
OECD 1979 1984 1987 1990 change change Q 
Males 
United States 1.23 1.36 1.38 1.40 0.17 0.077 
United Kingdom 0.88 1.04 1.10 1.16 0.28 0.121 
France 1.19 1.18 1.22 1.23 0.04 0.018 
JaEan 0.95 1.02 1.01 1.04 0.09 0.041 
Females 
United States 0.96 1.16 1.23 1.27 0.31 0.141 
United Kingdom 0.84 0.98 1.02 1.11 0.27 0.123 
France 0.96 0.93 1.00 1.02 0.06 0.027 
JaEan 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.83 0.05 0.023 
Five year 
CEE 1988 1989 1993 1994 1995 change Q 
All 
Czech Republic 0.88 1.16 1.31 0.358 
Hungary 1.14 1.30 1.33 0.158 
Poland 0.96 1.11 1.22 0.186 
Romania 0.67 1.02 1.12 0.375 
Notes to Table 3.6: 
a) Wage inequalities for selected DECD countries by Kat=. Loveman and Blanchjlower (1995) and 
for CEE countries by Rutkowski (1996a) for 1988-1993 and Rutkowski (1997) for 1994/1995. 
b) Q The difference between the last year and the first year value expressed on a five year basis. 
Source: Kertesi and K5110 (2000) 
The empirical evidence presented in Table 3.6 confinns that the initial pre-
transition (i.e. before 1990) earnings distribution in Central and Eastern European (eEE) 
countries was rather low by international standards. This is further observed by the 
educational group ratio values in selected OECD and CEE countries presented in Table 
3.7. Lower levels of relative wages are evident when a comparison is made between 
OECD and CEE countries for the same period. However, the economic transition caused 
the process of wage decompression at an impressive pace as illustrated by the five year 
~ h a n g e e in the last column of Tables 3.6 and 3.7. For example, in Table 3.6, the change in 
the 90th to 10th ratio of log wages between 1988/89 and 1994/95 in selected transition 
economies is in a range. from 16 to 37 percentage points. The change in the similar 
measure of wage inequality varies from 2 to 14 percentage points in selected OECD 
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countries, even including the US, which exhibited one of the highest rates of growth of 
wage inequality. 
Table 3.7: Changes in educational differentials in the advanced OECD countries and 
in the CEE countries 
Five 
Initial Ratio Second Ratio years 
GECD Educational ![ouQ ratio ~ e a r r value ~ e a r r value change a 
United States College/ High school 1979 1.37 1987 1.52 0.11 
United 
Kingdom College/No qualification 1980 1.53 1988 1.65 0.08 
France Males: NonmanuallManual b 1976 1.58 1987 1.53 -0.03 
Females: NonmanuallManual b 1976 1.38 1987 1.35 -0.01 
Japan CollegelUpper high school 1979 1.26 1987 1.26 0.00 
Canada UniversitylHigh school 1980 . 1.4 1985 1.43 0.03 
West Germany (14-18)/(11-13) years 1981 1.36 1983 1.42 0.10 
Sweden UniversitylPost Secondary 1981 1.16 1986 1.19 0.03 
Netherlands U n i v e r s i t ~ / S e c o n d a ! ) : : 1983 1.43 1987 1.23 -0.25 
CEE 
Czech Republic Higher education/Secondary 1988 1.29 1992 1.41 0.15 
Hungary Higher education/Secondary 1989 1.44 1994 1.47 0.03 
Higher educationIV ocattraining sch. 1989 1.56 1994 1.86 0.30 
Poland Higher educationIVocational 
secondary 1988 1.23 1993 1.39 0.16 
Notes to Table 3.7; 
a) For OECD countries: the calculations by Davis (1992), except France. b Educational differentials for 
males and females nonmanuallmanual workers in France by Kat=. Loveman and Blanchjlower (1995). 
b) For CEE countries: calculations for Hungary by Kertesi and Kallo (2000) and for Czech Republic and 
Poland by Rutkowski (1996a). 
c) a The difference between the second year and the initial year value expressed on a five year basis. 
Source: Kertesi and K6llo (2000) 
The sharp increase in relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers in transition 
economies can be illustrated by looking at changes in educational differentials for the UK 
and Hungary in Table 3.7. In particular, the growth in the relative wage of college trained 
workers to workers with no qualifications expressed on a five year basis was 8 percentage 
points in: the UK in the 1980s whereas the change in relative wage of higher to vocational 
education in Hungary in the late 1980s / early 1990s was 30 percentage points. Hence, the 
economic transition allowed earnings differentials, measured by 90th to 10th ratios in Table 
3.6 or by educational differentials in Table 3.7, to become more comparable with those 
observed in advanced market GECD countries. 
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Table 3.8: Raw Gini coefficients 
Year 1987-1988 1989 1993 1994 1993 -1994 
Author C H AM AC P W P C H 
Bulgaria 0.25 0.23 0.3 0.34 0.34 
Czech 
Republic 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.26 
Hungary 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24 
Poland 0.27 0.27 0.31 
Romania 0.23 0.23 0.255 0.29 0.29 
Slovakia 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Estonia 0.23 0.30 0.39 0.39 
Latvia 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Lithuania 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.36 
Russia 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.40 0.50 0.41 0.48 
.. ... Notes to Table 3.8: The Gmls are Identified In columns by year and by dIfferent sources, indIcated by letters: 
AC Aghion and Commander (1999), AM Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), C Corricelli (1997), H Honkkila 
(1997), P Popov (1996), and W World Bank (1997). Source: Rosser, Rosser and Ahmed (2000) 
The similar pattern of increasing earnings inequality during first years of transition 
(i.e. early 1990s) relative to the pre-transition period (i.e. late 1980s) is presented by Gini 
coefficients in Table 3.8 for a number of transitional countries using different sources of 
empirical evidence. 
3.5.2 Wage Inequalities, Transition 
In this section we amplify these general findings on inequality trends with further 
evidence. First, there was a significant increase in earnings inequality, especially for 
workers with higher levels of education during transition in CEE countries. Second, 
greater earnings inequality is observed in the private sector (where there is, presumably, no 
monopsony power) than in the public sector. Third, the main changes in the earnings 
distribution took place largely at the upper end i.e. among skilled workers, especially 
graduates. 
The increases in educational differentials and their correlation with the sector of 
ownership have been analysed by many researchers. Rutkowski (1996b) analysed the 
change in the wage structure in Poland, which is typical also of other CEE transitional 
economies, and concluded that the ~ i d e n i n g g of wage differentials, can be largely 
explained by increases in the returns to education. For example, he finds that in 1988 a 
worker with a university degree had only 19 percent higher earnings than the worker with 
basic vocational training. The education wage differential increased by 27 percentage 
points during the economic transition. In addition, in 1993, a public sector worker with a 
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university degree earned around 50 percent more than a public sector worker with basic 
vocational training while the private sector worker with university degree earned around 
90 percent more than the private sector worker with basic vocational training. Greater 
compression of the public sector wages compared to the private sector wages can be 
observed in the Polish example in Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4: Raw earnings differentials by educational attainment in Poland, 1993 
2 
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! 1.4 .. Rimary 1.2 ,..."" .. General ,... 
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Notes to Figure 3.4: Earnings are average net monthly earnings. Relative wage of each educational 
qualification (primary, general, vocational, post-secondary school and university degree) relative to 
the reference basic vocational education. 
Source: Rutkowski (1995) 
Furthermore, Rutkowski (1995) reports the ratio of earnings of white collar 
workers to earnings of blue collar workers in 1993 in Poland. At the median this ratio was 
1.12 in the public sector and 1.30 in the private sector. White collar workers at the top 
deciles had 1.13 and 1.60 higher earnings than blue collar workers at the top deciles, in the 
public and the private sectors, respectively. 
Public-private wage differentials by educational attainment from the same study 
are presented in the Table 3.9. Table 3.9 shows that all workers, regardless of educational 
attainment, earned a premium in the private sector. But the private sector pay 'mark-up' 
, ' 
was the highest for workers with a university degree. This confirms that highly skilled 
workers gained much more from private sector employment than workers with lower skills 
during transition. Rutkowski (1995) estimated that the private sector rewarded high skills 
by 30 percent higher wages, relative to the public sector, while workers with lower skills 
earned at most 11 p e r c ~ t t more than in the public sector. In addition, the age-earnings 
profile in the private sector was found to be significantly steeper than in the public sector 
meaning that earnings peaked _ about four years earlier in the private sector than in t h ~ ~
public sector. 
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Table 3.9: Raw earnings in the private sector relative to earnings in the public sector t 
by educational attainment in Poland, 1993 
Educational All Men Women 
level 
All levels 105.7 102.0 106.5 
Tertiary, university level 127.3 112.3 141.4 
Tertiary, below university 132.8 105.0 140.8 
Secondary vocational 111.1 107.3 112.3 
Secondary general 105.8 102.2 103.4 
Vocational training 103.3 103.0 105.9 
Primary 110.9 108.6 107.7 
Nares to Table 3.9: Public sector = 100. 
Source: Rutkowski (1995) 
Empirical evidence from other sources also confirms that private sector employers 
were using wage policy to attract relatively qualified workers away from the public sector 
jobs where they suffered from greater wage compression. For example, Flanagan (1995) 
finds that private firms in Hungary and Czech Republic tried to pay higher salaries than the 
public sector: 10 percent more for unskilled workers and up to twice more for skilled 
workers, according to the World Bank survey in 1993. Yet, he and other researchers, such 
as Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997), argue that to some extent this differential might be 
offset by higher nonwage benefits paid by the public sector. Flanagan (1995) concludes 
that private firms appear to pay higher average wages when they compete directly with the 
public sector for particular skills, although the margin and composition of the overall 
compensation package varied across sectors and countries. 
The insufficiently competitive public sector salary structure relative to the private 
sector firms of comparable size is clearly evident from the Table 3.1 O. The results are 
estimated by Nunberg (2000) for the Czech Republic. Table 3.10 shows that the difference 
between public and private sector pay is more pronounced at the higher skill levels and 
larger size companies. 
Table 3.10: Public-private salary comparisons in the Czech Republic in 1998 
Type of Public Sector Position, 
Qualification and Salary Point 
Type of Private Sector 
Position 
CEO 
Chief Financial Officer 
Business Director 
HRDirector 
Marketing Director 
Info Systems Director 
Sales Representative 
Executive Secretary 
Accounting Assistant 
Size of Private Sector Firm 
500+staff 
Smaller than 500 staff 
Private Sector 
Compensation 
(US$) 
6175 
3803 
3006 
2816 
2712 
1897 
703 
729 
470 
Public Sector 
Compensation 
Public 
Compensation 
(US$) as % of Private Sector 
1875 30.4 
1406 37 
906 30.1 
784 27.9 
689 25.4 
603 31.8 
466 66.3 
421 57.7 
380 81 
Grade Education Requirement MinlMidIMax 
Minister 
First Deputy Minister 
Director 
12 5 Y University degree 
11 5 Y University degree 
10 5 Y University degree 
9 5 Y University degree 
3 or 5 y University 
8 degree 
7 Full high school 
of Salary 
Range 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Mid 
Mid 
Mid 
CEO Salaries 
Private Sector 
Compensation ($) 
2656 
1875 
Public Sector Public Compensation as % of Private Type of Public Sector 
Compensation ($) Sector Position 
1875 70.6 Minister 
1406 75 First Deputy Minister 
Source: Nunberg (2000) 
However, there is some evidence of public sector pay restructuring in an attempt to 
move towards a competitive wage distribution. In the case of Hungary, Kezdi (1998) 
shows that public sector earnings have actually increased between 1986 and 1996, but still 
could not keep up with private sector earnings levels. This is illustrated by the Table 3.11. 
The highest pay increase can be observed for the occupations requiring the highest level of 
educational qualification, in both public and private sectors, but this increase was three 
times higher in the private than in the public sector. As one goes down the occupational 
scale, the difference between increases in the public and private sector earnings declines . 
. 
Moreover, Table 3.11 shows that the lowest educational occupations experienced higher 
growth of earnings in the public than in the private sector. 
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Table 3.11: Relative salary position of certain occupations in the public 
administration and private sector, 1986-1996 
(whole economy average of the year = 100) 
1986 1996 1986-1996 % change 
Public Private Public Private Public 
Occupation administration sector administration sector administration 
Chief executives a 191 208 243 379 27 
Business 
administration Q 148 148 180 234 22 
Higher educated 
bureaucrats a 138 147 173 221 25 
Lower educated 
bureaucrats b 82 105 108 121 32 
Administrati ve 
occupations b 78 83 89 93 14 
Notes to Table 3.11: Q With higher education level. b With secondary school education level. 
Source: Kezdi (1998) 
Nunberg (2000) provides some further evidence of public sector pay restructuring 
in civil service in Hungary. This is illustrated by the increases in civil servants' salaries in 
the Table 3.12. The attempt to decompress public sector pay is shown by pay increases 
disproportionally concentrated among the top skilled occupations. 
Table 3.12: Civil Servants with Increased Salaries in Hungary, 1997 
Percent of staff in class with salaries increased 
Senior Managers 74.2 
Non-Managers with Higher Level Qualifications 47.S 
Civil Servants with Secondary Level Qualifications 36.5 
Administrative Grades 30.1 
Blue Collar Workers 19.3 
Source: Nunberg (2000) 
This section therefore provided the following evidence: (1) faster increases in wage 
inequality in transition economies compared to the OEeD countries driven by the impact 
of a growing private sector on labour markets (2) a private sector wage policy that 
attracted qualified workers away from public sector jobs which suffered from greater wage 
f 
compression and (3) public sector incentives to adj ust wages, especially of skilled workers, 
once exposed to competition. 
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Private 
sector 
82 
58 
50 
15 
12 
3.5.3 Employment reallocation in transition 
The competition between public and private sectors for scarce skills, initiated by 
the economic transition in CEE countries, can be further revealed by the information on 
employment reallocation across different ownership types. There is much empirical 
evidence on fundamental changes in employment structure in CEE economies during 
transition. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) provide evidence of tremendous industrial 
reallocation and private sector growth. For example, based on the evidence collected from 
17 transition economies, they find that the private sector share of GDP rose from an 
average of 14% prior to economic reform (late 1980s) to 46% in 1995. 
The enormous shifts in the sectoral composition of output are supported by the data 
from 26 transition economies, among which the most advanced reformers experienced up 
to an 11% decline in the share of industry in GDP and up to almost a 15% increase in 
service share in GDP, between 1989 and 1994. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) argue that 
profound changes in ownership and industrial reallocation would seem to set the stage for 
large gross flows of workers in and out of employment. However, the available evidence 
says otherwise. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) show that the majority of the transition 
economies experienced a stagnant unemployment pool with very small unemployment 
outflow rates - especially flows from unemployment to employment. Instead, they 
observed large net flows of workers across firms and sectors. Available surveys of multi-
country evidence confirms that a high fraction of open positions were filled by workers 
who transit directly from another job, rather than from unemployment or non-participation. 
Blanchard (1997) reports that the fraction of new hires that came directly from another job, 
was 40% in Poland and 71% in Hungary in 1992, as compared to only 20% in the United 
States. 
-In this context, some empirical studies argue that the emerging private sector hired 
exclusively directly from the public sector because unemployment was seen by employers 
as a signal oflower qualification (for example V e ~ e m f k , , 1993, Allison and Ringold, 1996, 
Boeri, 1998, Jurajda and Terrell, 2003). 
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Table 3.13: Labour turnover in CElt countries at the beginning, during and at the 
end of economic transition 
Q Job creation and job destruction rates 
Period and Bv e n t e r ~ r i s e e t y ~ e e
Coun!!1 Collective Private State 
Annual Creation Destruction Creation Destruction Creation Destruction 
1989 Estonia 0.37 1.41 64.89 1.06 0.00 2.12 
1993 Estonia 0.00 22.53 59.96 12.12 0.44 \3.56 
1997-2000 Privatised Private State 
Hungary 4.70 4.90 7.80 3.30 4.30 6.90 
Romania 2.20 10.10 26.20 2.90 1.30 12.70 
Russia 6.70 500 1350 S.10 0.60 4.80 
OECD All 
1984-1991 Creation Destruction 
France 12.70 11.80 
Netherlands 8.20 7.20 
United 
Kingdom 8.70 6.60 
United States 13.00 10.40 
iQ Hiring and seearation rates 
By enterprise 
t v ~ e e Collective Private State 
Annual H i r i n ~ ~ SeEaration H i r i n ~ ~ SeEaration H i r i n ~ ~ SeEaration 
1989 Estonia 9.89 10.93 70.21 6.38 8.6 10.72 
1993 Estonia 15.06 37.59 76.51 28.68 14.63 27.74 
1993 Poland 37.20 34.80 14.20 15.80 
1999 Poland 35.20 31.40 14.00 18.70 
By employment 
size 20-99 100-400 500+ 
Annual H i r i n ~ ~ SeEaration H i r i n ~ ~ SeEaration H i r i n ~ ~ SeEaration 
1989 Estonia 14.09 11.02 7.78 11.01 6.91 9.63 
1993 Estonia 36.19 24.46 18.60 31.30 9.68 29.04 
Notes to Table 3. J 3: Ownership in Hungary, Romania and Russia are based on ownership type in 
2000 and the job creation and job destruction rates are average r a ~ e s s during 1997-2000 period. 'Privatised' 
firms are those with private ownership share exceeding 50 per cent in 1997. Private includes private firms 
established since 1990. State sector for Romania excludes six state-owned firms changing title in 1997-1998. 
For OECD countries job creation and destruction rates are annual average rates as a percentage of total 
employment during 1984-1991 except for United Kingdom during 1985-1991. 
Sources: Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) for Estonia, Socha and Weisberg (2002) for Poland, 
Commander and Ko110 (2008) for Hungary, Romania and Russia and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for 
OECD countries 
, f 
The empirical evidence on differences in hiring and separation rates as well as job 
creation and job d e s t ~ c t i o n n rates between public and private sectors presented in ~ h e e Table 
3.13 are striking. For example, the private sector accounted for virtually all of the job 
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creation in Estonia. It can be observed that private firms experienced relatively high rates 
of separations and job destructions but these were more than offset by remarkably high 
hiring and creation rates. Socha and Weisberg (2002) described the private sector labour 
market as close to a 'perfect competition' model based on the calculated annual hiring and 
separation rates during the period of economic transition in Poland given in Table 3.13. 
Furthermore, Table 3.13 shows that the job destruction rates in the state-owned and 
collective enterprises were excessively high at the start of transition but by 1993 had 
declined to rates comparable to those in the private sector. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 
(2002) explain that state-owned and collective firms were hiring only to replace separating 
workers on the remaining jobs. The same pattern is confirmed by Bilsen and Konings 
(1998) for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, by Jurajda and Terrell (2001) for Czech 
Republic and Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) and Socha and Weisberg (2002) for 
Poland. Moreover, Commander and Kalla (2008) using data for Hungary, Romania and 
Russia presented in Table 3.13, confirmed that the pattern of the contribution of new 
private firms to job creation and of state-owned and privati sed firms to job destruction 
remained, even by the end of the economic transition, although of much smaller magnitude 
(which became comparable in size with the rates in OECD countries). 
Finally, if one looks at the hiring and separation rates by employment s,ize 
presented in Table 3.13 we observe that hiring rates declined with the size of the 
enterprise, but the separation rates increased with the size of the firm. This is in contrast 
with firm behaviour in market economies where large employers have the lowest 
separation rates (for example Manning, 2003). However, this was not unusual for 
transition economies having in mind the over-employment in the so called 'dinosaur' (due 
to the giant size) firms created under central planning. This data is of course compatible 
with workers moving from sectors with lower wages into jobs with higher wages . 
. 
A similar pattern is confirmed by Nunberg (2000) for the 'non-productive" 
branches of the public sector. She reports that for CEE countries in 1997, staff turnover in 
civil service ranged from around 7 to 11 per cent per annum (Hungary 9, Estonia 6.8, 
Czech Republic 11) while international attrition standards tended to be under 5 percent per 
annum., 
This sub-section therefore provided evidence on employment reallocation across 
different ownership types. The main findings confirmed that the private sector contributed 
to job creation whereas the public sector contributed to job destruction over the course of 
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the economIc transition. Moreover, a high fraction of open positions were filled by 
workers who transited directly from another job, rather than from unemployment. In 
addition, hiring rates declined with the size of the enterprise, but separation rates increased 
with the employment size of the firm, as workers moved from over-employed state-owned 
factories to competitive private businesses. All this is compatible with the onset of a 
competitive private sector which enhances the 'outside option' of public sector workers, 
especially the most skilled. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the effects of public sector restructuring on employment 
and wages during the economic transition in Central and Eastern European countries. The 
restructuring took place against a background of a decline in public sector labour market 
monopsony power. The results in this chapter suggest that the differential elasticity of 
labour supply for skilled and unskilled workers may be important for the understanding of 
public sector wage compression in centrally planned economies and to the changes in the 
wage distribution that occurred during the transition. Both the theoretical framework and 
the empirical evidence are provided to support this argument. 
The theoretical part of the chapter supports our intention and effort to illustrate two 
main characteristics of the public sector in pre-transition economies: 
greater wage equality than in a competitive market 
differential monopsony power over skilled and unskilled workers. 
The chapter has argued that these factors were connected: low productivity workers 
had a more elastic supply and therefore, the ability of the public sector to exploit its 
monopsony power is less for low productivity workers than for high productivity workers. 
An egalitarian wage strategy thereby exploits the lower elasticity of supply of high 
productivity workers. The chapter has shown that a rationale for the public sector paying 
more equal wages to workers of differing productivity is that it is exploiting its monopsony 
power, and therefore we have shown that the relative employment of skilIed workers to 
unskilled workers in the public sector will be greater than in the competitive market. 
Furthermore, the theoretical framework developed in this chapter shows the 
outcomes of a decline in public sector monopsony power along the transition. These are 
reflected in an increase in the relative elasticity of labour supply for skilled workers, a 
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decline in the relative employment of skilled workers in the public sector and an increase 
in public sector wage inequality. 
The empirical part of the chapter confirms six foundation points for the theoretical 
framework developed: (1) earnings differentials were more compressed in the pre-
transition period in CEE countries than in the market OECD economies (2) the economic 
transition sees a decline in the ability of the government to 'manage' pay structure (3) 
economic transition allowed earnings inequality to become comparable with inequality 
observed in· advanced market DECD economies (4) the main changes in the earnings 
distribution were caused by increases in the returns to high skills (5) changes in the relative 
wages guided labour reallocation between public and private sectors and (6) greater 
earnings inequality in the competitive private sector caused a higher sector pay gap for 
high skilled workers but this differential declined over the course of the economic 
transition. The evolution of public relative to private sector wages over the transition, and 
how this varied over worker types, will be considered at greater length in subsequent 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Public-private earnings differentials in Serbia 
4.1 Introduction 
The economic transition in Eastern Europe represents a fruitful case-study of the 
evolution of the wage structures between the private and public sectors. In Serbia, during 
the period analysed in this chapter from 1995 until 2008, the public sector has been 
privatised and restructured through a number of significant reforms. The transformation of 
ownership will have a potential effect not only on employment composition but also on 
relative wages and hence on the distribution of the wages in the two sectors of 
employment. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of earnings in the private 
and public sectors during the period of economic transition in Serbia. This will be done by 
examining changes in public-private wage differentials, on average and across the 
percentiles of the wage distribution, for male and female employees, controlling for 
characteristics. Distributional aspects of wages are especially important for the analysis of 
the development of public and private sector wages during the period of economic 
transition for two reasons. Firstly, as we saw in chapter 3, wage setting mechanisms in the 
public sector imply that wages are more compressed than in the private sector, which 
means that estimates of the average effect of public sector status may not give an entire 
insight into public-private wage differentials. Secondly, public sector restructuring over 
the period of economic transition is likely, from the analysis in the previous chapter, to 
induce a widening of the public sector wage distribution as the economy moves towards a 
competitive private sector dominated wage distribution. 
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This chapter tackles several issues: (1) it provides a detailed explanation of the 
changes in the employment and wage composition during the period of economic 
transition in Serbia. using administrative and micro data. (2) it discusses changes in the 
coverage and methodology of micro data. (3) it augments the earlier literature of public-
private wage differentials by using a more comprehensive definition of earnings and 
longer series of data. (4) it then provides an analysis of the evolution of public-private 
wage differentials for male and female employees in Serbia on average and across the 
earnings distribution using different sources of micro data over the transition period. (5) it 
attempts to correct for a measurement error and endogeneity arising from large-scale 
privatisations in cross-sectional public sector pay gap estimates from individual reported 
data. 
Although the chapter distinguishes systematic differences in hourly remuneration 
across the public and private sectors using a variety of data sets, the cross-sectional nature 
ofthe available data and the difficulty in finding rational exclusion restrictions for possible 
sectoral self-selection issues, limit the capacity to identify structural models of 
simultaneous sector selection and wage determination. Nevertheless, the chapter proposes 
a novel instrument to exploit the variation in public sector status across individuals arising 
from the large-scale privatisation. This is done by combining different sources of data. 
The chapter is organised in four parts. The first section portrays the institutional 
setting in Serbia and describes the main stages of privatisation during the economic 
transition. The next section presents changes in sectoral composition by using 
administrative and household data. The third section contains the estimation of public-
private sector pay differentials at the mean and at the selected percentiles of the pay 
distribution. The empirical analysis in third section is therefore based on OLS and quantile 
regression methods. A final section uses i n s t r u m e n t ~ l l variable methods to obtain results 
that are robust to measurement error. An instrument based on industry level changes in the 
proportion of workers working for the public sector is applied. This instrument is proposed 
to infer the likelihood of changes in the public sector status and hence in whether an 
individual is affected by privatisation. 
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4.2 Transition in Serbia 
4.2.1 Macroeconomic Context and Wage Developments 
Serbia was one of the very last countries of Eastern Europe to initiate a process of 
economic transition. The economic transition in Serbia began in 1989 but from 1991 
onwards it was interrupted by wars and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, by UN 
sanctions (introduced in 1992), by hyperinflation in 1993-1994 and the NATO bombing 
campaign. This was followed by estimated 18% decline in real GDP and chronic economic 
depression in 1999. 
Market reforms that had been undertaken at the beginning of the 1990s in other 
Eastern European economies started in Serbia only after democratic changes in October 
2000. In 2001 the main macroeconomic policy changes took place. Economic sanctions 
were lifted and most price controls were relaxed. The managed floating exchange rate was 
introduced and IMF Stand-by Arrangements were approved. A restrictive monetary policy 
was combined with an expansionary fiscal policy. The New Privatisation law was adopted 
and a comprehensive tax reform was implemented. Following the approval of an investor-
oriented law in June 2001, a comprehensive privatisation programme was initiated (EBRD, 
2002). Real GOP grew annually on average by 6% from 2001-2008, as presented in Table 
4.la. 
The growth of real net wages was significantly higher than the growth of real GOP 
during the post-2000 period, with the exception of 2008. For example, Table 4.1 b shows 
that real GOP increased by 5% but the real average net wage rose by 16% on average 
during 2001-2008 period. 
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Table 4.1a: Main macroeconomic indicators in Serbia, 1990-2008 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Growth in real GDP r/o). -7.9 -11.6 -27.9 -30.8 2.5 6.1 7.8 10.1 1.9 -18.0 5.2 5.1 4.5 2.4 9.3 6.3 6.5 6.9 
Inflation (%) 593 121 9237 116.5*10 12 3.3 78.6 94.3 21.3 29.5 37.1 60.4 91.1 21.2 11.3 9.5 17.2 13.0 8.0 
Government Balances (%GDP) na na na na na -4.3 -3.8 -7.6 -5.4 na -1.0 -4.9 -8.3 -3.4 0.0 0.9 2.7 -1.9 
Current Account ('YoGDP) na na na na na na -9.8 -6.5 -4.2 -4.4 -5.1 -5.0 -17.5 -16.4 -14.8 ' -10.0 -8.8 -15.7 
Foreign Direct/nvestment na na na na na na 0 740 113 112 25 165 475 1360 966 ]481 3500 2523 
Notes to Tobie 4. /0: Foreign Direct Investn't net inflows recorded in the balance of payments in US$ million. Data SOllrce: EBRD Transition Report vanous years 
Table 4.1b: Economy and labour market indicators in Serbia, 1994-2008 
]994 1995 ]996 ]997 1998 ]999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nominal GDP per capita (in US$) 1367 ]562 1308 1220 863 ]413 1910 2542 2977 3234 3953 5393 6174 
Nominal Monthlv Earninj!s (% chanj!e) I na na na 48.2 33.3 23.] 91.1 ]29.6 51.7 25.3 23.7 24.1 24.4 22.0 17.9 
Real Afonthlv E a r n i l 1 ~ s s (% chanKe) I na na na 26.9 3.8 -]4.0 30.7 38.5 30.5 ]4.0 ]4.2 6.9 ] 1.4 ]5.3 6.2 
Labour force (end-year) (% c h a l 1 ~ e ) )
-
-2.3 0.9 I.J -1.2 -0.5 -7.2 -2.4 1.8 1.3 2.5 -4.5 2.2 -1.1 -6.] -2.0 
Employment (end-year) (% chal1Ke) -2.4 -0.9 -0.4 -1.4 -1.8 -8.6 -2.6 0.2 -1.6 -1.3 -6.4 0.9 -2.3 -1.5 -0.] 
Employed in Private Sector (% change) 2 na na na na na na na na 5.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 -2.0 3.0 ]1.0 
Employed in Sectors other than Private (% chanj!e) 2 na na na na na na na na -7.0 -7,0 -6.0 -]0.0 -9.0 -6,0 -9,0 
Unemployment (end-year) 3 23.3 24.6 25.7 25.9 26.8 27.9 24.4 25.5 27.6 30.3 31.7 32.4 33.2 29.9 28.5 
Privatisation Revenues (cumulative in % GDP) 4 na na na na na na na na 2.4 6.9 7.7 ]0.2 17.4 20.2 21.4 
Private Sector Share in GDP (%) ~ ~ na na na na na na 40 40 45 45 50 55 55 55 60 
Share of industry in GDP (%) 41.0 40.1 38.6 39.3 39.7 38.2 26.0 27.2 34.3 23.2 22.8 21.8 21.8 21.4 20.7 
Share of agricllinire in GDP (%) 31.4 31.1 29.4 29.4 ]9.0 25.1 ]7.6 17.2 19.3 ]2.1 13.3 12.0 11.3 9.8 10.1 
I Population end-year, millions 6 10.5 10.5 ]0.6 10.6 10.6 8.4 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Notes fa TaMe 4, / b: na denotes that data is not available; I annual average gross but from 1999 net; 2 from annual average number of employed persons published in Statistical YeaIbook of Serbia (1996-2008); 3 
% of labour force (end-year); 4 government revenues from cash sales of enterprises, not including investment commitments; ~ ~ rough EBRD estimates, based on available statistics from both official (government) 
sources and unofficial sources. The underlying concept of private sector value added includes income generated by the activity of private registered companies, as well as by private entities engaged in infonnal 
• activity in those cases where reliable information on informal activity is available; 6 decrease in 1999 is the result of excluding Kosovo population from the total. 
Data Sollrce: EBRD Transition Report various years and Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
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Remarkably high growth in average monthly real wages during 2001 and 2002 was to 
some extent due to the fiscal reform through which additional payments that were previously 
non-taxable (such as meals and travel allowances) were included in the net wage. Therefore, 
the total remuneration increased by approximately 15% relative to the "wage":s This measure 
changed the definition of earnings, allowing a greater similarity to the pay concept utilised in 
market economies. 16 
Apart from the new method of wage calculation the unexpectedly high real growth in 
wages from 2001 was also caused by a number of other factors. One of them was the 
government's effort to regulate wage growth consistently across certain branches of the public 
sector such as public education, public health and public services. Other factors included the 
liberalisation of wages in the rest of the economy, the stabilisation of the growth in prices and 
the cost of living and the inflow of the funds from abroad in the form of aid, loans or 
privatisation proceeds. 
Importantly, a part of the reported growth in average wages may have stemmed from 
privatisation and from the decline in the number of workers in public sector enterprises. Table 
4.1 b shows that public sector employment decreased (by around 8% per year) while the 
number of employed in the private sector increased over the post - 2000 period (with the 
highest growth of 11 % in 2008). 
Nevertheless, despite the decline in employment and large-scale privatisation, the 
public sector remains the major employer in Serbia. In 2008, the public sector employment 
represented around a quarter of the total labour force (24.75%) and almost a third of the total 
number of employed (28.79%) in Serbia (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Labour 
Force Survey, October, 2008). 
Public pay is an important 'component of government spending as well as its groWth 
rate having implications for the budget deficit and internal and external macroeconomic 
15 Approximation based on Labour Force Survey data and Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Office of the Republic 
of Serbia (2002). Similar confinned by an estimation of obligatory payment of meal allowances and vacation 
b o ~ u s e s s to employees given by the 2005 amendment to the Labour L ~ w w for increase in wages (Le. taxable base) 
in Quarterly Monitor of Economic Trends and Policies in Serbia (2006) No.7. 
16 Although OEeD economies often have defined remuneration in the form of pensions and various fringe 
benefits and share options. 
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balance. Personnel expenses represent the main cost to the government budget with public pay 
costs making up one quarter of total public expenditures in Serbia. The public wage bill share 
constituted 9.6% of GDP in 2007 and is planned to be 9.1% in 2010 (Bulletin of Public 
Finances, 2007). 
The following sub-section explains public sector wage-setting arrangements during 
three periods: pre-transition, the transition period during the 1990s and the transition period 
after 2000. 
4.2.2 Pre-transition: regulating public sector wages 
In Yugoslavia 'self-managed' socialism replaced the Soviet economic system from 
1950. Empirical research by Estrin (1981) points out that in Yugoslav 'self-managed' firms 
incomes were centrally determined until 1958. The firms were granted a greater role in 
income distribution only from 1965 until 1972. Income policies introducing guidelines for 
income distribution in 1972 are described by Estrin (1981) as an effective reassertion of 
central control over earnings. According to his estimates Yugoslav wage differentials were 
narrow by Western standards, but wider than in some Eastern European countries. For 
example, he records that the ratio of highest to lowest skill group earnings in the UK in 1960 
was 3.5 whereas in the same time in Eastern Europe varied from 1.5 in East Germany to 2 in 
Poland (excluding bonus payments) and 2.6 in Yugoslavia. Considering the period unti11975 
Estrin (1981) finds that skill differentials remained relatively narrow and stable over time. 
During the period preceding the transition process in Yugoslav economy (1974-1988) 
wage levels were determined through a "social compact" based on bargaining among the 
associations of working ?rganisations, trade unions and executive council of s?cio-political 
communities (Ognjenovic, 2003). Collective bargaining agreements first appeared in 1989 but 
Krstic (2002) points out that in practice trade unions exerted minimal influence on wage 
setting outcomes. A special interest in maintaining a minimal difference in wages between 
skilled and unskilled workers remained as the main concern was given to employment 
maximisation (see earlier chapter 3). 
The key pre-transition distinction in public-private sector employment was actually a 
. division between agricultural and non-agricultural markets. Primorac and Babic· (1989) 
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describe the private agricultural sector as having low productivity, low incomes and a 
considerable amount of disguised unemployment. They point out that, although this sector 
accounted for almost a third of total employment, it was completely ignored by official 
statistics and the accepted practice was to discuss problems of employment in relation to the 
public (Le. so called 'social') sector only. 
4.2.3 Pay setting during the economic transition in the 1990s 
The introduction of a new special Collective Bargaining Agreement Law in 1990, 
finally allowed wage determination to have some regard to expertise, complexity of work, 
responsibility and working conditions (Ognjenovic, 2003). In addition, for the first time, 
flexible types of employment were allowed. 
However, the restructuring of the labour market was slowed down by the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1992, when real GDP declined 
by 27.9% (EBRD, 2002), a law was passed in which it was forbidden to lay-off employees in 
the public sector during the period of UN sanctions (Krstic, 2002). Moreover, the difference 
between the highest and the lowest public sector wage during the UN sanctions was 
prescribed to be 3 : 1 and workers on the so-called 'paid leave of absence' received part of 
their wages from a special fund (Krstic, 2002). The proclaimed policy that jobs had to be 
preserved during the period of economic sanctions served as a new form of subsidy, similar to 
unemployment benefits (Jovici6, Nojkovi6 and Paranos, 2000). As a consequence the policy in 
the public sector resulted in a steep decline of real wages (Jovicic, Nojkovic and Paranos, 
2000). 
Despite very low earnings in the public sector, Krstic (2002) explains that most of the 
. . 
employees kept formal employment status to preserve social benefits in the form of pension 
and health insurance, transportation and food allowances, compensating low wages by second 
job earnings in the informal sector. Krstic (2002) estimated that 33% of employees in 1997 
had a second job in the informal private sector. 
The economic policy on' privatisation during the 1990s was uncertain and 
contradictory causing diversified ownership types (Jovi6c, Nojkovic and Paranos, 2000). In 
particular, the first privatisation attempt started with the reform programme in 1989 and lasted 
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until 1994. In this period around a third of all public sector enterprises in Serbia had begun 
ownership transformation (Cerovic, 2002). The majority of these firms were privatised 
through share issues to employees at privileged terms. In this way few enterprises have been 
privately owned; most of them transformed their status into worker shareholdings or other 
types of companies typically in the so called 'mixed ownership' (Le. partially privatised). 
However, after hyperinflation 17 in 1994, the amendments to ex-post capital revaluation 
effectively blocked the privatisation process and led to a considerable decline of the relative 
share of privatised capital. At the same time the new ownership type - the 'state' sector was 
created. This sector was formed by transformation of around 40% socially owned enterprises 
into state owned companies by re-nationalisation in the early 1990s and after hyperinflation in 
1994 (Uvalic, 2001). The state sector included the most important infrastructure enterprises 
both on the state level and on the local level (so called 'public state' and 'public local' 
enterprises) in such sectors as transport (railways, roads, highways and air transport), water 
supply, radio and television, forestry and energy. In the period from 1994 to 1997, the 
privatisation process of the remaining socially-owned enterprises was mainly directed towards 
local investors and ownership transfers by enterprises remained voluntary. 
The new private sector had been emerging in a 'spontaneous' manner and was mainly 
present in the informal sector. The ratio of the informal economic activity to registered GDP 
in 1997 was 34.5% and to total GDP was 25.7% (Krstic, 2002). These figures confirm that 
effectively the private sector was large but not controlled. 
At the end of 1998, 76% of the total number of enterprises in the economy were new 
emerging private ,firms into the market (Uvalic, 2001), mostly in the trade and service sector 
and processing industry. These firms were mainly very small in terms of employment i.e. 
usually single proprietor firms with less than 10 employees and were largely pushed into the 
informal ~ e c t o r r of business activity due to restrictive regulations. Unlike in the public sector, 
the wages in the new emerging private sector consisting of large number of small firms .were 
determined by free market forces. 
17 Yugoslav hyperinflation lasted 24 months, between February 1992 and January 1994. During this period the 
price level rose by a factor of 3.6 x 1022 • It was the second highest recorded hyperinflation in the world history 
after the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-1946 and the second longest ever recorded after the Russian 
hyperinflation in the 1920s which lasted 26 months (Petrovic, Bogetic and V u j o ~ e v i c , , 1999). 
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4.2.4 Pay setting and privatisation during tlte economic transition after 2000 
In 2000 after democratic changes, Serbia initiated structural reforms and attempted to 
integrate the informal private sector into the formal economy. Economic activity was 
channeled from the informal to the formal private sector by fiscal reforms, financial sector 
restructuring, low corporate tax rates (10%) and the introduction of a value added tax (18%) 
(EBRD, 2002). 
The Serbian labour market as it is today was laid down by the new Labour Law in 
2001. The Law allowed employers the possibility to encourage highly educated workers and 
workers who contribute to development of the company through greater discretion in the 
determination of individual wages of employees (Ognjenovic, 2003). Moreover, from 200 I 
the government wage policy aimed to adjust the disparities across wages in activities that 
employ large portion of highly educated workers that had lagged behind the Republic's 
average growth for years, such as public education, public health and public services 
(Ognjenovic, 2003). 
Apart from the wage inflation pressures in the public sector arising from attempts to 
implement "catch-up" in some skilled professions, the influence of other labour market 
institutions such as unions and minimum wage was negligible. In particular, Arandarenko and 
Avlijas (2009) point that the union strength and coverage of employees by collective 
agreements had diminished during the entire period. The minimum wage has not been 
excessive (40% of the average wage during the 2000s) and its enforcement is found to be 
weak to such an extent that the average wages in some of the low-paid sectors of the economy . 
amounted to below the minimum wage. 
A radical change in the core concept of privatisation, from the insider's model to 
commercial sales, was made from 2001. The privatisation process was supervised by the 
Agency for Privatisation and has been predominantly based on the method of sale by auctions 
and tenders. Most of these firms have been sold after being restructured. Complete 
privatisation of the socially-owned enterprises was set to be finished by the end of 2008 while 
• • 
the privatisation of the mixed sector (i.e. partially privati sed but still with substantial capital 
stakes held by the state) was planned to be finalised by the end of 2010 (Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Social Policy (2005). 
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Figure 4.1: The composition of the work force by ownership type in 2001-2008 period 
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Notes to Figure 4. 1: Number of employed persons is a sum of: employed in enterprises, insititutions and 
organisations from the Semiannual Survey on Employees and Salaries and Wages (the data on employees in 
small size enterprises (up to 50 employees) from the Supplementary Survey to the Semiannual Survey also 
included), individual entrepreneurs persons solely running business and their employees from the Health 
Insurance Office of Serbia and agricultural producers from Labour Force Survey. Private sector includes number 
of employed persons in private property and public sector includes number of employed persons in all other 
types of property (state, social, mixed, cooperative). 
Data Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
Figure 4.1 presents sectoral shares in total number of formal employees by ownership 
type during the period of large-scale privatisation. from 2001 until 2008. A share of the 
private sector increased from 45% in 2001 to 67% in 2008 whereas the public sector declined 
from 55% in 2001 to 33% in 2008. The private sector surpassed the public sector share in 
employment from 2003. 
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4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Administrative data 
Employer-provided administrative data from bi-annual Survey data on Employees and 
Salaries and Wages cover those employed in enterprises, institutions, cooperatives and 
organisations of all property types that have been actually envisaged as censuses of medium 
and large firms and institutions in the formal sector. From 1997 the Serbian cfficial statistics 
collects data on employees in small-size enterprises (Le. up to 50 employees) by using the 
Supplementary Survey to Semi-annual Survey. Both surveys contain data on the number of 
employees and monthly wage bills collected on 31 st March and 30th September each year. 
Employees are defined as those who are formally employed - persons with a formal legal 
contract in their employment. From 2003 the data from personnel records are disaggregated 
by industry branch, region, gender, educational qualification and ownership type. 
Nevertheless, administrative data does not provide a representative sample of the 
labour market for public-private sector earnings estimation during the period of economic 
transition. This is because: (1) data is disproportionately collected from public sector 
employers and does not include individual entrepreneurs (Le. shops, self-employed, agencies) 
and their employees (2) this source of data covers the formal sector only and (3) the average 
monthly wages before and after taxes, contributions and deductions are calculated by simply 
dividing wage bills by total number of workers regardless of whether workers received 
remuneration in the actual month or not. 
The fact that the private sector is largely underestimated by this data source is best 
presented in the Figure 4.2. This depicts the share of the private sector in total employment 
recorded by a d m i n i s t r a t i v ~ ~ data and by the Labour Force Survey data during the period of 
large-scale privatisations. Figure 4.2 suggests that the Labour Force Survey data provides a 
more accurate picture of the labour market during the economic transition in Serbia. 
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Figure 4.2: The private sector share in total employment by different sources of data 
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However, administrative data may provide an insight into changes in public sector 
employment during the period of economic transition as given by Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: Public sector employment during economic transition 
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Notes to Table 4.3: 1997-2000 is a proxy of public sector employment since the Statistical Office has 
not recorded the employer's ownership type during this period. But the sample relates mainly to employed 
persons in public sector enterprises, institutions and organisations. Ownership type is provided from 200 I. 
Data Source: Statistical Office of the Republ ic of Serbia 
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Table 4.2: Public sector employment structure by industry branch 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agriculture 5.23 5.23 5.17 5.15 4.91 4.64 4.47 4.42 4.26 3.70 
Industry and Mining 43.27 43.23 43.00 42.59 38.21 36.12 33.68 31.91 29.76 26.98 
Construction 6.56 6.31 6.09 5.81 5.18 5.07 5.00 4.96 4.80 4.36 
Trade 9.79 9.24 8.98 8.59 6.66 6.36 5.79 5.32 4.94 4.48 
Catering and Tourism 2.18 2.20 2.26 2.17 1.98 1.81 1.74 1.67 1.61 1.44 
Transport 7.40 7.42 7.44 7.53 7.97 8.18 8.31 8.38 8.59 8.55 
Finance 4.91 4.78 4.79 4.79 4.61 4.62 4.96 5.32 5.26 5.09 
Government 3.21 3.48 3.62 3.79 5.31 5.95 6.46 6.91 7.38 8.19 
Education and Health 15.00 15.59 16.11 16.93 22.18 24.12 26.12 27.41 29.51 33.01 
Other services 2.47 2.52 2.54 2.65 ·2.98 3.14 3.47 3.69 3.88 4.18 
Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
.. Notes to Table 4.2: 1997-2000 IS a proxy of publIc sector employment since the Statistical Office has not 
recorded the employer's ownership type but the sample relates mainly to employed persons in enterprises. 
institutions and organisations in the public sector. Only from 2003 the questionnaire was expanded and 
employers provide data on their ownership type and industry branch and employee structure by gender and 
educational qualification. 
Data Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
In addition, Table 4.2 shows the public sector employment structure by industry 
branch from 1997 until 2008. Since the large-scale privatisations only started in the post-2000 
period, changes in the public sector industry branch structure recorded by Table 4.2 in the 
2003-2008 period are mainly due to privatisation. Public sector restructuring during the period 
of large-scale privatisations is best observed by the decline in the proportion of employees in 
industry and mining, construction, trade and agriculture and an increase in the proportion of 
employees in government administration, education and health. This data will be utilised later 
in the instrumental variable procedure to infer the likelihood of changes in individual public 
sector status due to privatisation. 
4.3.2 Labour Force Survey data 
The annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) have been conducted continuously since 1995 
by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. This individual level data survey is based 
on a nationally representative random sample obtained by using a two-staged stratified 
sampling method. The p r i m ~ ~ sampling units in LFS are census districts with a minimum of 
20 households. The secondary sample units are households selected with equal' probabilities. 
Five households are randomly selected in each census district. 
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Box 4.1: LFS main employment definitions from LFS Methodology, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
LFS from 1995 until 2003 LFS from 200" 
Total Employed Individuals who performed some work for remuneration (in money or in kind) at least one day in the Individuals who performed some work for remuneration (in money or in kind) at least hour in 
reference week (based on formal or oral agreement) as well as each person that has job but in the the reference week (based on formal or oral agreement). 
week obserVed was absent from work due to illness or injury, holiday or vacation, strike or lockout, 
educational or training leave, maternity or parental leave, reduction in economic activity, temporary 
disorganisation or sllspension of work because of bad weather, mechanical or electrical breakdown, 
or shortage of raw materials or fuels, or other temporary absence. As employed are defined also 
supporting household members that were helping in the household more than I S hours in the 
reference period to whom this work is the only way of providing subsistence and those who stated 
that they had not worked for pay in response to the standard question but performed some temporary 
. short-term work during the reference week . 
Paid Employed Employees with formal or oral agreement (regardless of whether or not receive social benefits), Self -
employed, Owners and Co-owners. 
Employees Employees with formal or oral agreement (regardless of whether or not receive social benefits). Employees with formal or oral agreement, members of the household that help in household 
business (in the field or in firm) and are paid for the work, pupils and students on the paid 
practice and all those performing any other paid temporary activity. 
Self-employed Individuals that earn for living from individual profession (scientist, artists, lawyers etc.). An individual that earns for living from individual profession (scientist, artists, lawyers etc.) or 
.. perform any other work without employees, farmers that work individually and do not provide 
paid help to family members or persons that independently find and organize jobs for 
, 
themselves (usually unregistered jobs such as child keeping, private lessons, selling goods on 
the flea market etc.). 
Owners Owners and Co-owners of private or mixed ownership firm regardless of whether the firm is in the An individual that is self-employed but employs at least one person, owners and co-owners of 
country or abroad. enterprises, entrepreneurs (private shops, agencies etc.) and farmers that use paid help of family 
members or others. 
Helpers An individual that has performed unpaid work more than IS hours in the last (reference) week in the An individual that helps family members in family business and is not paid for that job. 
family firm, farm, shop if that job is the only way of providing subsistence. Students who only temporarily help in family business that can be done without their help are 
not included. 
Farmers An individual that earns for living only from agriculture regardless whether works on its own land 
(farm) or not 
I 
Temporarily An individual who, during the reference period, performed some work for money, but which was not 
Active a permenent and regular source of income. Thus, here are included all individuals who stated that 
they had not worked for pay in response to the standard question i.e. they neither had any job nor 
. 
they actively looked for one but still performed some temporary short-term work during the 
reference week. 
Other Active An individual that earns for living by finding and organizing jobs independently (usually 
unregistered jobs such as child keeping, house cleaning, goods selling on a flea markets) 
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Stratification is performed across settlement type (Le., urban and rural) and across the Serbian 
territory (Vojvodina, Belgrade, Central Serbia). 
The survey is conducted in October each year with the exception of the 1995 survey 
which was undertaken in March and September and that of 1996 which was conducted in 
May. From 2008 data is collected twice per year in April and in October. Each of the LFS data 
sets represents a cross-sectional view of the labour market. I8 
The long term trend in employee wages from 1995 to 2008 is hard to measure because 
there was a break in LFS methodology in 2004 when the employee definition was completely 
revisited and fully adjusted to the International Labour Organisation and Eurostat definition. 
Box 4.1 explains the main classificatory differences between two LFS data sets according to 
LFS Methodology in 1996 and 2004. The LFS 1995-2003 employment categories such as paid 
employed (employees, self-employed, owners and co-owners), helpers, farmers, temporarily 
active and other active do not match the new ones in LFS 2004-2008: employers, self-
employed, employees and helpers. 
In addition, the LFS sampling frame was changed in 2004. The LFS sampling frame 
between 1995 and 2003 was based on the 1991 Census of Population in the Republic of 
Serbia. The total number of selected households within 880 census districts was 4,400 and 
around 12,000 individuals were interviewed in each survey. The latter dataset, from 2004 to 
2008, is based on the 2002 Census of Population in the Republic of Serbia. The number of 
census districts increased to 1,300; the total number of households increased to 6,500 (7,000 
in 2008) and the number of individuals that were interviewed in each survey increased to 
around 20,000. 
18 rotating panel element is introduced only from 2008. 
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4.3.3 Living Standard Measurement Survey data 
The Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) is another source of individual 
level data. It is carried out by The Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Affairs19 in 
June 2002 and repeated in 2003. 
The LSMS is a study of household living standards and contains a rich set of personal 
and household welfare characteristics as well as information on labour market status. The 
LSMS is nationally representative and designed as two-stage sampling survey based on 2002 
Census of Population in the Republic of Serbia. In the first stage, Serbia is stratified by six 
main regions and within each region by urban and rural areas. Once the enumeration districts 
are selected in each unit a constant number of households are chosen and all the persons in the 
selected households are interviewed. The 2002 sample size included 6,386 households in 621 
census rounds with 19,725 individuals interviewed. In repeated survey in 2003, the first stage 
units were selected from the basic sample (obtained in 2002) by including only even 
numbered census block units. This means that 2003 survey was conducted using a sample of 
2,548 households with 8,027 individuals. 
A labour market module of LSMS questionnaire is consistent with the 2004-2008 LFS. 
Both LFS from 2004 and LSMS determine the labour market activity in the same way and use 
the standard International Labour Organisation methodology for definition on employment. 
19 LSMS were implemented as the Governments' own studies supported by the World Bank advisory teams. The 
primary data collection for 2002 and 2003 was conducted by the Strategic Marketing and Media Research 
Institute (SMMRI) (see Bjeloglav, David, Krstic and Matkovic, 2007). 
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4.4 Public-private sector pay differentials 
4.4.1 Changes in employment composition during the economic transition 
In this sub-section, changes in employment composition between public and private 
sectors are examined from 1995 until 2008 by using LFS annual samples for employees aged 
from 15 to 64 who reported non zero mainjob wages and hours of work. 
In LFS 1995-2003 the public sector is set to include all ownership types other than 
private (state, social, cooperative and mixed). The public sector in LFS 2004-2008 includes 
state and social ownership types whereas other properties are excluded because they are 
recorded from 2008 jointly as category 'other' which also includes unknown ownership types. 
The main sample changes indicate: (1) the growth of private sector employment and 
(2) public sector restructuring towards a larger number of highly qualified workers 
(professionals) in education, government and health. 
The proportion of employees in the private sector in LFS data sample has been 
increasing considerably since 1995. In the 1995 sample, 5.5% of men and 10.3% of women 
are working in the private sector and in the 2003 sample, this proportion had increased to 25% 
for men and 30% for women. Krstic (2002) highlights that women appear more likely to work 
in the private sector than men, but that this would be different if the focus of the analysis were 
not only on employees but also other employment categories such as self-employed and 
employers where males tend to be in the majority. In the 2004 data sample, 39% of men and 
40% of women have a private sector job and in 2008 this proportion had increased to 60% of 
men and 53.5,% of women. 
Changes in employment composition by industry branch across the public and private 
sectors are illustrated on Figures 4.4 and 4.5 for men and women separately. The effects of 
privatisation are clearly presented through a decline of the fraction of public sector men and 
women employed in industry branches such as industry and mining, construction, trade and 
agriculture and through increase o(the share of these branches in the private sector. Pubfic 
sector restructuring led to increases .in a share of men and women working in government 
administration, education, culture and health. 
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Figure 4.4: Changes in employment composition by industry branch and sector for men 
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Data Source: Calculated by author from Labour Force Surveys for 1995, 2003, 2004 and 2008 
Figure 4.5: Changes in employment composition by industry branch and sector for 
women 
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Data Source: Calculated by author from Labour Force Surveys for 1995, 2003, 2004 and 2008 
Noteworthy changes were also found in the occupational composition between 1995-
2003 and 2004-2008 samples. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that the public sector has been 
restructured towards high skilled professions in education, health and administration. 
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Figure 4.6: Changes in employment composition by occupation and sector for men 
100'/0 
00'/0 
W/O 
70>/0 
aJ'/o 
50% 
4CP/o 
3CP/o 
2lY/o 
10% 
Public 
(1'/0 -j--lL-..l-,--'--"-r- -"-,,-
1995 2003 2004 2008 
Private 
1995 2003 2004 2008 
o F'rtEssiaa cr Mist 
o V\b1(a" in Ad'liristrctiCJ1 
o V\otrKer in the 5eNce Sectcr 
o V\otrKer in Traia 
• Mner, lrd.Jstriai cr Simla' 
V\b1(a" 
oFamer 
Data Source: Calculated by author from Labour Force Surveys for 1995, 2003, 2004 and 2008 
Figure 4.7: Changes in sector employment composition by occupation and sector for 
women 
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These changes are more pronounced for women than for men. For example, in the 
1995 sample women make up 40% of the public sector work force out of which around 35% 
works in education, health and administration. In the 2008 sample, the share of the female 
workforce in the public sector is 46% out of which around 70% works in education, health and 
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administration. In addition, whereas the share of blue collar occupations such as miners and 
industrials has declined in the public sector it has increased in the private sector. 
Apart from the differences in occupational and industry branch structure public and 
private sector samples differ in other workers' characteristics. Public and private sector LFS 
sample proportions and means of the job and workers' characteristics are reported for men and 
women in Tables A4.2 and A4.3 in the Appendix. The following conclusions from these 
Tables can be pinned down. In general, public sector workers are on average older with more 
labour force experience than private sector workers. Moreover, public sector workers are 
better educated with roughly 5-9% more men and 9-14% more women with university degrees 
than private sector workers. Workers with secondary school degree are more likely to work in 
the private than in the public sector. Private sector workers are more likely to work longer 
hours per month and be single. From 2004 in particular, public sector workers are more likely 
to live in the cities and private sector workers in the rural areas. 
4.4.2 Trends in pay levels and pay inequality in tlte public and private sectors during 
economic transition 
This sub-section illustrates trends in unconditional real hourly earnings by gender and 
ownership type at different points of the pay distribution and summarises the magnitude of 
pay inequality in each sector. Three different measures of pay variability or dispersion are 
used: the standard deviation of the log of hourly earnings, the decile ratios and the Gini 
coefficients. The LFS provides earnings data net of taxes, pension and welfare payments. The 
earnings measure relates to total remuneration which includes regular wage and all non-wage 
benefits from the main job (such as meal and transportation allowances). The earnings are 
I • 
denoted in Serbian currency (dinar) and converted to October 2005 prices. 
Trends in the real hourly earnings by ownership type at different points of the log pay 
distribution are presented for male and female workers on Figures 4.8 and 4.9. The Figures 
disclose variability in pay level during 1995-2003 and upward trend during 2004-2008 in both 
public and private sectors at all percentiles. 
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Figure 4.8: Real hourly earnings percentiles for male employees in public and private 
sectors in Serbia, 1995-2008 
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Figure 4.9: Real hourly earnings percentiles for female employees in public and private 
sectors in Serbia, 1995-2008 
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Notes 10 Figures 4.8 and 4.9: Hourly earnings percentiles are given in natural logarithm values. Earnings relate 
to total main job pay compensation (regular wage plus non-wage benefits) net of taxes, pensions and welfare 
benefits and expressed in October 2005 prices. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia (LFS), 1995-2008 
In particular, Figure 4.8 shows that in most of the years, during 1995-2003 period, 
public and private sector male workers at and below the median of unconditional hourly 
earnings distribution fared similarly in terms of pay. But those above the median fared better 
in the private sector. Figure 4.9 shows that only female workers at the 10th percentile of the 
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unconditional hourly earnings distribution fared similarly across sectors whereas public sector 
provided pay advantage for all other percentiles during 1995-2003. During 2004-2008 period 
both male and female workers at all the percentiles of unconditional hourly earnings 
distribution fared better in the public than in the private sector. The advantage of holding a 
public sector job was the greatest for workers at and below the median. 
Table 4.3: Earnings inequality by gender and ownership type in Serbia, 1995-2008 
90/10th Decile Ratio Standard Deviation Gini Coefficient 
Year Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
1995 1.30 1.48 1.39 1.27 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.50 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.29 
1996 1.43 1.48 1.45 1.31 0.59 0.68 0.58 0.52 0.30 0.42 0.28 0.30 
1997 1.51 1.39 1.46 1.14 0.61 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 
1998 1.36 1.50 1.36 1.34 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.52 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.28 
1999 1.36 1.40 1.24 1.24 0.54 0.62 0.52 0.54 0.28 0.34 0.26 0.30 
2000 1.25 1.20 1.12 1.10 0.52 0.58 0.46 0.46 0.28 0.31 0.24 0.25 
2001 1.25 1.34 1.27 1.10 0.51 0.54 0.52 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.24 
2002 1.19 1.28 1.19 1.35 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.29 
2003 1.17 1.13 1.10 1.13 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.28 
2004 1.23 1.39 1.10 1.35 0.55 0.59 0.48 0.59 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.32 
2005 1.20 1.48 1.14 1.35 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.32 
2006 1.19 1.32 1.10 1.37 0.48 0.53 0.45 0.55 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.32 
2007 1.15 1.20 1.20 1.31 0.49 0.56 0.48 0.52 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.30 
2008 1.20 1.16 1.20 1.16 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.28 
1m ,tn Notes to Table 4.3. DeCile ratio 90110 IS calculated as the difference between the log earnmgs at the 90 
percentile and at the 10th percentile. The Gini coefficient estimates use earnings in the unlogged form. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia (LFS) from 1995 until 2008 
The magnitude of pay inequality measured by the standard deviation of the log of 
hourly earnings, the 90/10th decile ratio of the log of hourly earnings and the Gini coefficient 
of hourly earnings by gender and ownership type is summarised in Table 4.3. The standard 
deviation or square root of variance is the average difference of the scores from the mean of 
the log pay distribution. The 90/10th ratio presents the difference between estimated log pay 
on the 90th and on the 10th percentile of the pay distribution. Unlike the decile ratios that relate 
the pay at the different percentiles of the distribution, the Gini coefficient is a measure of 
inequality across the whole distribution, as it is influenced by the shape of the distribution at 
all percentiles.2o 
20 If one randomly draws two people from the population then the expected wage difference between those two 
people as a proportion of the average wage is twice the Gini coefficient, so that Gini of 0.238 says that the 
expected wage gap between two men chosen at random is 47.6% of the average pay (Puhani, 1997). 
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According to all measures of pay inequality presented in Table 4.3 the private sector 
earnings distribution is wider than the public sector earnings distribution for both men and 
women over the most of the years observed. The public sector pay inequality during 1995-
2003 period has rather an inverted U shape i.e. increasing in the first three years and declining 
afterwards. During the 2004-2008 period the public sector pay inequality declines until 2006 
and increases in the last two years. On the other hand, there was a private sector pay 
compression in the last two years. This period coincides with tax reform that allowed tax 
exemption for the first 5,000 Serbian dinars of every wage from January 1, 200721 which is 
likely to have affected more private than public sector earnings given that minimum wage 
recipients or those receiving only slightly higher earnings are more concentrated in the private 
sector. 
4.4.3 Empirical studies on public-private sector pay differentials 
Public-private sector pay differentials have been estimated by studies that used 
Yugoslav Labour Force Survey data (YLFS) for either Serbia or the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.22 The reviewed studies in this sub-section differ in years covered by the analysis 
as well as in econometric methods used. The studies also differ in earnings definitions and 
workers' samples used. Nevertheless, they make the same distinction between the public and 
private sector. In particular the public sector is set to include all ownership types other than 
private. 
A first study that estimated public-private pay differentials in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was by J o v i ~ i c , , Nojkovic and Paranos (2000). The OLS method is used to 
estimate the sectoral gap in 1998. Apart from wage earners, owners and co-owners of private 
. . 
enterprises and the self-employed are also included in the working sample. Hence, the 
proportions of persons employed were roughly: 116 in the private sector and 5/6 in the public 
sector. The authors write that: " ... differences in averages for some of the allowances (other 
than wages) are significantly in favour of the social (Le. public) sector for lunch allowance, 
21 as well as reductions in the personal income tax burden from 14 to 12 percent of the gross wage, Quarterly 
Monitor of Economic trends and Policies in Serbia (2007) No.8. . 
22 Confederation of two Republics: Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006. 
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union help, and 'other earnings'. However, in total, wages make up as much as 85.3% of total 
earnings (83.3% in the social sector and 95.4% in the private sector) and we take monthly 
wage as a dependent variable"; (Jovicic, Nojkovic and Paranos, 2000, p. 6). Therefore, 
although realising the difference in the total pay remuneration across sectors the analysis in 
this study is based not on the total monthly pay remuneration but rather on a regular monthly 
wage. JoviCic, Nojkovic and Paranos (2000) found that the private sector seems mostly to 
reward men between 35 and 40 years old (and proportionately to their education) who work 
long hours and preferably run their own businesses. 
Considering the first years of economic transition from 1995 until 2000, Reilly (2003) 
provided evidence for a private sector premium in Serbia for male employees aged between 
18 and 64. The results of this study are rather inconclusive. Indeed, Reilly (2003) pointed that 
the estimated gap behaved erratically during the 1990s. In particular, applying quantile 
regression analysis of hourly wages and controlling for a large set of workers' characteristics 
(education, labour force experience, nationality, industry, occupation, settlement type, region 
and marital status). Reilly (2003) reported zero private sector premium at the 10th percentile 
and 65% at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution in 1995, but no significant premia 
across the distribution in 1996. In 1997, a 20% private sector premium was estimated for the 
10th percentile but no significant pay gap was found at the 90th percentile. In 1998, around a 
20% premium was found across the wage distribution. In 1999 premium was significant at 
both ends of the distribution whereas in 2000 workers in the middle of the distribution were 
estimated to obtain the greatest premia. Hence, Reilly (2003) commented that the movements 
displayed by private sector premium do not appear to have developed a settled pattern over the 
years considered. 
In addition, Reilly (2003) estimated tne average private sector premium to be 32.7% 
by pooling 1995-2000 data. The quantile regression estimates obtained in this study suggested 
a 17% premium for workers at the 25th percentile and almost a 70% premium for workers at 
90th percentile while workers at other percentiles of the wage distribution obtained no 
significant 'premiums' compared to their private sector counterparts. 
• • 
From reading the Reilly (2003)'s paper it is not clear whether the earnings definition 
relates to regular w ~ g e e only or expands the definition of the wage with s o ~ e e or all non-wage 
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benefits recorded by the survey (such as meal and travel allowances, union help, vacation 
bonuses and other supplements) which remember, are disproportionately prevalent in the 
public sector. Reilly (2003) writes: "The earnings measure available within the YLFS is based 
on the mainjob only" (p.7.), and gives no other detail how earnings were actually created. 
Finally, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) employed YLFS data for both male and female 
employees from 15 to 64 years old but only examined the year 2000. In addition, this study 
used the sample for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Le. Serbia and Montenegro) rather 
than only for Serbia (as used by Reilly (2003». 
Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) acknowledged the importance of non-wage benefits in 
comparisons of earnings between public and private sectors. The authors write: " Our wage 
definition is based on main job earnings only, which includes the regular wage and all 
additional wage payments (transportation subsidies, payments in kind, and such)", (Jovanovic 
and Lokshin, 2003, p. 8). 
Furthermore, this study attempted to correct for sector selection by using marital status 
and number of job holders in a household to obtain selectivity corrected wage estimates. 
Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) found that the private sector premium after controlling for 
squared labour force experience, education, industry and region was on average 9.4% for men 
and 4% for women in 2000, using an endogenous switching regression model. 
Relative to the average estimate reported for male employees by Reilly (2003) the self-
selection corrected private sector pay premia estimated by Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) is 
lower by 22 percentage points. A difference in estimates obtained by these two studies is quite 
substantial and may indicate: (1) differences in the samples for the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Serbia (2) differences due to earnings definitions used and/or (3) the 
importance of the self-selection bias in the cross-sectional estimates. 
Nevertheless, the effect of the instruments used for self-selection by Jovanovic and 
Lokshin (2003) is rather dubious for two reasons. First, a positive relationship between marital 
status and wages is a common finding in the literature (e.g. Dustmann and Van Soest, 1998). 
S.econd, the number of job holders in a household a r g u ~ b l y y picks up a tendency towards job 
security. Moreover, it is found to have a significant effect on the sector choice of females but 
not of males. 
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In order to test the findings of some of the previous studies and extend the estimation 
period over the major phase of economic transition in Serbia which started after 2000 the 
chapter proceeds with econometric analysis of public-private sector earnings differentials 
from 1995 until 2008. 
4.5 Econometric analysis 
4.5.1 Data definitions 
The empirical analysis is based on LFS and LSMS data sources for Serbia23• The 
working samples are restricted to male and female employees between 15 and 64 years old 
who reported non-zero monthly wages and non-zero hours of work for their main job only. 
We make a distinction between two main sectors: public and private. In LFS 1995-
2003 the public sector is set to include all ownership types other than private. The same 
distinction between sectors is used in other studies that measured public-private sector pay 
differentials in Serbia (e.g. Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) and Reilly (2003)). In particular, 
LFS 1995-2000 records four ownership types: social, private, cooperative and mixed. From 
2001 the state and unknown property categories are also distinguished. From 2008 the 
registered and unregistered employers are distinguished within the private sector and apart 
from social and state ownership there is a category 'other' ownership types (cooperative, 
mixed and unknown). The LSMS 2002-2003 distinguishes among private (registered and 
unregistered), state/social, mixed and cooperative ownership types. To make samples 
compatible the public sector in LSMS 2002-2003 and LFS 2004-2008 includes only state and 
social ownership types whereas other properties (cooperative, mixed and unknown) are 
excluded. In addition, the private sector in LFS 2008 and LSMS 2002-2003 includes private 
registered and non-registered firms because this distinction is made only in these surveys. 
Table 4.4 provides information on the timing of the surveys and of working sample 
sizes, by gender and ownership type. In contrast to the 1995-2003 period, the sizes of the 
• 
23 Respondents from Kosovo and Montenegro are excluded due to the lack of consistent responses over the full 
period considered. 
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private and public sector samples became similar during 2004-2008 and we restrict our 
analysis in LSMS 2002-2003 and LFS 2004-2008 to full-time employees only. 
Table 4.4: Timing of surveys and number of observations used in analysis 
Reference Year 
Number of Males Number of Females Total 
Data 
and a Month 
Public Private Public Private 
LFS March-95 1,399 80 930 107 2,516 
May-96 1,375 93 925 96 2,489 
Oct-97 1,372 116 954 117 2,559 
Oct-98 1,327 159 956 159 2,601 
Oct-99 1,290 173 919 178 2,560 
Oct-OO 1,421 213 1,008 225 2,867 
Oct-Ol 1,329 273 947 233 2,782 
Oct-02 1,272 284 910 251 2,717 
Oct-03 1,164 381 792 332 2,669 
LSMS June-02 1,605 518 1,162 462 3,747 
June-03 530 260 392 199 1,381 
LFS Oct-04 1,472 935 1,091 721 4,219 
Oct-05 1,314 1,123 1,002 729 4,168 
Oct-06 1,186 1,186 966 797 4,135 
Oct-07 1,059 1,261 881 894 4,095 
Oct-08 959 1,423 832 958 4,172 
Data Source: LFS successive years from 1995 to 2008 and LSMS in 2002 and 2003 
The earnings measure relates to pay received for the reference month and any arrears 
owed to the worker may be reflected in the monthly pay measure. It is not possible to 
distinguish between employees who failed to report their earnings and those who did not 
received earnings in the reference month. Furthermore, all data sets collect information on 
earnings excluding taxes, pensions and any payments by the worker into welfare plans. In 
contrast to the LSMS, in LFS (except in year 2008), there is no information as to whether the 
, • 
employee has paid insurance for pension and health or not. The share of workers without paid 
insurance is 4% in LSMS 2002-2003 sample while in the LFS 2008 sample about 6.5% of 
individuals are not entitled to pension or health insurance (6.3% in the private sector and 0.2% 
in the public sector). 
The greater share of workers not entitled to pension or health insurance in the· private 
rather than in the public sector will tend to overestimate the public sector penalty and, 
conversely, underestimate the public sector premium. Although we acknowledge this problem 
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there is no reasonable way to resolve it due to data limitations. Another common problem for 
researchers using self-reported data is the possibility that individuals under-report their 
earnings. If this is more likely for private sector workers then this will affect the public sector 
pay gap in the opposite direction of the effect of social insurance entitlements. 
An advantage of the LFS 1995-2003 and LSMS 2002-2003 datasets is that they 
provide detailed information on the wage and non-wage benefits from the main job. In 
particular, the LFS 1995-2003 records separately six categories of monthly earnings from the 
main job: (1) the regular wage (2) meal and transportation allowances (3) union assistance (4) 
in-kind benefits (5) credits from the firm (not from the bank) and (6) all other benefits from 
the main job. Hence, the hourly earnings from the main job are defined to include regular 
wage and all non-wage benefits. Our earnings definition is consistent with Jovanovic and 
Lokshin (2003). As mentioned earlier, the importance of these various components of total 
remuneration changed radically over the period. 
Table 4.5: Average Annual Share of Wages and Hot Meal and Transport Allowances in 
Earnings by Ownership Type and Gender in Serbia, 1995-2003 
Male Female 
Public Private Public Private 
Hot Meal Hot Meal Hot Meal Hot Meal 
and and and and 
Transport Transport Transport Transport 
Year Wage Allowances Wage Allowances Wage Allowances Wage Allowances 
1995 85% 14% 94% 6% 82% 16% 92% 7% 
1996 84% 15% 92% 8% 81% 17% 92% 8% 
1997 84% 15% 93% 7% 83% 15% 91% 6% 
1998 85% 13% 95% 5% 82% 16% 94% 6% 
1999 85% 15% 94% 6% 82% 17% 94% 6% 
2000 84% 16% 95% 4% 81% 19% 94% 6% 
2001 96% 3% 99% 1% 96% 4% 98% 1% 
2002 97% 2% 99% 0% 98% 2% 99% 0% 
2003 98% 2% 99% 0% 98% 1% 99% 0% 
Data Source: Authors calculatIOns from LFS successive years from 1995 to 2003 
Table 4.5 shows the different components of total remuneration for both public and 
private sector employees during the 1995-2003 period. Before the fiscal reform in 2001, about 
. , 
85% of the total earnings received by public sector workers were regular payments (Le. wage), 
and approximately. 15% were subsidies on transportation and meals (Le. non-wage payments). 
In the private sector, only about 4% of the total earnings came from such subsidies, and 96% 
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came from regular wages. Payments in kind, credits from employers, and other kinds of non-
wage payments constituted less than 1 % of total earnings in the private sector. 
The motive for different components of total remuneration across sectors was that 
additional (non-wage) payments to earnings, such as meal and transportation allowances etc., 
were non-taxable before the fiscal refonn in June 2001. Consequently, for the employees in 
the fonnal sector, dominated by the public sector work-force, non-wage payments comprised 
an important part of income during the 1990s. After the fiscal refonn in June 2001 these 
additional benefits became a part of a regular wage and thereby, differentially affected the 
trajectory of public and private sector wages. 
For this reason, in the LFS 1995-2003 and LSMS 2002-2003 samples, all non-wage 
components are added to the regular wage of the individual. This total remuneration from the 
main job is denoted as 'earnings' in our study. As explained, the difference between total 
remuneration and the regular wage diminished after 2001. L.FS 2004-2008 does not record 
non-wage benefits as separate categories. 
Finally, the earnings definition used in our analysis is based on the hourly earnings of 
the main job. In LFS 1995-2003 the hourly pay is computed from monthly pay divided by 
actual number of hours worked in the previous month. Since the survey reference period for 
actual hours worked was a week prior to the interview, we mUltiply the reported total hours 
worked in the previous week by the average number of weeks in a month (i.e. 4.25) and 
assume that the number of hours worked was unifonn in the month prior to the interview. In 
addition to the actual number of hours worked in the last week, the LFS 2004-2008 provides 
information on the usual numbers of hours worked per week. The latter is found to have lower 
standard deviation and is used for hourly pay calculation in this data set. In LSMS 2002-2003 
the infonnation on working hours in the last month is available and hence the last month's pay 
is·divided by last month's working hours to calculate the hourly pay. The hourly pay in all data 
sets is deflated.by using the consumer price index (CPI) that relates to the month in which the 
various surveys were conducted. The CPI is recalculated using October 2005 as the base. 
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4.5.2 Variables used in empirical analysis 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are described in Table A4.1 in the 
Appendix. The dependent variable is an individual worker's log hourly real after tax earnings. 
The explanatory variables include: labour force experience, educational qualification, 
nationality, marital status, occupation, geographical location by region and settlement type, 
industry branch and employers' ownership type. 
All explanatory variables are categorical variables. Specifically, the binary regressor 
takes the value one if a certain variable can be attached to the employee based on the answer 
provided in the survey questionnaire and zero otherwise. 
The wage earners are grouped into five categories according to the labour force 
experience: less than 5 years, between 5 and 10 years, between 10 and 20 years, between 20 
and 30 years and more than 30 years of experience. Three marital status (single, married and 
other (divorced or widow)) and nationality types (Serbian, Montenegrin and other 
nationalities) are formed. The educational information in the datasets allows for the 
differentiation of five education groups: less than primary school, primary school, secondary 
school, college and university degree and above. 
Although the industry branch code system changed from 2001 and the occupational 
code system changed from 2004, we are able to form consistent industry branches and 
occupations categorical (dummy) variables for the whole observed period. Each of the nine 
regressors are created based on detailed classifications of industries and occupations provided 
by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. The industry branch variable consists of the 
following categorical (dummy) variables: agriculture; industry and mining; construction; 
transport; trade; catering and tourism; financial and other services; government administration 
and social security; education, culture and health. The occupation variable consists of the 
following categorical (dummy) variables: farmer; miner or worker in industry or similar; 
worker in trade; worker in services; welfare worker; worker in administration (clerk); 
manager; professional or artist and other. Three regional dummies are created according to 
• 
individual geographical location: Belgrade (Serbian capital and suburbs) and Central Serbia 
and Vojvodina (the provinces). In addition we distinguish across two settlement types: urban 
. and rural. 
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4.5.3 Econometric methods and methodological issues 
In general, the public and private sector earnings equations can be estimated 
conditional on the set of worker and job characteristics in the following 'double equation' 
model: 
Private sector: 1 NP NP + f3' NP + NP nWi =a Xi Gi (4.1) 
Public sector: (4.2) 
where NP and P denote non-public (Le. private) and public sectors respectively. Therefore, 
In Wi j is the log of real hourly earnings for the i th individual if he/she works in the j sector 
which is explained by Xi set of observed worker and job characteristics such as labour force 
experience, educational qualification, marital status, nationality, settlement type, region, 
industry branch and occupational affiliation with the sector-specific parameter vector f3 j and 
G s are error terms constructed to be uncorrelated with x. 
Cross sectional differences (Le. those estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS» in 
earnings between public and private sector employees with similar characteristics can be 
obtained by pooling both sectors' data together in an earnings regression with a dummy 
variable ~ ~ taking the value one if i th employee works in the public sector and zero . 
otherwise. This 'dummy variable' model is given by: 
In Wi = a + f3' Xi + r ~ ~ + G i (4.3) 
where r is the 'average' estimate of the public sector pay gap equivalent to an intercept shift. 
The 'dummy variable' approach given by (4.3) does not allow for inter-sectoral differences in 
the returns to skill or any other worker and job characteristic since it assumes that 
/3 = /3 P = /3 NP which mayor may not be true. 
In order to test whether the 'returns' to any characteristics X differ statistically 
significantly between sectors the xs can be interacted with the public sector dummy variable. 
P . In this case a public sector pay gap as such is not estimated but only the inter-sectoral 
differences for any characteristics. The fully interacted model takes the following form: 
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(4.4) 
where /3 is the private sector effect of any .variable in x (Le. /3 NP) and /3 + f is the public 
sector effect of any variable in x (i.e. = /3 p) whereas f is the inter-sectoral difference for any 
variable in x. 
Furthermore, a decomposition method is a way of using the split sample model to 
estimate the returns to characteristics and the returns to coefficients separately. This method 
decomposes the pay differential into a component that is due to difference in the mean values 
of characteristics and a componenent that is due to difference in the returns to characteristics 
(Le. coefficients). Following Oaxaca (1973) a decomposition model can be written as: 
lnw P -lnw NP =(x p -x NP)/3NP +[ (a P -a NP )+x P (f3 P _/3NP) ] (4.5) 
where the first bracket represents the effect of differences in characteristics and the second 
bracket represents the effect of differences in coefficients (could be interpreted as public 
sector earnings premium or penalty). 
Away from the conditional means all these models ('double equation', 'dummy 
variable' and decomposition models) can be estimated for the conditional quantiles of the 
earnings distribution. While the conditional mean is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression which predicts the average (mean) earnings by minimising the sum of squared 
errors, the quantile regressions predict the quantiles of the earnings distribution by minimising 
the absolute sums of the errors (Le. the estimator is known as Least Absolute Deviations 
(LAD». 
Formally, this means that OLS (Le. the conditional mean E(1n Wi I Xi) ) solves: 
n 2 
min I (In Wi -P'Xi -rP;) (4.6) 
i-I 
and LAD (Le. the conditional median Med(ln Wi I Xi) solves: 
n 
min Ilin Wi - P' Xi - rP; I (4.7) 
i .. 1 
n n 
where I lIn Wi - f3' Xi - rP; I = I (In Wi - /3' Xi - rP; )sgn{ln Wi - f3' Xi - rP;) where sgn( a) is the 
i=1 . I-I. . 
sign of a: 1 if a is positive and -1 if a is negative or zero. 
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Since the linear quantile regression model can also be estimated on quantiles other than 
median the general model can be formulated as in Koenker and Basset (1978): 
for i = 1, ... ,n (4.8) 
with Q u a n t s ( l n w i l x i ' ~ ) = J 3 ' s x i + r s P ; ; and Quants(sislxi,JD=O where 9 th is the 
regression quantile, 0 < 9 < 1 , computed by: 
n ; ~ t t { . . ~ ~ 911nw;-p'sxi -rsp;I+. ~ ~ (l-9)llnWi - p'sxi -rsp;l} (4.9) 
{3 dn w, ~ { 3 3 S Xi +ysp. .. In Wi <{3 9 Xi +Ysp. 
If is is positive, then public sector workers at 9 th conditional quantile of In Wi earn a 
premium. If iSis negative, then public sector workers at 9 th conditional quantile of In Wi earn 
a penalty. Therefore, estimating (4.8) the public sector pay effect can be traced over the entire 
conditional distribution of In W by increasing 9 continuously from 0 to 1. 
The quantile regression method provides a richer understanding of the data due to a 
more complete picture than OLS. In addition this method is less sensitive to outliers and 
provides a more robust estimator in terms ofheteroskedasticity and departures from normality 
than OLS. However, while LAD helps to guard against outliers the estimators are justified 
only asymptotically (Wooldridge, 2003). 
A decomposition of differences in distribution into a part explained by coefficients and 
a part explained by characteristics using quantile regression method can be formulated as 
proposed by Melly (2006i4• In Melly (2006) the consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed estimators are obtained in two steps. In the first step the conditional distribution is 
estimated by traditional quantile regressions in each sector for each selected quantile. In the 
second step the conditional distribution is fntegrated over the range of the covariates to 
estimate the unconditional distribution. This approach is semi parametric since the conditional 
quantiles are assumed to satisfy a parametric restriction but distributional assumption is not 
required and the covariates can influence the whole conditional distribution. 
24 The estimation procedure proposed by Melly (2006) is extended version of Machado and Mata (2005) and 
Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000). The estimation procedure is less restrictive than Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
(1993) since it accounts for heteroskedasticity. In the literature the differences in distributions are analysed by 
different assumptions as proposed by Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Donald, Green, and Paarsch (2000); 
Fortin and Lemieux (1998). -
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The counterfactual distributions are estimated by replacing either the estimated 
coefficients or the distribution of characteristics in one sector by the other sector's estimated 
coefficients or the distribution of characteristics (Melly (2006), p. 111). A decomposition of 
differences in unconditional distribution at each quantile into a part explained by coefficients 
and a part explained by characteristics can be written as: 
S(x P ,PP) -Sex NP ,PNP) = [S(x P ,Pp) -sex P ,PNP) ] + [S(x P ,PNP) -sex NP, PNP) ] (4.10) 
where the first bracket represents the effect of differences in coefficients (could be interpreted 
as public sector earnings premium or penalty) and the second bracket represents the effect of 
differences in the distribution of characteristics. 
The sectoral status (P), conditional on x, is assumed to be uncorrelated with the error 
term up to this point. This may not be true due to potential unobserved earnings determining 
characteristics that are related to a public sector status. In policy-evaluation terms this is a 
missing data problem: we are not able to observe the earnings of public sector workers had 
they been employed in the same capacity in the private sector and vice versa. In addition, the 
public sector status recorded by individual level data may simply be mismeasured. The 
measurement error problem has a similar statistical structure to the omitted variable problem. 
If the sector of employment is considered to be endogenous either due to unobserved 
workers' heterogeneity or due to measurement error, instruments that influence sectoral 
attachment but are uncorrelated with earnings are required to correct for the bias in cross-
sectional estimates. This can be written as: 
(4.11) 
where Zj are characteristics (i.e. instruments) that indicate sectoral attachment but should not 
have a direct effect on earnings. They will be correlated with earnings, but only vhi their 
association with P and 8 is the parameter vector. (4.11) is typically used in the first stage of 
a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) or assuming p = pP = pNP in (4.3) in a linear 
probability model in the first step of a two stage least squares instrumental variable procedure. 
The main weakness of instrumental variable approaches is the absence of suitable 
instruments. In this chapter we propose an instrument that exploits the variation in the public 
sector status during the period of large-scale privatisations. 
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4.6 Regression analysis 
4.6.1 Overview of Goals 
The empirical analysis has five goals. First, we want to test whether there was a 
public-private sector earnings differential and how it changed during the fourteen year long 
period of economic transition. For this purpose, a 'dummy variable' model is initially 
estimated by OLS to obtain an estimate of the public sector pay gap at the unconditional and 
conditional mean for each year of the observed period from 1995 until 2008. In this context 
we also want to test whether personal and job characteristics of the workers affect the sectoral 
pay gap. So, in the regression analysis we use a large set of personal and job characteristics of 
the workers as conditioning variables and test for their potential impact. 
Our second goal is to test whether the public sector pay effect for workers with similar 
characteristics varies across the earnings distribution. Hence, quantile regressions are 
estimated at selected percentiles of the earnings distribution conditional on the same set of 
covariates as in the mean regression. 
Our third goal is to compare the obtained estimates with the results of previous studies. 
So, we replicate a study that covered the initial period of economic transition by using the 
same methods and data sets. 
Our fourth goal is to test whether a 'dummy variable' approach is too restrictive. 
Hence, in order to reveal whether the returns to characteristics differ across sectors a 'double 
equation' model is estimated at the conditional mean and at the conditional selected 
percentIles of the earnings distribution. Finally, the estimated public sector pay effects across 
the conditional earnings distribution are re-estimated by a decomposition method. 
I , 
Our fifth goal is to test whether there is any measurement error in the public sector 
status resulting from workers confusion and/or ambigous ownership types during the period of 
. large-scale privatisations. For this purpose, an instrument is constructed from employer-
provided aggregated data and is matched to self-reported individual level data. The proposed 
instrument is also ·argued to be suitable to control for endogeneity in the public sector status 
arising from large-scale privatisations. The public sector pay effects are then estimated for 
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groups of workers according to their educational qualification by using two stage least squares 
and treatment effects instrumental variable procedures. 
Since each of the goals are accomplished for male and female employees separately 
we are able to investigate wheather the public sector sector pay differential behaved 
differently between these two groups of workers during the period of economic transition. 
4.6.2 Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis is based on annual as well as on pooled data estimates. The 
pooled estimates are obtained for the periods given by data conveniences and different stages 
of economic transition in Serbia. In particular, due to the break in data methodology the LFS 
annual data can be pooled over two separate periods: 1995-2003 and 2004-2008. These 
periods also correlate broadly to two different stages of economic transition in Serbia. As 
explained, during the 1990s the private sector mainly consisted of a large number of small 
firms (in terms of employment) and entrepreneurships. Systematic economic reforms and 
large-scale privatisation programs were launched from 2001. In order to consistently follow 
changes during the period of structural reforms we employ an additional source of individual 
level data, LSMS for 2002-2003 and show changes in the public sector pay gap relative to 
LFS 2004-2008. In this way we show that the periods analysed relate to a change in sign of 
the estimated public sector pay gap which we argue is caused mainly by privatisation. At the 
final point of analysis, employer-provided administrative data from official statistics are 
explored as a third source of data for the purpose of instrumental variable creation. This 
corrects for the possibility of measurement error in the LFS recorded public sector status 
arising from the large-scale privatisations (as suggested by Disney and Gosling, 2003). 
, , 
(i) Annual Mean Estimates 
Public-private sector earnings differentials2S may be largely determined by the 
different nature of jobs and skills in the two sectors. In order to obtain unconditional and 
• • 
conditional average public-private sector pay differentials for each year from 1995 until 2008 
2S expressed in log percentage points throughout the chapter 
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for men and women, separately we use a 'dummy variable' approach. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 
present the OLS regressions estimation results. 
The unconditional public sector pay gap estimates are raw differences in mean log real 
hourly earnings between public and private sectors. The conditional public sector pay gap 
estimates are the differences in the mean log real hourly earnings between the public and 
private sectors after controlling for workers' labour force experience, educational 
qualification, marital status, nationality, settlement type, regional allocation, industry branch 
and occupational affiliation?6 Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present only the returns to education over the 
period of economic transition in Serbia from 1995 until 2008. The full conditional estimation 
specifications are presented in Tables A4.4 and A4.5 in the Appendix. 
The fit of the hourly earni.ngs equations augmented by additional 'control' variables, 
using the R-squared, is reasonably good and improves over the years. The overall explanatory 
power of the variance of mean log hourly pay in the augmented regression in 1995 for men is 
0.30 and 0.43 in 2008 and for women 0.31 in 1995 and 0.63 in 2008. The F statistics confirms 
that all the regressors are jointly statistically significant. The Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity is performed by regressing the residuals from an OLS regression on the 
same set of covariates and showed heteroskedastic errors at most cases. A common way of 
estimating variance of coefficients in the presence of heteroskedasticity is to use robust or 
White (1980) standard errors to calculate 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 4.6 shows that the raw average difference in earnings between the two sectors 
was not statistically significant during most of the years from 1995 until 2003 for male 
workers. But adjusting for worker and job characteristics, the estimates show statistically that 
public sector ownership significantly penalised male workers from 1997 until 2002. Similarly, 
for female workers a statistically significant raw public sector pay premium becomes a penalty 
(statistically significant from 1998 until 2002) after controlling for differences in the nature of 
jobs and skills in the two sectors. 
26 It should be acknowledged that finn size is not one of the control variables because it is more subject to 
measurement error given that the data are self-reported and that the survey only contains a.question on number of 
persons who work with the individual in the local unit. Moreover, chapter 5 uses the employer survey data on 
firm size in the empirical specification but the results are not materially altered when finn size control variables 
are excluded. 
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Table 4.6: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia, 1995-2003 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
. 
Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I W o ~ ~ W o m e n n ... Men -1 Women 
Unconditional Model.' 
Public 
Sector: 0.044 0.100 0.024 0.254 0.022 0.269 -0.074 0.097 -0.004 0.081 -0.090 -0.005 -0.041 0.156 -0.026 0.070 0.032 0.160 
(0.67) (1.91 ) (0.33) (4.48)-- (0.40) (5.05)-- (-1.52) (2.16)- (-0.09) (1.85) (-2.14)- (-0.16) (-1.14) (4.67)-- (-0.77) (1.91) (1.11) (S.IO)--
Conditional Model: 
Education: 
No qualific. -0.043 -0.272 -0.171 -0.167 -0.084 -0.018 -0.097 -0.147 -0.181 -0.130 -0.087 -0.018 -0.053 0.024 0.016 -0.056 0.052 . 0.041 
(-0.54) (-2.57)- (-2.11 )- (-1.56) (-1.09) (-0.19) (-1.10) (-1.92) (-2.20)· (-1.47) (-0.96) (-0.13) (-0.72) (0.17) (0.22) (-0.69) (0.58) (0.27) 
Primary f f f / f f f f f f f f f f f / f f 
Secondary 0.110 0.138 0.054 0.122 0.075 0.125 0.090 0.084 0.032 0.090 0.013 0.127 0.121 0.245 0.181 0.225 0.178 0.190 
(3.13)-· (2.50)- (1.37) (2.47)- (1.91) (2.89)·- (2.27)- (1.94) (0.86) (2.10)- (0.35) (3.51 ) •• (3.44)·· (S.90)·· (5.74)-· (S.78)·· (5.26)·· (4.79)·· 
College 0.266 0.298 0.153 0.169 0.264 0.217 0.192 0.190 0.210 0.218 0.150 0.260 0.351 0.420 0.311 0.347 0.321 0.372 
_ (5.16)·- (4.32)-· (2.71)** (2.53)· (4.52)·· (3.73)** (3.20)·· (3.19)·· (3.58)·· (3.78)·· (2.79)·- (5.43)·· (6.56)·· (8.19)-· (5.51)-· (6.76)** (5.74)·· (6.80)** 
University 0.427 0.466 0.409 0.364 Q.401 0.420 0.426 0.345 0.413 0.415 0.316 0.447 0.617 0.669 0.570 0.61S 0.594 0.63 
(6.89)·· (6.51 ) •• (6.03)·- (5.59)·· (5.97)·· (6.84)** (6.72)·· (5.34)·· (6.24)** (7.22)·· (4.66)** (9.24)·· (10.66)-· (12.49)·· (10.43)** (12.04)·· (10.41)·· (12.31)·· 
Public . 
Sector: -0.087 -0.144 -0.127 -0.075 -0.156 -0.058 -0.234 -0.183 -0.144 -0.165 -O.24S -0.182 -0.118 -0.087 -0.100 -0.143 -0.051 -0.062 
(-1.34) (-2.22)- (-1.61) (-\.15) (-2.73)-· (-0.90) (-4.95)·· (-3.76)·· (-2.44)·· (-3.67)·· (-5.26)-· (-4.84)·· (-3.18)·- (-2.31)· (-3.09)·· (-4.60)*- (-1.77) (-1.65) 
Constant 3.717 3.824 3.783 3.448 4.333 3.933 4.206 3.802 4.051 3.574 4.008 3.748 3.998 3.941 4.191 4.004 4.149 3.893 
(28.80)·· (24.70)·· (29.68)·· (23.51)-- (36.12)·· (26.78)·· (36.38)·· (33.30)·· (36.13)·· (29.40)-· (38.70)·· (31.18)·· (43.92)·· (36.21)·· (46.06)·· (39.40)" (42.31)** (31.70)** 
Adj. R-sq 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.30 0.40 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.35 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.48 0.30 0.44 
Reg. st.error 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.51 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.36 
Breusch 
Pagan test 34.86 81.12 48.40 76.83 21.32 49.63 25.80 17.33 31.59 39.44 14.03 39.09 44.67 68.25 16.39 22.41 47.74 44.93 
Observations 1479 1037 1468 1021 1488 1071 1486 1115 1464 1097 1634 1233 1602 1180 1556 1161 1545 1124 
----
- --- ---_.-
Notes to TaMe 4. 6 ~ ~
a) The depended variable is the log of real hourly earnings. Earnings are net of taxes, pensions and welfare benefits. They include payments for meals, 
. transport, union benefits, credits from the firm and payment in kind. They relate to earnings received on the main job only and are expressed in October 
2005 Serbian dinars. 
b) All explanatory variables are categorical. All specifications include a set of labour force experience, marital status, nationality, settlement type, region, 
industry branch and occupational dummies. Full results given in Table A4.4 in the Appendix. 
c) The estimation procedure for the mean regression is OLS and White (1980) estimated standard errors are used to calculate 95% confidence interval. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of constant variance in each case. Robust t statistics reported in. 
parentheses. OLS regression analysis reported used STAT A 8.0: .. and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively using 
two-tailed test.! denotes category omitted in estimation. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey 1995-2003 
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Table 4.7: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia, 2004-2008 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Variables Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
llnconditional Model: I 
Public Sector: 0.239 0.335 0.274 0.347 0.231 0.316 0.358 0.400 0.350 0.500 
(9.93)" (12.66)" ( 1 2 . 1 ~ · · · (13.37)·· (11.12)·· (12.93)" (16.49)·· (16.70)·· (\7.51)" (21.76)·· 
CondWonal Model: 
Education: 
No qualification -0.049 -0.154 -0.095 -0.129 -0.014 -0.059 -0.113 -0.213 -0.043 -0.061 
(-0.63) (-1.68) (-1.13) (-1.41) (-0.21) (-0.61) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-0.56) (-0.54) 
Primary f f f f f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.122 0.134 0.102 0.157 0.161 0.116 0.076 0.221 0.131 0.159 
(3.58)·· (3.49)·· (3.09)·· (4.16)·· (5.72)·· (3.41)·· (2.42)· (7.40)·· (4.73)·· (5.63)·· 
College 0.277 0.297 0.271 0.375 0.34 0.274 0.195 0.361 0.27 0.309 
(5.47)·· (5.88)·· (5.59)·· (8.06)·· (7.39)·· (6.41)" (4.37)·· (8.31)·· (6.42)·· (7.98)" 
University 0.55 0.509 0.509 0.575 0.617 0.534 0.453 0.649 0.538 0.64 
(11.06)·· (10.03)·· (10.16)·· (11.74)·· (14.87)·· (12.46)·· (9.44)" (15.88)·· (\2.47)·· (\6.27)·· 
Master degree 0.522 0.726 0.504 0.635 0.341 0.797 0.489 1.004 0.811 0.8\2 
(3.45)·· (6.54)·· (4.38)·· (6.51)·· (2.01)· (6.24)·· (2.03)· (5.46)·· (6.71)*- (6.90)·· 
PhD degree 0.82 0.873 0.753 1.103 1.178 0.621 0.939 0.778 1.149 1.007 
. 
(9.22)*- (5.23)·· (7.06)·· (4.75)·· (9.80)·· (10.12)·· (6.46)·· (15.69)·· (10.31)·· (14.04)·· 
Public Sector: 0.030 -0.028 0.087 0.012 0.089 -0.021 0.189 0.Q78 0.191 0.122 
(1.16) (-0.93) (3.62)" (0.37) (4.12)" (-0.69) (8.09)·· (2.72)** (8.81)·· (3.72)·· 
Constant 4.042 3.837 3.954 3.814 4.237 3.763 4.298 3.972 4.547 4.096 
(42.59)·· (35.26)** (39.52)** (29.25)·· (47.79)" (33.56)·· (42.10)·· (31.01)·* (50.23)** (46.26)·* 
I 
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.56 0.39 0.54 0.43 0.63 
Regress ion st. error 0.49 0.41 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.44 0.37 0.39 0.33 
Breusch Pagan test 15.44 14.84 40.90 8.89 27.02 32.08 23.55 0.19 14.37 0.31 
Observations 2407 1812 2437 1731 2372 1763 2320 1775 2382 1790 
Notes to TaMe 4. 7: See notes to Table 4.6. Full results given in Table A4.5 in the AppendIX. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey 2004-2008 
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Table 4.7 shows that the unconditional public sector pay premia was statistically 
significant during the 2004-2008 period for both men and women whereas the conditional 
sectoral gap was statistically significantly different from zero from 2005 for men and from 
2007 for women. 
A further insight into time trends of estimated unconditional and conditional public 
sector pay gap (i.e. f) is given by Figures 4.10 and 4.11. These Figures plot the unconditional 
and conditional public sector pay gap with a 95% confidence interval for men and women, 
respectively. 
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show that the conditional results in general lower the measured 
public sector pay effect. However, for male workers the 95% confidence intervals of 
unconditional and conditional estimates during the 1995-2003 period intersect suggesting that 
the unconditional and conditional estimates can not be separated for every year. This is not 
the case for female workers. Furthermore, the 95% confidence intervals during the 2004-2008 
period are tighter relative to the previous period suggesting a greater importance of observable 
characteristics in explaining wages. Nevertheless, the 95% confidence intervals indicate again 
that differences in observed characteristics between sectors are more important for female 
than for male workers. Finally, the estimates conditioned on controls do not follow the same 
time trend as the unconditional estimates (let alone level). This may reflect a change in the 
composition of public sector workers over time. For example, during the 2004-2008 period 
the difference between the raw differential and estimated premium declines for men and 
increases for women. These changes are likely to capture a pay-workforce quality trade-off 
indicating higher quality female and lower quality male workforce in the public sector. 
Summarising the results for both men and women Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show that the 
conditional average annual public sector pay gap was negative during the 1995-2003 period 
but positi,ve during the 2004-2008 period. 
In this context, it is important to point out that during the 1990s most workers were 
still in the public sector. The private sector mainly consisted of small firms and 
entrepreneurships. Systematic economic reforms and large-scale privatisations programs were 
launched from 2001. Indeed, in the LFS 1995-2003 sample the public sector is almost seven 
times larger for men and almost five times larger for women than the private sector whereas 
during 2004-2008 the public and private sector samples became of almost equal sizes. This 
implies that the gap is related to stages of economic transition and hence to public sector size' 
in terms of employment (as suggested by chapter 3). 
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Figure 4.10: Public sector pay relative to private sector pay: conditional and 
unconditional differences in hourly pay for men in period 1995-2003 with 95% 
confidence interval 
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Figure 4.11: Public sector pay relative to private sector pay: conditional and 
unconditional differences in hourly pay for women in period 1995-2003 with 95% 
confidence interval 
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Notes to Tables 4.10 and 4. 1 I: White (1980) estimated standard errors are used to compute the 95% confi dence 
intervals. The break in data methodology between 1995-2003 and 2004-2008. 
Data Source: Calculated by author from successive Labour Force Surveys 1995-2008 
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In addition, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the returns to education over the' period of 
economic transition in Serbia from 1995 until 2008. In contrast to other transition economies, 
returns to all educational levels higher than primary school education were contracting from 
1995 to 2000. For example, Table 4.6 shows that male workers with a university degree saw a 
decline in returns from 43% in 1995 to 32% in 2000. On the other hand, Munich, Svejnar and 
Terrell (2002) reported that the wage differential between university educated males and those 
with only a junior high school education in the Czech Republic increased from 28% at the end 
of the 1980s to 72% by 1996. Keane and Prasad (2001) also found that the returns to a college 
degree relative to primary school increased from 37% in 1986 to 53% in 1992 and 68% in 
1996 in Poland. Hence, Serbia lagged behind in labour market reforms when compared with 
other transitional countries due to sluggish transition and political and economic turbulences 
during the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the point estimates presented in Table 4.6 indicate that the returns to 
education started to increase from 2001 when the systematic economic reforms were initiated. 
Furthermore, Table 4.7 shows that the returns to education in Serbia increased to the levels 
observed in other transition economies during the 2004-2008 period. For example, the 
university educated male and female workers enjoyed around a 60% pay 'mark-up' relative to 
workers educated to primary school level. 
Returns to other characteristics from the full regression specifications presented in 
Tables A4.4 and A4.5 in the Appendix are summarised as follows. Labour force experience 
effects were poorly determined in the real hourly earnings specifications. This is consistent 
with findings in other transitional countries where experience obtained under the communist 
regime was not valued by the new market system (Flanagan (1995) for Czech Republic, 
Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) for Moscow). 
Workers in financial and other services, government administration and education and 
• 
health enjoyed a pay 'mark-up' relative to a number of other industry branch activities. The 
set of occupational level variables shows on average lower wages for farmers, 
miners/industria! and trade workers. Managers and professionals earned significant earnings 
premia relative to other occupational categories. Residing in the Serbian capital Belgrade 
proviqes significant premium relative to residing in northern p ~ o v i n c e e Vojvodina and even 
more compared to Central Serbia. 
Finally, the annual average public sector hourly pay gap. estimates presented in this 
sub-section can be compared with other studies. Sector pay gap estimates reported by Reilly 
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(2003) for 'male employees in Serbia from 1995 until 2000 show the same pattern and sign 
over the years but are a bit larger for most of the years considered. Since the estimates 
reported in Reilly (2003) are obtained in the specifications including a number of interactive 
variables a comparison with our estimates will be discussed in greater depth later. 
In contrast to Reilly (2003), Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) estimated for male and 
female employees in year 2000 a much lower pay gap than our estimate. In particular, 
whereas the OLS estimates for 2000 in Table 4.6 are -24.5% for men and -18.2% for women, 
Jovanovic and Lokshirt (2003) reported -9.4% public sector pay gap for men and -4% for 
women in 2000. However, the regression analysis in this sub-section differs from Jovanovic 
and Lokshin (2003)'s for several reasons: first, they used the data for the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia27 rather ~ h a n n only for Serbia; second, they included fewer controls in the 
regression analysis and third the estimates reported are obtained by applying the endogenous 
switching regression approach. 
In particular, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) included age and its squared term, a 
dummy for a single person, the number of jobholders in the household, educational and 
regional dummies in the sector choice equation. In the wage equation they included labour 
force experience and its squared term, educational, regional and industry branch dummies. 
The number of job holders in the household, argued to be an instrument for risk-aversion, is 
found to be insignificant for male workers but significant for female workers. Finally, their 
results imply that workers in the public sector have lower unbserved earning potentials than 
workers in the private sector. 
Although their results indicated that the OLS estimates should be taken with caution, a 
lack of strong instruments suggests that the 'true' public sector pay gap is not convincingly 
estimated by using an endogenous switching regression approach. We acknowledge that 
correcting for non-random selection is important, but as pointed by Dustmann and Van Soest 
. , 
(1998) it is only useful when meaningful instrumental variables that play a role in the 
selection mechanism but which can be excluded from the wage equation are available. 
27 Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 and is not covered 
by our analysis. 
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(ii) Annual Quantile Regression Estimates 
In the further analysis we examine the public-private sector earnings differentials at 
different points in the earnings distribution. Annual quantile regressions are estimated by 
using the specification identical to that employed in estimating the mean annual regressions. 
Conditional annual public sector pay gap at the selected percentiles of the earnings 
distribution by gender is presented in Figure 4.12 using LFS 1995-2003 and in Figure 4.13 
using LSMS 2002-2003 and LFS 2004-2008. Standard errors are obtained by the 
bootstrapping procedure (Hahn, 1995) with 1000 replications in all cases. The estimates 
presented on Figures 4.12 and 4.13 can be found in Table A4.6 in Appendix. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Figures 4.12 and 4.13. First, the public 
sector pay gap estimates proved sensitive to stages of economic transition. Second, the public 
sector pay gap is related to a worker's position in the earnings distribution. 
With respect to first conclusion, the sign of the public sector pay gap at most of the 
percentiles was negative until 2003 and positive afterwards. Looking at annual changes in the 
size of the public sector pay gap, the public sector workers at all the percentiles saw a 
deterioration of their financial position until 2000 and improvements in the following years 
relative to their private sector counterparts. Hence, there is a clear evidence of increasing 
public sector pay penalty over the period of economic recession (i.e. 1995-2000) and its 
decline when the systematic economic reforms started from 2001.28 Furthermore, during the 
period of large-scale privatisations the public sector pay gap became positive from 2004 with 
an increasing trend for both men and women until 2008. 
With respect to the second conclusion, the quantile regression estimates provide a 
richer insight into the public sector pay effects than the OLS estimates. For example, the 
quantile regressions reveal that during the period 1995-2003 the public sector pay penalty was 
statistically significant only in 1998 and 2000 across the whole male 'earnings distribution. 
This finding is contrary to Reilly (2003) who finds evidence of a statistically significant pay 
gap at some points in the earnings distribution i!1 1995, 1997 and 1999. This will be a subject 
of further investigation later in the section. 
28 Periods of recession and recovery are also supported by year estimates in the pooled specifications presented 
in Tables A4.7-A4.12 in the Appendix which show that the public sector earnings had declined until 2000 and 
increased afterwards. 
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Figure 4.12: Evolution of public sector pay gap for each of the percentiles of the 
earnings distribution by gender in period the 1995-2003 
a JoIn 
nas 
na; 
.0.15 
.(12 
o ~ ~ ~ · ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ · ·
4as 
.0.1 
.0.15 
42 
.0.25 
.0.3 
.0.35 
.0.4 
I MIr1 
• 
a JoIn 
Notes to Figure 4.12: Bootstrapped quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates 
for the selected percentiles conditional on the following set of categorical (dummy) variables: labour force 
experience, educational qualifications, marital status, nationality, settlement type, region, industry branch, 
occupation. * denotes that estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 significance level based on 
estimated standard errors obtained by the bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. 
Data Source: LFS 1995-2003 
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Figure 4.13: Evolution of public sector pay gap for each of the percentiles of the pay 
distribution by gender in Serbia in the period 2002-2008 
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Noles 10 Figure 4.13: Bootstrapped quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the public sector 
coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles conditional on the following set of categorical (dummy) 
variables: labour force experience, educational qualifications, marital status nationality (except in LSMS), 
settlement type, region, industry branch, occupation (except in LSMS). • denotes that estimates are significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 significance level based on estimated standard errors obtained by the 
bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. 
Dala Source: LSMS 2002-2003 and LFS 2004-2008 
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Furtherinore, in 2001 the gap was statistically significant for male workers above the 
median and in 2002 at both ends of the earnings distribution whereas there was no statistically 
significant gap at any of the percentiles in 2003. On the other hand, with the exception of 
2001, the public sector penalty for female workers was statistically significant across all the 
percentiles from 1998 until 2002. 
Finally, although there was no statistically significant gap at the conditional mean in 
2004 as estimated by OLS, the quantile regressions reveal that male w o r k e ~ s s collected 
statistically significant public sector pay 'mark-up' at and below the median. In 2005 the 
public sector premium is estimated at all percentiles except at the 90th and the mean estimate 
was almost identical to the median estimate. During the last three years male workers at all 
the percentiles gained from a public sector status. On the other hand, female workers at all the 
percentiles fared the same across sectors until 2007 and 2008 when statistically significant 
public sector premium is estimated across the whole earnings' distribution except at the 90th 
percentile. These results showed improvement in the financial position of public sector 
workers over time at all the percentiles but indicated that relative to the private sector the 
public sector earnings distribution remained more compressed. 
(iii) Pooled Mean and Quantile Regression Estimates 
Aggregating the annual data together, as presented in Table 4.8, the estimates are 
obtained on the conditional mean and selected percentiles of the earnings distribution for the 
periods given by data convience. Moreover, these periods also correlate broadly to different 
stages of economic transition and hence to the different signs of the estimted public sector pay 
gap. The pooled estimates presented in Table 4.8 are obtained in the same specification as 
used in annual regressions but adding the year dummies to account for the aggregate time 
effect. 
The results indicate that the public sector compressed earnings during the whole 
period of economic transition in Serbia. For example, the inequality-reducing effect for public 
sector' male workers appears similar during 1995-2003 and 2004-2008 but the whole 
distribution of differentials is shifted upwards from penalties to premia. In particular, for the 
period 1995-2003 the public sector pay penalty for male workers increases as one moves 
towards the top-end of the earnings distribution. The LSMS 2002-2003 estimates show no 
statisticaIly significant difference in earnings at the lower part of the earnings distribution but 
statisticaIly significant negative public sector pay gap at the median and above. During the 
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2004-2008 period the public sector pay premia is inversely related to the percentiles of the 
earnings distribution. This means that the estimated public sector 'mark-up' declines as one 
moves towards the top-end of the earnings distribution. These patterns are similar for women. 
It is important to stress that the reported estimates are obtained under the assumption that the 
selection into the public sector conditional on control variables is random. 
Table 4.8: Public sector pay penalty by different periods and data sources 
LFS 1995-2003 LSMS 2002-2003 LFS 2004-2008 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Mean -0.138 -0.130 -0.130 -0.050 0.110 0.030 
(-9.41)** (-8.59)** (-4.90)*· (-1.43) (10.65)" (2.32)" 
10th -0.092 -0.168 -0.055 -0.045 0.153 0.071 
(-3.60)·· (-5.22)" (-0.99) (-0.73) (7.74)*· (3.15)** 
25th -0.096 -0.116 -0.050 -0.002 0.131 0.053 
(-5.06)" (-5.78)" (-1.63) (-0.06) (8.93)·· (3.04)" 
50th -0.091 -0.096 -0.070 -0.007 0.119 0.072 
(-4.98)** (-7.48)" (-2.16)· (-0.25) (9.99)·· (5.79)** 
75th -0.116 -0.097 -0.170 -0.039 0.127 0.039 
(-6.36)·* (-6.20)** ( -5.35)** (-0.95) (9.44)" (2.38)-
90th -0.152 -0.126 -0.202 -0.144 0.091 -0.012 
(-5.49)" (-6.13)" (-4.22)*· (-2.1 0)- (5.02)-· (-0.50) 
Notes to Table 4.8: a) Each regression specification includes a set of dummies for: labour force experience, 
educational qualification, marital status, settlement type, region, nationality (except in LSMS), industry branch, 
occupational affiliation (except in LSMS) and year as well as dummy for the public sector status. 
b) The estimation procedure for the mean robust regression is OLS and t test reported in 
parentheses is calculated based on White (1980) estimated standard errors. Bootstrapped quantile regression 
procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles (1oth, 25 th , 50th, 75 th and 90th). 
The t test reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions is calculated based on standard errors estimated by 
the bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications in all cases .• - and - denote significance at the 0.0 I and 0.05 
level respectively. . 
Dala Source: LFS 1995-2003, LSMS 2002-2003 and LFS 2004-2008 
A single empirical study that estimated public-private sector pay differentials across 
the pay d i s t r i b u t ~ o n n for male workers in Serbia was accomplished by R ~ i l l y y (2003). This 
study applied the same empirical method as here but using LFS data for male employees, 
aged between 18 and 64, from 1995 until 2000. Reilly (2003) provides evidence for a public 
sector pay penalty as presented in the first column in Table 4.9. The conditional estimates are 
obtained in the regression specification controlling for the same set of characteristics as in 
Table 4.8 but expanded by a number of. interaction terms designed to capture variation in 
sector pay effects. The interactive variables consist of the sector status and workers who have 
no educational qualification, live in the city, ~ o r k k in construction or finances and other 
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services and are farmers. In addition to these five interaction terms the full set of year 
interaction terms is included in each regression specification. 
An important issue, discussed shortly, is measurement error, especially in relation to 
the definition of the hourly wage, thereby biassing the estimates of the conditional public 
sector wage gap. In particular we use total pay compensation. This is the sum of six 
components of monthly earnings from the main job as recorded separately in the LFS: (1) the 
regular wage (2) meal and transportation allowances (3) union assistance (4) in-kind benefits 
(5) credits from the firm (not from the bank) and (6) all other receiving from the main job. 
But, from reading Reilly (2003) it is not clear how the earnings measurement is created. We 
suspect that not all non-wage benefits recorded by LFS are added to a regular wage since our 
replication using the same econometric specification and data set showed lower estimates of. 
public sector pay gap. 
As presented in the second column in Table 4.9 we find no statistically significant 
public sector pay penalty at and below the median but significant pay penalty above the 
median during 1995-2000 period. Reilly (2003) however, finds significant penalty on the 25 th 
and 90th percentiles only. Moreover, the public sector pay penalty for male workers at the top 
of the earnings distribution is about one third lower than the Reilly (2003)'5 estimate. 
At the mean our estimate is about 14% lower than the Reilly (2003)'s estimate. This 
difference in the mean sector pay gap estimates fits broadly with the difference in non-wage 
components of total remuneration between public and private sector employees. As pointed 
earlier, before the fiscal reform in 2001, about 85% of the total earnings received by public 
sector workers were regular payments (Le. wage) and approximately 15% were subsidies on 
transportation and m e a l ~ ~ (Le. non-wage payments). In the private sector, only about 4% of the 
total earnings came from such subsidies, and 96% came from regular wages. Hence, 
correcting for differences in components of total remuneration the estimated public sector pay 
f • 
penalty declines. 
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Table 4.9: Public se'ctor pay gap comparison with previous study 
Dependent Variable 
Total Pay Compensation 
(Earnings=Wage+ All Non-
(Reillv, 2003) Wage Benefits recorded by LFS) 
LFS 1995-2000 1 1995-2000 2 
Men Men 
Mean -0.3268 -0.1855 
(-3.80)** (-3.40)** 
10th -0.1732 -0.1452 
( -1.45) (-1.65) 
25th -0.1714 -0.0858 
(-2.03)* (-1.92) 
50th -0.1787 -0.0598 
(-1.85) (-1.17) 
75th -0.2272 -0.218 
(-1.88) (-2.14)* 
90th -0.6933 -0.4478 
(-3.17)** (-3.16)" 
Notes 10 Table 4.9: a) 1 and 2 the samples used relate to male employees, aged between 18 and 64, who 
reported non-zero main job earnings. In addition, in order to replicate sample used by Reilly (2003), the 1995 
LFS from September is used. The reference months of the surveys in other years are same as presented in Table 
4.4. 
b) Each regression specification includes a set of dummies for: labour force experience, 
educational qualification, marital status, settlement type, region, nationality industry branch, occupational 
affiliation, private sector status and year. In addition, the private sector dummy variable is interacted with: 
dummy for individuals with no formal educational qualification, dummy for individuals whose occupation is 
farmer, dummy for individuals whose industry branch is construction, dummy for individuals whose industry 
branch is finances and other services, dummy for individuals who live in the city plus a full set of year dummy 
interactions. 
c) The estimation procedure for the mean robust regression is OLS and t test reported in 
parentheses is calculated based on White (1980) estimated standard errors. Bootstrapped quantile regression 
procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles. The 1 test reported in 
parentheses for the quantile regressions is calculated from estimated standard errors based on the bootstrapping 
procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. The estimates obtained on the private sector dummy are 
transformed to reflect the public sector pay differential. *. and • denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level 
respectively. 
Data Source: Pooled LFS 1995-2000: I Reilly (2003) Table 3, p. 26; 2 author calculation 
Finally, in the specification used by Reilly (2003) (given in Table 4.9) a number of 
interactive variables are included to capture variation in the sector pay gap effects. These 
interactive terms indicated some differences between public and private sector pay at selected 
occupational, educational and industry level. 
In order to reveal whether the returns to characteristics differ between sectors at 
different points in the distribution of the covariates, naturally, the next step in our analysis is 
to estimate conditional earnings equations at the mean and selected percentiles for public and 
private sectors separately. The results are obtained by pooling LFS 1995-2003, LSMS 2002-
2003 and LFS 2 0 0 ~ - 2 0 0 8 8 data separately. The detailed regression results are reported In 
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Tables from A4.7 to A4.l2 in the Appendix. The text focuses on the results of general 
interest. 
For the period 1995-2003 the R-squared reported in Tables A4.7 and A4.8 in the 
Appendix shows that the explanatory variables capture earnings variation better in the public 
than in the private sector. Men received greater returns to labour force experience but lower 
returns to education attainment in the private than in the public sector. This result implies that 
the private sector rewarded more specific (as measured by labour force experience) than 
general (as measured by education attainment) human capital. This finding is consistent with 
Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) who found the effect of education insignificant and the effect 
of age negative and significant on the probability of being employed in the private sector in 
Serbia in 2000. Similar results are found by Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland in 1996. 
Both Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) and Adamchik and Bedi (2000) argued that the quality 
rather than the quantity of education may be more important in private sector wage 
determination. 
On the other hand, women in the public sector were rewarded more for both specific 
and general human capital than in the private sector. The regional differences were significant 
in both sectors but greater in the private than in the public sector. Correlation between 
macroeconomic shocks and earnings .was more pronounced in the public than in the private 
sector as captured by year dummies indicating a fall in earnings until 2000 across all the 
percentiles. Point year estimates from 2001 (Le. when economic reforms started) show that 
the growth of earnings was statistically significant and similar across sectors. 
The estimates obtained by using LSMS 2002-2003 data presented in Tables A4.9 and 
A4.10 in Appendix are quite similar to the LFS 1995-2003 estimates. Conversely, in 2004-
2008 period, the private sector estimates presented in Tables A4.l1 and A4.12 in the 
Appendix show statistically significant differences in returns across industry branches and 
. . 
occupational affiliations which were greater than in the public sector for both men and 
women. The increase in the private sector earnings variation captured by industry and 
occupational variables resulted from large-scale privatisations during this period. In addition, 
the returns to education increased statistically significantly with each educational level in both 
sectors but were lower in private than in the public sector. Year dummies show faster earnings 
I • 
growth in the public sector than in the private sector especially at the upper end of the 
earnings distribution. These results may be related to public sector wage reforms which aimed 
to improve the financial position of skilled professions. 
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(iv) Decomposition of differences in distribution 
We now re-estimate the pooled quantile regression models by using a decomposition 
method. This method is based on aggregating differences in the distribution into a part 
explained by differences in returns to characteristics and into a part explained by differences 
in characteristics. 
A decomposition is obtained by following a version of the approach developed by 
Melly (2006). As in Melly (2006) the consistent and asymptotically nonnally distributed 
estimators are obtained in the following way: in the first step the conditional distribution is 
estimated by 100 quantile regressions in each sector for each selected quantile and integrated 
over the range of the covariates in the second step. The counterfactual distributions are then 
estimated by replacing either the estimated coefficients or the distribution of characteristics in 
one sector by the other sectors' estimated coefficients or the distribution of characteristics 
(Melly (2006), p. 111). 
The full decomposition results are ploted in Figures A4.1-A4.3 and summarised in 
Table A4.l3 in the Appendix. The part of the total (Le. unconditional) earnings differential 
explained by differences in returns to (observed) characteristics (interpreted as the sector pay 
gap) is presented in Table 4.10. For each period and gender these results are similar to the 
results obtained using a 'dummy variable' approach in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.10: Decomposition of pUblic-private sector earnings differential at different 
fI d'ff; • t t h t' f percen I es: I erences lD re urns 0 c arac ens ICS 
LFS 1995-2003 LSMS 2002-2003 LFS 2004-2008 
Percentile: Men Women Men Women Men Women 
10th -0.078 -0.043 0.043 -0.072 0.170 0.122 
(-4.21) •• (-2.23)· (1.09) (-2.37)· (11.57) •• (18.98) .. 
30th -0.066 -0.037 -0.016 -0.013 0.131 0.158 
(-3.66) •• (-2.28)· (-0.62) (-0.52) (13.85) •• (21.88) •• 
50 tb -0.063 -0.058 -0.062 0.014 0.103 0.118 
(-3.67) •• (-3.83) •• (-2.78) •• (0.66) (11.69) •• (19.94.) •• 
70 tb -0.092 -0.109 -0.079 -0.044 0.076 0.052 
(-4.97) •• (-S.53) •• (-3.64) •• 
_(-1.93) (7.S3) •• (7.5\) •• 
90tb -0.153 -0.188 -0.130 -0.259 -0.000 -0.059 
(-6.42) •• (-9.25) •• (-3.37) •• (-4.70) •• (-0.02) (-5.33) •• 
. . Notes to Table 4. J 0: DecomposItion estimatIOn procedure Implemented by estlmatmg 100 quantile regressions in 
each sector accounting for: labour force experience, educational qualification, marital status, settlement type, 
region, nationality (except in LSMS), industry branch, occupational affiliation (except in LSMS) and year. The 
variance has been estimated by bootstrapping the results 100 times. Coefficients component contribution to the 
log difference in real hourly earnings between the public and private sectors are presented. The t test reported in 
parentheses .•• and • denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. The full decomposition results 
are presented in Figures A4.1, A4.2 and A4.3 and in Table A4 .. 13 in the Appendix. 
Data Source: LFS 1995-2003, LSMS 2002-2003 and LFS 2004-2008 
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In particular, removing differences in characteristics, Table 4.10 shows that during the 
1995-2003 period, the public sector workers received statistically significantly lower earnings 
than workers in the private sector. The public sector pay penalty increased for higher 
percentiles. 
The part of the total earnings differential accounted by differences in coefficients 
obtained by pooling LSMS 2002-2003 data show no statistically significant public sector pay 
gap for male workers below the median but a significantly negative gap for workers at and 
above the median. The estimates for public sector female workers during 2002-2003 were 
statistically significant only at both ends of the earnings distribution but the gap was three 
times larger at the top-end than at the bottom-end. 
During 2004-2008 most public sector workers received higher earnings than workers 
in the private sector. The public sector pay premium for both men and women decreased 
monotonically from the bottom-end to the top-end of the earnings distribution. The public 
sector pay premia are statistically significantly different from zero at all the percentiles except 
at the top-end percentile for male workers whereas at the top-end percentile for female 
workers the premium translates into a statistically significant penalty. 
Hence, the results from the decompositions of differences in distribution reinforce the 
previous finding that workers at the upper-end of the earnings distribution tended to lose more 
during 1995-2003 and to gain less during the 2004·2008 period. However, caution is required 
when interpreting these estimates. As pointed by Lucifora and Meurs (2004) although the 
earnings differential due to coefficients is usually referred to as the 'unexplained' part with 
respect to what is explained by characteristics, decomposition may also over or under estimate 
the residual depending on whether omitted variables are positively or negatively correlated 
with productivity as well as depending on the distribution of the omitted variables across 
sectors. We therefore now consider the public sector as endogenous explanatory variable. 
, . 
(v) Public Sector as Endogenous Explanatory Variable 
The public-private sector earnings gap is estimated to this point by methods which 
assumed random selection into the public sector conditional on control variables. The problem 
is that the P might be endogenous i.e. correlated with the error. In particular, the estimates 
produced in the previous sub-section may not single out the true effect of public sector status 
on pay given that the workers may self-select on the basis of their unobserved characteristies 
such as tastes and productivities. In policy-evaluation terms this relates to a missing data 
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problem: we are not able to obserVe the earnings of public sector workers had they been 
employed in the same capacity in the private sector and vice versa. 
As pointed by Brainerd (2002) one can argue that worker self-selection during the 
large-scale privatisation in a transition economy is likely to be negligible at least because of 
limited worker mobility in the short run. However, another related issue is measurement error. 
In particular, public sector status may be mismeasured given that the data is self-reported. In 
her study on public-private sector earnings differentials in Russia, Brainerd (2002) suggested 
that the OLS estimates may actually be biased downward due to the probable measurement 
error in ownership status reported by workers. This is likely given the workers' confusion due 
to rapidity of the mass privatisation program or due to the ambiguous ownership status of 
their firms. A similar argument was made concerning contracted-out workers in the UK by 
Disney and Gosling (2003). 
In this section we primarily attempt to control for the measurement error in cross-
sectional estimates of the public sector pay gap. The measurement error problem has a similar 
statistical structure to the omitted variable problem. If we start from the OLS regression 
model: 
(4.12) 
where PI * is a non-observed true public sector status instead of which we have a measure PI 
then the measurement error is given by: U; =1'; -P*I . Hence, the (4.12) can be re-written 
as: 
lnw; =a + {3'XI +rP; +(SI -yu;) (4.13) 
Under the classical errors-in-variables (CEV) assumption the measurement error is 
uncorrelated with x; and the unobserved explanatory variable PI· but correlated with PI 
since P; = P *1 +u;. IfCEV holds the OLS estimator r in the equation (4.13) will be biased 
towards zero. 
We can use an instrumental variable (IV) procedure to correct for a measurement error 
problem. In order to do that we need an IV for PI' Such an IV must be correlated with PI' 
uncorrelated with sand uncorrelated with the measurement error u. Hence, both PI and IV 
, . 
mismeasure PI * but their measurement errors are assumed to be uncorrelated while they are 
. correlated throught their .dependence on PI· (Wooldridge, 2003). 
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We assume that a variable xl for the jth worker's characteristic (for example 
occupation or industry branch affiliation) which is the proportion of people with this 
characteristic who are in the public sector satisfies these conditions. In particular, it is 
reasonable to assume that the greater the proportion of people with j th characteristic in the 
public sector the higher the likehood that an individual with the j th characteristic works in 
the public sector. If we calculate these variable means from administrative data supplied by 
employers the 'noise' should be orthogonal to the difference between reported and actual. 
public sector status. 
Since administrative data contain the information on employers' ownership type, 
industry branch and the number of employees by skill qualification, we use the industry 
branch proportions of the public sector employees as an IV. We argue that changes in the 
proportions among industry branches in the public sector are caused mainly by privatisation. 
A similar approach is proposed by Disney and Gosling (2003). They used the proportion of 
each occupation in the public sector from employer-provided data (Le. NES) matched into 
individual reported data (Le. BHPS) to correct for a measurement error in estimating changes 
in the public sector pay effects resulting from privatisations (i.e. competitive tendering (CCT) 
and contracting out) in the UK during 1990s. 
Moreover, workers who remain in the public sector subsequent to privatisations might 
not be a random sample of workers. Hence, we argue that changes in the proportions among 
industry branches in the public sector can be a suitable instrument to control for measurement 
error as well as endogeneity in the public sector status arising from the large-scale 
privatisations given that these changes capture the effect of privati sat ion. 
Acknowledging that the public sector effect may vary with a worker's skill level we 
apply the IV procedure on groups of workers according to their educational qualification and 
gender. Therefore, first, we calculate the industry branch proportions in the public sector for 
each skill group by gender from administrative data. The LFS data is then divided into three 
skill groups for each gender separately. The high skilled group includes workers with college 
and university degrees and above. The skilled group includes workers with high school 
educational level. The unskilled group includes workers with primary school or less. In each 
of the six groups (i.e. by gender and skill), based on reported inaustry branch an individual is 
assigned the proportion of its industry branch in the public sector calculated from 
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administrative data. This imputed variable z is then used in two stage least squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variable procedure as an IV to correct for the measurement error. 
Formally the 2SLS can be written in a form of two OLS equations which are estimated 
by a two step procedure. In the first step we estimate: 
(4.14) 
where z, is a constructed IV, x, is a set of workers' characteristics, 1'C is a constant and V, IS 
an error term. In a second stage we estimate: 
A 
lnw; = a + f3'x, + r ~ ~ +B, (4.15) 
We can also test whether 1', is an exogenous variable in which case there is no need to 
instrument. In particular, since ZI is uncorrelated with B, ~ ~ is uncorrelated with B if and 
only if V is uncorrelated with u . In order to test this we estimate: 
(4.16) 
and test the zero hypothesis (HO) on the fitted residual: ). = 0 using a I statistic. If we reject 
HO at a 0.05 significance level we conclude that 1', is endogenous because v and u are 
correlated (Wooldridge, 2003). 
An alternative approach to 2SLS adds more structure to account for the binary nature 
of the public sector status 1', by estimating the first-stage model in (4.14) as a latent-variable 
model similar to the probit model using the maximum likelihood method. Hence, the 
unobserved latent variable 1', * determines whether 1',=1 or O. The models (4.14) and (4.15) 
become: 
A 
In w, =a + f 3 ' x ; + r ~ + s ; ;
lijp'*>O 
P.= { . ; 0 otherwise. 
(4.17) 
The errors (e, v) are assumed to be correlated bivariate normal with Var(B,)=a 2 , 
Var(v;) = 1 and Cov(sl' VI) = pa 2 (Cameron -and Trivedi, 2009). The model (4.17) is 
usually referred to as the treatment effects model because the binary endogenous regressor 1', 
can be viewed as a treatment indicator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
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The data limitation for a measurement error exercise is that the Statistical Office has 
not recorded industry branch structure by ownership sector before 2003. For this reason, we 
are able to construct and impute the IV from administrative data only in the LFS 2004-2008. 
Nevertheless, given that the 2004-2008 period correlates to large-scale privatisations this 
period is reasonably assumed to be the most affected by possible measurement error in the 
public sector status. In addition, for the 1995-2003 period we construct the IV from LFS data 
base. Finally, for the 2004-2008 period we also obtain estimates by using the IV from LFS 
data base to reveal differences in IV effects between administrative data IV and LFS data IV. 
The results of these models are presented in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 for male and female 
employees separately. For each period and each group of employees each model is estimated 
including the year dummy variables to allow for aggregate time effects. The results of these 
models are presented in the first columns of each group in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. Furthermore, 
the models are expanded for labour force dummy variables. Labour force experience is less 
subject to error. The estimates from models including both year and labour force experience 
dummy variables are presented in the second columns of each group in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. 
The statistically significant coefficients are in bold. The standard errors are given in 
parentheses in italics. Since the individuals are clustered according to their industry branch 
affiliation, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on instrument. 
Controlling for clustering increases reported standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi. 2009). 
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show that the IV which is constructed from administrative data 
and used in LFS 2004-2008 in 2SLS models satisfies the first assumption of statistically 
significant correlation with the public sector status net of time period dummy variables for 
high skilled and skilled men and for all skills female groups. When the model is expanded to 
include labour force experience dummy variables the IV is not statistically significant for both 
skilled and unskilled male workers but remains significant for high skilled male and all skills 
female groups. Similar results are reported using treatment effects models. 
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Table 4.11: IV estimates for men 
. I nstrument constructed from: 
Instrument constructed from: Labour Foree Survey data 1995-2003 Instrument constructed from: 
-
Administrative data 2004-2008 and used in Labour Foree and used in Labour Foree Survey data 200"-2008 and used in 
Survey 2004-2008 l.abour Foree Survey 1995-2003 Labour Foree Survt'y 2004-2008 
IIigh skilled Skilled l1nskilled High skillt'd Skilled l1nskilled High skilled Skillt'd l1nskilled 
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience dummies included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
lSI.S First sta(f,e: 
Dependent variable: Public Sector 
Instrument: Industry share 1.11 1.05 0.11 O.ot 0.09 0.02 0.52 0.52 0.27 0.22 0.13 0.09 1.90 1.83 0.39 0.29 0.30 
(0.07) 0.06 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 0.07 (0.04) (0.05) (0.20) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
lSIS Second .wat:,e: . 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
Public Sector 0.27 0.2-' 0.96 4.87 2.07 6.91 -0.44 .,0.44 -0.49 -0.61 0.38 0.42 0.27 0.2" 0.61 0.63 1.00 
, (0.10) (0.10) (/.06) (70.30) (3.08) (39.18) (0.25) (0.23) (0.28) (0.34) (0.55) (0.80) (0.08) 0.08) (0.23) (0.33) (0.47) 
Exot:,enei{j' tests 
HO: public sector exogenous: F test (fitted residual=O) 4.43 1.66 6.56 0.24 9.97 3.95 7.95 2.83 19.81 4.49 2.45 0.95 8.48 3.30 20.19 13.08 10.99 
p value 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.63 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UO: weak instrument: F test (instrument=O) 250 288 II 0 2 0 146 117 202 152 20 9 566 535 170 67 16 
Treatment EfIfC1s Model: MI.E . 
Dependent variable: Public Sector 
Instrument: Industry share 3.89 3.80 0.40 0.00 0.45 0.06 4.88 5.00 1.26 1.16 0.78 0.70 6.35 6.32 0.99 0.82 0.95 
(0.74) (0.75) (0.30) (0.00) (0.28) (0.48) (0.7/) (0.73) (0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.10) (0.80) (0.83) (0.34) (0.35) (0.30) 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
Public 'Sector 0.21 0.18 0.83 0.13 0.79 0.16 -0.13 -0.18 -0.18 -0.08 -0.16 -0.16 0.21 0.17 0.83 0.79 0.80 
- (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.17) (0.29) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.22) (0.33) (0.36) (0.67) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0./5) 
LR test of independent equations (rho=O): chi2( I) 2.11 1 . 5 ~ ~ 41.43 1.45 11.58 0.00 2.95 0.74 7.60 0.02 0.03 0.10 2.82 1.98 34.21 33.42 14.87 
p value 0.15 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.97 0.10 0.39 0.01 0.90 0.87 0.75 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Of.S . 
I'uhlic Sector 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.22 -0.28 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.16 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.0/) (0.0/) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.0/) (0.0/) (0.02) 
Number ofObservallons: 2272 8351 1913 2596 8497 2628 2272 8351 
------ ---
,VOles 10 TaMe 4.11: Administrative data 2004-200S IV from: Semiannual Survey data on Employees and Salaries and Wages. Standard errors reported in parenthesis: 2SLS 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity·robust and adjusted for clustering on industry share instrument. Standard errors in Treatment effects MLE model are adjusted for 
clustering on industry share instrument. OLS standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 0.05 level. Critical value 110: 
instruments are weak is 16.3 S. Dala SOllrce: LFS 1995-200S 
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Yes 
Yes 
0.21 
(0.08) 
1.27 
(0.76) 
5.50 
0.02 
8 
0.83 
(0.33) 
0.72 
(0./8) 
8.02 
0.00 
0.15 
(0.03) 
1913 
Table 4.12: IV estimates for women 
Instrument constructed from: 
Instrument constructed from: Labour Force SUn'ey data 1995-2003 Instrument constructed from: 
Administrative data 2004-2008 and used in Labour Force and used in Labour Force SUn'ey data 2004-2008 and used in 
SUn'ey 2004-2008 Labour Force SUn'ey 1995-2003 Labour Force SUn'ey 2004-2008 
• High skilled Skilled lInskilled High skilled Skilled lInskilled High skilled Skilled lInskilled 
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience dummies included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
2SU. First stage: 
Dependent variable: Public Sector 
Instrument: Industry share 0.79 0.75 1.70 1.53 0.76 0.61 0.26 0.26 0.41 0.32 0.18 0.15 0.81 0.77 1.70 1.54 1.45 1.34 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0./0) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) 
2SI.S Secolld stllge: 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
Public Sector 0.14 0.09 0.38 0.33 0.62 0.67 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 -1.18 -1.17 -1.38 0.14 0.09 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.30 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.24) (0.30) (0.12) (0.19) (0.62) (0.78) (0.48) (0.55) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.0/) 
Exogelleitr tt'Sts 
110: P!,blic sector exogenous: f test: fitted residual=O 1.34 0.53 19.72 2.46 17.93 6.28 0.52 0.14 40.69 5.51 10.25 8.10 1.46 0.63 19.52 3.24 12.49 10.4 
P value 0.25 0.47 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.47 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.43 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
110: weak instrument: F test (instrument=O) 796 671 1254 1324 71 34 163 168 67 57 20 13 729 698 1156 1936 353 295 
Treat",e'" Effects Motlel: III1.E 
Dependent variable: Public Sector 
Instrument: Industry share 3.48 3.49 4.89 4.64 1.81 1.62 3.15 3.36 1.72 1.51 0.98 0.87 3.60 3.6 5.25 5.06 4.32 4.12 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.09) (0.90) (0.84) (0.79) (0.43) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.29) (0.34) (0.28) (0.29) (0.68) (0.69) (0.78) (0.80 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
I'ublic Sector 0.19 0.16 0.38 0.31 0.70 0.68 0.09 0.04 -0.19 -0.31 -0.34 -0.27 0.19 0.16 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.27 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.19) (0./6) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0./0) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
I.R test of independent equations (rho=O): chi2(1) 0.23 2.89 4.68 2.54 7.05 8.91 0.26 4.85 22.33 15.59 4.87 0.28 0.33 1.74 4.16 3.02 3.77 3.74 
P value 0.63 1.48 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.60 0.56 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.05 
Of.S 
"ublic Sector • 0.18 0.1l 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.02 -O.1l -0.19 0.18 0.13 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.14 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (O.O/) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.0/) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
~ . ' : o f O b s e r v a t i o n s : _ _ _ 2414 5588 __ . 1188 2333 6101 1605 2414 5588 1188! 
Noles to TaMe -1.12: See Notes to Table 4.11. 
Data Source: LFS 1995-2008 
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As expected, for most of the groups where the IV is statistically significant the 2SLS 
estimator of the public sector pay gap is larger than the OLS estimator. This confirms that the 
classical errors-in-variables (CEV) assumption holds. However, the standard error is also 
larger. Therefore, a 95% confidence interval using OLS is much tighter than that using the IV. 
In fact the 95% confidence interval actually includes the OLS estimator in most cases. For this 
reason we also test whether the difference between 2SLS and OLS is statistically significant. 
This is done by performing an exogeneity test of statistical significance of the fitted residuals 
as given by equation (4.16). The robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DHW) F test and p values are 
reported in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. 
The exogeneity test shows no statistically significant difference between the 2SLS and 
OLS estimates for male high skilled and female skilled workers when the model is expanded 
for labour force experience dummies. The same is confirmed by the treatment effects model. 
Similarly, for high-skilled female workers, the F test of the fitted residual suggests that the 
public sector is exogenous and hence the OLS estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS 
estimator. If we compare the 2SLS and treatment effects models for high skilled men, and 
high skilled and skilled women obtained by administrative IV and LFS IV the results are 
identical. 
The difference between estimates obtained by administrative IV and LFS IV becomes 
visible only for skilled and unskilled men, and unskilled women. In particular, for skilled and 
unskilled male workers the IV constructed from LFS data is positive and statistically 
significant. The 2SLS public sector estimated premia are large but statistically insignificant 
after controlling for labour force experience due to an increase in standard errors for both 
skilled and unskilled men. In addition, the F test on an instrument (which is simply the square 
of the t statistics) is lower than the rule of thumb value of 10 for the unskilled men indicating a 
weak instrument problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009i9• 
The coefficients estimated by the treatment effects model are similar in magnitude and 
sign to 2SLS but the standard errors are considerably lower. Hence, by imposing more 
s t r u ~ t u r e e the treatment effects models suggest a statistic,ally significant public sector pay 
29 or ~ h e n n 16.38 which is the 2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald test critical value suggested by Stock and Yogo 
(2005), (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
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'mark-up' for both skilled and unskilled male workers which is about four times greater than 
the OLS estimates. Moreover, similarly to F test of the fitted residual in 2SLS the LR test of 
independent equations in treatment effects models rejects the null hypothesis that the error 
correlation is zero indicating that the OLS estimates for skilled and unskilled male workers 
may be biased towards zero. 
Similar conclusion holds for unskilled female workers for whom the public sector pay 
premium estimated in 2SLS and treatment effects models using both administrative and LFS 
IV is greater than the OLS estimators. But the premium estimated using an administrative IV 
is about twice as great as that estimated using the LFS IV. 
Finally, and opposite to that shown for the 2004-2008 period, the public sector pay 
effects using a 1995-2003 LFS IV have in most cases negative signs. In particular, the 2SLS 
estimates for high skilled and skilled male groups are much larger than the OLS estimates but 
the standard errors are also large so that the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Both 
male and female unskilled groups indicate the weak instrument problem. 
Summarising the results, it can be concluded that both 2SLS and treatment effects 
instrumental variable procedures confirmed the OLS predictions about a negative public 
sector pay gap during 1995-2003 and a positive gap during the 2004-2008 period in most 
cases. Moreover, the 25L5 and treatment effects public sector pay gap estimates are not only 
of similar sign but of a similar size, too. In particular, both IV methods suggested that the 0 LS 
estimates may be ~ i a s e d d towards zero and hence indicated that the classical errors-in-variables 
(CEV) assumption holds, but in most of the cases the public sector regressor is not found to be 
endogenous. 
At this point it is important to emphasise that the self-reported datasets do not contain 
instruments that would provide rational exclusion restrictions when identifying'the individual 
worker's sector choice. In this context we argue that the application of proxies for unobserved 
'innate ability' is by no means justifiable when the invalid proxies are used. For example, 
even if we had parental background characteristics (as suggested by Dustmann and Soest 
(1998» at our disposal these would not be ofmpch help. As explained at the beginning of this 
chapter, the transition changed the institutional setting fundamentally from the world in which 
parents of the individuals covered by the analysis wo.rked. Indeed observed workers in Serbia 
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not only participate in a different labour market but live in a different country from the one in 
which their parents lived. 
Furthermore, in the study on the public-private sector pay differentials in Serbia, 
Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) tested potential instruments from LFS data to correct for sector 
self-selection. They tried to use the number of unemployed in the household, the number of 
pensioners in the household and the proportion of non-wage income in total individual income 
as variables. However, they found all these variables insignificantly different from zero in the 
selection equation. Faced with the lack of the instruments they used marital status and the 
number of jobholders in the household as identification of the public sector status. 
Nevertheless, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) found that the number of jobholders in the 
household had a significant effect on sector choice of females but not of males. We argue that 
the number of jobholders in the household may pick up partially a tendency towards job 
security and associated benefits when the formal and informal sectors co-existed but these 
were not likely to be decisive during the major period of large-scale privatisations of the 
public sector. 
Indeed, the large-scale privatisations imply sectoral changes of jobs when majority of 
people actually does not move jobs. However, in these cases the measurement error may loom 
large. In addition, those who remain in the public sector subsequent to privatisations might not 
be a random sample of workers (as pointed by Disney and Gosling, 2003). Hence, we argue 
that the effect of privatisation captured by changes in public sector industry proportions can be 
a suitable instrument to control for endogeneity as well as measurement error. In this context, 
the results of the chapter for the period of large-scale privatisations indicated that workers in 
the public sector have lower unobserved earning potential than workers in the private sector 
given that die 2SLS estimator is larger than the OLS estimator. 
In the related empirical literature on 'union' effect researchers suggested that although 
we are not certain about the true size of the OLS bias we can still have an idea about it. For 
example, Chowdhury and Nickell (1982) found that the cross-sectional estimate is of a right 
magnitude given that the m e a s u r e ~ e n t t error bias offsets the omitted quality variables b!as. 
Lewis (1983) and Freeman (1984) suggested that the OLS estimates provide an upper bound 
whereas the longitudinal estimates provid.e a lower bound of the 'true' effect. 
160 
Nevertheless, Disney and Gosling (2003) showed that this may not be the case when 
estimating changes in the public sector pay effects resulting from privatisations. In particular, 
Disney and Gosling (2003) estimated changes in the public sector pay effects caused by 
competitive tendering (CCT) and contracting out in the UK during 1990s by educational level 
and gender. They found that college educated men are negatively selected into the public 
sector and hence the negative cross-sectional (i.e. OLS) premium translates into the positive 
after controling for selection (i.e. first differences estimator). They found that the longitudinal 
estimates are actually the preferred ones since the differential is biased downward by 
measurement error and upward by endogenous job moves. However, the lack of the panel data 
constraints this kind of estimation in this chapter and is hence left for the future research. 
4.6.3 Summary o/the Results/rom Regression Analysis 
The empirical anaysis in this chapter had five goals. First, we tested whether there was 
a public-private sector earnings differential on average and how it changed during the fourteen 
year long period of economic transition, from 1995 until 2008. The OLS results showed that 
the public sector pay gap was negative but grew to positive during the mature period of 
economic transition. In particular, the conditional public sector pay effect was statistically 
significantly negative from 1997 until 2002 for men and from 1998 until 2002 for women. 
This effect became statistically significantly positive from 2005 until 2008 for men and from 
2007 until 2008 for women. 
In addition, we tested for the role of personal and job characteristics of workers. 
Labour force experience effects were poorly determined in the real hourly earnings 
specifications during 1990s. This is consistent with, findings in other transitional countries 
where experience obtained under the communist regime was not valued by the new market 
system (for example Flanagan (1995) for Czech Republic, Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for 
Poland, Jovanovic and Lokshiri (2004) for Moscow). However, in contrast to other transition 
economies, returns to all educational levels higher than primary school education were 
contracting from 1995 to 2000 in Serbia. This is not surprising given the economic recession 
during 1990s. The returns to education started to increase from 2001 and 'catch-up' the levels 
~ 6 1 1
, 
observed in other transitional economies during the period of structural reforms and large-
scale privatisations (Le. 2004-2008). 
Our second goal was to test whether the public sector pay effect for workers with 
similar characteristics varied across the earnings distribution. The pooled quantile regressions 
showed: first, that the public sector pay gap proved sensitive to stages of economic transition 
at all selected percentiles of the earnings distribution and second, that the public sector pay 
gap correlated to a worker's position in the earnings distribution. With respect to the first. 
conclusion, the sign of the conditional public sector pay gap at most of the percentiles was 
negative during 1995-2003 period and positive during 2004-2008 period. With respect to 
second conclusion, the results indicated that the public sector compressed earnings during the 
whole period of economic transition in Serbia. In particular, the inequality-reducing effect for 
public sector male workers appeared similar during 1995-2003 and 2004-2008 but the whole 
distribution of differentials had been shifed upwards from penalties to premia. 
Our third goal was to compare the obtained estimates with the results of the previous 
study that used the OLS and quantile regression methods on the same data sets but from 1995 
until 2000 for male employees, aged between 18 and 64. This study was accomplished by 
Reilly (2003) and showed no settled pattern in sector pay gap estimates over the years and 
across the earnings distribution. Our replication of this study indicated a possible 
measurement error in relation to the definition of the hourly wage, thereby biasing the 
estimates of the conditional public sector wage gap. In particular, our estimator obtained by 
using a total pay compensation (regular wage plus non-wage benefits) is found to be lower by 
14% on average. This fits broadly to the difference in the non-wage benefits share in total 
remuneration between the public and private sectors. 
Our fourth goal was to test the robustness of the quantile regression estimates obtained 
from a 'dummy variable' approach. So, the public sector pay effects across the conditional 
earnings distribution are re-estimated by a decomposition method. Removing the differences 
in characteristics the results from the decompositions reinforced the previous finding that the 
public sectpr workers received statistically significantly: lower eru:nings during the 1995-2003 
period and higher earnings during the 2004-2008 period than workers in the private sector. 
Moreover, this I11ethod also suggested that the public sector pay penalty increased for higher 
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percentiles during 1995-2003 and that the public sector pay premium decreased monotonically 
from the bottom-end to the top-end of the earnings distribution during 2004-2008 for both 
men and women. 
Our fifth goal was to test whether there was a measurement error in the public sector 
status resulting from workers confusion and/or ambigous ownership types during the period of 
large-scale privatisations. For this purpose, an instrument constructed from an employer-
provided aggregated data was matched into a self-reported individual level data. The 
instrument was based on the changes in the proportions among industry branches in the public 
sector. We argued that these changes were caused mainly by privatisation and hence can also 
be a suitable instrument for the endogeneity. The public sector pay effects are then estimated 
for groups of workers according to their educational qualification by using two stage least 
squares (2SLS) and treatment effects instrumental variable procedures. The public sector pay 
gap estimated by both 2SLS and treatment effects confirmed the OLS predictions about the 
sign of the public sector pay gap. Furthermore, both IV methods indicated that the public 
sector pay gap during the large-scale privatisations (i.e. 2004-2008 period) declined with the 
higher educational qualification. 
Finally, 2SLS and treatment effects methods suggested that the OLS estimates of the 
public sector pay gap during the large-scale privatisations (Le. 2004-2008 period) may be 
biased toward zero. If the results are interpreted in the context of measurement error both IV 
methods indicated that the classical errors-in-variables (CEV) assumption holds. In addition, if 
the results are interpreted in the context of endogeneity both IV methods indicated that 
workers in the public sector have lower unobserved earning potential than workers in the 
private sector. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the public-private sector earnings differentials in Serbia 
over the period of economic transition from 1995 to 2008. The economic transition in Serbia 
• can be divided into two stages, prior and after 200.0. During the 19905 the private sector 
mainly consisted of large number of small firms and entrepreneurships emerging in small but 
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profitable segments of the market. Systematic economic reforms and large-scale privatisations 
programs were launched from 2001. 
Given the stages of economic transition and break in LFS data methodology in 2004 
we analysed the public sector pay effects by using LFS 1995-2003 and 2004-2008 separately. 
The LSMS data is used as an additional source of individual level data for 2002 and 2003 to 
show changes in the public sector pay gap relative to 2004-2008. At the final point of the 
analysis employer-provided administrative data from official statistics are explored as a third 
source of data for the purpose of instrumental variable creation which corrected for a 
measurement error as well as endogeneity in the public sector status arising from the large-
scale privatisations. 
The chapter presented the public sector pay effects based on four analyses: OLS, 
quantile regressions, decompositions of differences in distribution, 2SLS and treatment effects 
instrumental variable procedures which all confinn: first, a negative public sector pay gap 
during the 1995-2003 period; second, a positive public sector pay gap during the 2004-2008 
period and third, a public sector inequality reducing effect relative to the private sector. 
The results obtained in this chapter are consistent with the predictions of the public 
sector monopsony model. In particular, theory laid out in chapter 3 suggested the negative 
public sector pay gap relative to the competitive private sector given that the public sector 
exerts its monopsony power. The model predicts that the gap will increase initially but the 
whole-sale privatisation of public sector activities is expected to decrease the gap due to 
adjustments in the public sector wage-employment setting to competitive environment. 
Indeed, the empirical results showed that the public sector pay penalty first increased 
and later closed down. Moreover, the decline in the public sector pay penalty was found to 
correlate to the size of the public sector in terms of employment. In particular, the chapter 
found that the public sector pay penalty transferred into a premium with the launch of large-
scale privatisations. Finally, the public sector monopsony model suggested that the earnings 
distribution is expected to be more compressed in the public sector than in the private sector. 
Theory predicts that pU,blic sector exerts. more power over skilled than over unskilled workers 
which should result in more negative or less positive public sector pay gap at the upper end of 
the earnings distribution which is also c o n f i r m ~ d d by the empirical results. 
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4.8 Appendix 
Table A4.1: Description of Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable name 
Married 
Single 
DivorcedlWidowed' 
Serbian 
Montenegrin 
Other' 
Belgrade 
Central Serbia 
Vojvodina' 
Rural' 
Urban (City) 
No Education 
Primary' 
Secondary 
College 
University 
Master 
PhD 
Labour Force Experience <=5 years' . 
S<Labour Force Experience<=IO years 
100Labour Force Experience<=20 years 
20<Labour Force Experience<=30 years 
Labour Force Experience>30 years 
Labour Force Experience2 (Years/IOO) 
Farmer 
Miner, Worker in Industry or Similar 
Worker in Trade 
Worker in Service Sector' 
Welfare Worker 
Worker in Administration (Clerk) 
Manager 
Professional or Artist 
Worker in Other Occupation 
A g r i c ~ l t u r e ' '
Industry and Mining 
Construction 
Trade 
Catering and Tourism 
Transport 
Financial and Other Services 
Government Administration 
Education, Culture and Health 
Public' 
Private 
=1 if the individual is married; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is single; otherwise O. 
Varillble Descri tion 
Demographic Variables 
=1 if the individual is divorced or widowed; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual's nationality is Serbian; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual'S nationality is Montenegrian; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual's nationality is some other; otherwise O. 
. Region and Location Variables 
=1 if the individual lives in capital Belgrade; otherwise O. 
"'1 if the individual lives in Central Serbia; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual lives in Vojvodina; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual lives in the village; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual lives in the city; otherwise O. 
Education Level and Labour Force Experience Variables 
=1 if the individual has no education or has incomplete primary education; otherwise O. 
.. 1 if the individual has primary education; otherwise O. 
"1 if the individual has secondary education; otherwise O. 
"'I if the individual has high education; otherwise O. 
"'I if the individual has university education; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has master degree; otherwise O. 
"1 if the individual has PhD degree; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has less or five years of working experience; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has more than five and less or ten years of working experience; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has more than ten and less or twenty years of working experience; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has more than twenty and less or thirty years of working experience; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has more than thirty years of working experience; otherwise O. 
Labour Force Experience squared of individual in years (divided by 100) 
Worker Occupation Variables 
=1 if the individual is a farmer; otherwise O. 
"'I if the individual is a miner, industrial or similar worker; otherwise O. 
"1 if the individual is worker in trade; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is worker in the service sector; otherwise O. 
"'1 if the individual is welfare worker; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is worker in government institution or administration; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is manager; otherwise O. 
"1 if the individual is professional or artist; otherwise O. 
=1 if individual works in some other occupation; otherwise O. 
Industry Branch Variables 
=1 if the individual works in agriculture and forestry; otherwise O. 
-I if the individual works in industry sector; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in construction; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in trade; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in catering and tourism; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in transport and communication; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in financial and other services; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in government administration and social insurance; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in education, culture, health and social work; otherwise O. 
Ownership Sector Variable 
"'1 if the individual works in non privately owned enterprise; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the privately owned enterprise; otherwise O. 
Hours and Wages Variablc! 
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TEXT CUT OFF IN THE 
ORIGINAL 
Main Job Monthly Hours (natural log) The natural logarithm of the monthly hours worked by the individual in their main job. 
Main Job Monthly Wage (natural log) The natural logarithm of the main job monthly regular wage 
Main Job Monthly Earnings (nalurallog) The natural logarithm of the main job monthly earnings which includes beside regular wage all additional paylT 
Main Job Hourly Wage (natural log) The natural logarithm of the hourly regular wage worked by the individual in their main job. 
Main Job HourI Earnings (natural log) The natural logarithm of the main 'ob hourlv earnings which includes beside regular wage all additional avme 
Notes to Table A4.1: - denotes variable omitted in estimation Data Sources: Labour Force Surveys (LFS) 
1995-2008 and Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) 2002-2003 
Table A4.2: Proportions and Means of Variables used in Analysis from LFS and LSMS-
Men 
LFS 1995-2003 LSMS 2002-2003 LFS 2004-2008 
Variables PUBLIC PRIVATE z score PUBLIC PRIVATE z score PUBLIC PRIVATE z score 
Log Monthly Earnings (din) 9.18 9.35 -11.48 9.38 9.45 -2.94 
Log Monthly Wage (din) 9.05 9.32 -17.31 9.37 9.44 -3.03 9.80 9.65 12.40 
Log Monthly Hours 5.15 5.21 -15.59 5.15 5.19 -2.47 5.17 5.27 
-13.56 
Log Hourly Earnings (din) 4.03 4.14 -7.58 4.23 4.26 -1.32 
Log Hourly Wage (din) 3.89 4.11 -13.56 4.22 4.26 -1.42 4.63 4.38 18.50 
Age (years) 43.47 35.81 27.86 42.40 37.01 14.32 43.40 38.75 22.67 
Labour Force Experience <=5 0.10 0.39 -24.29 0.15 0.43 -16.87 0.11 0.26 -19.79 
S<Lfe<=IO years 0.10 0.16 -7.51 0.11 0.14 -3.10 0.12 0.17 
-6.04 
1 O<Lfe<=20 years 0.30 0.20 9.40 0.28 0.21 4.24 0.26 0.24 2.35 
20<Lfe<=30 years 0.35 0.19 15.92 0.31 0.17 9.48 0.31 0.22 11.12 
Labour Force Experience>30 0.15 0.05 15.76 0.16 0.05 11.90 0.19 0.10 13.08 
No Education 0.03 0.02 4.45 0.02 0.03 -1.04 0.01 0.02 
-4.88 
Primary 0.16 0.13 3.61 0.15 0.16 -1.00 0.11 0.16 
-5.06 
Secondary 0.60 0.74 -12.27 0.60 0.66 -3.65 0.62 0.71 
-7.96 
College 0.09 0.05 7.54 0.11 0.08 2.85 0.09 0.05 7.85 
University 0.11 0.06 7.60 0.11 0.06 5.77 0.15 0.06 13.08 
Master 0.01 0.00 1.04 0.01 0.00 4.72 
PhD 0.00 0.00 1.90 0.01 0.00 4.26 
Urban (City) 0.35 0.31 3.83 0.60 0.59 0.64 0.62 0.58 4.19 
Rural 0.65 0.69 -3.83 0.40 0.41 -0.64 0.38 0.42 
-4.19 
Single 0.17 0.42 -20.60 0.17 0.29 -7.47 0.77 0.64 13.51 
Married 0.78 0.53 20.28 0.79 0.69 6.80 0.19 0.31 
-13.44 
DivorcedlWidowed 0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.Q3 0.03 1.16 0.04 0.05 -1.49 
Belgrade 0.22 0.29 -5.93 0.19 0.21 -1.48 0.26 0.21 4.42 
Central Serbia 0.51 0.44 5.S5 0.26 0.28 -0.95 0.53 0.48 5.93 
Vojvodina 0.26 0.27 -0.56 0.55 0.51 2.03 0.22 0.31 
-10.72 
Serbian 0.87 0.86 1.37 0.92 0.87 6.61 
Montenegrin 0.02 0.01 1.44 
Other 0.11 0.13 -1.94 0.08 0.13 
-6.54 
Agriculture 0.09 0.03 13.15 0.08 0.09 
-1.45 0.04 0.07 
-7.91 
Industry and Mining 0.43 0.27 14.12 0.41 0.16 16.49 0.32 0.37 
-0.94 
Construction 0.07 0.13 -7.72 0.05 0.13 
-6.83 0.04 O.IS 
-14.91 
Trade 0.01) 0.32 -22.29 0.04 0.22 -14.15 0.03 0.22 
-24.27 
Catering and Tourism 0.02 0.09 -10.55 0.02 0.06 -6.18 0.01 0.04 
-8.97 
Transport 0.10 0.07 4.40 0.09 0.D7 2.68 0.13 0,06 8.73 
Financial and Other Services 0,05 0.Q1 -2.44 0.05 0,14 -8.00 0,10 0,08 4,27 
Government Administfation 0.08 0.00 27.66 0.10 0,00 16.08. 0,19 0.00 29.17 
Education, Culture and Health 0.10 0.02 16,75 0,08 0.01 9.94 0.14 0,01 21.43 
Farmer 0,04 0.02 5.99 0,01 0,03 
-10.95 
Miner, Worker in Industry 0.40 0.28 10.46 0.33 0.48 
-9.53 
Worker in Trade 0.05 0.24 -17.89 0.01 0,09 
-14.43 
Worker in Service Sector 0.13 0.28 -13.62 0.09 0,05 4.81 
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Welfare Worker 0.05 0.01 14.47 0.03 0.00 11.02 
Worker in Administration 0.13 0.07 8.72 0.09 0.06 6.49 
Manager 0.06 0.02 9.31 0.03 0.03 0.59 
Professional or Artist 0.10 0.05 7.87 0.32 0.16 15.98 
Worker in Other Occupation 0.04 0.03 2.47 0.09 0.10 
-3.10 
1995 0.12 0.05 12.52 
1996 0.12 0.05 10.35 
1997 0.11 0.D7 7.52 
1998 0.11 0.09 2.89 
1999 0.11 0.10 1.36 
2000 0.12 0.12 -0.15 
2001 0.11 0.15 -4.73 
2002 0.11 0.16 -5.87 0.75 0.66 5.60 
2003 0.10 0.22 -11.61 0.25 0.34 -5.60 
2004 0.25 0.16 12.04 
2005 0.22 0.19 4.05 
2006 0.20 0.20 -0.28 
2007 0.18 0.21 -4.96 
2008 0.16 0.24 -10.97 
Observations 11949 1772 2135 778 5990 5928 
Notes to Table A4.2: The z-score IS testmg for the statIstIcal dIfferences between means and proportIons across 
the public and private sectors. The critical value at the 0.05 level is ± 1.96. 
Data Source: LFS 1995-2008 and LSMS 2002-2003 
Table A4.3: Proportions and Means of Variables used in Analysis from LFS and LSMS-
Women 
LFS 1995-2003 LSMS 2002-2003 LFS 2004-2008 
Variables PUBLIC PRIVATE z score PUBLIC PRIVATE z score PUBLIC PRIVATE z score 
Log Monthly Earnings (din) 9.11 9.12 -0.34 9.30 9.18 4.80 
Log Monthly Wage (din) 8.95 9.07 -7.64 9.29 9.17 4.62 9.74 9.47 19.81 
Log Monthly Hours 5.14 5.19 -16.48 5.11 5.11 -0.42 5.14 S.23 
-11.53 
Log Hourly Earnings (din) 3.97 3.93 3.15 4.19 4.06 4.49 
Log Hourly Wage (din) 3.81 3.88 -4.17 4.18 4.06 4.33 4.60 4.25 23.99 
Age (years) 42.58 35.67 25.62 41.37 35.17 15.72 43.30 38.23 22.24 
Labour Force Experience 
<-Sy 0.11 0.43 -25.64 0.16 0.48 -16.51 0.11 0.31 -20.96 
5<Lfe<=10 years 0.11 0.16 -6.00 0.13 0.16 -1.66 0.14 0.19 
-4.45 
1 O<Lfe<=20 years 0.36 0.21 13.79 0.33 0.23 5.83 0.31 0.25 6.01 
20<Lfe<=30 years 0.35 0.17 17.97 0.32 0.12 12.30 0.34 0.20 14.55 . . 
Labour Force Experience>30 0.07 0.03 7.35 0.06 om 6.85 0.11 0.05 7.69 
No Education 0.02 0.01 3.30 0.01 0.Q2 
-1.20 0,01 0.03 
-7.73 
Primary 0.15 0.10 5.20 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 
-2.62 
Secondary 0.57 0.78 -17.89 0.53 0.66 
-6.80 0.52 0.71 
-12.35 
College 0.11 0.05 9.97 0.15 0.11 3.04 0.13 0.06 9.49 
University 0.15 0.06 12.96 0.17 0.08 7.52 0.22 0.08 15.12 
Master 0.01 0.00 2.48 0.01 0.00 4.18 
PhD 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.00 0.00 1.74 
Urban (City) 0.34 0.37 -1.98 0.76 0 ~ 6 8 8 3.91 0.73 0.66 6.54 
Rural 0.66 0.63 1.98 0.24 0.32 -3.91 0.27 0.34 
-6.54 
Single 0.12 0.32 -17.19 0.13 0.27 
-7.90 0.75 0.67 
-10.73 
Married 0.76 0.59 13.36 0.74 0.65 4.76 0.14 0.24 
-7.00 
DivorcedIWidowed 0.12 0.09 4.17 0.13 0.08 ., 3.55 0.11 0.09 3.54 
Belgrade 0.29 0.28 0.42 0.25 0.23 0.88 0.29 0.25 4.23 
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Central Serbia 0.45 0.42 2.54 0.25 0.30 -2.59 0.47 0.46 0.81 
Vojvodina 0.26 0.30 -3.18 0.50 0.47 1.S9 0.24 0.29 
-5.11 
Serbian 0.88 0.86 1.56 0.92 0.89 4.96 
Montenegrin 0.01 0.01 0.44 
Other 0.11 0.12 -2.01 0.08 0.11 -4.94 
Agriculture 0.04 0.01 7.96 0.03 0.06 -3.78 0.01 0.05 
-10.36 
Industry and Mining 0.29 0.20 8.83 0.27 0.12 9.39 0.14 0.30 -9.12 
Construction 0.02 0.02 -0.95 0.02 0.Q2 -0.60 0.01 0.02 
-0.07 
Transport 0.11 0.57 -37.02 0.08 0.43 -19.62 0.04 0.40 
-32.87 
Trade 0.04 0.08 -6.63 0.02 0.Q7 -4.93 0.02 0.06 
-7.48 
Catering and Tourism 0.04 0.02 4.73 0.04 0.01 4.64 0.05 0.02 6.00 
Financial and Other Services 0.08 0.07 2.18 0.05 0.16 -7.96 0.09 0.13 
-3.79 
Government Administration 0.07 0.00 24.27 0.09 0.00 12.07 . 0.13 0.00 19.45 
Education, Culture and Health 0.31 0.02 46.04 0.33 0.04 22.64 0.50 0.02 49.67 
Farmer 0.02 0.00 5.46 0.00 0.03 
-11.41 . 
Miner, Worker in Industry or 
Similar 0.18 0.11 9.10 0.04 0.15 
-10.57 
Worker in Trade 0.09 0.50 -32.95 0.02 0.32 
-29.62 
Worker in Service Sector 0.13 0.17 -4.42 0.05 0.07 
-4.26 
Welfare Worker 0.03 0.00 11.05 0.00 0.00 
-1.41 
Worker in Administration 0.30 0.14 15.67 0.11 0.07 6.64 
Manager 0.03 om 6.75 0.02 0.02 0.37 
Professional or Artist 0.17 0.04 21.84 0.61 0.24 31.00 
Worker in Other Occupation 0.06 0.03 6.50 0.14 0.10 4.39 
1995 0.11 0.06 7.10 
1996 0.11 0.06 8.27 
1997 0.11 0.07 6.43 
1998 0.11 0.09 2.66 
1999 0.11 0.10 0.65 
2000 0.12 0.13 -1.30 
2001 0.11 0.14 -2.62 
2002 0.11 0.15 -4.18 0.74 0.69 2.83 
2003 0.09 0.20 -9.91 0.26 0.31 -2.83 
2004 0.23 0.18 6.15 
2005 0.21 0.18 3.81 
2006 0.20 0.19 0.94 
2007 0.18 0.22 -3.63 
2008 0.17 023 -6.96 
Observations 8341 1698 1554 661 4772 4099 
Notes to Table A 4.3: See notes to Table A4.2. 
Data Source: LFS 1995-2008 and LSMS 2002-2003 
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Table A4.4: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia, 1995-2003 
19')5 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women Men I Women 
• Public Sector: 
Conditional Model: 
Experience: 
If <= 5 Years f / f / / / / / / / / f / / / / f 
5< Years<=10 -0.040 -0.051 -0.065 0.080 -0.016 0.054 0.068 0.070 -0.010 0.091 0.044 0.056 0.101 0.009 0.089 0.133 0.Q78 0.097 
(-0.79) (-0.88) (-1.07) (1.40) (-0.29) (0.97) (1.24) (1.32) (-0.16) (1.65) (0.85) (1.12) (2.2W (0.20) (2.18)· (3.36)·· (1.84) (2.42)· 
10< Years<=20 0.036 -0.021 0.021 0.033 0.045 0.070 0.022 0.084 0.011 0.101 0.021 0.017 0.067 0.064 0.032 0.176 0.053 0.156 
(0.65) (-0.34) (0.36) (0.55) (0.81) (1.22) (0.38) (1.48) (0.19) (1.84) (0.43) (0.37) (1.46) (1.30) (0.64) (4.06)·- (1.17) (3.30)·· 
20< Years<=30 0.031 0.027 -0.010 -0.060 0.018 0.107 0.002 0.019 0.012 0.174 0.069 -0.011 0.093 0.105 0.061 0.254 0.051 0.266 
(0:36) (0.25) (-0.11) (-0.57) (0.21) (1.07) (0.02) (0.19) (0.15) (2.02)- (0.88) (-0.15) (1.24) (1.31) (0.83) (3.53)-- (0.68) (3.39)--
>30 Years -0.033 0.176 -0.027 -0.136 0.012 0.161 -0.012 -0.039 0.013 0.253 -0.014 -0.001 0.150 0.052 0.107 0.347 0.044 0.271 
(-0.24) (0.96) (-0.19) (-0.76) (0.09) (0.97) (-0.09) (-0.24) (0.10) (1.88) (-0.11) (-0.01) (1.27) (0.37) (0.94) (2.86)·- (0.38) (2.24)· 
Education: 
No Qualification -0.043 -0.272 -0.171 -0.167 -0.084 -0.018 -0.097 -0.147 -0.181 -0.130 -0.087 -0.018 -0.053 0.024 0.016 -0.056 0.052 0.041 
(-0.54) (-2.57)- (-2.11)- (-1.56) (-1.09) (-0.19) (-1.10) (-1.92) (-2.20)- (-1.47) (-0.96) (-0. \3) (-0.72) (0.17) (0.22) (-0.69) (0.58) (0.27) 
Primary 
Secondary 0.110 0.138 0.054 0.122 0.Q75 0.125 0.090 0.084 0.032 0.090 0.013 0.127 0.121 0.245 0.181 0.225 0.\78 0.190 
(3. \3)_. (2.50)- (1.37) (2.47)- (1.91) (2.89)*- (2.27)- (1.94) (0.86) (2.10)-. (0.35) (3.51)** (3.44)** (5.90)·- (5.74)** (5.78)-· (5.26)·- (4.79)--
College 0.266 0.298 0.153 0.169 0.264 0.217 0.192 0.190 0.210 0.218 0.150 0.260 0.351 0.420 0.311 0.347 0.321 0.372 
(5.16)·- (4.32)-- (2.71)" (2.53)- (4.52)-- (3.73)*- (320)·· (3.19)·- (3.58)-· (3.78)-- (2.79)-· (5.43)*- (6.56)*- (8.19)·· (5.51)** (6.76)-- (5.74)** (6.80)*· 
Un'iversity . 0.427 OA66 0.409 0.364 OAOI 0.420 0.426 0.345 0.4\3 0.415 0.316 0.447 0.617 0.669 0.570 0.615 0.594 0.630 
(6.89)-- (6.51)" (6.03)-- (5.59)" (5.97)·- (6.84)-- (6.72)** (5.34)" (6.24)-- (7.22)** (4.66)-- (9.24)·· (10.66)·- (12.49)-- (10.43)·- (12.04)-· (10.41)-- (12.31)·· 
Industry Branch: 
Agriculture f f / f f f f f f / f / f . f f f f f 
Industry & Mining 0201 0.167 0.155 0.321 0.127 0.230 0.046 0.112 -0.017 -0.011 0.111 0.072 0.109 0.035 0.098 0.152 -0.026 0.072 
(3.20)-- (1.34) (2.44)- (3.02)-· (\.97)- (1.93) (0.74) (1.44) (-0.30) (-0.11) (2.18)· (0.80) (1.99)- (0.45) (1.70) (1.97)- (-0.44) (0.67) 
Construction 0.045 0.030 0.165 0.322 -0.014 0.074 -0.026 0.195 -0.027 -0.027 0.147 0.206 0.081 0.088 0.126 0.147 0.061 0.017 
(0.63) (0.20) (2.00)- (2.81)·· (-0.17) (0.45) (-0.33) (1.61 ) (-0.36) (-0.23) ( 1.93) (I. 78) (1.19) (0.93) (1.95) (1.59) (0.88) (0.\3) 
Trade -0.027 -0.010 0.062 0.171 -0.100 0.041 -0.112 -0.019 -0.099 -0.055 -0.069 -0.009 0.051 -0.102 0.085 0.062 0.006 0.152 
(-0.22) (-0.07) (0.60) (1.33) (-0.97) (0.29) (-1.23) (-0.19) (-1.11) (-0.49) (-0.89) (-0.09) (0.69) (-1.24) (1.13) (0.73) (0.08) (1.52) 
Catering& Tourism 0.163 0.112 0.060 0.288 -0.015 0.305 -0.204 -0.007 -0.121 0.042 -0.047 0.067 -0.030 -0.051 0.082 0.086 0.022 0.093 
(1.74) (0.77) (0.66) (2.16)- (-0.17) (2.23)* (-2.37)- (-0.08) (-1.25) (0.35) (-0.58) (0.59) (-0.31 ) (-0.54) (0.86) (0.95) (0.22) (0.80) 
Transport 0.314 0271 0.384 0.540 0.221 0.574 0.211 0.442 0.115 0251 0.152 0.199 0.269 0.097 0.288 0.293 0.150 0.180 
(4.70)-- (1.88) (5.68)** (4.38)-· (3.00)-- (4.47)·- (2.94)** (4.37)-- (1.76) (2. \3)- (2.70)-- (1.76) . (4A8)·· (1.12) (4.72)·· (3.26)-- (2.31)- (1.66) 
Financial Services 0257 0256 0.385 0.587 0.360 0.523 0.302 0303 0.094 0.263 0.134 0.232 0.1% 0.041 0.230 0.185 0.130 0.196 
(3.33)·· (1.93) (5.38)-- (5.38)-- (5.15)-· (4.31)·- (4.03)-- (3.31)" (\.16) (2.52)- (2.14)· (2.53)· (3.24)-- (0.52) (3.53)·- (2.27)- (1.86) ( 1.92) 
Govern" Admin. 0.314 0.224 0.423 0.488 0.333 0.480 0.213 0.210 0.134 0.118 0.109 0.065 0.277 0.180 0.185 0.255 0.108 0.252 
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(4.84)" (1.66) (6.47)" (4.58)" (4.88)" (3.99)-- (3.11)" (2.58)· (1.98)- (1.12) (1.81) (0.68) (4.21)" (2.40)· (3.16)" (3.23)" (\.69) 
• Education&IIealth 0.185 0.151 . 0.273 0.375 0.213 0.396 0.087 0.237 -0.073 0.114 -0.045 0.038 0.127 0.096 0.115 0.197 0.088 
-
(2.74)" (1.20) (4.16)-- (3.65)" (3.20)" (3.39)-· (1.25) (2.94)" H·04) (1.14) (-0.78) (0.42) (2.10)· (1.35) (1.90) (2.55)· (1.4) 
Occupations: 
Famler 0.075 -0.083 -0.130 -0.061 -0.195 -0.112 -0.079 -0.171 -0.096 -0.288 -0.128 -0.402 -0.036 -0.097 -0.007 0.133 -0.134 
(0.87) (-0.39) (-1.24) (-0.38) (-2.0W (-0.69) (-0.84) (-1.13) (-1.05) (-1.41) (-1.68) (-2.7)·· (-0.48) (-0.90) (-0.09) (1.00) (-\,42) 
Industrial Worker 0.033 -0.046 0.080 -0.102 0.015 0.011 0.049 -0.065 0.011 0.092 0.017 0.013 0.087 -0.100 0.008 -0.078 -0.016 
(0.74) (-0.65) (1.54) (-1.45) (0.28) (0.19) (0.99) (-1.04) (0.24) (\,41) (0.39) (0.22) (2.20)· (-1.58) (0.22) (-1.40) (-0.38) 
Trade Worker 0.121 -0.100 0.009 -0.110 0.062 -0.015 -0.063 -0.129 -0.069 0.026 0.055 -0.102 -0.052 -0.026 -0.186 -0.036 -0.108 
(1.05) (-0.99) (0.09) (-1.14) (0.57) (-0.14) (-0.75) (-1.48) (-0.83) (OJ I) (0.74) (-1.42) (-0.79) (-0.41) (-2.90)" (-0.57) (-I. 73) 
Service Worker . f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Welfare Worker 0.113 OJ88 0.086 0.146 0.043 0.203 0.232 0.132 0.182 0.205 0.248 0.220 0.023 0.233 0.042 0.183 0.047 
(1.81) (4.15)·· (1.38) (\.79) (0.51) (2.69)·· (3.53)·· (1.98)· (2.56)· (2.51)· (3.91 ) •• (2.53)· (OJ2) (4.28)·· (0.65) (2.81)·· (0.91) 
Clerk 0.071 0.104 0.122 0.125 0.126 0.173 0.108 0.190 0.071 0.238 0.136 0.131 0.019 0.128 0.119 0.127 0.091 
( 1.45) (1.84) (2.36)· (2.22)· (2.30)· (3.33)·· (2.16)· (3.52)·· (1.32) (4.26)·· (2.80)·· (2.70)·· (0.48) (3.11)·· (3.06)** (3.17)*· (2.21)· 
Manager 0.275 0.440 0.446 0.565 0.292 0.455 OJ03 0.460 0.245 0.450 0.341 0.320 0.143 0.180 0.225 OJ92 0.227 
(3.98)·· (5.29)·· (5.70)·· (5.06)·· (3.08)·· (3.38)" (3.88)" (4.89)·· (2.86)·· (5.42)·· (4.64)·· (3.91)·· (2.09)· (1.94) (3.72)·· (6.60)·· (3.40)" 
Professional 0.209 0.186 0.229 0.28 0.203 0.250 0.163 0.235 0.161 0.268 0.196 0.161 0.059 0.110 0.144 0.194 0.111 
(3.77)·· (2.89)·· (3.49)·· (4.63)·· (2.98)·· (4.18)·· (2.61)" (3.59)** (2.53)· (4.58)·· (3.19)·· (3.11)·· (1.15) (2.29)· (2.28)· (3.65)·· (I. 79) 
Rrgion: 
Belgrade f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Central Serbia -0.405 -0.336 -0.396 -0.382 -0.450 -0.400 -0.407 -0.313 -0.411 -0.339 -0.314 -0.255 -0.329 -0.351 -0.345 -0.398 -0.246 
(-13)·· (-8.2)·· (-11 ) •• (-10)·· (-13)·· (-II)" (-12)·· (-9.0)·· (-12)" (-II)·· (-10)·· (-8.9)" (-11.7)" (-11.4)" (-11.7)" (-13.5)·· (-8.3)·· 
Vojvodina -0.263 -0.159 -0.273 -0.224 -0.289 -0.257 -0.268 -0.226 -0.225 -0.248 -0.151 -0.154 -0.162 -0.254 -0.226 -0.329 -0.179 
(-6) •• (-3)·· (-6)" (-5)" (-6)" (-6) •• (-6)" (-5)·· (-5)·· (-5)" (-3)·· (-4) •• (-4) •• (-5)·· (-6)·· (-9)" (-4)" 
Pllblic Sc-ctor: -0.087 -0.144 -0.127 -0.075 -0.156 -0.058 -0.234 -0.183 -0.144 -0.165 -0.245 -0.182 -0.118 -0.087 -0.100 -0.143 -0.051 
(-1.34) (-2.22)· (-1.61) • (-1.15) (-2.7)" (-0.9) (-4.9)·· (-3.8)·· (-2.6)·· (-3.7)" (-5.3)·· (-4.8)·· (-3.18)·· (-2.3W (-3.09)** (-4.60)·· (-1.77) 
Constant 3.717 3.824 3.783 3.448 4J33 3.933 4.206 3.802 4.051 3.574 4.008 3.748 3.998 3.941 4.191 4.004 4.149 
(28.8)-· (24.7)·· (29.7)" (23.5)" (36.1)" (26.8)·· (36.4)·· (33.3)·· (36.1)·· (29.4)·· (38.7)·· (31.2)·· (43.9)·· (36.2)·· (46.1 ) •• (39.4)·· (42.3)" 
Adj. R-squan:d 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.42 OJ2 0.43 0.30 0.40 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.35 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.48 0.30 
Regression st.error 0.46 0.49 0.5 0.45 0.51 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.36 0.42 
Rrellsch Pagan test 34.86 81.12 48.40 76.83 21.32 49.63 25.80 17.33 31.59 39.44 14.03 39.09 44.67 68.25 16.39 22.41 47.74 
Observations 1479 1037 1468 1021 1488 1071 1486 1115 1464 1097 1634 1233 1602 1180 1556 1161 1545 
Notes to TaMe A 4.4: 
a) The depended variable is the log of real hourly earnings. Earnings are net of taxes. pensions and welfare benefits. They include payments for meals. 
transport. union benefits, credits from the firm and payment in kind. They relate to earnings received on the main job only and are expressed in October 
2005 Serbian dinars. 
b) All explanatory variables are categorical. All specifications include marital status. settlement type and nationality dummies. 
c) The estimation procedure for the mean regression is OLS and White (1980) estimated standard errors are used to calculate 95% confidence interval. 
. Breusch-Pagan I Cook· Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of constant variance in each case. Robust I statistics reported 
beneath the coefficients. OLS regression analysis reported used STAT A 8.0: •• and • denote statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level 
respectively using two-tailed test./denotes category omitted in estimation. Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia 1995-2003 
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(2.48)-
0.215 
(2.19)· 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.005 
(-0.09) 
-0.184 
(-3.71)*· 
f 
0.111 
(1.76) 
0.109 
(2.74)" 
0.254 
(4.00)·· 
0.135 
(2.91)·· 
f 
-0.253 
(-7.9)·· 
-0.16 
(-4) •• 
-0.062 
(-1.65) 
3.893 
(31.7)" 
0.44 
0.36 
44.93 
1124 
Table A4.5: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia, 2004-2008 
200" 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Variahles Men 1 Women Men 1 Women Men -I Women Men I Women Men I Women 
Vnconditionlli Model: 
Pu blic Sector: 0.239 0.335 0.274 0.347 0.231 0.316 0.358 0.400 0.350 0.500 
(9.93)" (12.66)·· (12.19)·· (13.37)·· (11.12)·· (12.93)·- (16.49)-- (16.70)-- (17.51)-- (21.76)·· 
Condition III Model: 
Experience: 
<= 5 Years f f f f f f f f f f 
5< Years<=10 0.052 0.021 0.005 0.052 0.042 0.030 0.041 0.049 0.023 0.039 
(1.45) (0.59) (0.15) (1.43) (1.35) (0.98) (1.27) (1.59) (0.78) (1.39) 
10< Years<=20 0.062 0.097 0.015 0.083 0.101 0.040 0.066 0.095 0.039 0.124 
(1.63) (2.90)-· (0.44) (2.46)- (3.44)·- (1.10) (2.05)· (2.79)-- (1.16) (3.29)-· 
20< Years<=30 0.053 0.131 0.009 0.181 0.061 0.046 0.071 0.119 0.011 0.114 
(0.99) (2.57)- (0.15) (3.61)" (1.56) (0.68) (1.44) (2.10)· (0.21) (1.51) 
> 30 Years 0.109 0.059 0.048 0.219 -0.013 0.085 0.015 0.084 -0.046 0.139 
(1.26) 
~ ~
(0.74) (0.51) (2.96)-· (-0.22) (0.78) (0.19) (0.98) (-0.52) (1.12) 
Eduration: 
No qualification -0.049 -0.154 -0.095 -0.129 . -0.014 -0.059 -0.113 -0.213 -0.043 -0.061 
(-0.63) (-1.68) (-1.13) (-1.41) (-0.21) (-0.61) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-0.56) (-0.54) 
Primary f f f f f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.122 0.134 0.102 0.157 0.161 0.116 0.076 0.221 0.131 0.159 
(3.58)** (3.49)-- (3.09)** (4.16)** (5.72)-· (3.41)·- (2.42)- (7.40)-- (4.73)** (5.63)·-
College 0.277 0.297 0.271 0.375 0.34 0.274 0.195 0.361 0.27 0.309 
(5.47)-· (5.88)-- (5.59)** (8.06)-· (7.39)-· (6.41)-- (4.37)·- (8.31)·· (6.42)" (7.98)·-
University 0.55 0.509 0.509 0.575 0.617 0.534 0.453 0.649 0.538 0.640 
(11.06)-- (10.03)-- (10.16)-- (11.74)·- (14.87)·· (12.46)** (9.44)** (15.88)-- (12.47)" (16.27)·· 
Master degree 0.522 0.726 0.504 0.635 0.341 0.797 0.489 1.004 0.811 0.812 
(3.45)** (6.54)-· (4.38)" (6.51)*· (1.46) (6.24)·· (2.03)- (5.46)*· (6.71)·· (6.90)" 
PhD degree 0.82 0.873 0.753 1.103 1.178 0.621 0.939 0.778 1.149 1.007 
(9.22)·- (5.23)" (7.06)" (4.75)·· (9.80)" (10.12)·· (6.46)·· (15.69)·- (10.31)·· (14.04)·· 
Industry Branch: 
Agriculture f f f f f f f f f f 
Industry & Mining 0.131 0.065 0.339 0.173 0.259 0.259 0.323 0.134 0.170 0.180 
(2.40)- (0.74) (5.51)" ( 1.59) (4.67)-· (2.84)·· (4.74)·· (130) (3.37)·· (2.88)·· 
Construction 0.130 -0.061 0.362 0.354 0.304 0.258 0.341 0.084 0.171 0.172 
(2.11)- (-0.51) (5.44)·· (2.44)· (4.98)·· (2.21)· (4.52)-· (0.59) (3.03)·· (1.93) 
Trade -0.020 0.005 0.337 0.136 0.237 0.365 0.321 0.115 0.D78 0.175 
(-0.30) (0.06) (5.09)·· (1.24) (3.79)" (3.84)·· (4.40)·· (1.07) (1.41) (2.82)·· 
171 
Catering& Tourism -0.111 0.015 0.098 0.104 0.045 0.273 0.240 0.066 0.121 0.121 
(-1.43) (0.16) (1.08) (0.88) (0.56) (2.59)·· (2.70)" (0.56) (1.52) (1.45) 
Transport 0.205 0.208 0.392 0.317 0.267 00394 0.322 0.233 0.120 O.ISI 
(3.60)" (2.IW (5.94)" (2.63)·· (4.44)" (4.02)" (4.35)" (2.03)· (2.18)· (2.07)· 
Financial &Other S 0.157 0.\32 00303 00329 0.296 0.434 0.330 0.252 0.102 0.214 
(2.60)·· (1.49) (4.28)·· (3.01 ) •• (4.92)·· (4.55)·· (4.41)·· (2.41)· (1.83) (3.36)·· 
Govern', Administr. 0.296 0.273 0.535 0.414 0.367 0.461 0.462 0.244 0.147 0.235 
(5.03)·· (3.21)·· (7.76)·· (3.78)" (S.80)·· (4.89)·· (6.11)·· (2.32)· (2.60)·· (3.43)·· 
Education&Health 0.103 0.147 0.303 0.250 0.227 0.373 0.262 0.240 0.075 0.219 
(1.71) (1.78) (4.S7)·· (2.32)· (3.88)·· (4.08)·· (3.35)·· (2.35)· (1.32) (3.45)·· 
Occupations: 
Farmer -0.367 -0.160· -0.\36 -0.033 -0.226 -0.228 -0.001 0.075 -0.215 0.017 
(-4.23)·· (-1.33) (-1.54) (-0.29) (-2.10)· (-1.74) (-0.00) (0.51 ) (-1.51) (0.12) 
Industrial Worker -0.058 _ -0.047 -0.007 -0.082 -0.073 -0.004 0.026 -0.020 0.024 -0.020 
(-1.37) (-0.75) (-0.16) (-1.23) (-1.68) (-0.08) (0.65) (-0.33) (0.64) (-0035) 
Trade Worker -0.093 -0.103 -0.210 -0.095 -0.271 -0.179 -0.125 -0.068 -0.073 -0.066 
(-1.31) (-1.71) (-3.11)·· (-1.45) (-4.59)·· (-2.92)·· (-2. \3). (-1.\5) (-1.37) (-1.21) 
Service Worker f f f f f f f f f f 
Welfare Worker 0.106 0.093 -0.021 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.303 0.000 
(1.48) (0.54) (-0.31) (0.00) 0.39 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00) (3.97)** (0.00) 
Clerk -0.021 0.161 -0.002 0.123 -0.093 0.206 -0.028 0.166 0.041 0.279 
(-0.47) (3.35)·· (-0.04) (2.10)· (-1.88) (3.87)·· (-0.58) (3.20)·· (0.96) (S.21)·· 
Manager 0.270 0.507 0.359 0.294 0.272 0.475 0.373 0.324 0.383 0.424 
(3.68)·· (5.43)" (4.44)" (2.81)" (3.29)" (5.32)·· (6.02)·· (3.11)·· (6.04)·· (4.63)·· 
Prcrfessional 0.087 0.292 0.109 0.205 0.021 0.314 0.232 0.251 0.236 0.349 
(1.93) (6.88)·· (2.3W (3.88)" (0.46) (6.48)·· (5.61)·· (5.19)·· (5.97)·· (7.04)·· 
Rrgion: 
Belgrade f f f f f f f f f f 
Central Serbia ·-0.225 -0.174 -0.241 -0.219 -0.339 -0.269 -0.305 -0.269 -O.28S -0.265 
(-8.12)·· (-7.22)·· (-10.26)·· (-9.11)" (-16.67)·· (-13.42)·· (-12.91)·· (-\3.00)·· (-\3.47)·· (-13.14)·· 
Vojvodina -0.088 -0.062 -0.176 -0.132 -0.204 -0.164 -0.218 -0.205 -0.180 -0.180 
(-2.84)·· (-2.16)· ( ~ . 2 3 ) " " (-4.S2)·· (-8.31)·· ( ~ . 6 7 ) · · · (-7.77)·· (-7.69)·· (-7.26)" (-7.62)" 
Public St'ctor: 0.030 -0.028 0.087 0.012 0.089 -0.021 0.189 0.Q78 0.191 0.122 
(1.\6) (-0.93) (3.62)·· (0.37) (4.12)** (-0.69) (8.09)·· (2.72)·· (8.81)" (3.72)** 
Constant 4.042 3.837 3.954 3.814 4.237 3.763 4.298 3.972 4.S47 4.096 
(42.59)·· (3S.26)" (39.52)·· (29.2S)" (47.79)·· (33.56)·· (42.\0)" (31.01)·· (50.23)·· (46.26)·· 
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.56 0.39 0.54 0.43 0.63 
Regression sL error 0.49 0.41 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.44 0.37 0.39 0.33 
Rreusch Pa!!an test IS.44 14.84 40.90 8.89 27.02 32.08 2J.5S 0.19 14.37 0.31 
Ohservations 2407 1812 2437 1731 2372 1763 2320 1775 2382 1790 
Notes to TaMe A-I.5: See notes to Table A4.4_ Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia 2004-2008 
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LFS 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
LSMS 
2002 
2003 
Table A4.6: Conditional annual public sector pay premia and penalties at the mean and 
I d -I - S b- 199- 2008 se eete pereenh es In er la, ~ ~
Mean 1 0 ' ~ ~ 25'· 50'· 7 5 ' ~ ~ 90'· 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
-0.087 -0.144 0.010 -0.219 0.036 -0.165 -O.Q28 -0.078 -0.128 -0.047 -0.178 ..().on 
(-1.34) (-2.22)· (0.11) (-1.17) (0.53) (-2.01)· (.0.33) (08) (.1.20) (-0.59) HIS) ( -1.00) 
0.127 0.075 -0.167 0.259 -0.005 0.093 -0001 0.014 0.092 -0.024 0.152 -0.017 
(1.61 ) ( 1.15) (-0.95) ( 1.79) (-0.04) (0.98) (-0.02) (0.20) ( 1.29) (-0.33) (0.60) (-0.13) 
-0.156 -0.058 -0.124 -0.101 -0.170 -0.110 -0.031 -0.032 -0.068 -0.098 ..().138 ..().081 
(-2.7)·· (-0.90) (-1.08) (.0.63) (-1.67) (-1.23 ) (.0.61) (-0.72) (-0.83) (-1.63) (-1.44) (-1.64) 
.0.234 -0.183 -0.252 ..().078 -0.158 -0.169 "().I62 ..().208 -0.163 -0.188 -0.338 -0210 
(-4.90)"· (-3.70)·· (-3.02)·· (-0.78) (-1.93) (-2.49)· (-3.34)** (-2.70)** (-2.49)· (-2.70)·· (-3.12)"" (-2.60)_· 
-0.144 -0.165 -0.125 -0.114 -0.134 ..().179 -0.097 -0.125 -0.128 -0.156 .0.155 -0.232 
(-2.60)·· (-3.60)·· (-1.42) (-1.09) (-2.56)" (-2.51)* (-1.72) (-3.10)** (-1.59) (-3.10)·* (-1.52) (-3.30)** 
-0.245 -0.182 -0.132 -0.166 -0.166 -0.164 .0.24 I -0222 -0252 -0.221 -0.262 -0234 
(-5.20)** (-4.80)** (-2.01)* (-2.10)* (-3.51)** (-2.48)* (-4.64)** (-7.20)** (-4.08)*- (-5.40)·· (-4.63)** (-3.20)** 
-0.118 ..().087 -0.09 ..().151 -0.070 .0.042 -0.047 -0.010 -0.092 ..().009 "()I55 0.003 
(-3.10)** (-2.31)" (-1.46) (-2.10)* (-1.00) (-0.83) (-1.08) (-0.32) (-2.82)** (-0.17) ( - 2 . 4 ~ ~ (0.07) 
-0.100 -0.143 .0.141 -0.222 -0.074 -0.144 -0.087 -0.129 -0.110 "()09I ..().050 -0109 
(-3.0)"· (-4.6)** (-2.16)* (-4.0)·* (-1.38) (-2.6)·· ( -1.87) (-290)·· (-2.75)·· (-2.44)· .0.96 (-2.20)· 
-0051 -0.062 -0.016 0.030 -0.053 ..().036 -0.017 -0.026 -0.042 -0.027 -0.070 -0.084 
(-1.77) (-1.65) (..().OO) (0.40) (-1.52) (.0.9)) (-0.57) (-069) (-I.3i) (-0.6\) (-1.33) (-1.221 
0.030 -0.028 0.138 0.012 0.083 -0.024 0.070 0.030 0.021 -0.039 0.010 -0036 
(1.16) (-0.93) (3.99)·· (0.20) (2.73)"· ("().60) (2.79)·· (1.29) (0.99) (-1.58) (025) (-0.71) 
0.087 0.012 0.145 0.084 0.118 0.064 0.08 0.037 0.067 ..().005 0.02 -0.044 
(3.62)·- (0.37) (2.55)· (1.83) (3.13)·- (1.87) (2.19)- (1.01 ) (2.96)** (-0.11 ) (041) (06) 
0.089 -0.021 0.091 0.015 0.086 -0.001 0.072 0.004 0.103 0.042 0.077 -0008 
(4.12)-- (-0.69) (1.99)- (0.30) (2.89)·· (-0.03) (2.80)"" (0.11) (4.30)·" ( 1.10) (2.39)· (-0.12) 
0.189 0.078 0.\30 0.103 0.201 0.130 0.204 0.123 0.201 0.081 0.177 0.038 
(8.09)"- (2.72)** (2.95)·· (2.43)· (6.01)·· (2.72)·" (6.70)·· (3.3))** (7.33)"· (2.371'· (488)·· (0.92) 
0.191 0.122 0.21 0.117 0.166 0.177 0.173 0.151 0.227 0.106 O.ISO 0.101 
(8.81 )". (3.72)"· (5.31)·· (1.97)" (5.44)** (4.64)** (5.34)"· (3.14)"· 11023\·· (343)." /5.61 ) •• (1.82 ) 
-0.131 -0.056 -0.062 0.024 -0.035 0.003 -0.092 .0.004 -0.190 -0.036 ..().207 -O.IS2 
(-4.00)-· (-1.26) (-0.S2) (0.29) (-0.86) . (0.05) (-2.3S)· (-0.13) (-3.44)·· (-0.74) (-4.11)·" (-2.00)· 
-0.130 -0.011 -0.153 -0.220 -0.108 -0.079 -0.094 0.045 -0160 0.095 ..().131 -0039 
(-2.90)·· (-0.19) (-1.60) (-2.30)· (-2.01 )" (-0.96) ( -1.89) (0.55) (-2.79)"· (I.21T /-139) (-039) 
Notes toTable A4.6: 
a) The dependent variable is the log of real hourly earnings. Earnings are net of taxes, pensions and welfare 
benefits expressed in October 2005 prices. From 1995 until 2003 earnings include regular wage and other non-
wage benefits such as: payments for meals, transport, union benefits, credits from the firm and payment in kind 
and other receivings from the main job which were separately recorded by surveys. From 2004 to 2008 non-wage 
benefits became a part of the regular wage and are not recorded by surveys as separate categories. 
b) All explanatory variables are categorical variables. The log hourly pay equations include the following 
regressors: public sector, labour force experience, educational qualification, marital status, settlement type, 
regional, nationality (except LSMS), industry branch and occupational dummies (except LSMS). The omitted 
categories are used according to the Table A4.1 denoted by I_ 
c) The estimation procedure for the mean regression is OLS and robust t statistics reported in parentheses 
computed on the basis of White (1980) standard errors. B o o t s t r a ~ p e d d quantile r e ~ r e s s i o n n ~ r o c e d u r e s s are used to 
obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles (101 , 251h, 501\ 75 and 901 ) and the estimated t 
statistics reported in parentheses is based on the bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. OLS 
and bootstrapped quantile regression analysis reported used STATA 8.0: •• and • denote significance at the 0.01 
and 0.05 level, respectively. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia (LFS) 1995-2008 and Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2002-2003 
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Table A4.7: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia for men, 1995-2003 
Public Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Private Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Experience: 
-
Experience: 
<=5 Years f f f f f f <=5 Years f f f f f f 
5< Years<=IO -0.007 0.009 0.001 -0.015. -0.005 0.053 5< Years<=IO 0.087 0.109 0.108 0.065 0.034 0.065 
(-0.35) (0.34) (0.04) (-0.8\) (-0.21) (1.65) (2.60)-- (1.52) (2.25)- (1.84) (0.74) (1.51) 
10< Years<=20 0.027 O.oJ8 0.038 0.018 0.029 0.049 \ 0< Years<=20 0.\04 0.10\ 0.lt9 0.138 0.108 0.037 
(1.60) (1.26) (1.96) (1.10) (2.25)· (2.17)· (2.85)-- (1.48) (2.28)- (4.85)-- (2.89)-· (0.76) 
20< Years<=30 0.054 0.064 0.060 0.030 0.038 0.088 20< Years<=30 0.155 0.207 0.171 0.14\ 0.113 0.123 
(3.16)-- (2.14)- (2.47)- (1.27) (2.75)-· (3.83)-· (3.58)-- (3.13)-· (3.47)·- (3.26)** (3.00)·· (1.79) 
>30 Years 0.080 0.080 0.061 0.047 0.084 0.122 >30 Years 0.177 0.31\ 0.214 0.186 0.129 0.127 
(4.19)-- (2.77)·· (2.14)- (1.94) (3.83)" (3.72)·· (3.05)-- (3.48)·· (3.16)·- (4.33)** (2.21)- (1.58) 
Education: Educ'alion: 
No qua1ificalion 
-0.099 -0.132 -0.088 -0.118 -0.080 -0.077 No qualification 0.195 0.107 0.149 0.065 0.256 0.504 
(-3.59)-· (-3.00)·· (-2.88)** (-3.53)·· (-1.78) (-1.53) (1.52) (0.50) (1.33) (0.69) (1.46) (0.98) 
Primary f f f f f f Primary f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.104 0.083 0.126 0.122 0.125 0.117 Secondary 0.021 -0.009 0.054 0.026 0.066 0.027 
(8.20)·- (3.06)·· (6.35)·· (8.0W- (8.66)·· (5.70)·· (0.55) (-0.11) (1.13) (0.57) (1.50) (0.35) 
College 0.257 0.229 0.281 0.265 0.258 0.264 College 0.152 0.096 0.171 0.084 0.090 0.338 
(13.46)·· (6.09)-· (9.15)-- (13.88)·· (11.87)·· (9.68)** (2.12)- (0.65) (1.54) (1.00) (0.90) (2.12)-
Vniversity 0.472 0.456 0.494 0.471 0.497 0.503 University 0.374 0.311 0.414 0.370 0.298 0.361 
(22.07)-· (8.34)" (23.28)-· (25.26)-- (23.68)-· (16.82)" (5.05)" (2.47)- (3.90)-- (4.30)-- (3.96)-· (2.05)-
. 
Settlement type: Settlement type: 
Rural f f f f f f Rural f f f f f f 
City 0.062 0.062 0.061 0.055 0.065 0.074 City -0.030 0.018 0.034 0.022 -0.007 -0.102 
(6.15)" (3.16)-- (4.28)" (4.34)·- (7.85)" (4.95)·· (-1.04) (0.40) (0.82) (0.91) (-0.22) (-1.77) 
Marital Status: Marital Status: 
Single -0.034 -0.055 -0.029 -0.047 0.000 0.021 Single 0.032 0.003 0.005 ·0.042 0.033 -0.028 
-
(-1.59) (-1.47) (-1.28) (-1.87) (0.02) (0.62) (0.63) (0.04) (0.07) (-0.98) (0.53) (-0.41) 
Married 0.016 -0.011 0.007 0.006 0.032 0.060 Married 0.036 -0.122 -0.064 -0.033 0.115 0.083 
(0.92) (-0.35) (0.41) (0.28) ( 1.53) (\.90) (0.78) (-1.94) (-1.09) (-0.66) (1.92) (1.32) 
DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f 
Rrgion: Rt'gion: 
Belgrade f f f f f f Belgrade f f f f f f 
Central Serbia -0.368 -0.467 -0.396 -0.341 -0.306 -0.281 Central Serbia -0.369 -0.469 -0.444 ·0.428 -0.391 -0.279 
(-32.91)" (-33.1)" (-30.1)-- (-40.2)·- (-24.7)·· (-15.8)·· (-12.0)·· (-10.4)·· (-8.21)" (-16.4)·· (-14.0)** (-4.84)·· 
Vojvodina -0.213 -0.351 -0.270 -0.203 -0.142 -0.092 Vojvodina -0.332 -0.533 -0.433 -0.351 -0.334 -0.254 
(-15.35)** (-13.3)·- (-14.0)-· (-13.9)·- (-9.55)·· (-4.60)·· (-8.78)·· (-8.86)·· (-5.84)** (-6.89)·· (-6.7W· (-4.36)** 
Nationality: Nationality: 
Serbian 0.002 -0.001 -0.019 -0.004 0.000 0.035 Serbian -0.031 -0.088 -0.049 0.023 0.021 -0.128 
(0.16) (-0.03) (-0.96) (-0.24) (0.01) (2.68)" (-0.71) (-1.31 ) (-0.91) (0.43) (0.41) (-1.77) 
Montenegrin -0.056 -0.197 -0.158 -0.080 -0.005 0.032 Montenegrin -0.047 -0.087 0.013 -0.028 0.080 -0.130 
(-1.33) (-3.26)·· (-2.94)" (-1.86) (-0.11) (0.40) (-0.40) (-0.53) (0.07) (-0.11 ) (0.56) (-0.81) 
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Other I I I I I I Other II II If II II If 
Industry Branch: Industry Branch: 
Agriculture I I I I I I Agriculture I I I I I I 
Industry&Mining 0.091 0.020 0.040 0.073 0.120 0.161 Industry&Mining 0.096 0.443 0.110 0.204 0.162 0.089 
(4.48)·· (0.57) (1.78) (3.39)'· (4.45)" (9.13)" (0.85) (\,27) (0.95) (1.98)' (2.17)' (0.30) 
Construction 1-0.004 -0.036 -0.045 -0.014 0.041 0.027 Construction 0.285 0.488 0.189 0.326 0.364 0.393 
(-0.16) (-0.61) (-1.40) (-0.57) (1.43) (1.32) (2.44)· (1.40) (1.54) (3.08)" (5.65)" (1.32) 
Trade 1-0.031 -0.104 -0.124 -0.050 0.051 0.103 Trade 0.040 0.339 0.047 0.218 0.126 0.067 
(-0.90) (-1.10) (-2.86)'· (-1.39) (1.61) (2.12)· (0.35) (0.89) (0.41) (1.97)' (1.56) (0.22) 
Catering&Tourism 1-0:013 -0.028 -0.028 -0.043 -0.045 -0.020 Catering&Tourism 0.010 0.339 -0.037 0.139 0.103 0.138 
(-0.37) (-0.33) (-0.55) (-1.19) (-1.43) (-0.40) (0.08) (0.95) (-0.36) (1.24) (0.98) (0.43) 
Transport 10.242 0.298 0.263 0.220 0.205 0.188 Transport 0.098 0.401 0.052 0.243 0.141 0.202 
(10.90)" (6.06)" (8.54)·· (9.25)" (7.91)" (7.31)" (0.81) (1.12) (0.47) (1.96) (1.77) (0.59) 
Financial Services I 0.251 0.304 0.255 0.207 0.208 0.165 Financial Services 0.068 0.381 0.046 0.205 0.156 0.067 
(10.53)" (5.88)" (7.63)" (6.02)" (8.34)" (4.88)" (0.56) (1.06) (0.33) (1.89) (1.64) (0.24) 
Govern', Admin 10.239 0.350 0.263 0.188 0.154 0.128 Govern" Admin 0.002 0.498 0.050 0.293 0.044 -0.208 
(10.89)·· (8.82)" (10.64)" (8.48)'· (6.47)" (4.95)" (0.01) (1.27) (0.31) (1.91 ) (0.31) (-0.77) 
Education&Heallh 1 0.111 0.249 0.164 0.075 0.025 -0.032 Education&Health 0.091 0.300 -0.049 0.219 0.218 0.233. 
(5.14)" (5.38)'· (7.69)" (4.85)" (1.22) (-1.25) (0.61) (0.86) (-0.24) (1.58) (1.62) (0.55) 
Occupations: 
1-0.093 
Occupations: 
Farmer -0.152 -0.104 -0.083 -0.081 -0.094 Farmer -0.135 0.168 -0.196 0.019 -0.078 -0.235 
(-3.06)" (-2.18)' (-2.64)" (-2.54)· (-1.58) (-2.60)' (-1.27) (0.56) (-1.21) (0.14) (-0.88) (-1.62) 
Industrial Worker I 0.026 0.047 0.034 0.011 -0.004 0.015 Industrial Worker 0.036 0.034 -0.017 0.041 0.042 0.086 
( 1.57) (1.44) (1.68) (0.71) (0.37) (0.63) (0.94) (0.49) (-0.33) (1.22) (0.66) (I. 74) 
Trade Worker 1-0.026 0.015 0.013 -0.028 -0.121 -0.155 Trade Worker -0.040 0.\01 -0.067 -0.112 -0.087 0.012 
(-0.76) (0.19) (0.37) (-1.31) (-3.04)" (-2.4)' (-0.84) (0.80) (-1.23) (-1.52) (-1.70) (0.19) 
Service Worker 
1{102 
I I I I I Service Worker I I I I I I 
Welfare Worker 0.073 0.136 0.132 0.101 0.066 Welfare Worker 0.298 0.355 0.205 0.141 0.494 0.289 
(4.55)" (1.55) (3.93)" (6.88)" (5.25)" (2.20)· (2.34)· (2.42)' (1.47) (0.47) (2.56)' (1.57) 
Clerk 10.084 0.128 0.101 0.076 0.040 0.011 Clerk 0.175 0.170 0.164 0.204 0.201 0.165 
(5.14)'· (3.98)" (5.24)'· (4.15)" (3.21)" (0.63) (3.57)'· (1.63) (2.07)' (2.82)'· (3.29)" (2.34)' 
Manager 10.273 0.332 0.266 0.278 0.232 0.223 Manager 0.200 0.368 0.107 0.239 0.239 0.315 
(10.79)-' (6.35)'- (10.12)-- (10.14)-- (10.95)-- (6.10)-· (2.07)- (1.46) (0.73) (2.01)· (2.26)- (1.41 ) 
Professional 10.152 0.183 0.154 0.145 0.114 0.110 Professional 0.227 0.308 0.228 0.204 0.326 0.273 
(7.19)" (4.03)-' (5.51)" (6.43)" (5.54)" (3.26)" (3.21)" (2.80)" (2.91)" (3.48)" (4.62)" (1.67) 
Other 10.034 0.015 0.019 -0.001 -0.041 -0.007 Other 0.065 0.260 0.058 0.070 0.087 0.032 
(l:51) (0.35) (0.64) (-0.07) (-1.39) (-0.16) (0.90) (2.22)' (0.59) (0.70) (0.91) (0.12) 
\'rar: 1 ~ . I 4 0 0 Year: 1995 I I I I I 1995 I I I I I I 1996 -0.164 -0.146 -0.124 -0.102 -0.100 1996 -0.118 -0.245 -0.149 -0.111 -0.160 -0.177 
(-7.82)" (-3.77)" (-6.31)" (-5.17)" (-5.05)" (-3.61)" (-1.32) (-1.56) (-1.45) (-0.91) (-1.93) (-0.93) 
1997 10.129 0.101 0.126 0.157 0.185 0.190 1997 0.155 0.149 0.199 0.178 0.156 0.068 
(7.01)-' (2.03)' (4.52)-- (8.38)" (10.32)-· (9.59)-- (2.07)- (1.27) (1.86) (1.89) (1.47) (0.43) 
1998 1-0·007 -0.004 0.000 -0.022 O.oJ5 0.032 1998 0.087 0.067 0.101 0.085 0.054 0.103 
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(-0.41) (-0.12) (0.02) (-0.97) (0.74) (1.38) (1.19) (0.S2) (1.06) (0.77) (0.49) (0.56) 
1999 -0.214 -0.209 -0.193 -0.240 -0.194 -0.196 1999 -0.161 -0.190 -0.157 -0.190 -0.143 -0.166 
(-12.09)" (-8.79)" (-10.7)" (-14.3)" (-10.3)" (-8.06)** (-2.16)· (-1.32) (-1.96) (-1.71) (-1.48) (-1.10) 
2000 -0.172 -0.174 -0.180 -0.217 -0.187 -0.140 2000 -0.031 -0.067 -0.025 -0.024 -0.054 -0.079 
(-9.84)" (-4.1S)·· (-8.24)·· (-12.8)" (-10.3)·· (-4.38)·· (-0.44) (-O.SI) (-0.36) (-0.21) (-0.67) (-0.50) 
2001 0.104 O.ISI 0.122 0.083 0.080 0.088 2001 0.147 0.161 0.200 0.141 0.087 0.060 
(6.16)*· (4.70)*· (5.35)*· (S.42)·· (3.06)·· (3.12)·· (2.15)· (1.31 ) (2.87)·· (1.45) (0.97) (0.37) 
2002 0.295 0.3SS 0.311 0.260 0.271 0.281 2002 0.332 0.383 0.364 0.332 0.311 0.224 
(17.39)·· (10.76)·· (17.23)*· (15.31)*· (lS.44)*· (10.41)·· (5.03)·· (3.87)** (5.48)*· (3.19)*· (3.69)** (1.50) 
2003 0.343 0.3S8 0.348 0.340 0.337 0.311 2003 0.348 0.405 0.417 0.368 0.298 0.178 
. 
(19.62)** (9.62)** (11.69)** (l6.S3)*· (16.84)** (13.88)** (5.35)" (3.76)*· (6.31)·* (3.73)** (3.81)** (1.21) 
Constant: 3.903 3.466 3.694 3.984 4.134 4.236 Constant: 4.005 3.340 3.814 3.922 4.140 4.613 
(102.89)" (43.16)** (72.72)** (92.72)" (79.16)·* (101.8)" (25.90)** (9.20)" (24.86)** (38.35)" (24.77)*· (13.30")** 
Rsq/Pselldo Rsq: 0.37 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 Rsq/Pselldo Rsq: 0.32 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 
Observations: , 1 1 9 ~ ~ 11949 11949 
-
11949 11949 11949 I Observations: 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 
._- --
Notes to Table 4.7; 
a) Samples relate to employees aged 15 to 64 who reported non-zero main job earnings and hours of work. The public sector includes all sectors other than 
private. 
b) The dependent variable is the log of real hourly earnings. Earnings are net of taxes, pensions and welfare benefits. They include payments for meals, 
transport, union benefits, credits from the finn and payment in kind. They relate to earnings received on the main job only and are expressed in October 2005 
Serbian dinars. 
c) All explanatory variables are categorical. 
d) The estimation procedure for the mean robust regression is OLS and t test reported in parentheses is calculated based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
robust estimated standard errors. Bootstrapped quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles (10'\ 
25 th, 50th, 75 th and 90th). The I test reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions is calculated based on standard errors estimated by the bootstrapping 
procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. OLS and bootstrapped quantile regression analysis reported used STAT A 8.0: ** and * denote significance at 
the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
e) fdenotes fategory omitted in estimation. 
Dala Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia 1995-2003 
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Table A4.8: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia for women, 1995-2003 
"uhlic Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Private Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Experit'nce: Experience: 
<=5 Years f f f f f f <=5 Years f f f f f f 
.5< Years<=10 0.075 0.061 0.041 0.062 oms 0.031 5< Years<=10 0.020 -0.041 0.009 0.059 0.045 0.006 
(3.78)" (1.44) (1.24) (3.09)" (2.21)· (0.87) (0.64) (-0.74) (0.21) (1.56) (1.08) (0.10) 
10< Years<=20 0.088 0.131 0.066 0.084 0.058 0.050 10< Years<=20 0.105 0.005 0.D78 0.124 0.128 0.152 
(5.15)·· (3.10)·· (1.86) (7.50)·· (3.97)·· (2.46)· (3.32)·· (0.08) (1.52) (2.83)·· (3.95)·· (2.66)·· 
20< Years<=30 0.\38 0.191 0.125 0.\19 0.097 0.074 20< Years<=30 0.135 0.196 0.125 0.187 0.\34 0.095 
(8.12)·· (5.30)·· (4.09)·· (9.88)·· (6.99)·· (4.\1)·· (3.89)** (2.83)·· (2.39)· (6.00)·· (4.03)·· (1.38) 
>30 Years 0.175 0.218 0.114 0.151 0.153 0.183 >30 Years 0.124 0.205 0.144 0.161 0.155 0.092 
(7.85)·· (3.49)·· (2.93)·· (9.04)·· (7.51)·· (4.90)·· (2.06)· (1.26) (1.82) (2.47)· (1.31) (0.94) 
Education: Education: 
No qualification -0.118 -0.156 -0.171 -0.089 -0.092 -0.082 No qualification 0.099 0.244 -0.011 0.030 0.163 0.347 
(-3.09)·· (-2.56)· (-2.61)" (-1.57) (-2.31)· (-1.33) (0.64) (I. 76) (-0.07) (0.16) (0.61) (0.55) 
Primary f f f f f f Primary f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.169 0.167 0.183 0.214 0.207 0.185 Secondary 0.076 0.076 0.142 0.174 0.095 0.037 
(10.87)·· (5.20)·· (10.94)·· (12.79)·· (10.78)" (8.12)·· (1.91 ) (1.29) (3.16)·· (6.70)·· (2.28)· (0.28) 
College 0.298 0.293 0.307 0.335 0.312 0.305 College 0.201 0.219 0.304 0.378 0.245 0.\30 
(14.99)·· (8.12)·· (15.54)" (16.39)·· (17.01)·- (11.49)" (3.15)-· (1.81 ) (4.08)·- (5.57)·- (3.42)·- (0.79) 
University 0.517 0.475 0.487 0.539 0.565 0.566 University 0.397 0.611 0.574 0.518 0.405 0.190 
(25.55)·- (8.85)·- (17.15)-- (25.89)-- (29.33)" (17.59)-- (6.09)-- (3.57)-- (9.39)·- (9.18)·- (7.26)·- (1.37) 
St'ttlt'mt'nt type: Settlement type: 
Rural f f f f f f Rural f f f f f f 
City 0 ... 018 -0.015 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.009 City 0.006 0.032 0.032 0.039 0.032 0.015 
(1.53) (-0.60) (1.35) (2.10)- (2.26)- (0.61) (0.25) (0.93) (1.08) (LSI) (0.86) (0.32) 
Marital Status: Marital status: 
Single • -0.013 -0.026 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 0.015 Single -0.030 -0.017 -0.021 0.044 -0.007 -0.043 
(-0.75) (-0.70) (-0.33) (-0.50) (-0.90) (0.49) (-0.68) (-0.20) (-0.37) (0.88) (-0.16) (-0.33) 
Married -0.030 -0.058 -0.033 -0.023 -0.025 0.014 Married -0.043 -0.036 -0.005 0.007 -0.011 -0.042 
(-2.29)- (-3.41 ) •• (-1.89) (-1.74) (-1.84) (0.81) (-1.02) (-0.64) (-0.08) (0.15) (-0.22) (-0.42) 
.DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f 
Rtgion: Rtgion: 
Belgrade f f f f f f Belgrade f f f f f f 
Central Serbia -0.318 -0.343 -0.318 -0.289 -0.274 -0.253 Central Serbia -0.411 -0.472 -0.445 -0.444 -0.394 -0.383 
(-26.9)-· (-12.0)" (-18.9)-- (-32.22)·- (-23.1)-- (-10.41)·- (-13.4)-· (-9.4)-· (-10.9)-- (-12.4)·- (-8.68)·· (-7.71)·· 
Vojvodina -0.199 -0.239 -0.240 -0.199 -0.152 -0.092 Vojvodina -0.373 -0.440 -0.419 -0.383 -0.351 -0.393 
(-13.6)" (-7.0·W· (-12.6)" (-12.47)" (-11.9)·· (-3.75)·· (-11.5)" (-7.6)" (-9.58)·· (-11.7)" (-6.89)·· (-8.77)·· 
Nationality: Nationality: 
Serbian -0.008 0.010 -0.037 -0.023 -0.006 -0.014 Serbian -0.005 -0.027 -0.049 0.047 0.002 -0.122 
(-0.49) (0.33) (-US) (-2.45)- (-0.36) (-0.72) (-0.\3) (-0.41) (-1.08) (1.25) (0.03) (-2.14)-
Montenegrin -0.023 -0.139 -0.122 -0.056 oms 0.041 Montenegrin -0.109 -0.074 -0.089 -0.115 -0.114 -0.340 
(-0.48) (-1.53) (-1.34) (-1.55) (0.41) (0.71) (-1.07) (-0.22) (-0.55) (-1.08) (-0.79) (-1.86) 
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'Other I I I I I 1 Other 11 11 If 11 II 11 
Industry Branrh: Industry Branch: 
Agriculture 1 1 1 1 1 1 Agriculture 1 1 1 1 I 1 
Industry&Mining 0.137 0.140 0.163 0.109 0.112 0.137 Industry&Mining 0.133 0.506 0.122 0.010 0.209 -0.101 
(3.99)-- (1.94) (3.57)-- (4.63)-- (2.26)- (2.96)-- (0.98) (1.52) (0.48) (0.1\) (1.46) (-0.36) 
Constmction 10.123 0274 0.202 0.132 0.040 -0.003 Construction 0.244 0.736 0.231 0.114 0.192 -0.185 
(2.75)·- (2.50)· (2.97)·· (3.06)·- (0.70) (-0.04) (1.65) (2.34)· (0.77) (0.84) (1.35) (-0.61) 
Trade 1-0.018 -0.004 0.100 -0.018 -0.008 -0.024 Trade 0.135 0.579 0.167 -0.016 0.108 -0.193 
(-0.42) (-0.03) (1.42) (-0.66) (-0.14) (-0.61) (1.00) (1.88) (0.72) (-0.18) (0.71) (-0.64) 
Catering&Tourism 10.073 0207 0.122 0.015 0.001 0.018 Catering&Tourism 0.245 0.613 0.158 0.069 0.256 -0.051 
(1.75) (2.36)· (2.44)· (0.34) (0.01) (0.34) (1.74) (1.98)· (0.63) (0.58) (1.89) (-0.16) 
Transport 10.360 0.485 0.385 0.298 0.321 0.280 Transport 0.056 0.604 0.127 -0.066 0.063 -0.301 
(9.10)·- (5.84)·· (6.87)·· (7.89)·· (5.02)" (5.42)" (0.37) (1.44) (0.49) (-0.70) (0.42) (-1.05) 
Financial Services I 0.315 0.529 0.419 0.272 0.221 0.205 Financial Services 0.134 0.541 0.185 0.028 0.136 -0.245 
(8.82)** (6.53)·· (8.81)·- (9.38)·· (4.43)·· (5.10)·· (0.97) (1.65) (0.74) (0.28) (1.02) (-0.78) 
Govem't Admin 10.260 0.515 0.376 0.200 0.\05 0.072 Govern't Admin -0.052 0.148 -0.476 -0.653 0.176 -0.406 
(7.46)** (7.25)·· (8.71)·· (8.78)·· (1.95) (1.46) (-0.13) (0.27) (-0.98) (-1.46) (0.41) (-0.73) 
Education&Health 10.201 0.469 0.347 0.153 0.036 -0.021 Education&Health 0.337 0.912 0.468 0.184 0.206 -0.166 
(5.94)·· (6.43)·· (7.49)·· (5.87)·· (0.68) (-0.41) (2.38)· (3.00)·· (I. 77) (1.74) (1.36) (-0.52) 
Occupations: 1-0.172 Farmer -0.379 ·0.108 -0.133 -0.073 -0.162 
Occupations: 
Farmer 0.284 0.646 0.289 0202 0.386 0.217 
(-2.98)·· (-1.82) (-1.48) (-1.95) (-1.15) (-2.20)· (1.49) (1.95) (1.24) (0.78) (1.39) (0.45) 
Industrial Worker 1 -0.060 -0.065 -0.043 -0.068 -0.058 -0.046 Industrial Worker 0.095 0.092 0.086 0.121 0.082 -0.012 
(-2.74)·· (-1.66) (-1.48) (-2.76)·· (-2.81)·- (-1.53) (I. 75) (0.90) (1.06) (2.18)- (0.95) (-0.12) 
Trade Worker 1-0.120 -0.147 -0.199 -0.111 -0.120 -0.117 Trade Worker 0.011 0.033 -0.014 0.018 0.066 -0.027 
(-3.59)" (-1.16) (-3.47)** (-3.78)** (-2.36)· (-3.50)·· (0.23) (0.37) (·0.31) (0.27) (0.93) (-0.51) 
Service Worker 
1{.I77 
I f f I 1 Service Worker I 1 1 1 1 1 
Welfare Worker 0.175 0.177 0.178 0.186 0.144 Welfare Worker -0.176 -0.253 -0.349 -0.143 -0.101 -0.066 
(7.15)·· (4.40)-· (5.94)-· (6.14)" (9.17)·· (3.76)" (-1.46) (-2.24)· (-2.52)· (-0.72) (-0.61) . (-0.21) 
Clerk 10.113 0.100 0.151 0.117 0.109 0.083 Clerk 0.254 0.184 0.214. 0.236 0.353 0.300 
(6.56)·· (2.34)· (8.43)·- (6.13)·· (7.16)·· (3.99)·- (5.82)·· (2.\0)· (3.88)" (4.43)·· (5.83)·· (4.45)·· 
Manager 10.352 0.392 0.392 0.357 0.301 0.253 Manager 0.358 0.355 0.310 0.291 0.530 0.735 
(11.68)·· (6.04)" (7.22)·· (14.33)** (11.18)" (7.43)-· (2.37)· (0.67) (2.04)· (2.73)·· (2.29)· (3.17)" 
Professional 10.160 0.171 0.202 0.155 0.145 0.123 Professional 0.345 0.153 0.154 0.345 0.528 0.546 
(8.34)-· (3.06)·· (7.31) •• (5.88)" (8.08)·· (4.66)·· (4.55)·· (0.93) (2.19)· (2.95)·· (6.98)" (6.58)·· 
Other 10.044 0.038 0.061 0.055 0.063 0.000 Other 0.083 -0.008 0.022 0.039 0.150 0.157 
(2.17)· (O.SO) (2.62)·· (I.S3) (3.S6)·· (0.01) (1.01) (-0.07) (0.26) (0.45) ( 1.17) (0.69) 
_, Ytar: 1 ~ . 1 2 7 7 Ytar: 1995 I I I 1 I 1995 I 1 1 I 1 f 1996 -0.175 -0.\05 -0.100 -0.124 -0.139 1996 -0.234 -0.361 -0.235 -0.155 -0.205 -0.301 
(-5.79)·· (-6.20)·· (-3.09)** (-4.45)·· (-4.94)·- (-3.73)·· (-3.60)·- (-2.50)· (-2.57)· (-2.55)- (-I.S0) (-2.10)· 
1997 10.160 0.147 0.194 0.176 0.166 0.122 1997 0.023 -0.049 0.027 0.106 0.140 -0.063 
(7.37)-- (3.59)-- (5.81)-- (7.87)-· (7.33)-- (4.60)-- (0.35) (-0.36) (0.28) (1.41 ) (1.34) (-0.61) 
1998 1-0·032 -O.OOS -0.022 -0.025 -0.031 -0.069 1998 -0.057 -0.068 -0.079 -0.009 0.051 -0.184 
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(-1.49) (-0.23) (-0.77) (-1.20) (-1.51) (-2.3W (-1.02) (-0.54) (-0.93) (-0.18) (0.50) (-2.01 ). 
1999 -0.262 -0.221 -0.232 -0.261 -O.2S0 -0.322 1999 -0.220 -0.248 -0.225 -0.149 -0.113 -0.238 
- (-12.3)" (-6.5W· (-6.45)·· (-12.92)·· (-13.2)·· (-9.45)·· (-3.84)** (-2.01 ). (-3.11)·· (-2.76)" (-1.99)· (-3.32)·· 
2000 -0.229 -0.240 -0.231 -O.26S -0.272 -0.332 2000 -0.129 -0.132 -0.097 -0.066 -0.141 -0.247 
(-11.2)·· (-9.64)·· (-1.5S)·· (-15.59)·· (-14.6)·· (-9.52)** (-2AW (-1.21) (-1.59) (-1.23) (-1.55) (-3.0S)·· 
2001 0.050 0.068 0.092 0.039 0.030 -0.0\6 2001 0.011 0.OS5 -0.016 0.017 0.069 -0.119 
(2.39)· (2.10)· (3.19)·· (2.67)·· (1.21) (-0.52) (0.22) (0.80) (-0.25) (0.30) (0.65) (-1.52) 
2002 0.240 0.290 0.253 0.221 0.221 0.IS1 2002 0.279 0.345 0.267 0.276 0.305 0.155 
(11.73)·· (10.80)·· (11.39)·· (12.28)·· (11.54)** (5.49)·· (5.49)·· (3.48)·· (4.53)·· (5.36)·· (3.13)·· (2.19)· 
2003 0.347 0.363 0.403 0.354 0.31S 0.247 2003 0.305 0.322 0.285 0.326 0.351 0.157 
(17.02)·· (S.4I)·· (16.35)·· (18.31)·· (17.56)·· (S.66)·· (6.02)·· (2.75)·· (4.12)·· (6.96)·· (3.67)** (1.94) 
Constant: 3.677 3.064 3.392 3.716 3.981 4.238 Constant: 3.836 2.966 3.603 3.747 3.917 4.892 
(80.92)·· (27.62)·· (45.32)·· (126.36)·· (65.06)·· (S5.09)·· (24.44)·· (S.14)·· (12.14)·· (35.38)·· (20.90)·· (12.00)·· 
RsqlPseudo Rso: 0.47 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 RsqlPseudo Rsq: 0.43 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 
Observations: 8341 8341 8341 8341 8341 8341 Observations: 1698 1698 1698 1698 1698 1698 
Notes to Table A4.8: See Notes to Table A4.7. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia 1995:-2003 
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Table A4.9: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia for men, 2002-2003 
-
Public !\lean 10th 25th 50lh 751h 90lh Private Mean 10th 25th 50lh 75th 90th 
.. :xperitnre: t;xperienre: 
<=5 Years f f f f f f <=5 Years f f f f f f 
5< Years<=IO 0.060 0.019 0.048 0.067 0.043 0.063 5<Years<=10 0.057 0.100 0.009 0.069 0.106 0.016 
(1.58) (0.34) (0.97) (2.31)· (\.03) (1.10) (1.00) (0.89) (0.10) (\.32) (\.75) (0.17) 
10< Years<=20 0.059 0.008 0.043 0.052 0.087 0.156 IO<Years<=20 0.121 0.212 0.082 0.1 13 0.138 0.147 
(1.80) (0.14) (1.00) (1.27) (1.88) (2.46)· (2.16)· (2.12)· (1.11) (2.01)· (2.18)· (1.18) 
20< Years':;=30 0,039 -0.036 0.017 0.070 0.081 0.150 20< Years<=30 -0.032 0.028 -0.050 -0.036 -0.008 0.084 
(1.17) (-0.47) (0.40) (1.80) (2.86)-- (2.07)- (-0.51) (0.20) (-0.56) (-0.78) (-0.07) (0.59) 
> 30 Years 0.092 0.109 0.088 0.118 0.111 0.127 >30 Years O.oJ8 -0.109 -0.022 0.065 0.113 0.177 
, (2.43)· (1.22) (2.04)· (3.89)-· (1.96) (1.61) (0.35) (-0.31) (-0.20) (0.53) (0.64) (1.21) 
Eduralion: Education: 
No qualification -0.072 -0.015 -0.095 -0.140 -0.142 0.129 No qualification -0.015 0.178 -0.140 -0.100 -0.036 -0.108 
(-0.88) (-0.06) (-1.47) (-1.77) (-0.87) . (0.61) (-0.08) (0.64) (-10.43) (-0.38) (-0.11 ) (-0.36) 
'Primary f f f f f f Primary f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.177 0.264 0.154 0.165 0.184 0.197 Secondary 0.205 0.193 0.213 0.177 0.159 0.2.96 
(5.56)-· (5.40)-- (4.43)-· (5.48)-- (3.48)-· (3.85)-- (3.4l)*· (1.90) (2.97)-- (1.58) (2.04)· (2.90)" 
College 0.356 0.460 0.338 0.313 0.367 0.402 College 0.317 0.429 0.353 0.280 0.224 0.427 
(8.57)-· (4.87)-· (8.09)-· (8.06)-- (7.27)-· (4.13)-- (3.81)·· (3.43)-- (3.53)-· (2.78)-· (2.84)" (2.50)-
University 0.651 0.700 0.627 0.633 0.648 0.705 University 0.654 0.662 0.547 0.530 0.648 0.854 
(15.39)-· . (8.91)-· (11.50)-· (15.57)-- (14.19)-· (7.46)·· (6.21)-· (4.88)·· (4.29)" (2.93)·· (3.36)" (5.01)·-
Settlement 
Settlement type: type: 
Rural f f r f f f Rural f f f f f f 
City 0.041 0.053 0.066 0.049 0.015 0.090 City 0.023 0.016 0.097 0.041 0.010 -0.044 
. (1.81) (0.99) (2.14)· (2.06)· (0.66) (2.97)·- (0.54) (0.20) (1.91) (0.91) (0.15) (-0.60) 
Marital Status: Marital status: 
Single -0.014 -0.095 -0.070 0.015 -0.029 -0.006 Single -0.172 -0.193 -0.103 -0.092 0.005 -0.762 
(-0.27) (-1.27) (-0.67) (0.31) (-0.46) (-0.07) (-0.97) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.62) (0.01) (-1.44) 
Married 0.065 -0.030 0.001 0.047 0.077 0.134 Married -0.070 -0.032 0.051 0.013 0.067 -0.776 
(1.43) (-0.45) (0.01) (0.97) (1.54) (1.72) (-0.41) (-0.11) (0.32) (0.10) (0.18) (-1.54) 
DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f 
Region: Region: 
Belgrade f f f f f f Belgrade f f f f f f 
Vojvodina -0.059 -0.022 -0.022 -0.047 -0.061 -0.036 Vojvodina -0.229 -0.302 -0.267 -0.243 -0.123 -0.160 
(-1.86) (-0.57) (-0.47) (-1.1 5) (-2.28)· (-0.58) (-4.42)·· (-2.80)-· (-4.03)-· (-3.43)-· (-2.04)· (-1.44) 
Central Serbia -0.167 -0.080 -0.118 -0.164 -0.193 -0.158 Cserbia -0.261 -0.361 -0.373 -0.316 -0.145 -0.097 
(-6.04)-· (-2.51)· (-2.62)-· (-5.76)" (-5.27)-- (-3.10)-· (-5.29)-· (-4.5)·· (-5.42)" (-5.56)·· (-2.96)-- (-0.89) 
I ndustry Branch: Industry Branch: 
Agriculture f f f f f f Agriculture f f f f f f 
Industl)'&Mining 0.089 0.021 0.087 0.073 0.114 0.094 Industry&Mining 0.079 0.106 0.045 -0.008 0.019 0.163 
p (2.62)" (0.42) (I. 78) (2.03)- (3.04)" (1.42) (1.17) (1.17) (0.56) (-0.12) (0.20) (0.96) 
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Construction -0.060 -0.261 -0.087 0.005 -0.008 -0.077 Construction 0.085 0.023 -0.062 0.117 0.096 0.210 
(-1.04) (-3.\ I)·· (-0.73) (0.07) (-0.15) (-0.66) (0.96) (0.15) (-0.53) (0.79) (0.83) (1.\6) 
Trade -0.239 -0.537 -0.321 -0.222 -0.\38 -0.068 Trade 0.061 0.103 0.039 0.017 0.064 0.090 
(-;.3.50)·· (-3.59)·· (-2.91)" (-3.05)" (-1.87) (-0.57) (0.97) (0.97) (0.59) (0.20) (0.58) (0.68) 
Catering&Tourism -0.087 -0.\33 0.043 -0.078 -0.181 -0.181 Catering&Tourism -0.026 -0.288 -0.170 -0.\37 0.017 0.253 
(-1.02) (-0.51) (0.34) (-1.17) (-2.55)· (-0.81) (-0.25) (-1.34) (-1.36) (-1.40) (0.10) (1.\5) 
Transport 0.102 0.152 0.164 0.093 0.094 -0.009 Transport 0.206 0.247 0.173 0.080 0.179 0.179 
(2.45)· (2.34)· (4.09)·· (1.87) (1.87) (-0.12) (2.22)· (1.55) (1.32) (1.09) (1.58) (0.69) 
Financial Services 0.015 -0.046 0.018 0.112 0.007 0.018 Financial Services 0.153 0.191 0.114 0.159 0.089 0.156 
(0.24) (-0.30) (0.18) (1.94) (0.11) (0.21) (2.34)- (1.08) (1.28) (1.95) (\ .03) (1.18) 
.Govern't Admin 0.233 0.303 0.277 0.234 0.178 0.151 Govern', Admin 0.171 0.260 0.521 0.228 -0.120 -0.287 
(5.68)·- (4.86)-- (5.31)·- (6.30)" (3.59)·- (1.79) (1.26) (0.70) (1.54) (2.63)-· (-0.74) (-1.33) . 
Education&Health 0.108 0.263 0.148 0.047 0.006 -0.061 Education&Health 0.032 -0.271 0.\31 0.200 0.148 0.r69 
(2.66)·- (4.24)-- (2.75)-- (0.97) (0.14) (-0.66) (0.18) (-0.74) (0.33) (0.84) (0.74) (0.53) 
Yl'ar: Year: 
2003 0.122 0.118 0.082 0.107 0.126 0.142 2003 0.125 0.258 0.152 0.106 0.054 0.026 
(5.00)-- (2.54)- (2.47)- (3.67)-- (4.34)-- (4.04)-- (3.07)-- (2.94)·· (3.52)·· (3.40)" (0.88) (0.39) 
Constant 4.003 3.477 3.789 4.026 4.269 4.376 Constant 4.283 3.617 3.944 4.279 4.433 5.403 
(57.54)·· (32.48)·· (33.86)" (49.27)" (41.36)·- (29.96)" (21.28)·· (9.93)·· (16.71)*· (22.11)·· (\2.22)·· (9.70)" 
Rsq Pstudo Rsq: 0.23 0.15 0:14 0.15 0.15 0.\3 R-sqlPstudo Rsq: 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.1 
Observations: 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 2135 Obstrva tions: 778 778 778 778 778 778 
- Notes to Table 4.9: 
a) Samples relate to full-time employees aged 15 to 64 who reported non-zero main job hours of work and non-zero main job earnings received for the month 
and the year of the survey. The public sector includes social and state sectors. 
b) The dependent variable is the log of real hourly earnings. Earnings are net of taxes, pensions and welfare benefits. They include payments for meals, 
transport, union benefits, credits from the firm and payment in kind. They are expressed in October 2005 Serbian dinars. 
c) All explanatory variables are categorical. 
d) The estimation procedure for the mean robust regression is OLS and t test reported in parentheses is calculated based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
robust estimated standard errors. Bootstrapped quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles (10'\ 
25 th, 50'b. 75 th and 90th). The t test reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions is calculated based on standard errors estimated by the bootstrapping 
procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. OLS and bootstrapped quantile regression analysis reported used STAT A 8.0: •• and • denote significance at 
. the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
e) fdenotes category omitted in estimation. 
Data Source: Living Standard Measurement Survey 2002-2003 
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Table A4.l0: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia for women, 2002-2003 
~ ~
Public Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Private Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Experience: Experience: 
<= 5 Years f f f f f f <=5 Years f f f f f f 
.5< Years<= 10 0.036 0.022 0.028 0.008 0.050 0.059 5< Years<=10 0.008 0.055 0.032 0.066 0.041 0.004 
(0.81) (0.53) (0.49) (0.\8) (0.89) (0.78) (0.\1) (0.62) (0.38) (0.63) (0.43) (0.02) 
10< Years<=20 -0.039 -0.038 0.012 0.021 0.021 0.017 10< Years<=20 0.030 0.006 0.096 0.129 0.083 --0.003 
(-0.93) (-1.01) (0.22) (0.54) (0.50) (0.28) (0.40) (0.05) (1.31) (1.55) (1.48) (-0.03) 
20< Years<=30 0.049 0.055 0.088 0.068 0.081 0.104 20< Years<=30 O.oI5 0.200 0.126 0.178 -0.020 -0.066 
(1.16) (1.38) (1.86) (\.73) (2.54)- (1.43) (0.21) (2.58)- (1.62) (2.22)- (-0.29) (-0.48) 
> 30 Years 0.102 -0.078 0.058 0.125 0.183 0.215 >30 Years -0.242 -0.315 -0.053 -0.146 -0.054 -0.089 
(1.27) (-0.75) (0.85) (1.88) (2.49)- (1.15) (-1.24) (-0.73) (-0.14) (-0.61) (-0.17) (-0.19) 
Education: Education: 
No qualification 0.100 0.185 0:101 0.127 0.197 0.003 No qualification -0.067 -0.111 0.168 -0.056 -0.164 0.440 
(1.15) (1.49) (1.48) (1.02) (2.50)- (0.03) (-0.23) (-0.35) (0.62) (-0.28) (-0.34) (0.53) 
• Primary f f f f f f Primary f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.278 0.232 0.286 0.308 0.344 0.359 Secondary -0.032 0.\34 0.Q28 -0.003 -0.060 -0.329 
(6.78)-- (2.96)-- (7.01)" (8.60)-- (8.78)-- (7.35)-- (-0.32) (1.18) (0.30) (-0.02) (-0.83) (-1.01 ) 
College 0.481 0.464 0.495 0.475 0.543 0.674 College 0.011 0.166 0.162 0.079 0.086 -0.265 
(9.56)-- (6.46)" (9.74)" (11.75)" (19.79)" (8.16)-- (0.10) (0.82) (1.30) (0.50) (0.80) (-0.90) 
University 0.774 0.695 0.709 0.730 0.847 0.972 University 0.441 0.436 0.418 0.566 0.604 0.224 
(16.02)-- (9.82)-· (18.86)-· (19.95)-· (17.64)" (12.45)" (3.31)·· (1.69) (2.57)· (3.07)-· (5.42)·· (0.48) 
Settlement type: Settlement type: 
Rural f f f f f f Rural f f f f f f 
City 0.045 0.100 0.057 0.044 0.043 -0.016 City 0.048 0.091 0.076 0.078 0.020 -0.010 
( 1.39) (1.64) (1.52) (2.40)- (0.98) (-0.26) (0.83) (1.43) (1.39) (1.17) (0.55) (-0.08) 
l\Iarilal Status: Marital Status: 
Single -0.107 -0.054 -0.081 -0.089 -0.083 -0.054 Single -0.349 -0.249 -0.174 -0.163 -0.293 -0.657 
(-1.93) (-0.62) (-1.37) (-1.59) (-1.35) (-0.64) (-3.13)-- (-2.05)- (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.90) (-4.16)--
Married -0.035 0.019 -0.037 -0.084 -0.074 -0.070 Married -0.203 -0.140 -0.114 -0.135 -0.150 -0.362 
(-0.92) (0.45) (-0.99) (-I. 79) (-1.%). (-0.86) (-1.97)· (-1.14) (-1.01) (-2.05)- (-1.06) (-2.70)--
DivorcedIWidow f f f f f f DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f 
Rtgion: Rtgion: 
Iklgrade f f f f f f Belgrade f f f f f 'j 
Vojvodina -0.039 -0.026 -0.050 -0.041 -0.046 0.025 Vojvodina -0.159 -0.118 -0.167 -0.194 -0.201 -0.155 
(-1.13) (-0.49) (-126) (-1.16) (-0.93) (0.47) (-2.30)- (-0.97) (-1.91) (-3.43)-· (-3.19)-· (-1.28) 
Cenlral Serbia -0.150 -0.136 -0.139 -0.126 -0.155 -0.064 Central Serbia -0.319 -0.231 -OJOO -OJ37 -0.290 -0.423 
(-4.65)·- (-3.08)·- (-4.28)" (-4.74)·· (-3.36)·- (-1.14) (-5.27)" (-\.70) (-3. \3)-- (-5.28)·· (-5.82)-· (-3.74)-· 
Industry Branch: Industry Bran('h: 
Agriculture f f f f f f Agriculture f f f f f f 
Industry&Mining -0.144 -0.317 -0.185 -0.129 -0.039 0.041 Industry&Mining -0.244 -0.094 -0.146 -0.162 -0.244 -0.297 
(-2.82)*· (-3.88)·· (-3.37)·· (-2.26)* (-0.89) (0.27) (-1.98)- (-0.50) (-1.59) (-1.45) (-2.03)· (-1.85) 
Construction -0.290 -0.380 -0.086 -0.290 -0.026 -0.079 Construction 0.048 0.193 -0.103 0.026 0.009 0.712 
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(-1.74) (-2.33)· (-0.46) (-1.91) (-0.\3) (-0.38) (0.27) (0.96) (-0.54) (0.13) (0.04) (1.60) 
I Trade -0.321 -0.500 -0.370 -0.274 -0.189 -0.086 Trade -0.234 -0.164 -0.242 -0.173 -0.223 ·-0.186 {-4.21)" {-4.92)" (-4.76)" (-3.81)" (-2.96)" (-0.49) (-2.01)· (-1.08) (-3.24)" (-1.95) (-2.48)· (-1.56) 
Catering&Tourism -0.075 -0.131 0.023 -0.129 -0.050 -0.088 Catering&Tourism -0.151 -0.346 -0.293 -0.228 -0.072 0.151 
(-0.93) (-0.82) (0.28) (-1.99)· (-0.56) (-0.25) (-0.93) (-1.55) (-2.07)* (-1.39) (-0.54) (0.32) 
Transport 0.\10 0.100 0.101 0.058 0.141 0.242 Transport -0.109 -0.016 -0.123 0.007 -0.127 -0.260 
(1.56) (0.70) (\.27) (0.99) (1.80) (0.86) (-0.67) (-0.05) (-0.57) (0.04) (-0.77) (-1.83) 
financial Services 0.148 0.083 0.199 0.139 0.146 0.239 Financial Services -0.106 -0.177. -0.080 -0.054 -0.162 0.175 
(2.10)· (0.76) (2.95)·· (2.13)· (1.68) (1.21 ) (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.87) (-0.57) (-1.46) (0.94) 
Govern't Admin -0.026 -0.073 -0.009 0.026 -0.016 0.018 Govern't Admin 0.098 0.261 0.052 0.106 0.034 -0.270 
(-0.47) (-0.70) (-0.15) (0.36) (-0.37) (0.10) (0.64) (0.72) (0.18) (0.40) (0.16) (-\.23) 
Education&Health 0.035 0.140 0.101 0.004 -0.026 0.001 Education&llealth 0.079 0.059 -0.004 -0.054 0.040 0.434 
(0.73) (2.01)· (2.40)· (0.05) (-0.66) (0.0\) (0.47) (0.27) (-0.03) (-0.35) (0.18) (1.22) 
Year: Year: 
2003 0.162 0.125 0.123 0.174 0.154 0.148 2003 0.083 0.161 0.072 0.096 0.056 0.047 
(5.42)*· (2.46)* (4.17)·· (5.03)·· (6.33)·· (2.41)· (1.68) (2.41)· (1.13) (1.98)· (0.86) (0.39) 
Constant: 4.020 3.512 3.734 4.013 4.167 4.310 Constant: 4.685 3.692 4.125 4.410 4.923 5.758 
(47.14)·· (32.28)·· (39.80)·· (40.93)·· (53.43)·* (18.41)·· (24.97)·· (16.62)*· (31.33)*· (30.27)·· (23.23)" (17.73)** 
R-sqlPseudo RS(J: 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.2 0.18 0.17 R-sqlPseudo RS(J: 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 
Observations: _ -'554 1554 1554 I ~ 5 4 _ . ~ ~ J554 1554 Observations: 661 661 661 661 661 661 
_ .. _-
Notes to Table A4.IO: See Notes to Table A4.9. 
Data Source: Living Standard Measurement Survey 2002-2003 
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Table A4.11: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia for men, 2004-2008 
Public Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Private Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Experience: . Experience: 
<= 5 Years f f f f f f <= 5 Years f f f f f f 
. 5< Years<=10 0.027 0.055 0.050 0.032 0.021 0.051 5< Years<=IO 0.038 0.047 0.060 0.032 -0.005 0.023 
(1.\8) (2.4W (1.40) (1.43) (0.75) (1.\4) (2.02)· (1.42) (2.05)· (1.23) (-0.25) (0.89) 
10< Years<=20 0.055 0.090 0.079 0.055 0.042 0.050 10< Years<=20 0.074 0.068 0.084 0.065 0.065 0.104 
(2.77)·· (3.12)·· (2.20)· (2.46)· (1.55) (1.33) (3.91)·· (1.63) (2.77)** (3.26)·· (2.57)· (2.91)** 
20< Years<=30 0.063 0.089 0.082 0.085 0.059 0.075 20< Years<=30 0.078 0.055 0.114 0.074 0.077 0.076 
(3.06)·· (3.07)** (2.33)· (3.56)·· (2.59)·· (2.03)· (3.79)·· (1.24) (4.36)·· (2.64)·· (4.55)·· (2.11)· 
> 30 Years 0.071 0.083 0.101 0.098 0.065 0.110 >30 Years 0.091 0.104 0.149 0.097 0.068 0.099 
(3.12)·· (1.73) (2.89)" (3.41) •• (2.98)·· (2.60)·· (3.67)·· (2.08)· (4.83)·· (3.44)·· (2.79)·· (3.82)·· 
Eduration: Education: 
No qualification _ -0.009 0.030 -0.061 -0.045 -0.013 -0.035 No qualification -0.071 -0.157 -0.003 -0.017 -0.096 -0.072 
(-0.17) (015) (-0.81) (-0.75) (-0.28) (-0.76) (-1.62) (-1.21) (-0.05) (-0.36) (-2.45)· (-0.99) 
Primary f f f f f f Primary f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.162 0.223 0.173 0.153 0.135 0.146 Secondary 0.084 0.122 0.096 0.095 0.062 0.098 
I 
(7.72)·· (4.28)** (8.19)" (6.07)·· (5.17)·· (7.22)·· (4.59)·· (5.21)·· (4.14)·· (4.01)·· (3.22)** (3.09)·· 
I 
College 0.330 0.386 00355 0.309 0.312 0.294 College 0.228 0.220 0.244 0.265 0.240 0.168 
(11.80)·· (6.20)·· (14.79)·· (9.03)" (9.56)·· (8.02)** (6.96)·· (3.00)·· (7.67)·· (7.49)·· (7.46)** (3.87)·· 
.University 0.610 0.618 0.588 0.583 0.578 0.663 University 0.487 0.404 0.495 0.528 0.510 0.506 
(22.17)·· (9.37)" (22.70)·· (15.98)·· (16.20)·· (17.02)·· (13.65)** (6.91)·· (11.17)·· (17.05)·· (14.78)·· (9.76)·· , 
-. 
Settlement type: Settlement type: 
Rural f f f f f f Rural f f f f f f 
City 0.052 0.047 0.055 0.042 0.042 0.056 City 0.030 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.031 0.024 I 
(4.41)·· (1.86) (3.81)·· (3.64)" (3.41)·· (3.53)·· (2.28)· (1.58) (2.24)· (2.95)·· (2.06)· (1.25) 
Region: Region: 
Belgrade f f f f f f Belgrade f f f f f f 
eentral Serbia -0.244 -0.287 -0.263 -0.249 -0.220 -0.162 Central Serbia -0.324 -0.390 -0.363 -00317 -0.307 -0.289 
(-181)·· (-10.3)·· • (-19.8)·· (-24.0)" (-16.3)·· (-8.62)·· (-19.5)·· (-10.2)·· -(24.0)·· (-14.3)*- (-20.6)" (-10.2)·· 
Vojvodina -0.095 -0.141 -0.167 -0.127 -0.069 -0.017 Vojvodina -0.252 -0.319 -0.309 -0.270 -0.230 -0.211 
(-5.88)" (-3.90)·· (-112)*- (-7.21)·· (-3.91 ) •• (-0.73) (-13.5)·· (-9.69)·· (-18.4)·· (-14.3)·· (-9.69)·· (-6.24)·· 
Marital Status: Marital Status: 
Married 0.058 0.013 0.069 0.084 0.065 0.022 Married 0.036 0.033 0.044 0.001 0.022 0.034 
(2.14)· (0.47) (2.73)·· (3.98)·· (2.29)· (0.34) (1.22) (0.70) (1.31) (0.05) (0.84) (0.97) 
Single -0.023 -0.041 -0.007 0.013 -0.009 -0.017 Single -0.015 -0.005 0.018 -0.042 -0.030 0.015 
(-0.76) (-0.93) (-0.29) (0.47) (-0.28) (-0.25) (-0.47) (-0.09) (0.51) (-1.44) (-0.89) (0.36) 
DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f 
Nationality: Nationality: 
Serbian 0.058 0.088 0.018 0.055 0.053 0.061 Serbian 0.013 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.017 0.039 
• (2.95)·· (1.85) (1.08) (2.94)·· (1.94) (2.55)· (0.67) (-0.00) (0.07) (-0.21) (0.82) (1.09) 
Other f f f f f f Other f f f f f f 
Industry Branch: Industry Branch: 
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Agriculture 
1{163 
1 1 1 1 1 Agriculture 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indlistry&Mining 0.104 0.092 0.179 0.182 0.160 Indlistry&Mining 0.311 0.393 0.318 0.208 0.235 0.295 
(4.60)" (1.75) (2.54)· (5.29)·· (5.15)·· (2.50)· (8.39)·· (6.07)·· (3.95)·· (4.65)·· (7.16)·· (4.71)·· 
Construction 10.203 0.239 0.169 0.190 0.172 0.143 Construction 0.314 0.349 0.308 0.229 0.269 0.352 
(4.81)·· (3.11 ) •• (2.78)·· (5.54)·· (3.64)·· (2.41)· (7.93)·· (5.79)·· (3.70)·· (4.95)·· (7.73)·· (4.83)·· 
Trade 10.068 0.077 0.01l 0.048 0.091 0.079 Trade 0.246 0.354 0.281 0.165 0.186 0.218 
(1.32) (1.04) (0.22) (0.87) (1.64) (1.14) (6.32)·· (5.18)·· (3.98)·· (3.50)·· (5.87)·· (3.26)·· 
Catering&Tourism 1-0·031 -0.101 -0.050 -0.048 -0.077 -0.068 Catering&Tolirism 0.216 0.275 0.166 0.095 0.196 0.142 
(-0.53) (-0.83) (-0.76) (-0.63) (-1.20) (-0.73) (3.83)·· (2.74)·· (1.83) (1.24) (3.06)·· (1.81 ) 
Transport . °10.178 0.236 0.165 0.147 0.125 0.087 Transport 0.335 0.338 0.281 0.235 0.321 0.394 
(4.92)·· (3.65)·· (3.81)" (3.71 ) •• (4.65)·· (1.27) (7.63)·· (4.22)·· (3.29)-· (4.79)-· (9.28)·· (4.41)·· 
Financial Services 
1
0
.
141 0.2tl 0.1l0 0.113 0.058 0.098 Financial Services 0.327 0.324 0.328 0.257 0.303 0.358 
. (3.78)·· (3.28)·· (2.50)- (2.83)·· (1.30) (1.38) (7.34)·· (3.53)·· (4.01)·· (4.69)-· (9.19)·· (4.49)*· 
Govem't Admin 0.271 0.375 0.274 0.225 0.162 0.153 Govern't Admin 0.580 0.979 0.687 0.433 0.340 0.258 
(7.46)·· (6.32)·· (7.19)" (5.91)" (4.83)** (2.27)· (6.96)·· (4.29)" (5.02)** (4.00)·· (3.73)** (3.34)·-
Edlication&Health 10.145 0.341 0.186 0.105 0.014 -0.061 Edlication&Health 0.140 0.149 0.109 0.097 0.096 0210 
(4.05)" (5.85)** (4.68)·· (2.69)·· (0.42) (-0.81) (1.70) (0.90) (0.92) (1.09) (1.82) (1.60) 
Orrupations: 
1-0.020 
Orrupations: 
Farmer -0.020 -0.076 -0.086 0.037 0.017 Farmer -0.034 -0.139 -0.105 -0.091 -0.023 -0.039 
(-0.31) -(0.16) (-0.73) (-0.82) (-0.30) (0.19) (-0.51) (-0.88) (-0.82) (-1.40) (-0.66) (-0.44) 
Industrial Worker 1-0.070 -0.086 -0.102 -0.110 -0.050 0.005 Industrial Worker 0.164 0.181 0.159 0.171 0.171 0.068 
(-3.34)·· (-2.17)- (-5.06)" (-5.67)-· (-1.74) (0.12) (4.02)-· (2.26)- (2.81)·- (3.38)·· (4.09)** (1.57) 
Trade Worker 1-0.099 -0.210 -0.226 -0.121 -0.085 0.005 Trade Worker 0.022 0.034 0.009 0.006 0.029 -0.091 
(-1.60) (-3.53)" (-1.98)· (-1.72) (-1.34) (0.05) (0.50) (0.42) (0.16) (O.ll) (0.59) (-1.73) 
Service Worker 
1{.027 
1 -I 1 1 1 Service Worker 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Wellare Worker 0.085 0.010 0.004 0.042 0.053 Welfare Worker 0.256 0.634 0.277 -0.010 0.338 0.107 
(0.85) (\.51) (0.32) (0.10) (1.29) (0.94) (\.58) (2.37)· (1.50) (-0.04) (1.13) (0.37) 
Clerk 1-0.095 -0.064 -0.104 -0.101 -0.089 -0.059 Clerk 0.198 0.241 0.191 0.158 0.182 0.150 
(-4.05)·· (-2.18)- (-3.93)" (-5.20)·- (-3.08)" (-1.46) (4.41)" (3.16)·· (4.24)·· (3.61)" (3.18)·· (2.44)-
Manager 10.189 0.257 0.208 0.159 0.164 0.200 Manager 0.567 0.583 0.548 0.491 0.546 0.667 
(4.90)" (3.78)" (4.88)-· (3.64)·· (3.45)" (2.82)·· (9.73)·· (3.73)·· (6.61)·· (9.27)·- (6.61)·· (6.11)·· 
Professional 10.032 0.033 0.018 0.021 0.046 0.085 Professional 0.381 0.428 0.369 0.361 0.354 0.296 
(1.47) (0.80) (0.92) (1.22) (1.52) (2.02)· (9.10)·· (5.11 ) •• (7.92)·· (6.69)·· (8.28)" (6.14)·· 
Other 1-0.165 -0.142 -0.172 -0.177 -0.159 -0.107 Other 0.020 0.025 0.014 0.035 0.040 -0.055 
(-6.24)" (-3.55)·· (-4.70)·· (-6.57)" (-4.31)·· (-2.50)· (0.44) (0.32) (0.20) (0.75) (0.87) (-1.13) 
Ytar: "tar: 
2004 
-" 
1 1 1 1 1 2004 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2005 0.056 0.033 0.063 0.034 0.037 0.016 2005 0.034 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.055 0.048 
(3.35)" (1.08) (3.64)·· (2.40)· (1.98)· (0.56) (1.52) (0.52) (1.07) (1.02) (1.93) (1.68) 
2006 10.183 0.176 0.168 0.142 0.158 0.144 2006 0.165 0.218 0.179 0.141 0.133 0.107 
(10.94)·· (H)4)·· (7.90)·· (8.75)·· (6.22)·· (9.65)" (7.88)" (6.80)·· (5.40)·· (5.81)·· (5.16)·· (3.80)·· 
2007 10.297 0.302 0.290 0.276 0.275 0.252 2007 0.186 0.298 0.212 0.158 0.154 0.120 
(16.98)·· (7.17)·· (12.73)·· (16.38)·· (13.39)·· (9.48)·· (8.72)·· (8.86)·· (8.02)·· (7.29)·· (5.97)·· (3.50)" 
'2008 10.341 0.350 0.303 0.311 0.308 0.301 2008 0.243 0.344 0.275 0.197 0.182 0.165 
"185 
(19.96)" (9.58)" (15.06)" (16.96)" (19.04)" (16.4W· (12.\0)·· (7.88)" (12.21)" (8.87)·· (9.20)-· (5.38)·· 
Constant: 4.064 3.531 3.924 4.144 4.390 4.527 Constant: 3.817 3.182 3.540 3.987 4.194 4.393 
(73.77)·- (39.87)·- (68.25)-- (65.94)-- (92.29)" (47.63)-- (55.04)-- (26.58)-- (49.02)-- (64.35)-· (70.88)-- (42.64)-· 
R-sq/Pseudo Rsq: 0.37 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 R-sqlPseudo Rsq: 0.33 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.23 
Observations: 5990 5990 5990 5990 5990 5990 Ohservations: 5928 5928 5928 5928 5928 5928 
Notes to TaMe 4.11: 
a) Samples relate to full-time employees aged 15 to 64 who reported non-zero main job hours of work and non-zero main job earnings received for the month 
and the year of the survey. The public sector includes social and state sectors. 
b) The dependent variable is the log of real hourly earnings. Earnings are net of taxes, pensions and welfare benefits and are expressed in October 2005 Serbian 
dinars. 
c) All explanatory variables are categorical. 
d) The estimation procedure for the mean robust regression is OLS and I test reported in parentheses is calculated based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
robust estimated standard errors. Bootstrapped quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles (1ot\ 
25 t\ 50th, 75 th and 90th). The I test reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions is calculated based on standard errors estimated by the bootstrapping 
procedure with 1000 replications in all cases. OLS and bootstrapped quantile regression analysis reported used STAT A 8.0: ** and * denote significance at 
the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. . 
e) [denotes category omitted in estimation. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia 2004-2008 
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Table A4.12: Estimation of main job hourly earnings in Serbia for women, 2004-2008 
J'ublic !\lean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Private Mean 10th 25th 5111h 75th 90th 
t:xperience: Experience: 
<= 5 Years f f f f f f <= 5 Years f f f f f f 
.5< Years<= I 0 0.032 0.085 0.010 0.020 0.030 -0.009 5<Years<=10 0.047 0.026 0.039 0.030 0.041 0.092 
(1.59) (2.73)** (0.46) (1.74) (2.04)* (-0.33) (2.34)* (0.78) (2.45)· (I. 70) (1.94) (3.32)·· 
10< Years<=20 0.086 0.118 0.064 0.073 0.085 0.060 IO<Years<=20 0.113 0.096 0.090 0.102 0.112' 0.171 
(4.88)** (3.79)*· (2.28)* (6.16)*· (6.53)** (3.35)** (6.09)** (3.87)·* (4.14)** (4.66)** (5.59)·* (5.28)** 
20< Years<=30 0.131 0.155 0.109 0.099 0.124 0.095 20<Years<=30 0.142 0.\33 0.123 0.\34 0.165 0.195 
(7.13)·· (4.89)·· (4.47)" (7.45)·· (9.48)** (3.77)·· (6.93)" (3.\3)" (4.38)·· (7.15)·· (7.49)·· (8.54)·· 
> 30 Years 0.177 0.233 O.l5S 0.146 0.161 0.117 >30 Years 0.097 0.03S 0.078 0.046 0.096 0.188 
(S.26)** (6.83)** (6.35)** (10.08)** (7.76)** (4.62)** (2.97)** (0.61) . (2.04)* (l.l2) (3.03)** (4.02)*· 
Education: Education: 
No qualification -0.027 -0.073 . -0.052 0.051 -0.025 -0.082 No qualification -0.117 -0.021 -0.104 -0.064 -0.097 -0.195 
(-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.53) (0.S4) (-0.78) (-0.49) (-2.27)· (-O.IS) (-1.64) (-1.10) (-1.79) (-2.19)· 
. Primary f f f f f f Primary f f f f f f 
Secondary 0.197 0.137 0.157 0.163 0.201 0.212 Secondary 0.109 0.055 0.101 0.\36 0.127 0.107 
(9.73)** (7.25)*· (9.56)** (10.00)** (7.50)·* (6.91)** (4.86)·* (1.73) (2.82)** (5.6S)** (4.34)** (2.21)* 
College 0.366 0.318 0.333 0.308 0.339 0.361 College 0.263 0.IS3 0.245 0.301 0.330 0.275 
(15.10)** (10.82)·· (10.83)** (16.09)** (9.90)·* (10.79)" (7.21)** (3.IS)·* (4.00)** (S.74)** (7.62)** (3.82)** 
University 0.642 0.575 0.575 0.566 0.642 0.748 University 0.525 0.410 0.527 0.554 0.543 0.586 
(26.43)" (18.00)·* (19.09)** (25.95)** (IS.25)** (lS.77)** (13.93)·* (9.09)·* (12.55)" (11.74)** (9.34)** (S.27)·* 
Settlement type: Settlement type: 
Rural f f f f f f Rural f f f f f f 
City • 0.038 0.02S 0.025 0.027 0.042 0.068 City 0.061 0.065 0.056 0.053 0.054 0.071 
(3.48)** (0.99) (1.61) (2.84)" (3.26)*· (6.35)** (4.27)** (2.21)* (3.61)** (2.85)** (2.86)** (2.99)** 
Region: Rrgion: 
Belgrade f f f f f f Belgrade f f f f f f 
Central Serbia -0.163 -0.116 -0.122 -0.129 -0.142 -0.125 Central Serbia -0.359 -0.390 -0.392 -0.385 -0.349 -0.315 
(-13.9)" (-6.80)·· (-9.15)** (-10.5)** (-10.1 )** (-7.S5)*· (-21.5)*· (-13.S)·* (-21.9)** (-1S.0)*· (-IS.S)·· (-13.2)** 
Vojvodina -0.083 -0.079 -0.087 -0.066 -0.061 -0.042 Vojvodina -0.256 -0.278 -0.303 -O.2S7 -0.249 -0.200 
-
(-5.82)" (-4.00)" (-4.79)" (-4.19)" (-3.73)*· (-2.20)· (-12.90)·* (-S.OI)** (-13.60)** (-11.40)** (-7.54)** (-5.74)" 
!\Iarital Status: Marital Status: 
Married 0.015 0.034 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.031 Married 0.005 0.048 0.011 0.011 -0.006- -0.013 
(0.83) (2.02)* (0.01) (-0.07) (-0.29) (-1.08) (0.22) (1.41 ) (0.50) (0.58) (-0.19) (-0.38) 
Single 0.004 0.010 -0.009 -0.015 0.009 -0.026 Single 0.009 0.080 0.020 -0.007 0.011 0.021 
(0.16) (0.30) (-0.29) (-O.8S) (0.38) (-0.70) (0.32) (2.08)· (0.68) (-0.24) (0.39) (0.72) 
DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f DivorcedlWidow f f f f f f 
Nationality: Nationality: 
!krbian 0.013 -0.005 0.011 0.010 0026 0.026 Serbian 0.037 0.052 0.044 0.058 0.045 0.004 
(0.70) (-0.15) . (0.47) (0.61) (1.20) (0.99) (1.59) (1.46) ( 1.55) (2.56)· (1.23) (0.16) 
Other f f f f f f Other f f f f f f 
Industry Branch: Industry Branch: 
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'Agriculture 1{044 / / / f f Agriculture / f / / f f Industry&Mining 0.107 -0.101 0.082 0.124 0.092 Industry&Mining 0.303 0.690 0.371 0.197 0.173 • 0.199 
(0.80) (0.72) (-0.76) (1.33) (1.78) (2.38)· (5.44)·· (4.00)·· (4.32)·· (5.52)·· (2.55)· (4.80)·· 
Construction 10.087 0.247 0.032 0.073 0.065 0.064 Construction 0.261 0.705 0.382 0.169 0.141 0.199 
(1.07) (0.77) (0.23) (1.06) (0.69) (0.49) (3.44)·· (3.29)·· (4.45)·· (2.67)·· (1.51 ) (\.78) 
Trade 10.127 0.357 0.065 0.143 0.087 0.055 Trade 0.268 0.631 0.371 0.179 0.129 0.160 
(2.04)· (\.74) (0.45) (2.09)· (1.21) (1.27) (4.68)·· (3.85)·· (4.26)** (4.13)·· (1.72) (3.20)·· 
Catering& Tourism 10.081 0.215 -0.050 0.115 0.098 0.051 Catering&Tourism 0.252 0.593 0.265 0.123 0.107 0.200 
(1.28) (1.15) • (-0.39) (1.85) (1.03) (0.84) (3.78)·· (3.15)·· (3.13)·· (1.68) (1.50) (2.83)" 
Transport 10.194 0.411 0.137 0.191 0.195 0.172 Transport 0.342 0.617 0.345 0.235 0.261 0.272 
(3.47)·· (2.35)· (1.01) (3.47)·· (2.68)·· (3.93)·· (4.73)·· (3.22)·· (2.91)·· (2.80)·· (2.74)·· (4.58)" 
Financial Services 10.195 0.414 0.122 0.162 0.174 0.186 Financial Services 0.400 0.702 0.440 0.321 0.294 0.313 
(3.61)·· (2.42)· (0.86) (3.01)·· (2.28)· (3.80)·· (6.72)·· (3.88)·· (5.08)·· (8.61)·· (3.65)·· (5.64)" 
Govern', Admin 10.243 0.520 0.180 0.212 0.172 0.150 Govern', Admin 0.322 0.841 0.403 0.142 0.154 0.741 
(4.66)·· (3.06)·· (1.38) (3.95)·· (2.42)· (3.37)·· (2.11)· (5.47)·· (3.61)·· (0.99) (0.40) ( 1.65) 
Education&Health 10.157 0.517 0.148 0.133 0.034 -0.035 Education&Health 0.361 0.749 0.428 0.235 0.241 0.275 
(3.05)·· (3.12)·· (1.16) (2.40)· (0.50) (-0.92) (4.93)" (4.62)·· (4.31)·· (3.32)·· (1.93) (2.60)·· 
Occupations: 
1-0.010 
Occupations: 
Farmer 0.156 -0.196 -0.044 0.014 -0.073 Farmer 0.153 0.176 0.113 0.063 0.217 0.247 
(-0.10) (0.92) (-1.27) (-0.25) (0.14) (-0.42) (2.04)· (1.16) (1.32) (0.68) (2.26)· (2.40)· 
Industrial Worker 1-0.124 -0.119 -0.118 -0.076 -0.084 -0.117 Industrial Worker O.os8 0.046 0.035 0.045 0.037 0.043 
(-2.69)·· (-1.06) (-1.88) (-1.65) (-1.45) (-1. 79) (1.40) (0.65) (0.74) (0.73) (0.67) (0.72) 
Trade Worker 1-0.219 -0.177 -0.251 -0.165 -0.218 -0.215 Trade Worker -0.004 0.018 -0.060 -0.025 -0.024 -0.020 
(-3.81)·· (-1.53) (-2.40)· (-2.07)· (-4.45)·· (-3.37)·· (-0.09) (0.28) (-1.26) (-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.28) 
Service Worker 
1{132 
f / f f f Service Worker / / / / f / 
Welfare Worker 0.181 0.180 0.176 0.099 0.001 Welfare Worker 0.264 0.184 0.201 0.289 0.265 0.276 
(4.93)*- (5.01)·· (4.09)·· (7.21)-· (2.83)" (0.04) (6.24)-· (2.3W (4.03)" (4.98)·· (5.62)·· (4.81)** 
Clerk 10.272 0.348 0.294 0.365 0.276 0.224 Clerk 0.521 0.326 0.380 0.532 0.670 0.704 
(4.99)·· (5.17)** (4.29)·· (4.46)-· (4.33)·· (3.50)" (7.40)*- (3.68)·· (4.04)·· (5.75)·· (7.85)·· (7.53)·· 
Manager 10.221 0.287 0.279 0.289 0.207 0.153 Manager 0.350 0.290 0.286 0.347 0.358 0.385 
(8.96)·· (8.37)·· (6.37)·· (13.62)·· (6.42)·· (4.69)·· (8.86)·· (3.90)·· (6.33)·· (6.20)·· (8.61)·· (6.13)** 
Professiooal 1-0.099 -0.076 -0.102 -0.098 -0.117 -0.114 Professional 0.103 -0.027 0.046 0.110 0.115 0.228 
(-3.75)·· (-2.51)· (-2.11)· (-3.35)·· (·2.40)· (-2.30)· (2.42)· (-0.34) (1.19) (1.96) (1.70) (2.38)· 
Other Other 
"tlr: Ytar: 
2004 / / ./ / / / 2004 f / f f f / 
2005 0.047 0.056 0.045 0.036 0.029 0.051 2005 0.041 -0.009 0.003 0.022 0.054 0.086 
(3.02)·· (1.94) (4.32)·· (2.79)·· (1.54) (3.20)" (1.66) (-0.18) (0.09) (0.68) (1.96) (1.89) 
2006 J 0.130 0.131 0.118 0.115 0.120 0.138 2006 0.130 0.158 0.143 0.105 0.104 0.104 
(8.72)·· (5.86)** (8.35)·· (7.57)-· (6.14)-- (6.15)-· (5.81)·· (4.23)-· (4.95)-· (5.27)-· (3.65)-- (3.03)-· 
2007 10.262 0.246 0.242 0.278 0.265 0.279 2007 0.182 0.206 0.196 0.166 0.136 0.154 
(16.56)·· (8.38)·· (18.86)·· (18.88)·· (15.27)·· (14.30)·· (8.30)·· (5.21 ) •• (5.30)·· (6.39)·· (5.85)·· (5.37)·· 
2008 J 0.306 0.265 0.270 0.3\1 0.318 0.302 2008 0.199 0.253 0.235 0.204 0.150 0.101 
(19.81)·· (12.04)" (12.47)·· (19.83)·· (17.11)·· (17.69)·· (9.48)·· (5.81)·· (6.99)·· (9.01)·· (6.34)·· (3.87)·· 
188 
Constant: 3.818 3.154 3.736 3.869 4.086 4.321 Constant: 3.653 2.875 3.427 3.764 4.027 4.186 
(57.96)·· (17.90)" (31.93)" (59.59)" (56.36)" (52.01)" (47.47)" (12.89)" (53.94)" (50.34)·· (47.01)" (39.58)·· 
RsqlPstudo Rsq: 0.54 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 R-sq/Pseudo Rsq: 0.45 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.34 
Observations: 4772 4772 4772 4772 4772 4772 Observations: 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 4099 
Notes to Table A4. J 2: See Notes to Table A4.11. 
Data Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia 2004-2008 
Table A4.13: D 't' fnubr t t diffi tial at diffi t =--------------- --- ------ ------tiles fl d , Serb' - --- - -- --- - - - -- -
LFS 1995-2003 LSMS 2002-2003 LFS 2004-2008 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
• Total Effects of Total Effects of Total Effects of Total Effects of Total Effects of Total Effects of 
Percentile: differential coefficients differentia I coefficients differential coefficients differential coefficients differential coefficients differential coefficients 
10th -0.084** -0.078** -0.000 -0.043* 0.048* 0.043 0.168** -0.072* 0.298** 0.170** 0.358** 0.122** 
. (-9.67) (-4.21 ) (-0.03) (-2.23) (2.24) (1.09) (7.69) (-2.37) (24.19) (11.57) (29.74) (18.98) 
30th -0.061** -0.066** 0.095** -0.037* 0.011 -0.016 0.209** -0.013 0.282** 0.131 ** 0.429** Q.l58** 
(-10.78) (-3.66) (1I.48) (-2.28) (0.90) (-0.62) (15.18) (-0.52) (35.23) (13.85) (37.36) (21.88) 
50th . -0.062** -0.063** 0.109** -0.058** -0.024* -0.062*- 0.178*- 0.014 0.271** 0.103*- 0.417** 0.118** 
(-14.2) ** (-3.67) (15.51) .(-3.83) (-2.04) (-2.78) (14.90) (0.66) (33.24) (11.69) (51.54) (19.94) 
70 tla -0.074** -0.092** 0.106** -0.109-- -0.054*- -0.079-- 0.154** -0.044 0.256*- 0.076** 0.365*- 0.052** 
(-15.33) (-4.97) (14.14) (-8.53) (-3.84) (-3.64) (11.26) (-1.93) (27.32) . (7.83) (42.43) (7.51) 
90 th -0.104*- -0.153*- 0.051*! -0.188** -0.077** -0.130** 0.001 -0.259** 0.197** -0.000 0.232** -0.059** 
(-16.63) (-6.42) (6.23) (-9.25) (-4.38) (-3.37) (0.02) (-4.70) (17.82) (-0.02) (16.75) (-5.33) 
Noles to Table A4. J 3: See Notes to Figures A4.1. A4.2 and A4.3. 
Dala Source: Labour Force Survey of the Republic of Serbia (LFS) 1995-2008 and Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2002-2003 
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Figure A4.1: Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different 
quantiles for men and women in Serbia, LFS 1995-2003 
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Data Source: LFS 1995-2003 
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Figure A4.2: Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different 
quantiles for men and women in Serbia, LSMS 2002-2003 
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by bootstrapping the results 100 times. Effects of coefficients presented with 95% confidence interval. 
Data Source: LSMS 2002-2003 
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Figure A4.3: Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different 
quantiles for men and women in Serbia, LFS 2004-2008 
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Chapter 5 
5 Public-private earnings differentials in Hungary 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore wage differentials between the public and private sectors 
in Hungary from 1992 to 2003. The question of interests are again whether there is evidence 
of different wage distributions between the public and private sectors and to what extent the 
public sector wage distribution has changed as a result of the economic transition. 
The analysis of the evolution of the wage structures between private and public sectors 
during the economic transition is particularly interesting for the case of Hungary. During the 
period observed (1992-2003), the public sector has been largely privati sed and restructured 
through a number of wage reforms. The ownership transformation had a potential effect on the 
distributions of wages in the two sectors of employment. 
The evolution of wages in the public and private sectors during the period of economic 
transition in ,Hungary is examined by estimating wage differentials for full-time male and 
female employees with similar characteristics on average and across the percentiles of the 
wage distribution. Furthermore, the chapter examines public sector pay penalties/premia for 
different skilled groups of workers. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regression 
estimation methods as well as decomposition of differences in distributions are again utilised. 
This chapter does not attempt to conirol for the measurement error in cross-sectional estimates 
of the public sector pay gap because t?e microdata used is an employer survey. 
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The chapter is organised into three parts. In the first part we examine the institutional 
. 
setting and method of privatisation in Hungary, as well as macroeconomic context and wage 
reforms during the economic transition. The second part explains the data and variables used 
in the empirical analysis. This part also introduces the wage trends and inequality. The final 
part estimates public-private sector earnings differentials by gender on average and at 
different points of the distribution. In addition, the pay effects of public sector status across 
groups differentiated by educational qualifications attained are estimated. 
5.2 Transition in Hungary 
5.2.1 Institutional background and privatisation 
Pre-transition Hungary had a similar wage-employment setting to other central 
planned economies. Kolle (1998) describes the system of pay reward in Hungary as having 
two main characteristics: first, firms in Hungary were constrained in their scope for 
discretionary wage-setting; and second, enterprises had an incentive to over-employ workers 
beyond the efficient level. 
Public wage policy was intended to minimise wage differentials. Workers were not 
rewarded according to their skill or productivity. The returns to education were low (Hamori, 
2007). 
Although Hungary abolished central planning in 1968, the wage plan remained the 
single most rigid limit set for enterprises. Wage levels were controlled by means of a tax that 
was a function of the ratio of wage bill growth to value added growth (Kolle, 1998). The tax 
~ e g i m e e penalised "excessive" increases in the wage bill ~ d d encouraged enterprises to increase 
employment rather than wage rates. 
Wages were not taxed at the individual level. Personal income tax was introduced for 
the first time in Hungary in 1988 (Abraham and Kezdi, 2000). 
The first market-oriented reforms of the Hungarian labour market started in 1985. 
Managing rights in labour markets were delegated to firms and political barriers to dismissals 
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were eliminated (Ko1l5, 1998). As a result, employment in Hungary started to decline as over-
. . 
employment was reduced. 
Commander, Koll5 and Ugaz (1994) document that at the start of the economic 
transition, Hungarian firms in the state sector (relative to other Eastern European comparators) 
cut employment often by involuntary means and by large magnitudes (for example over 33% 
between 1989 and 1993). These cuts in employments were seen as a response to very 
significant labour hoarding and intended t9 bring employment closer to competitive levels. 
For example, during the period 1990-1993, the ratio of state sector job losses to private sector 
job gains was 1.7 (Commander, K{)1l5 and Ugaz, 1994). Consequently, open unemployment 
grew from virtually zero during the pre-transition period to double digits during the 1990s 
(Delteil, Pailhe and Redor, 2004). 
The organised process of privatising state enterprises started in 1991. Pri vatisation in 
Hungary was mainly based on competitive tenders open to foreign participation. Brown, Earle 
and Telegdy (2008) point out that workers were not given rights to preferentially acquire 
shares in their companies nor were there mass distribution of shares aided by vouchers unlike 
in other transition economies (for example in Poland or Czech Republic). The outcome was 
very little worker ownership (in only about 250 firms), and instead significant managerial 
ownership and highly concentrated block holdings, many of them by foreign investors. 
The method of case-by-case privatisation (mainly by foreign direct investment), 
although gradual, was completed earlier than in most other Eastern European countries. 
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2008) report that by the end of 1992, 43.6% of Hungarian firms 
had already been privati sed and that the share of firms privati sed to foreigner ownership was 
the highest, relative to other Eastern European countries (nearly 17% of all enterprises by 
2004). In terms of e m p l o y m e ~ t , , this meant that more than 50% of employment of the firms 
that were privatised was sold to foreign investors (Delteil, Pailhe and Redor, 2004). 
Overall, Hungary has been considered as one of the most successful countries in 
transforming its economy from state socialism to modern capitalism (Kezdi, 2002). The 
EBRD (2003) Transition Report records that, even during post-privatisation phase of foreign 
investment .(from 1998), Hungary continues to attract foreign Gapital owing to the wide 
availability of skilled and 'knowledge workers' and also because of the implementation of 
supportive economic policies. 
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The supr0rtive economic policies to the business sector i n c l u ~ e d : : low corporate tax 
rate at 16% (which is one of the lowest among OEeD countries) as well as the ta'{ exemption 
of inbound dividends, tax deductions on interest income and a system of direct budgetary 
support in favour of certain types of companies in both private and state ownership (EBRD, 
2004). 
In 2003, the government adopted a plan to complete the process of privatisation within 
the next three years, after which only 37 companies would remain permanently in state 
ownership (EBRD, 2003). Nevertheless, even these companies are market oriented and in 
terms of wage-setting do not differ from privately owned companies. For this reason the 
public sector in Hungary now comprises only "budget sectors": government administration, 
education, health and social services. 
Since privatisation, enterprise-level bargaining plays the decisive role in wage 
determination (Kertesi and Kollo, 2000). A tripartite Commission of Conciliation of Interests 
was set up in 1988 to help industrial dialogue and to facilitate negotiations between the state, 
employers' associations and trade unions (Delteil, Pailhe and Redor, 2004). However, even 
though unions, chambers of commerce and the government enter national-level negotiations, 
they only publish recommendations rather than effective guidelines (Kertesi and Kollo, 2000). 
In general, from 1993 in Hungary wages are set at the firm level regardless of the ownership 
type and the majority of the firms have no collective agreement at the industry branch or 
region level (De1teil, Pailhe and Redor, 2004). 
Kertesi and Kollo (2000) reveal that the emerging institutional patterns of bargaining 
provide favourable conditions for competitive labour markets. A . 'union effect' on wages is 
not found. In addition, during the 1990s minimum wages were set at low levels and only 
indirectly influenced the wage-setting through underpinning public sector pay and social 
benefits (Kertesi and Kollo, 2000). The next section describes macroeconomic circumstances 
during the economic transition in Hungary. 
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5.2.2 ft,facroeconomic Context and Wages 
I 
The economic transition in Hungary can be divided into three periods.3o The first 
period, from 1990 to 1997, relates to so called 'transformational' phase and stabilisation 
package. The second time period, from 1998 to 2000, is known as 'the boom of the Hungarian 
economy'. The third time period from 2001 to 2003 is characterised by the set of wage 
reforms. 
During the 'transformational recession' real gross wages declined (by 7.6% in 1995 
relative to 1994) coupled with a decrease in the rate of real GDP growth (by 1.4% in 1995 
relative to 1994) and an increase in the inflation rate (by 10% in 1995 relative to 1994) 
(Tables 5.1a and 5.1b). 
In 1995, the 'Bokors Csomag' stabilisation programme was adopted This programme 
constrained the growth of nominal public sector wages and the government budget. These 
measures increased the GDP growth rate (by 4-5% per year) and decreased the inflation rate 
from around 28% in 1995 to 10% by 2000 (Hamori (2007) and Table 5.1a). Moreover, in 
1995, apart from fiscal restrictions and changes in monetary policy, the banks and public 
utilities were privati sed to foreign strategic investors (Kezdi, 2002). 
During the 'boom' of the Hungarian economy, from 1998 to 2000, real wages started 
to increase (by 4% on average per annum) as well as labour force participation (by 1% 
average per annum) and the unemployment rate declined to 6.4% in 2000 (Table 5.tb). 
The third period of economic transition begun after 2000 and coincides with the period 
of wage reforms when the Socialist-led government came into the office in 2002. During this 
period the minimum wage increased from around 29% of average earnings in 2000 to 41 % in 
2002 (Hamori, 2007).31 In addition, between September 2002 and 2003, public sector nominal 
wages increased by 50% on average affecting various groups of public 'Service employees 
(approximately 800,000 employees which represents around 20% of the labour force) 
(Hamori, 2007). 
• 
30 Division based on Horvath and Hudomiet (2005) and Hamori (2007) 
31 The statutory minimum wage relates to gross monthly earnings net of overtime pay, shift pay and bonuses. The 
minimum wage is legally binding and covers all employment contracts (Hamori, 2007). 
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Table 5.la: Main macroeconomic indicators in Hungary, 1990-2008 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Growth in real CDPJ%) -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 6.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 5.2 4.1 3.5 1.2 
Inflation (%) 28.9 35.0 • 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7 6.8 3.6 4.0 6.7 
Covn 'I Balances (% GDP) 0.0 -2.9 -6.1 -6.0 -7.5 -6.7 -5.0 -6.8 -8.0 -5.6 -3.0 -3.5 -8.4 -6.4 -5.4 -6.1 -8.6 -4.9 
Current Accollnl{% GDP)_ 0.4 0.8 0.9 -9.0 -3.7 -4.0 -4.5 -7.2 -7.8 -8.5 -6.1 -7.1 -8.7 -8.6 -7.4 -7.8 -7.6 -6.4 
Foreign Direcllnvestment 311 1459 1471 2328 1097 4772 3335 3715 3070 3060 2151 3573 2722 479 3542 5353 3500 2197 
Notes to TaMe 5.la: Foreign Direct Investn't net inflows recorded in the balance of payments in US$ million. Data Source: EfiRD Transition Report vanous years 
Table 5.lb: Economy and labour market indicators in Hungary, 1994-2008 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CDP per capita (in US$) 4052 4359 4425 4495 4641 4757 4683 5140 6467 8219 9971 10829 11215 13785 
Nominal Cross Earnings (%) I 22.6 16.8 20.4 22.3 18.3 13.9 13.5 18.2 18.3 12.0 6.1 8.8 8.2 8.0 
Real Cross Earnings (%J I 3.8 -11.4 -3.2 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 9.0 13.0 7.3 -0.7 5.2 4.2 0.0 
Labour force (,,/oj I 
-3.3 -2.6 -1.2 -1.3 0.4 2.1 0.6 -0.4 0.2 1.4 0.1 1.3 1.0 -0.2 
Emplovment (%) I -2.0 -1.9 -0.8 0.0 1.4 3.1 1.2 0.3 0.1 1.3 -0.3 0.0 0.7 -0.1 
• 2 
Unemplol'ment (,,/oj 12.4 12.1 11.8 11.6 10.1 9.9 6.4 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.3 7.3 7.5 7.4 
Private Sector Share Emp 't(%) 3 
.. 
na 71.0 76.8 83.3 81.4 82.1 80.4 79.6 79.3 79.1 79.1 79.4 77.3 78 
Industn'Share in Emp't (%) 4 27.6 26.7 26.7 26.7 27.8 27.4 33.7 34.1 34.1 33.3 32.9 32.4 32.3 32.6 
Privatisation Revenues S 123 20.8 23.4 27.5 28.6 29.8 30.2 . 30.3 30.7 31.1 33.5 34.2 33.3 33.5 
Private Sector (% GDP) 3 55 60 70 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Share of ill dust no (% CDP) 21.9 . 23.1 23.5 25.0 25.9 26.7 27.9 27.2 26.8 27.5 28.3 25.9 26.0 25.5 
Share oJJ1gric. (% CDP) 5.9 5.9 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.3 4.6 5.5 4.7 4.4 4.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 
Population, millions (end-war) 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.0 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 
Notes to TaMe 5.1 b: Earnings are monthly; na denotes that data is not available; I annual average; 2 % of labour force (end-year); 3 rough EfiRD estimates, based on available 
statistics from both official (government) sources and unofficial sources. The underlying concept of private sector value added includes income generated by the activity of 
private registered companies, as well as by private entities engaged in informal activity in those ca<;es where reliable information on informal activity is available; 4 includes 
electricity, power, manufacturing, mining and water; S cumulative (% GDP): government revenues from cash sales of enterprises, not including investment commitments. 
Data SOllrce: EBRD Transition Report various years 
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Hamori (2007) provides a detailed explanation of the Hungarian public sector wage 
scale (Kozalkalmazotti ber/dbla) according to which wages increase mechanically both 
horizontally and vertically along ten educational categories (A - J). Within each qualification 
category wages increase with seniority along 14 brackets of different magnitudes. The wage 
scale is justified as assuring equal wages for public sector employees for a given job with the 
same qualification and seniority. There are however separate wage scale for tertiary education 
and research institutes and civil servants. According to Hamori (2007) the government revised 
the wage scale in 2002 such that the wages in the lowest qualification and seniority category 
(AI) are equal to the statuary minimum wage and those in the lowest seniority bracket of the 
highest qualification category (J1) earn 2.65 times more than the minimum wage. Moreover, 
the government introduced a minimum monthly wage for tertiary graduates, whereby the 
wages of the lowest education and seniority bracket of tertiary graduates (F I) were set to be 
twice the statutory minimum wage (Hamori, 2007). 
According to Telegdy (2006), the motivation behind the significant wage increases for 
public service employees between September 2002 and 2003 was to combat losses of highly 
skilled labour in the public sector due to the private selection. Furthennore, the intention was 
to impede negative selection by labour quality into the public sector because the public sector 
wages were lagging behind private sector wages during the whole period of economic 
transition in the 1990s (a phenomenon documented by Nickell and Quintini (2002) for the 
UK). 
Although, the general government deficit more than doubled in 2002 (Table S.Ia), it 
was argued that generous public sector wage increases were important for the government to 
retain the human capital needed to improve administrative capacity and absorb European 
Union (EU) funds during following years (EBRD, 2'003). Hungary joined the EU on the I st of 
January, 2004. 
The next section presents the wage trends in public and private sectors and estimates 
the public sector pay 'gap' for different groups of workers during the economic transition in 
Hungary before EU,accession. 
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5.3 Data and variables used in empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis is carried out by using microdata for Hungary from the 
Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS). The WS is an employer-provided cross-sectional 
microdataset. The data host is the Hungarian National Employment Office and the harmonised 
database is created by the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
The target population of the WS includes all budget institutions and companies above 
a certain size. Waves are available for' 1986, 1989, and annually since 1992. From 1992 the' 
data is collected from both the private and public sectors. 
The sampling frame for firms until 1994 includes every tax-paying legal entity using 
double-sided balance sheet with at least 20 employees. From 1995 firms employing at least 10 
employees and from 2000 employing at least 5 employees are included in the survey. On the 
other hand all budgetary institutions, independent of size, provide information on their full-
time employees. From 2002 the data also cover part-time employees. The selection procedure 
provides a random sample of workers by collecting the data from sampled employers on 
individual workers born on 5th, 15th and 25 th of any month.32 The sampling weights are defined 
in a way that the ratio of the business and public employees included in the unweighted 
sample reflects the same ratio as aggregate data for the Hungarian economy. The frequency 
weights are used in the empirical analysis in order to make harmonised sample representative. 
In order to provide sample consistency over the years the analysis is restricted to 
employers with more than 20 employees. This selection procedure may potentially cause a 
bias (constant over time) due to the well-known employer size - wage effect. In particular, if 
small private firms pay lower wages this would affect the measured public-private sector pay 
gap. Therefore, the estimates must be in.terpreted with caution and as conditional on the 
selected samples. On the other hand, the possible problem of underreporting wages in the 
private sector which is characteristic of small employers is mitigated in this analysis. For 
. . 
example, Kertesi and Kalla (2003) find that, although generally high, the compliance rate to 
minimum wage regulations in Hungary is lower among smaller private employers and Hamori 
32 This includes on average 6.5% of production workers and 10% of non-production workers within firms and 
100/0-12% random samp les in the case of budgetary institutions. 
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(2007) points out that especially small enterprises are more likely to report workers at the 
officially declared minimum wage but pay them above that level. 
Particularly useful for the analysis of wage levels and wage dispersion is that the WS 
data sets are very large cross-sections, ranging from 130,000 to 220,000 observations, 
depending on the year. We employ data from the selected waves from May 1992 lintil May 
2003. The sample includes full-time wage earners aged between 15 and 64 who are working 
in the public or private sector. The non-profit sector is excluded. 
The public sector relates to the budgetary institutions. From 1994 it is possible to 
distinguish between civil servants, public servants, judges and prosecutors within the 
budgetary sector. Business employees in the companies represent the private sector. Since 
there is no information on employer ownership structure within the private sector, even 
companies with the majority share owned by the state are classified into the private sector. 
Hence, the public sector in this dataset consists of the budgetary institutions that are under 
direct government supervision only, whereas the companies comprise the 'business' i.e. 
private sector whether or not they are fully privately owned or of mixed ownership. It is 
argued by the data providers that this classification does not impede the analysis of public-
private sector wage differentials because the market-related wage setting mechanism within 
the 'business' sector holds for all companies irrespectively of the precise ownership structure. 
However, we cannot test whether this is the case given these definitions. 
Table 5.2: Annual sample sizes by ownership type and gender, 1992-2003 
Sector: Public Sector Private Sector 
Gender: Men Women Men Women 
Number as%of Number as%of Number as%of Number as% of 
Year: ofobs. Men ofobs. Women ofobs. Men ofobs. Women 
1992 9,751 15.20 25,879 39.27 . 54,402 84.80 40,014 60.73 
1995 9,429 12.85 31,459 40.97 63,936 87.15 45,326 59.03 
1996 11,881 18.35 40,233 51.41 52,859 81.65 38,026 48.59 
1997 11,977 18.69 41,840 52.67 52,101 81.31 37,600 47.33 
1998 11,650 18.16 40,176 52.12 52,500 81.84 36,903 47.88 
1999 11,442 18.27 38,420 51.69 51,171 81.73 35,907 48.31 
2001 10,394 , 17.19 36,374 49.37 50,072 82.81 37.299 50.63 
2002 10,239 15.40 36,922 48.96 56,262 84.60 38,485 51.04 
2003 9,704 14.82 32,788 44.95 55,782 85.18 40.155 55.05 
Data Source:· The HarmoOlsed Hunganan Wage Survey (WS), 1992-2003 
The number of observations In the working sample by sector and gender is 
summarised in the Table 5.2. Since the public sector includes the budgetary institutions only, 
there are approximately five times more male workers in the private than in the public sector 
sample. Female workers are more equally distributed across sectors in the working sample. 
Table AS.l in the Appendix describes the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
first variable, earnings, is the natural logarithm of the monthly gross earnings. This is defined 
as the monthly gross wage in May plus regular premia and bonuses in May plus one twelfth of 
the sum of all other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over 
the previous year denoted in Hungarian currency (forint) and converted to 2003 earnings by 
the annual consumer price index.33 The irregular incomes and all other payments include the 
13 th month's salary, year-end bonuses and other pecuniary payments but do not include in-
kind benefits (such as car and cellular phone usage, representation expenses, meals and 
transportation subsidies etc.). There are, however, differences in the amount of unobserved 
benefits across sectors. For example, teachers have long holidays and nearly all public sector 
employees receive meal vouchers. Hence, these public sector advantages may bias the level of 
sector pay gap but not its changes over time given that these differences are constant. In 
addition, the data on earnings are considered to be more precise in WS than those gained by 
the household survey because the earnings information is provided by the employers 
(Horvath, Hudomiet and Kezdi, 2004)34. 
The WS contains weekly hours as specified by the employment contract but only for 
1992, 2002 and 2003 and monthly paid hours are recorded from 1999. Due to this limitation 
we base our analysis on monthly gross earnings for the whole period observed from 1992 until 
2003. The hourly gross earnings equations are estimated only for three last years of the 
observed period. 
The WS contains a rich set of employee and employer information. We use variables 
on individual employee's gender, educational qualification and occupation and employer's 
industry branch, size and ownership as well as geographical location by urban type and region 
as dummies as in previous chapter . 
• 
33 The harmonised WS also include information on net wages. The net wage is calculated from the gross amount 
using the tax brackets of the given year and is not used in our analysis. 
34 Horvath, Hudomiet and Kezdi (2006) compare the household Tarki Monitor survey with the WS and find that 
the average after tax earnings are about 15% lower in the self-reported data (Le. household survey data) 
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Due to significant changes in the Hungarian occupational code the harmonised dataset 
provides the longitudinal analysis only from 1995 until 2003 and hence, the occupational 
affiliation is not used as an explanatory variable in the 1992 year data set. Potential labour 
market experience is created as age minus years spent in education minus six and is used as a 
continuous variable together with its squared term. Years spent in education are estimated as 
follows: 6 if the employee has not finished primary education, 8 in case he/she finished 
primary education, 11 in the case of completed vocational training, 12 in the case where the 
employee has completed secondary education, 16.5 if the employee obtained a university 
degree before 1996 and 16.3 if he/she obtained a university degree after 1996. The educational 
infonnation in the dataset allows for the differentiation of four education groups: primary 
school or less (unskilled), vocational degree (low-skilled), high school degree (middle-skilled) 
and tertiary degree (high-skilled). 
Proportions and means of the variables used in analysis are presented in Tables AS.2 
and AS.3 in the Appendix. The t-squared tests shows that there is a significant difference 
between the vectors of the means of the variables in the public and private sector for both 
genders. This confinns that the characteristics of the public sector workers differ from those of 
the private sector in a number of dimensions. 
Public sector employees are on average older than private sector employees for both 
genders. Moreover, public sector employees have more years of experience and are better 
educated than private sector employees for both genders. The majority of public sector 
workers are employed in establishments employing between 50 and 300 employees. There are 
more private than public sector employees, for both genders on average, that work in 
companies larger than 300 employees. The distribution of workers across urban and rural type 
is s ~ m i l a r r across sectors. 
Since the public sector includes budgetary institutions only, the public sector 
employees are concentrated in public administration and education, health and social work 
(50% of public sector male workers and 60% of public sector female workers are hired in 
• education, health and social work and the rest in p u ~ l i c c administration). In the private sector, 
the dominant industry branch is manufacturing (around 40% for both genders), followed by 
t r a ~ s p o r t , , telecommunications and trade. Agriculture is a l!l0re important industry branch for 
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male private sector workers compared to female private sector workers, whereas financial 
services are more important employers for female than for male private sector workers. The 
industry branch affiliation will not be used in the empirical analysis as an explanatory variable 
because of the collinearity with the public-private sample distinction in this data. 
Professionals represented a dominant occupation for both genders on average in the 
public sector (around 35%). Conversely, in the private sector professionals represent around 
5% of work-force for both genders. The proportions of male and female managers is almost 
equal across sectors. Blue collar men (such as industrial workers and operators) and white 
collar women (such as technicians and clerks) workers represent the majorities in the private 
sector occupational structure. 
In general, observed differences in the public-private sample composition should 
explain a good deal of the differences in earnings between two sectors. 
5.4 PUblic-private sector earnings differentials 
This section illustrates the unconditional earnings distribution by sector and gender 
and provides measures of earnings inequality as well as a brief summary of previous studies of 
Hungarian public-private sector earnings differentials. It is followed by a section containing 
econometric analysis. 
5.4.1 Trends in public and private sector pay during economic transition 
The unconditional public and private gross monthly real earnings distribution from 
1992 until 2003 for male and female workers are plotted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. For men, the 
raw average gross monthly earnings are higher on average and across most of the percentiles 
in the public than in the private sector from 1992 until 2003, with the exception of the year 
1996. The same holds for women, apart from the 90th percentile at which the private sector 
earnings are higher than public sector earnings during most of the years reviewed. Public 
sector earnings for both men and women showed more variation over the period than private 
sector earnings. In particular, all percentiles presented saw a decline in public sector earnings I 
until 1996, a modest increase until 2001 and a sharp increase during the last two years 
observed. 
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Figure 5.1: Gross Monthly Real Earnings Percentiles for Male Employees in public and 
private sectors in Hungary, 1992-2003 
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Figure 5.2: Gross Monthly Real Earnings Percentiles for Female Employees in public 
and private sectors in Hungary, 1992-2003 
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Notes to Figures 5.1 and 5.2: Earnings at 10th 50th and 90th percentiles are given in natural logarithm vaLues. The 
gross monthly real earnings relate to before tax and include regular wage in May plus regular premia and bonuses 
in May plus one twelfth of the sum of all additional payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time 
job paid over the previous year denoted in Hungarian currency (forint) and converted to 2003 earnings by the 
annual consumer price index. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS) from 1992 until 2003 
On the other hand, in the private sector, earnings for both male and female workers at 
the 90th percentile have been increasing over the whole period. The earnings of the workers at 
the median remained rather stable whereas those at the 10th percentile saw a decline during the 
1990's and sharp increase in 2001 and 2002. 
205 
· The magnitude of pay inequality is summarised by using three measures of inequality: 
the standard deviation of the log gross earnings, the 90/10th decile ratio and the Gini 
coefficient. All measures of inequality presented in Table 5.3 show greater dispersion of 
earnings in the private than in the public sector for both male and female workers during most 
of the years considered. In addition, there is almost no difference in monthly and hourly 
earnings dispersion, as estimated for the last three years for which the data on monthly hours 
are available. 
Table 5.3: Earnings inequality by gender and ownership type in Hungary, 1992-2003 
90/10th Ratio Standard Deviation Gini Coefficient 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
1992 1.24 1.30 1.13 1.27 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.50 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.30 
1995 1.36 1.38 1.26 1.32 0.55 0.56 0.49 0.53 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.31 
1996 1.34 1.38 1.24 1.38 0.53 0.58 0.48 0.56 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.33 
1997 1.41 1.50 1.17 1.47 0.56 0.62 0.46 0.59 0.33 0.37 0.27 0.36 
1998 1.44 1.54 1.21 1.52 0.57 0.62 0.48 0.60 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.36 
1999 1.42 1.60 1.22 1.52 0.56 0.64 0.49 0.61 0.33 0.39 0.29 0.37 
2001 1.58 1.54 1.18 1.40 0.62 0.61 0.48 0.57 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.35 
200lh 1.58 1.52 1.16 1.38 0.62 0.61 0.47 0.57 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.35 
2002 1.56 1.51 1.23 1.35 0.59 0.61 0.49 0.55 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.35 
2002h 1.57 1.50 1.22 1.34 0.59 0.61 0.48 0.55 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.35 
2003 1.38 1.59 1.15 1.38 0.55 0.63 0.44 0.56 0.31 0.40 0.26 0.35 
2003h 1.36 1.57 1.12 1.37 0.54 0.63 0.44 0.56 0.31 0.40 0.25 0.35 
Notes to Table 5.3: The gross monthly earnmgs relate to before tax and mclude regular wage In May plus regular 
premia and bonuses in May plus one twelfth of the sum of all additional payments and irregular incomes 
connected to the full-time job paid over the previous year denoted in Hungarian currency (forint) and converted 
to 2003 earnings by the annual consumer price index. The gross hourly earnings are obtained by dividing the 
gross monthly earnings with monthly hours. The gross hourly earnings i n e ~ u a l i t y y measures are reported for 
2001, 2002 and 2003 years and denoted by the letter h. Decile ratios 90/101 are calculated as the difference 
between the log earnings at the 90th percentile and at the 10lh percentile. The Gini coefficient estimates use 
earnings in unlogged form. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS) from 1992 until 2003. 
Standard deviations, Gini coefficients and 90/10th ratios show that the male public sector 
earnings inequality has an inverted U shape, first increasing until 2001 and declining 
afterwards. This period relates to minimum wage increases (by 5:7% in 2001 and 25% in 
2002) and public sector wage increases between 2002 and 2003. For female workers the 
public sector inequ.ality measures show more volatility during the period .. On the other hand, 
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the private sector earnings distribution narrowed only in 2001 and 2002 for both men and 
women. This is not surprising given the minimum wage increases in these years. 
5.4.2 Empirical studies on Hungarian pUblic-private sector pay differentials 
To our knowledge, there are only two empirical studies on the Hungarian public sector 
earnings gap. A detailed analysis of public-private sector earnings differentials for full-time 
male wage earners was conducted by Hamori (2007) using WS data from 1994 until 2003. 
This study applied OLS and quantile regression methods to estimate the annual public sector 
gap at the mean and at five percentiles of the gross monthly real log earnings distribution 
conditional on education, potential labour force experience and Hungarian capital Budapest. 
Hamori (2007) found substantial public sector earnings penalties between 1994 and 
2002, at all estimated quantiles (other than at the 10th quantile in some cross-sections) which 
increased across the distribution. For example, the negative public sector earnings gap was 
estimated to be 13% at the bottom quantile and 40% at the top quantile in 1994 and 25% at the 
bottom quantile and 62% at the top quantile in 1997. In the later period, from 1998 until 2000 
the public sector pay penalty amounted to around 3% and 55% at the 10th and 90th quantiles 
respectively. In the final year of the observed period (i.e. 2003 which was the year of public 
sector pay reforms) the public sector pay gap became positive for male employees at the 10th 
and 25 th percentiles of the earnings distribution but remained negative at other percentiles. 
Separating samples by educational qualification, Hamori (2007) found that changes in 
the size of the public-private sector earnings gap over time were uniform across the 
distribution for the unskilled (primary school and less educational level) and low-skilled 
(vocational school level) groups. For middle (high school level) and especially for high skilled 
. . 
(university degree and above) groups of workers, increases in the public sector pay penalty 
until 2000 were more pronounced at the top of the distribution whereas a decreasing trend in 
the public sector penalty in the years after 2000 was more pronounced at the bottom of the 
distribution. 
Telegdy (2006) used the WS databases during the post-transition period, between 2000 
and 2004, to examine the effects of 2003 public pay reforms in education, health care and 
public administration m Hungary .. This study did not disaggregate male and female 
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employees. Telegdy (2006) estimated by OLS that the 27% public sector average pay penalty 
in 2000, obtained after controlling for worker's gender, experience, education and occupation, 
became a premium of 8.4% in 2004. 
5.5 Regression Analysis 
5.5.1 Overview of Goals 
The empirical anaysis has four goals. First, we want to test whether there was a public-
private sector earnings differential and how it changed during the period of economic 
transition. For this purpose, the public and private sector data sets are pooled together in a 
single equation model estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The coefficient estimates on 
a public sector dummy variable are used to show the average unconditional and conditional 
mean for each year of the observed period from 1992 until 2003. In this context we also want 
to test whether personal and job characteristics of the workers affect the sectoral pay gap. So, 
in regression analysis we use a large set of personal and job characteristics of the workers as 
conditioning variables and test for their potential impact. 
Our second goal is to test whether the public sector pay effect for workers with similar 
characteristics varies across the earnings distribution. Hence, the quantile regressions are 
estimated at the selected percentiles of the earnings distribution conditional on the same set of 
covariates as in the mean regressions. 
Our third goal is to test whether the returns to characteristics differ across sectors. 
Hence, we estimate public and private sector earnings at the conditional mean and at the 
conditional selected percentiles for each sector separately. Finally, the estiIhated public sector 
pay effects across the conditional earnings distribution are re-estimated by a decomposition 
method. 
Our fourth goal is to test whether the public-private sector earnings differential varies 
with worker's ski1llevel. So, the public sector pay effects are estimated for groups of workers 
• 
according to their educational qualification at the conditional mean and at the conditional 
selected percentiles of the earnings distribution. 
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Since each of the goals are accomplished for male and female employees separately 
we are able to investigate wheather the public sector sector pay differential behaved 
differently between these two groups of workers during the period of economic transition. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that we do not explicitly deal with endogeneity and 
measurement error problems in this chapter. On the one hand, there are no suitable 
instruments in the employer-provided survey to control for differences in workers' unobserved 
heterogeneity between sectors. Moreover, the public. sector includes only budgetary 
institutions and hence, unlike in the chapter 4, we are not able to use changes in the 
proportions of industry branches or occupations within the public sector caused by large-scale 
privatisations as an instrument for endogeneity. On the other hand, there is less measurement 
error in this data because it is an employer survey. 
5.5.2 Annual ft-fean and Quantile Regression Estimates 
Cross sectional differences in earnings between public and private sector employees 
for each year of the observed period are first estimated by OLS. Hence, both sectors' data sets 
are pooled together in an earnings regression with a dummy variable P; taking the value one if 
the i th employee works in the public sector and zero otherwise. This 'dummy variable' model 
is given by: 
In w, = a + {3'x, +rP; +E, for i = 1, ... ,N (5.1) 
where In w, . is the log gross real earnings for the i th individual. The set of observed worker 
and job characteristics XI with the parameter vector {3 includes worker's labour force 
experience and its quadratic form, educational qualification and occupational affiliation and 
employer's urban type, region and size and G, is an error term which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with xj • A public sector dummy variable P; = 1 if the i 'h individual works in the 
public sector and zero otherwise. Hence, r is the 'average' estimate of the public sector pay 
. , 
gap equivalent to an intercept shift. 
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The estimation results from monthly and hourly gross earnings annual equations over 
the period of economic transition in Hungary from 1992 until 2003 are presented in Tables 5.4 
and 5.5 for men and women separately. Gross hourly earnings are calculated by dividing the 
gross monthly earnings with monthly hours. Monthly hours are available for the last three 
years. 
The unconditional time trends of r presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are the raw 
differences in mean real gross earnings between public and private sector workers. The 
conditional time trends of r presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are differences in mean real gross 
earnings between public and private sector workers conditional on worker's labour force 
experience and its quadratic term, education, occupation (except in 1992) and employer's 
urban type, region and size. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present only the returns to labour force 
experience and education. The full specification results from conditional regressions are 
presented in Tables AS.4 and AS.5 in the Appendix. 
The fit of the monthly gross earnings equations augmented by additional 'control' 
variables using the R-squared is relatively high. The explanatory power of the variance of 
mean log monthly gross pay in the augmented regression increases from 0.45 (0.52) in 1995 to 
0.54 (0.60) in 2003 for men (women). The regression standard error increases from 0.45 
(0.35) for men (women) in 1995 to 0.46 (0.39) in 1999 and declines to 0.42 (0.34) in 2003 for 
men (women). The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity is performed by regressing the 
residuals from an OLS regression on the same set of covariates. Although estimated 
coefficients and R squared statistics are not affected, in all cases the test showed 
heteroskedastic errors which implies that the variance of log monthly pay varies across 
variables. For this reason, the estimated heteroskedasticity robust or "White" standard errors 
f 
of the coefficients reported in parentheses are used to calculate 95% confidence intervals. 
The overall F statistic evaluates the null hypothesis that coefficients on all explanatory 
variables in the model equal zero and leads easily to rejection of this null hypothesis in all 
equations. Most of the control variables are statistically significant at 1 % level of significance 
for both genderg. The overall explanatory power of the variance of mean log hourly gross pay 
is equal to the monthly and the estimates are not materially different. 
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Table 5.4: Estimation of real monthly and hourly gross earnings in Hungary for men, 1992-2003 
i992 1995 1996 1991 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 200lh 2002h 2003h 
Unconditional Model 
Public Sector: 0.183·" 0.090··· -0.051··· 0.016··· 0.049··· 0.043··· 0.106··· 0.158··· 0.283··· 0.126"· 0.159··· 0.290·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Conditional Model 
Experience: 0.034"· 0.024··· 0.024·" 0.021··· 0.021··· 0.019"· 0.017··· 0.011··· 0.017··· 0.018··· 0.017"· 0.016·" 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Experience Sq: -0.051··· -0.034··· -0.035··· -0.020··· -0.031··· -0.028"· -0.028"· -0.021··· -0.025··· -0.028··· -0.027"· -0.024··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education: 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Lowskilled 0.155··· 0.080··· 0.099··· 0.116··· 0.120··· 0.112··· 0.010··· o.on··· 0.098··· 0./03··· 0.073··· 0.099··· 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00l) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00l) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Middleskilled 0.381··· 0.201··· 0.222··· 0.265··· 0.210"· 0.266"· 0.235··· 0.202··· 0.210··· 0.24/··· 0.208·" 0.214"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Ilighskilled 0.836··· 0.561··· 0.609··· 0.616··· 0.702·" 0.737··· 0.706··· 0.676··· 0.691··· 0.7JJ··· 0.685··· 0.700··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Public Sector: -0.065··· -0.075··· -0.252·" -0.228··· -0.204··· -0.215· ... -0.223··· -0.196··· -0.071··· -0.202··· -0.199·" -0.069··· 
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant: 10.55··· 10.42·" 10.22··· 10.27··· 10.24··· 10.32··· 10.49··· 10.65··· 10.77··· 5.509··· 5.607··· 5.686··· 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R-sqllared 0.405 0.455 0.468 0.460 0.476 0.473 0.483 0.513 0.538 0.490 0.523 0.548 
RootMSE 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.42 
Ohservations___ _ 6415J ___ J3365 64740 64078 64150 62613 60466 66501 65486 60466 66501 65486 
Notes fa Table 5.4: The samples used relate to full time employees, aged between 15 and 64. The depended variable is the log of real monthly and hourly gross 
earnings. Monthly_gross earnings are defined as monthly gross wage in May plus regular premia and bonuses in May plus one twelfth of the sum of all other 
payments· and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous year, denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual 
consumer price index. The gross hourly earnings calculated by dividing the gross monthly earnings with monthly hours and estimates in italics are obtained for 
2001,2002 and 2003 years denoted by the letter h. All specifications include worker's occupational affiliation (except 1992) and employer's urban type, region 
and size. Full results given in Table A5.4 in the Appendix. The estimation procedure for the mean robust regressions is OLS and estimated robust standard errors 
calculated based on White (1980) are reported in parentheses. OLS regression analysis reported used STATA 10.0: *** denotes the 0.01 significance level.! 
<fenotes category omitted in estimation. 
Dala Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS) from 1992 until 2003 
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Table 5.5: Estimation of real monthly and hourly gross earnings in Hungary for women, 1992-2003 
1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2001h 2002h 2003h 
Unconditional Model 
Public Sector 0.037·" 0.032·" -0.068"· 0.009·" 0.028··· 0.020··· 0.047·" 0.114··· 0.289··· 0.078··· 0.112··· 0.298"· 
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (OOOl) (0.001) 
Conditional Model 
Experience 0.028··· 0.024··· 0.022··· 0.019··· 0.018·" 0.020··· 0.017··· O.OIS··· O.OIS"· 0.018·" 0.015·" 0.015··· 
(0.000) (0.000) _(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Experience Sq -0.038··· -0.030·" -0.024··· -0.018··· -0.017"· -0.024"· -0.022··· -0.0\8··· -0.017··· -0.023"· -0.0/8··· -0.0/6··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education: 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Lowskilled 0.181··· 0.063··· 0.067··· 0.OS8··· 0.062·" 0.073"· 0.OS9··· 0.044··· 0.036··· 0.055··· 0.043··· 0.033··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.00/) (0.00/) 
Middleskilled 0.406··· 0.223··· 0.231··· 0.242··· 0.247·" 0.249·" 0.190··· 0.199"· 0.179··· 0./89··· 0.20/"· 0./80··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Highskilled 0.791··· O.S09··· 0.529··· 0.57S"· 0.600"· 0.686··· 0.627··· 0.649··· 0.6S3·" 0.624··· 0.649*** 0.654"· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Sector -0.077··· -0.OS2·" -0.184"· -O.IS6··· -0.150"· -0.183"· -0.191·" -0.130··· O.OOS·" -0.163··· -0.133··· 0.015··· 
( 0 ~ 0 0 1 ) ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Constant 10.43··· 10.29"· 10.19·" 10.2S··· 10.27·" 10.27·" 10.46·" 10.68"· 10.83··· 5.463··· 5.588··· 5.682·" 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.440 0.522 0.S27 0.504 0.S03 0.514 0.508 0.S29 0.598 0.5/0 0.532 0.602 
Root MSE 0.35 0.3S 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.32 
Observations 65893 76785 782S9 79440 __ . 77079 
----
74327 73673 75407 72943 73673 75407 72943 
Notes to Table 5.5: See Notes to Table 5.4. Full results given in Table A5.5 in the AppendiX. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS) from 1992 to 2003 
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Comparison between unconditional and conditional estimates in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
shows that the sectoral pay gap is largely determined by different nature of jobs and skills in 
public and private sectors. In particular, the statistically significant unconditional public sector 
premium for the most of the years, turns into statistically significant public sector penalty after 
controlling for differences in characteristics. 
A further insight into time trends of estimated unconditional and conditional public 
sector pay gap 935 is given by Figure 5.3.36 
Figure 5.3: Public sector pay relative to private sector pay: unconditional and 
conditional differences in real gross earnings by gender in period 1992-2003 
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Figure 5.3 shows that the conditional results lower the measured public sector pay 
effect. Moreover, male workers across sectors are more different in observable characteristics 
than female workers. In general, estimated conditional differentials for a decade of economic 
3S expressed in log percentage points throughout the chapter 
36 The 95% confidence intervals spread is about 0.005 or less (i.e. difference between lower and upper bound). 
Since the 95% confidence intervals are attached closely to the estimates they are not presented on Figure 5.3 . 
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transition in Hungary reveal widening of the sector pay gap from 1992 until 2001 and its 
closure by 2003. Hence, the public sector pay gap was negative during most of the period of 
economic transition, but grew to zero by the end of the period reviewed in this chapter. 
The cyclicality in the public sector pay gap may be related to economic policies. The 
increasing negative trend in the estimated public sector pay gap during the initial years of 
economic transition correlates with the period of 'transformational recession' during which 
the public sector employment increased from 21 % of total employment in 1992 to 24.1 % in 
1995 (Kezdi, 1998). As suggested by theoretical model in chapter 3 an increase in public 
sector employment leads to pay reduction given by the budget constraint. Indeed, the increase 
in the public sector pay penalty in 1996 resulted from the government income measure to 
'freeze' public sector wages (Hamori, 2007). In addition, in 1995 the banks and public utilities 
were privati sed to foreign strategic investors (Kezdi, 2002). 
The 'boom' of the Hungarian economy as a result of the implementation 'Bokors 
Csomag' macroeconomic stabilisation program relates to the 1997-2000 period. Figure 5.3 
shows a modest decline in the public sector pay penalty in 1997 and 1998, but a further 
increase until 2001. Hence the economic boom led to a generally more rapid increase in 
private sector pay. Furthermore, the minimum wage increases in 2001 and 2002 mainly 
affected private sector pay since the majority of minimum wage earners is located in that 
sector.37 However, the public sector pay penalty declined from 2002 and closed down in 2003. 
Increases in the average public sector wage between 2002 and 2003 are associated with wage 
reforms which aimed to increase the public sector nominal wages by 50% on average. 
In addition to the monthly estimates, hourly public sector pay differentials from 2001 
until 2003 are also plotted in Figure 5.3. The difference between the hourly and monthly gross 
. pay gap estimates is rather modest. In particular, tne difference is observable in 2001 only, 
albeit quite small (around 2% for male and 3% for female workers). 
The estimated annual conditional public sector pay effects at the mean can be 
compared to the results reported by Hamori (2007) and Telegdy (2006) that used the same 
data. Hamori (2007} obtained public sector pay gap estimates from OLS ,monthly earnings 
37 Hamori (2007) emphasises that the compliance of minimum wage regulations is very high in Hungary. For 
example in 2001, less than 2% of the full-time employees were paid less than the minimum wage .. 
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equations for male workers from 1994 until 2003 after controlling for labour force experience, 
its squared term, education and Hungarian capital Budapest. That study estimated that the gap 
was -21%, -31% and -38% in 1995, 1996 and 1997 and -36%, -32% and -14% in 2001, 2002 
and 2003 respectively. These estimates are a bit larger than those reported in Table 5.4 mainly 
due to the fact that they are not conditional on workers' occupation. In particular, the public 
sector workers are on average more educated and more experienced than the private sector 
workers but most of the better paying occupations are in the private sector. This tends. to 
decrease the estimated gap. Indeed, our estimates are in line with the results reported by 
Telegdy (2006). That study obtained the OLS estimates in monthly earnings equations for the 
2000-2004 period on the pooled sample of male and female workers after controlling for 
worker's gender, experience, education and occupation. Similarly to conditional estimates in 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 Telegdy (2006) reported that the mean public sector pay gap was -25.7%, -
20.5% and 7% in 2001,2002 and 2003 respectively. 
Furthermore, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the returns to labour force experience and 
education over the period of economic transition in Hungary. The labour force experience 
effects are statistically significant and increase at a decreasing rate. This is in contrast to the 
usual finding that labour force experience gained during the pre-transition is not valued by the 
market in transition (Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) for 
Moscow and earlier chapter 4 for Serbia). However, these estimates are consistent with the 
results reported by Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) for Slovenia and may be explained by early 
retirement schemes which made experienced labour relatively scarce at the start of economic 
transition. 
The level of educational attainment strongly correlates to pay differentials. As 
expected, university level education (high-skilled educational qualification) is valued the most ' 
in the labour market. The returns to high-skilled educational level are increasing during the 
whole period i.e. from 56% in 1995 to 69% in 2003 for men and from 51 % in 1995 to 65% in 
2003 for women.38 
38 The estimates on returns to education are greater in 1992 than in the following years, but this is because the 
occupational affiliation is not controlled for 1992 due to significant changes in the Hungarian occupational code. 
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The estimated returns to educational qualification obtained for Hungary are 
comparable with the findings reported by related empirical studies for other transitional 
economies. For the Czech Republic, Munich, Svenjar and Terrell (2002) reported an increase 
in returns to university educated male workers relative to junior high school from 28% in 1989 
to 72% in 1996. For Slovenia, Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) found the returns to university 
education relative to less than primary school increased from 72% in 1987 to 94% in 1991. 
For Poland, Keane and Prasad (2001) estimated that returns to college education relative to 
primary school increased from 37% in 1986 to 53% in 1992 and then further increased to 68% 
in 1996. Finally, for Hungary, Hamori (2007) finds that relative to primary school or less 
(unskilled) the average premium to high school (middle-skilled) and university degree (high-
skilled) rose dramatically while the average return to vocational education (low-skilled) 
remained constant during the transition period from 1994 until 2003. Hamori (2007) suggests 
that this is on the one hand partially due to the inefficient training in vocational institutions 
and on the other hand due to the increasing demand for high-skilled labour. 
Returns to other characteristics from the full regression specifications presented in 
Tables A5.4 and A5.5 in the Appendix are summarised as follows. The top paying 
occupations are professionals and managers. Nevertheless, the managers are rewarded almost 
two times more on average than professionals. Male managers are better paid than female 
managers whereas the difference in pay between genders is not particularly pronounced for 
professionals. Female technicians and clerk employees are more rewarded than male 
employees with the same occupations, on average, during most of the years considered. The 
least paid occupations are farmers and labourers, for both genders. 
The earnings are highly positively correlated with the firm size. The increase in pay 
with the firm size is greater for male than for female workers. Working in the 'Hungarian 
capital Budapest or county centers provides significant premiums relative to working in the 
rural areas but more for female than for male workers. All regions relative to Central Hungary 
are less rewarding. 
The same conditional annual equations are, now estimated at the selected quantiles of 
the earnings distribution. 
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of conditional public sector pay gap for each of the percentiles of 
the monthly gross pay distribution by gender in Hungary, 1992-2003 
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Noles 10 Figure 5.4: Quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected 
percentiles. The public sector monthly gross earnings pay gap is estimated abstracting from all variations 
attributable to worker's labour force experience, its quadratic fonn, educational qualification and occupational 
affiliation (except in 1992) and employer's urban type, region and size. Presented estimates are reported in Table 
A5.6 in Appendix. Standard errors obtained by the bootstrapping procedure based on 200 replications in all 
cases. * denotes that estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 significance level. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1992-2003 
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Each bar on Figure 5.4 presents the annual conditional public sector pay 
penalties/premia for each of the selected percentiles of the log real monthly gross earnings 
distribution, for men and women separately. The estimated standard errors are obtained by the 
bootstrapping procedure with 200 replications in all cases.39 The coefficient estimates 
presented on Figure 5.4 are summarised in Table A5.6 in the Appendix. 
The quantile regression estimates provide a richer insight into the public sector pay 
gap. In particular, apart from females at the 10th percentile that gained from the public sector 
status over the whole period considered, Figure 5.4 shows an increasing public sector pay 
penalty until 1996, modest fluctuations until 1999 and declining trend at all percentiles of the 
pay distribution for both gender during 2000s. In 2003 the public sector male workers below 
the median and female workers at and below the median started to collect statistically 
significant 'mark-up' relative to their private sector counterparts. Although other groups of 
public sector workers also saw the improvements in their financial position the increses in pay 
as a result of wage refonns in 2003 appear to had the greatest effects on the lower part of the 
earnings distribution. 
In general, Figure 5.4 provides evidence of significant public sector pay compression 
relative to the private sector earnings distribution. Particularly, whereas for workers below the 
median the public-private sector pay gap is rather small, for workers at and above the median 
the gap is substantial over the whole period considered. The pattern of the increasing 
conditional public sector pay penalty as one moves up the earnings distribution is best 
illustrated by comparing the estimates across the percentiles. For example, the public sector 
pay penalty for male workers is greater by almost one tenth at the 25 th percentile, by one fifth 
at the 50th percentile, by one quarter at the 75 th percentile and by more than a third at the 90th 
percentile relative to the public pay penalty at the 10th percentile over a decade considered. 
39 The number of replications is lower than in the chapter 4 given the large dataset. As pointed by Melly (2006) 
the number of replications must be kept reasonable because of the computation time. The same number of 
replications is used by Hamori (2007); 
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5.5.3 Pooled Estimates 
(i) lvfean and Quantile Regressions 
In the further analysis previous results are pooled across the years. The changes in the 
public sector pay distribution relative to the private sector pay distribution are investigated 
comparing the period of economic transition during 1990s with the period during 2000s. The 
reasons for this time division are the wage reforms that took place after 2000 which might 
affected the earnings distribution. These reforms related to minimum wage increases in 2001 
and 2002 and to public sector wage increases between 2002 and 2003. 
Initially a 'dummy variable' approach was used to obtain the pooled estimates across 
the earnings distribution from 1995 until 1999 and from 2001 until 2003. The covariates 
included in the pooled regressions are the same as in annual regressions but expanded by year 
dummies to account for aggregate time effects. The public sector pay differentials at the mean 
and at the selected percentiles of the earnings distribution for the two time periods by gender 
are presented in Table 5.6. The improvements in the financial position of public sector 
workers between the two periods are given by the last two columns of Table 5.6. A negative 
sign of the point change shows decline in the public sector pay penalty. 
In general, Table 5.6 shows that the public sector pay gap is smaller at lower-half and 
larger in upper-half of the earnings distribution than that obtained using OLS for all workers. 
In particular, the public sector pay penalty increases monotonically over the earnings 
distribution for men during 1995-1999. The same public sector inequality reducing pattern is 
present during 2001-2003 but the male workers at the 10th percentile collect the public sector 
premium. In addition, the public sector p e n ~ l t i e s s for the rest of the percentiles during 2001-
2003 are lower than during 1995-1999. For female workers the 10th percentile during 1995-
1999 and the 10th and 25 th percentiles of the public sector earnings distribution during 2001-
2003 are higher than their counterpart percentile on the private sector earnings distribution. 
The reverse holds for the other percentiles, but as for men, public sector penalty is lower 
during 200l-2003 than during 1995-1999. The upward shift in the public sector earnings 
distribution relative to the private sector earnings distribution between the two periods was the 
most pronounced for workers at and below the middle of the distribution ... 
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Table 5.6: Public sector pay penalty and premium across monthly gross earnings 
distrib . f d . H . 1995 1999 d 2001 2003 utlOn or men an womenm ungary In 
-
an 
-
1995-1999 2001-2003 Change 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Mean -0.l95·" -0.144··· -0.164··· -0.106··· -0.031 -0.038 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-sq; Adj R-sq. 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.55 
RootMSE 0.44 0.38 0.43 0.36 
10th Percentile -0.037·" 0.059·" 0.020··· 0.091··· -0.057 -0.031 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.22 0.27 0.20 0.26 
25th Percentile -0.137··· -0.048·" -0.062··· 0.030··· -0.075 -0.078 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.31 
50th Percentile -0.214··· -0.139··· -0.152··· -0.060"· -0.062 -0.079 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.35 
75th Percentile -0.289·" -0.226··· -0.231·" -0.158·" -0.058 -0.068 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.30 0.38 0.35 0.37 
90th Percentile -0.340··· -0.305·" -0.305·" -0.252·" -0.035 -0.053 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.34 0.40 0.39 0.39 
Observations 328946 385890 192453 222023 
.. Notes to Table 5.6: The public sector monthly gross eammgs pay gap IS estimated condltlonal on the following 
set of regressors: labour force experience, its quadratic form, educational qualification, occupational affiliation, 
employer urban type, employer region, employer size and year dummies. The estimation procedure for the mean 
robust regressions is OLS and estimated standard errors calculated based on White (1980) are reported in 
parentheses. Quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected 
percentiles. Standard errors obtained by the bootstrapping procedure with 200 replications in all cases and 
reported in parentheses .... denotes the 0.01 significance level. 
Data Source: Pooled Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1995-1999 and 2001-2003 
Three main conclusion can be drawn from these results: firstly, the public-private 
sector pay differential is greater for workers at higher percentiles for both men and women 
during both periods of economic transition; secondly, the gap is higher for men tb.an for 
women during both periods of economic transition; thirdly, the gap declined from earlier to 
later period of economic transition. These conclusions are based on the assumption that the 
returns to characteristics are the same across sectors. 
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In order to test whether the returns to characteristics differ between sectors earnings 
equations are now estimated using the same set of covariates but in the following 'double 
equation' model: 
Private sector: I NP NP + f3' NP + NP nWj =a Xj G j (5.2) 
Public sector: In wP j = a P + f3' P x. + G P , I (5.3) 
where NP and P denote non-public (i.e. private) and public sectors respectively. The 
estimates are obtained by gender for two sub-periods, 1995-1999 and 2001-2003 at the 
conditional mean and at conditional selected percentiles using monthly gross earnings whereas 
hourly gross earnings equations have been estimated for the later period only. The results are 
presented in Tables A5.7-A5.10 in the Appendix. Most of the control variables included in 
both earnings equations are statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance. However, the 
sizes of the estimated coefficients differ between sectors implying different structure of the 
returns to characteristics. 
In particular, returns to all skill levels for both male and female workers are greater in 
the private than in the public sector, except for low skilled women. The inter-sectoral 
differences in returns to education increase with the level of education. For example, during 
1995-1999 the average returns to vocational (low skilled), high school (middle skilled) and 
university (high skilled) education for full-time male employees are estimated to be 11 %, 25% 
and 69% higher than the reference primary (unskilled) level of education in the private sector 
and 8%, 18% and 39% in the public sector, respectively. The results obtained for the private 
sector are comparable with the estimates reported by other studies for Hungary. For example, 
Kertesi and Ko1l5 (2002) estimated that between 1986 and 1999 the average relative returns to 
vocational education remained approximately constant (around 12%) but average relative 
returns to high school and college education increased, from 14% to 21% and from 36% to 
63% respectively, relative to the primary education base. 
Furthermore, the quantile regressions reveal the effects of the rigid pay scales in the 
public sector. As explained at the b e g i ~ i n g g of the chapter the public sector wage scale in 
Hungary assured equal wages for employees for a given job with the same qualification and 
seniority. Indeed, the quantile regressions show that the inter-sectoral differences in returns to 
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education increase with higher percentiles of the earnmgs distribution for each level of 
education. 
A divergent earnings determination pattern between sectors is the most pronounced for 
university graduates. For example, the inter-sectoral difference in returns to education was 10 
percentage points at the 10th percentile and 50 percentage points at the 90th percentile for male 
graduates during 1995-1999. This was caused by an equal 'mark-up' to university level of 
education relative to the primary education base at each percentile of the earnings distribution 
paid by the public sector as given by coefficient estimates presented in Table AS.7 in the 
Appendix. As opposed to the rigid pay scales in the public sector the earnings determination 
in the private sector was more flexible allowing workers at a higher percentiles an 
accumulation of returns. 
Focusing attention on returns to education in each sector during the 2001-2003 period 
Tables A5.8 and A5.9 in the Appendix provide evidence of the convergence in public and 
private sectors earnings determination processes. In particular, a decline in inter-sectoral 
differences in returns to education between two sub-periods was the most pronounced for 
workers below the median who had university level of education. Hence, the results indicated 
that the inter-sectoral differences and their changes over time varied between workers with 
different levels of educational qualifications as well as across the earnings distribution within 
each educational level. This will be further investigated in the next section. 
Additional inspection of Tables A5.7-A5.l0 in the Appendix suggests that the earnings 
. 
structure between the two sectors was different with respect to returns to other characteristics 
as well. For example, relative to the base group the majority of occupations were paid less in 
the public than in the private sector for both genders and contrary to returns to education these 
sectonil differences increased over the period. In addition, public sector pay was more equally 
distributed across employers in different regions and of different sizes than private sector pay. 
Finally, Tables AS.7-AS.I0 in the Appendix show that the annual average public sector pay in 
years during 1996-1998 was lower than the reference pay in year 1995, whereas the average 
private sector pay increased guring the same period. A decline in the public sector ,Pay was 
proportional across the earnings distribution whereas the increase in private sector earnings 
was greater at the top-end of the earnings distribution. 
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On the other hand, average public sector earnings increased twice as fast as average 
private sector wages in 2002 and about three times faster in 2003 relative to the reference 
2001 wage level. The pay increases during the 2001-2003 period may reflect both minimum 
wage increases and public sector wage reforms. The effects of minimum wage increases are 
likely to be captured by the 2002 year dummies as showed by greater increases in pay at the 
lower end of the earnings distribution in both sectors. If the 2003 year dummy estimates in 
public sector earnings equation reflect the increases in pay as a result of public sector wage 
reform then it can be observed that these effects declined as one moves up the earnings 
distribution. The differences in returns to characteristics between sectors are not explained by 
the number of working hours since the estimates obtained using the log of real hourly gross 
earnings during 2001-2003 are analogous to monthly estimates. 
(iiJ Decomposition of Differences in Distribution 
We now re-estimate the pooled quantile regression models by using a decomposition 
method. This method is based on aggregating the differences in the distribution into a part 
explained by differences in returns to characteristics and into a part explained by differences 
in characteristics. 
A decomposition is obtained by following a version of the approach developed by 
Melly (2006) in the same way as described in chapter 4. The model can be written as: 
where the first bracket in (5.4) represents the effect of differences in coefficients (could be 
interpreted as public sector earnings premium or penalty) and the second bracket represents 
the effect of differences in the distribution of characteristics; /} is the estimated percentile of 
the earnings distribution and the x includes the same set of covariates as in the previous 
models. 
The full decomposition estimation results are ploted in Figures AS.l and AS.2 and 
summarised in Table AS.II in the Appendix. The part of the total (Le. unconditional) 
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differential explained by differences in returns to (observed) characteristics (interpreted as the 
sector pay gap) for the periods 1995-1999 and 2001-2003 by gender are presented in Table 
5.7. 
Table 5.7: Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different 
fl d ' f ~ ~ . t t h t·· Dercen I es: I erenees In re urns 0 C arae erlstIcs 
1995-1999 2001-2003 Change 
Percentile: Men Women Men Women Men Women 
loth 
-0.001 0.034*** -0.002** 0.046*** 0.001 -0.012 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
30th -0.136*** -0.069*** -0.054*** -0.012*** -0.082 -0.057 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
50th -0.204*** -0.143·** -0.160*** -0.122*** -0.044 -0.021 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
70th -0.289*** -0.261*** -0.273*** -0.256*** -0.016 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
90th -0.472*** -0.443*** -0.406*** -0.439*** -0.065 -0.004 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
.. Notes to Table 5.7: DecomposItIOn of dIfferences In dIStrIbutIOn estimatIOn procedure Implemented by 
estimating 100 quantile regressions in each sector accounting for worker's labour force experience, its 
quadratic fonn, educational qualification, occupational affiliation and employer's urban type, region and size 
and year. The variance has been estimated by bootstrapping the results 100 times. Coefficients component 
contribution to the log difference in real monthly gross earnings between the public and private sectors are 
presented. The standard errors reported in parentheses. *** denotes the 0.01 significance level. Full 
decomposition results presented in Figures A5.1 and A5.2 and in Table AS.II in the Appendix. 
Data Source: Pooled Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1995-1999 and 2001-2003 
For each period Table 5.7 shows that the estimates are the same in sign and similar in 
size to the results obtained using the :dummy variable' approach in Table 5.6. In particular,! 
during the 1995-1999 period apart from the 10th percentile the public sector pay penalty was 
statistically significant and increased from the bottom-end to the high-end for both men and 
women. The same holds for the 2001-2003 period but workers at the 10th percentile collected 
statistically significant public sector premia whereas the public sector pay penalty at the other 
percentiles was lower than during the 1995-1999 period. Therefore, removing differences in 
characteristics, decomposition results reinforce the prevIOUS finding that the earnings 
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distribution is more compressed in the public than in the private sector and that the gap 
declined over period reviewed. 
(iii) Jvfean and Quantile Regressions by Educational Qualification 
The previous analysis suggested a compressed structure of the public sector earnings 
distribution. If a worker's earnings are interpreted as a measure of skill the compression of 
public sector pay indicates that the public sector pay penalty increases with skill. Furthermore, 
public sector pay compression may differ within each skill group. For example, the sectoral 
differences in earnings for unskilled workers are expected to be more uniform across the 
earnings distribution than for university graduates. As argued by Disney and Gosling (1998), 
ifpublic sector workers with university degrees are more equal in terms of ability and 'drive' 
than their private sector counterparts, or if private sector workplaces are more likely to pay a 
premium for these attributes, then there will be a difference between the estimated effects of 
the public sector at for example the median or upper percentiles of the earnings distribution. 
In order to test both between and within group public-private sector pay differentials as 
well as their changes over a decade of economic transition the sector pay gap in this sub-
section is estimated across the pay distribution for each skill level separately. 
The public sector pay effects across groups of workers differentiated by educational 
qualifications attained are estimated using a 'dummy variable' method given by equation (5.1) 
at the conditional mean and at the conditional selected percentiles of the earnings distribution. 
The public-private sector pay gap estimates are obtained by pooling the data during 1990s and 
2000s separately for each educational group by gender. 
The unskilled group includes workers with primary educational qualification or less. 
, . 
The skilled group includes workers with both vocational (low skilled) and high school degree 
(middle skilled). The high-skilled group includes workers with a university degree . 
. Since some of the occupations are not present for some educational groups we do not 
control for occupations and hence are able to pool data from 1992 until 1999 for the 1990s 
period. Each pooled regression is therefore estimated conditional on labour force experience, 
its quadratic form, employer urban type, employer region and a set of year dummies. We can 
compare our results to Hamori (2007) who estimated the annual sectoral pay gap from 1994 
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until 2003 WS data for different educational groups of full-time male employees conditional 
on the similar set of covariates. 
The public sector pay differentials estimated for three groups of workers according to 
educational qualification by gender are plotted in the Figure 5.6. The first two charts present 
the results from mean regressions estimated by OLS. The rest of the charts illustrate quantile 
regression estimates. All estimated conditional public sector pay premia/penalties are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance and summarised in Table AS.l2 in the 
Appendix. In addition to the monthly estimates Table A5.12 reports the hourly estimates for 
the 2001-2003 period. The difference between the monthly and hourly pUblic-private sector 
differentials is insignificant. 
The impact of the public sector pay status across groups differentiated by skill 
qualifications attained is evident from Figure 5.5. The between-group reduction in inequality 
for male workers arising from public sector earnings determination is observable in both 
periods by the increase in the negative average returns to public sector with higher skill level. 
For female workers the between-group reduction in inequality is observable in the higher 
negative average returns to public sector graduates relative to their private sector counterparts 
in both periods. In addition, the between-group reduction in inequality is also observable by a 
greater average public sector pay gap for men than for women. Finally, the between-group 
public sector pay compression is illustrated by a higher penalty to public sector status at the 
upper end of the earnings distribution which is almost double for high skilled workers than for 
other skill groups and by the higher premia for unskilled and skilled women at the lower end 
of the earnings distribution relative to men. 
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Figure 5.5: Public sector monthly gross pay premium/penalty by highest educational 
qualification on average and across the pay distribution by gender in Hungary 
during 1992-1999 and 2001-2003 
0 
-4.05 
-4.1 
-4.15 
.(1.2 
-4.25 
.(1.3 
-4.35 
.(1.4 
0.1 
0.05 
.t . ( ( . ~ ~
:' -4.1 j .(1.15 
.. .(1.2 
.(1.25 
.(1.3 
0.1 
0.05 
It 0 
'! .(1.05 
:. -0.1 
1.(1·,5 
.. -4.2 
.(1.25 
-4.3 
.. 
. 
" ! 
i 
I 
.. 
UwkJllod 
10 
10 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
.(1.1 
.(1.2 
.(1.3 
.(1.4 
.(1.5 
.(1.8 
.(1.7 
10 
Men 
Sded 
HIghe ___ 1 QooI __ 
25 
25 
Men Unlldlecl 
50 
Pe ... _ 
MenSklled 
50 
'.Mntlt. 
~ ~
75 
Min High ,klltd 
25 50 
' ... nIM 
D11O'2-'. 
e2OO1·2C03 
Hgh.-
a1gD2·,1iIQ9 
.200,·2003 
so 
so 
a'SII8l-' • 
a2OO'l·ZXD 
75 SO 
0.05 
0 
-4.05 
I -4.1 -4.15 
" 
.(1.2 
-4.25 
... 
I .(13 -4.35 
.. .(1.4 
-4.45 
.(1.5 
0.1 
0.05 
.f - 4 . ~ ~
1.(1.1 j -4.15 
-4.2 
-4.25 
-4.3 
G.2 
0.15 
t 0.1 
" 0.05 
l: 0 
~ ~ -4.05 
JI -4.1 ! -4.15 
-4.2 
-4.25 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
t -4.1 
" 
.(12 
I;' -4.3 
.. 
-4.4 
I -4.5 .(1.8 
.. 
-4.7 
-4.8 
u._ 
10 
10 
10 
Wo_n 
at8llQ.' • 
eDt.2IXD 
Sklled HIgh.kiIIed 
H1gho_ Ed_ol auol_ 
Women Unsklled 
DI892-tOOO 
.2001·2003 
25 50 75 so 
Percen ... 
Women Skilled 
25 50 75 so 
Pe ... nIile 
WOmM High IkIIed 
at .. ,• 
atOD1·lCD:) 
25 50 75 SO 
''-0 
Notes 10 Figure 5.5: The public sector monthly gross earnings gap is estimated conditional on labour force 
experience, its quadratic fonn, employer urban type, employer region and year. • denotes that all coefficients are 
significant at 0.01 level. Estimates are summarised in Table AS.12 in the Appendix. 
Data Source: Pooled Harrnonised Hungarian Wage Survey, 1992-1999 and 2001-2003 
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In addition to between-group pay compression Figure 5.5 suggests that there is an 
equalising effect within skill groups attached to public sector status. In particular, working in 
the public sector clearly reduces the pay ineqUality among graduates relative to the private 
sector for both men and women. For example, the public sector pay penalty increased from 
1.5% (4.6%) at the 10th percentile to 61.5% (71.5%) for men (women) at the 90th percentile 
during 1992-1999. 
The same inequality-reducing effect is apparent for public sector graduates from 2001 
until 2003, but the public sector penalty is lower than during the 1992-1999 period. During 
2001-2003 both public sector male and female graduates at the 10lh percentile obtained premia 
relative to their private sector counterparts but the penalty for having a public sector job 
remained at the rest of the percentiles. For example, the 15% public sector premium for male 
workers at the 10th percentile converts into 60% public sector penalty at the 90th percentile. 
Our estimates are consistent with Hamori (2007). In particular, controlling for labour 
force experience, its quadratic fonn and Hungarian capital Budapest iIi a log monthly gross 
earnings equation, Hamori (2007) estimated that in 1994, the public sector pay penalty for 
male graduates increased from around 21 % at the 10th percentile to 69% at the 90th 
percentile. Similar to our results, Hamori (2007) found for 2003 a 27% public sector premium 
for graduates at the 10lh percentile, but around 62% public sector penalty at the 90th . 
percentile. 
A.substantial public sector within-group earnings equalising effect for graduates in 
Hungary may be best depicted if the results are compared to some of the developed DEeD 
countries. For example, Disney and Gosling (1998) estimated for UK public sector male 
graduates in 1983 a 25% premium over their private sector counterparts at the 10lh percentile 
which drops to zero as one moves up the income distribution. During 1991-1995 although the 
whole distribution has shifted downwards (with workers at 25 th percentile and above obtaining 
public sector pay penalties) Disney and Gosling (1998) find the same inequality reducing 
effect. Hence, relative to the UK the estimated public sector pay compression for male 
graduates in H u n g ~ y y was three times greater. 
Differences between the estimated coefficients during the 1990s and 2000s plotted on 
the Figure 5.5 are p r e s e ~ t e d d in columns titled as 'change' in Table A5.l2 in the Appendix by 
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gender and summarised in Table 5.8. A negative sign presents the improvements in the 
financial position of public sector workers between the 1992-1999 and 2001-2003 periods. 
Table 5.8: Change in the public sector pay gap between 1992-1999 and 2001-2003 
. d b h' h d . I rfi' d d p_eno s >y 19. est e ucatlOna qua I lcation an gen er 
19905-20005 Change 
Unskilled Skilled High skilled 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Mean -0.087 -0.123 -0.067 -0.070 -0.045 -0.077 
10th -0.039 -0.015 -0.048 -0.025 -0.166 -0.165 
25th -0.061 . -0.134 -0.111 -0.104 -0.060 -0.107 
50th -0.108 -0.160 -0.121 -0.104 -0.010 -0.063 
75th -0.103 -0.160 -0.039 -0.068 -0.033 -0.103 
90th -0.112 -0.134 0.004 -0.046 -0.009 -0.060 
Notes to Table 5.8: 1990s-2000s change IS the dIfference between the estimated public sector pay gap 
during the 1992-1999 period and the estimated public sector pay gap during the 2001-2003 period. The public 
sector pay gap for each period by gender and highest educational qualification at the mean and selected 
percentiles are plotted on the Figure 5.5 and presented in Table A5.l2 in the Appendix. 
Data Source: Pooled Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey, 1992-1999 and 2001-2003 
Table 5.8 suggests the following conclusions. First, during 2001-2003 relative to 
1992-1999 all public sector educational groups improved their financial position. On average 
the improvements were the highest for the unskilled group of male and female workers. 
However, quantile regressions reveal that high-skilled workers at the 10th percentile saw the 
greatest improvement relative to their private sector counterparts between the two sub-periods. 
Second, on average and at most of the conditional percentiles, improvements in the financial 
position of public sector workers were greater for women than for men for every educational 
group. Third, within the unskilled group except at the 10th percentile the improvements in 
financial position of public sector workers were uniform across the earnings distribution. 
Within the skilled group the public sector pay penalty declined the most for workers at the 
I 
middle of the earnings distribution. Within the high-skilled group workers at the top-end saw 
the smallest change in their financial position between the two sub-periods relative to their 
private sector counterparts. 
Again, these conclusions are consistent with Hamori (2007) who found uniform 
changes in the public sector pay gap across the earnings. distribution during economic 
transition for male workers with lower skills but not with higher skills. As has been shown in 
this section, Hamori (2007) also suggested that high skilled male workers were more affected 
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at the top end until 2000 (increasing trend in public sector penalty) and at the bottom end of 
pay distribution after 2000 (decreasing trend in public sector penalty) due to public sector 
wage reforms. 
5.5.4 Summary oflhe Regression Results 
The empirical anaysis in this chapter had four goals. First, we tested whether there was 
a public-private sector earnings differential and how it changed during the period of economic 
transition. The OLS annual estimates showed that the conditional mean public sector pay 
differentials were negative during most of the period of economic transition in Hungary, but 
grew to zero by the end of the period reviewed in this chapter. In particular, there was a 
widening of the mean sector pay gap from 1992 until 2001 and its closure by 2003. The 
change in the sign of the public sector pay gap is argued to be due to public sector wage 
refonns that took place in the early 2000s and aimed to increase public sector nominal wages 
by 50% on average. 
In addition, we tested personal and job characteristics of workers. In contrast to the 
usual finding that labour force experience gained during the pre-transition is not valued by the 
market in transition (Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) for 
Moscow and our results in chapter 4 for Serbia) we found statistically significant returns to 
experience in Hungary. These results are similar to returns to experience reported by Orazem 
and Vodopivec (1997) for Slovenia and explained as an outcome of early retirement schemes 
which made experienced labour relatively scarce at the start of the economic transition. 
Furthermore, we found that returns to university level education were increasing 
during the whole period observed. The estimated returns to educational qualification obtained 
I I 
for Hungary are comparable with the findings reported by related empirical studies for other 
transitional economies (such as Keane and Prasad (2001) for Poland; Munich, Svenjar and 
Terrell (2002) for Czech Republic; Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) for Slovenia). 
Our second goal was to test whether the public sector pay effect for workers with 
similar characteristics varied across the earnings -distribution. Indeed, quantile regressions 
indicated significant public sector pay compression. In particular we found: firstly, that the 
public-private sector pay differential was greater for 'workers at higher percentiles, i.e. the gap 
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was smaller at lower-half and larger in upper-half of the earnings distribution than that 
obtained using OLS; secondly, that the gap was higher for men than for women; and thirdly, 
that the gap declined from earlier to later period of economic transition (Le. before and after 
2000). 
Our third goal was to test the robustness of the quantile regression estimates obtained 
from a 'dummy variable' approach. So, the public sector pay effects across the conditional 
earnings distribution are re-estimated by a decomposition method. Removing the differences 
in characteristics the results from the decompositions reinforced the previous finding that the 
earnings distribution was more compressed in the public than in the private sector and that the 
difference in distributions declined over a period reviewed. 
Our fourth goal was to test whether the public sector compressed pay both within and 
between groups of workers with different educational qualifications. Between groups the 
public sector pay equalising effect is confirmed by a higher penalty to public sector status at 
the upper end of the earnings distribution which is almost double for high skilled workers than 
for other skill groups, and by the higher premia for unskilled and skilled women at the lower 
end of the earnings distribution relative to men. The public sector compressed the pay the 
most amongs graduates for both men and women. For example, the public sector within-group 
earnings equalising effect for male graduates in Hungary is found to be three times greater 
than the similar estimate reported by Disney and Gosling (1998) for the UK during 1990s. 
Moreover, the chapter showed that all public sector educational groups improved their 
financial position during 2000s relative to the 1990s, although women more than men. This is 
not surprising given the public sector wage reforms in early 2000s and the fact that the public 
sector is more female dominated. Finally, the improvements were highest for the unskilled 
groups of male and female workers on average. However, quantile regressions revealed that 
actually high-skilled workers at the lOth percentile saw the greatest improvement, whereas 
those at the top-end saw the smallest change in their financial position relative to their private 
sector counterparts. Within the skilled group the public sector pay penalty declined the most 
for workers at the middle of the earpings distribution. Within the unskilled group the 
improvements in financial position of public sector workers were uniform across the earnings 
distributi on. 
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Finally, the chapter did not explicitly deal with endogeneity and measurement error 
problems. Employer survey has less measurement error than self-reported data but has no 
suitable instruments to control for differences in workers' unobserved heterogeneity between 
sectors. In addition, the public sector includes only budgetary institutions and hence, unlike in 
the chapter 4, we are not able to use changes in the proportions of industry branches within 
public sector caused by large-scale privatisations as an instrument for endogeneity. However, 
some conclusions from IV methods applied in the chapter 4 can be relevant for the results 
obtained here. In particular, chapter 4 indicated that the public sector workers are more likely 
to have lower unobserved earning potentials than private sector workers in which case the 
methods applied in this chapter tend to over-estimate the public sector pay penalty. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the 
earnings distribution in public and private sectors by gender during the economic transition in 
Hungary. The analysis was performed during the twelve-year long period, from 1992 until 
2003, using an employer-provided microdata. 
Over the time period covered by the analysis the public sector had witnessed large-
scale privatisations and restructuring through a number of wage reforms. In particular, during 
the 1990s the public sector earnings lagged behind the private sector earnings. In order to 
combat losses of highly skilled labour in the public sector due to the private sector selection 
the government increased nominally public sector wages by 50% on average between 
September 2002 and 2003. In addition, the level of minimum wage increased in 2001 by 57% 
and in 2002 by 25%. 
t 
The chapter illuminated changes in the public sector earnings inequality relative to the 
private sector by estimating public-private sector earnings differentials for each year and by 
the two sub-periods i.e. before and after 2000. The public sector pay gap was estimated by . 
OLS, quantile regressions and decomposition of differences in distributions methods. 
The empirical results 0btained in this chapter are consistent with the predictions of the 
public sector monopsony model laid out in chapter 3 which suggested the negative public 
sector pay gap and greater pay compression relative to the competitive private sector .. In 
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particular, the data confirmed that both men and women in the public sector fared significantly 
worse than their private sector counterparts during 1990s, but this penalty declined to almost 
zero until 2003. The results from quantile regressions verified that the public sector pay 
distribution was more compressed than in the private sector and hence workers at and above 
the median fared significantly worse off having a public sector status even by the end of the 
period considered. 
A decline in the public sector monopsony power due to private sector competition for 
workers, as suggested in chapter 3, may have been reflected in the public sector wage reforms 
in Hungary which attempted to improve the financial position for skilled workers. However, 
although the quantile regressions revealed that the high-skilled workers indeed saw the 
greatest improvements as a result of public sector wage reforms, this was rather the case only 
for those at the 10th percentile. In contrast to unskilled workers who experienced uniform 
changes across the earnings distribution, the skilled and high-skilled workers at the top-end of 
the earnings distribution saw the smallest changes in their financial position when compared 
to their private sector counterparts. Finally, the fact that the gap was the lowest for the 
unskilled workers and that the changes in the financial position for this group were uniform 
across the earnings distribution confirmed that these workers were more similarly rewarded 
across the two sectors. Therefore, the empirical results in this chapter verified two main 
characteristics of the public sector set by the theoretical model presented in the chapter 3: 
greater wage equality than in the private sector and differential monopsony power over skilled 
and unskilled workers. 
. 233 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, lS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
TEXT CUT OFF IN THE 
ORIGINAL 
5.7 Appendix 
Table AS.I: Descri tion of Variables Used in the Anal sis 
Variable name 
Monthly Gross Earnings and natural log of 
Monthly Gross Earnings 
Hourly Gross Earnings and natural log of 
Hourly Gross Earnings 
Monthly Hours 
Budapest 
County center 
City 
Village' 
Central Hungary' 
Central Transdanubia 
Western Transdanubia 
Southern Transdanubia 
Northern Hungary 
Northern Great Plain 
Southern Great Plain 
Unskilled' 
Low skilled 
Middle skilled 
High skilled 
Labour Force Experience <=5 years' 
S<Labour Force Experience<=IO years 
100Labour Force Experience<=20 years 
20<Labour Force Experience<=30 years 
Labour Force Experience>30 years 
Labour Force Experience2 (YearslIOO) 
Manager 
Professional 
Technician 
Clerk 
Worker in Services' 
Farmer 
Miner Industrial 
Operator 
Labourer 
Agriculture' 
Mining & Manufacturjng 
Electricity Gas Water 
Construction 
Trade 
Tourism and Catering 
Transport Post Telecommunications 
Variable description 
Wages and Hours Variables 
Monthly gross earnings are defined as monthly gross wage in May plus regular premia and bonuses in May plus one twel 
of the sum of all additional payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous y 
denoted in Hungarian currency (forint) and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual consumer price index 
Hourly gross earnings are obtained by dividing monthly gross earnings with monthly hours 
The monthly hours are reported paid hours in May 
Employer Location and Region Variables 
=1 if the individual works in capital Budapest; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in county center; otherwise O. 
"'I if the individual works in city; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the village; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the Central Hungary; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the Central Transdanubia; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the Western Transdanubia; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the Southern Transdanubia; otherwise O. 
-I if the individual works in the Northern Hungary; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in the Northern Great Plain; otherwise O. 
-=1 if the individual works in the Southern Great Plain; otherwise O. 
Worker Education Level and Labour Force Experience Variables 
=1 if the individual has primary education and less; otherwise O. 
"'I if the individual has vocational education; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has high school education; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has tertiary education; otherwise O. 
-I if the individual has less or five years of working experience; otherwise O. 
"'I if the individual has more than five and less or ten years of working experience; otherwise O. 
"1 if the individual has more than ten and less or twenty years of working experience; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has more than twenty and less or thirty years of working experience; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual has more than thirty years of working experience; otherwise O. 
Labour Force Experience squared of individual in years (divided by 100) 
Worker Occupation Variables 
-1 if the individiJal is a manager; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a professional; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a teChnician; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a ,clerk; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a worker in the services; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a farmer; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a miner or industrial; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is an operator; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual is a labourer; otherwise O. 
Employer Industry Branch Variables 
=1 if the individual works in agriculture and forestry; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in industry sector; otherwise O .• 
=1 if the individual works in electricity. gas and water; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in construction; otherwise O. 
=) if the individual works in trade; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in catering and tourism; otherwise O. 
=\ if the individual works in transport and communication; otherwise O. 
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Financial Intermediation & Real Estate & 
Renting Machinery 
=1 if the individual works in financial and other services such as real estate and renting machinery; otherwise O. 
IT & Research & Development 
Other Business Activities 
Public Administration & Defense & 
Compulsory Social Security 
Education & Health & Social Work 
Sewage & Refuse Disposal & Sanitation 
Sports & Cultural & Recreative 
Other & Private households with employed 
Extra territorial organisations and bodies 
21<=Employer Size<=50' 
SI<=Employer Size<=300 
301<=Employer Size<=IOOO 
IOOI<=Employer Size<=3000 
Employer Size>=3001 
=1 if the individual works in computer sciences and research and development; otherwise O. 
= I if the individual works in other business activities; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in public administration and compulsory social security; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in education, health and social work; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works in sports and culture and similar; otherwise 0 
=1 if the individual works either in non listed industry or for the private households; otherwise O. 
=1 if the individual works for extra territorial organisations and bodies; otherwise O. 
Employer Size 
=1 if individual works for employer with over 20 employees but less than 5 I employees 
=1 if individual works for employer with over 50 employees but less than 301 employees 
=1 if individual works for employer with over 300 employees but less than 1001 employees 
=1 if individual works for employer with over 1000 employees but less than 3001 employees 
=1 if individual works for employer with over 3000 employees 
Ownership Sector Variable 
Publici =1 if the individual works in the 'budgetary sector' (1992) or the individual is civil servant, judge, prosecutor or 
public servant (1995·2003); otherwise O. 
Private -I if the individual works in the ente rise in the com etitive sector; otherwise O. 
Notes to TableA 5.1: - denotes variable omitted in estimation. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1992-2003 
Table A5.2: Proportions and Means of Variables used in Analysis from Harmonised 
H . W S M unganan age urvey - en 
Period 1992 1995·1999 2001·2003 
Sector Public Private Public Private Public Private 
St. St. St. St. St. St. 
Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. 
Log Monthly Gross 
11.63 0.48 11.45 0.52 11.43 Earnings (HUF) 0.56 11.40 0.61 11.79 0.60 11.60 0.62 
Monthly Hours 180.83 14.9 182.57 13.1 
Log Hourly Gross 
Earnings (HUF) 6.59 0.60 6.40 0.62 
Age (years) 40.98 10.4 38.79 10.5 42.01 10.7 38.68 10.7 43.94 11.1 39.58 11.0 
Labour Force 
Experience <=5 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 
5<Lfe<=10 years 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.10 0030 0.14 0.35 
lo<Lfe<=20 years 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44 
20<Lfe<=30 years 0032 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 . 0.27 0.44 
Labour Force 
Experience> 30 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.42 
Unskilled (Primary 
School or less) 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.12 0033 0.17 0038 
Low skilled 
(Vocational Degree) 
Middle skilled (High 
0.14 0.34 0.41 0.49 0.18 0.39 0.43 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.45 0.50 
School Degree) 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.44 
High skilled (Tertiary 
0.51 0.50 0.10 0.29 0.43 Degree) ,0.50 0.11 0.31 0.50 0.50 0.12 0.33 
Budapest 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.23 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.23 0.42 
County center 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 
City 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.35 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.48 
Village 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.11 0.32 .' 0.14 0.35 O.1l 0.31 0.13 0.34 
Central Hungary 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.49 0.30 0.46 
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Central Transdanubia 
Western Transdanubia 
Southern Transdanubia 
Northern Hungary 
Northern Great Plain 
Southern Great Plain 
2 I <=Employer 
Size<=50 
51<=Employer 
Size<=300 
301 <=Employer 
Size<=IOOO 
1001<=Employer 
Size<=3000 
Employer Size>=3000 
Agriculture 
Mining & 
Manufacturing 
Electricity Gas Water 
Construction 
Trade 
Tourism & Catering 
Transport Post 
Telecommunications 
Financial 
Intermediation & Real 
Estate & Renting . 
Machinery 
Computer Activities & 
Research & 
Development 
Other Business 
Activities 
Public Administration 
& Defence & 
Compulsory Social 
Security 
Education & Health & 
Social Work 
Sewege & Refuse 
Disposal & Sanitation 
Sport & Culture 
Other & Private 
households with 
employed 
Extra territorial 
organisations 
Manager 
Professional 
Technician 
Clerk 
Service 
Farmer 
Miner Industrial 
Operator 
Labourer 
1992 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33 
0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 
0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29 
0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 
0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 
0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 
0.08 0.26 0.07 0.25 
0.46 0.50 0.29 0.45 
0.22 0.42 0.24 0.42 
0.16 0.36 0.19 0.39 
0.08 0.28 0.22 0.41 
1.00 0.00 1.00 O.QO 
0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.34 
0.08 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34 
0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 
0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 
0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33 
0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 
0.12 0.32 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 
0.44 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.36 0.48 
0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 
0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 
0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 
0.00 0.06 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.2S 
0.00 0.00 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.49 
0.00 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.23 
0.00 0.02 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.26 
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.31 
0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.14 
0.02 0.14 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.32 
0.00 0.05 0.Q3 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.04 O.1S 
0.01 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 
0.00 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.21 
0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 
0.53 0.50 0.00 0.06 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.06 
0.00 0.04 om 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.11 
0.05 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.08 
0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 
0.32 0.47 0.04 0.19 (U5 0.48 0.05 0.22 
0.17 0.37 0.08 0.28 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 
0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 
0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 
0.01 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.16 
0.11 0.31 0.36 0.48 0.09 0.29 0.35 0.48 
0.09 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.27 0.21 0.41 
0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 O.OS 0.27 
0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 
0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 
0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 
0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 
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2001 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 
2002 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 
2003 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 
Observations 9751 54402 56379 272567 30337 162116 
Notes to Table A5.2: The samples used relate to full time male employees, aged between 15 and 64. Means, 
Proportions and Standard Deviations obtained for 1992 sample, pooled 1995-1999 samples and pooled 2001-
2003 samples. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1992-2003 
Table AS.3: Proportions and Means of Variables used in Analysis from Harmonised 
H \V S W ungarIan age urvey - omen 
Period 1992 1995-1999 2001-2003 
Sector Public Private Public Private Public Private 
St. 5t. 5t. St. St. St. I Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. 
Log Monthly Gross 
Earnings (HUF) 11.31 0.44 11.27 0.50 11.23 0.48 11.23 0.58 11.59 0.49 11.43 0.56 
Monthly Hours 178.65 11.4 181.04 10.1 
Log Hourly Gross 
Earnings (HUF) 6.40 0.49 6.24 0.56 
Age (years) 38.89 9.51 38.47 9.72 40.28 9.44 38.31 10.0 42.59 9.94 39.64 10.S 
Labour Force 
Experience <"'5 0.10 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 
5<Lfe<"'10 years 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33 
1 o<Lfe<=20 years 0.29 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 
20<Lfe<=30 years 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45 
Labour Force 
Experience> 30 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 
Unskilled (Primary 
School or less) 0.25 0.43 0.36 0.48 0.22 0.42 0.29 0.45 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.44 
Low skilled 
(Vocational Degree) 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.27 0.23 0.42 0.09 0.28 0.25 0.43 
Middle skitled (High 
School Degree) 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49 
High skitled (Tertiary 
0.35 0.48 0.06 0.24 0.34 Degree) 0.47 0.08 0.27 0.39 0.49 0.10 0.30 
Budapest 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 
County center 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 
City 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 
Village 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31 O.IS 0.36 0.11 0.31 
Central Hungary 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 
Central Transdanubia 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.33 
Western ;rransdanubia 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.1.3 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34 
Southern Transdanubia 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 
Northern Hungary O.IS 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.\0 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 
Northern Great Plain 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 O.IS 0.36 0.12 0.32 
Southern Great Plain 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 
21<"'Employer 
Size<"'50 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.25 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 
51<=Employer 
Size<=300 0.46 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48 
30 I <"'Employer . . 
Size<"'IOOO 0.21 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43 
1 00 I <"'Employer 
S ize<"'3 000 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 
Employer Size>=3000 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.04 0.21 0.17 0.38 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.34 
Agriculture 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.03 '0.18 
237 
Mining & 
Manufacturing 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.50 
Electricity Gas Water 0.00 om 0.Q3 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.Q3 0.16 
Construction 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.38 
Tourism & Catering 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.20 
Transport Post 
Telecommunications 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.Q3 0.08 0.27 
Financial 
Intermediation & Real 
Estate & Renting 
Machinery 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.28 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.26 
Computer Activities & 
Research & 
Development 0.00 0.06 om 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 
Other Business 
Activities 0.00 0.D4 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.24 
Public Administration 
& Defence & 
Compulsory Social 
Security 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 
Education & Health & 
Social Work 0.62 0.48 0.01 0.08 0.61 0.49 0.01 0.12 
Sewege & Refuse 
Disposal & Sanitation 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08 
Sport & Culture 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.09 
Other & Private 
households with 
employed 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.07 
Extra territorial 
organisations 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manager 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 
Professional 0.29 0.45 0.Q3 0.17 0.31 0.46 0.04 0.19 
Technician 0.33 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.40 
Clerk 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.34 
Service 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.22 0.12 0.33 
Farmer 0.00 0.D4 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.12 
Miner Industrial 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.39 
Operator 0.00 0.Q3 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.34 
Labourer 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.30 
1992 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1995 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.41 
1996 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 
1997 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
1998 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
1999 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
2001 0.33 
. 
0.47 0.36 0.48 
2002 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 
2003 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 
Observations 25879 40014 192128 193762 106084 115939 
Notes to Table A5.3: The samples used relate to full time female employees, aged between 15 and 64. Means, 
Proportions and Standard Deviations obtained for 1992 sample, pooled 1995-1999 samples and pooled 2001-
2003 samples. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1992-2003 
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Table A5.4: Estimation of real monthly and hourly gross earnings in Hungary for men, 1992-2003 
'1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 200lh 2002h 2003h 
Unconditional Model 
Public Sector: 0.183··· 0.090··· -0.051"· 0.016·" 0.049·" 0.043··· 0.106··· 0.158··· 0.283··· 0.126··· 0.159··· 0.290··· 
. (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Conditional Model 
Experience: 0.034··· 0.024··· 0.024··· 0.021··· 0.021"· 0.019··· 0.017··· 0.017··· 0.017·" 0.0/8··· 0.017··· 0.016··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Experience Sq: -0.051··· -0.034··· -0.035··· -0.020··· -0.031··· -0.028··· -0.028"· -0.027··· -0.025··· -0.028··· -0.027··· -0.024··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education: 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Lowskilled. 0.155··· 0.080··· 0.099··· 0.116··· 0.120··· 0.112·" 0.010··· 0.072·" 0.098··· 0.103··· 0.073··· 0.099··· 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.00/) (0.00/) 
Middleskilled 0.381··· 0.201··· 0.222··· 0.265··· 0.270··· 0.266··· 0.235··· 0.202··· 0.210··· 0.241··· 0.208·" 0.214··· 
-
(0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) (0.001) 
Highskilled 0.836··· 0.561·" .0.609··· 0.676··· 0.702··· 0.737··· 0.706··· 0.676··· 0.691··· 0.7/1··· 0.685··· 0.700··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Occupation: 
Manager 0.575"· 0.690·" 0.668··· 0.735··· 0.690··· 0.717··· 0.727··· 0.778··· 0.722··· 0.748··· 0.788"· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Professional 0.253··· 0.294··· 0.311··· 0.332·" 0.326··· 0.361"· 0.384··· 0.441"· 0.355··· 0.398 ... • 0.439··· 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Technician 0.197··· 0.267··· 0.232··· 0.295"· 0.306·" 0.333··· 0.334··· 0.358··· 0.337··· 0.356··· 0.370··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Clerk 0.055··· 0.112"· 0.140·" 0.153··· 0.129··· 0.152··· 0.187··· 0.167··· 0.152··· 0.207··· 0.179··· 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Service Worker f f f f f f f f f f f 
Farmer ~ ~ 0.065··· 0.0517··· 0.0642··· 0.0769··· 0.0880··· 0.0739··· -0.01··· 0.1 03··· 0.0714··· 0.010··· 0.106··· 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Minerindustrial 0.142·" 0.159··· 0.147·" 0.189··· 0.195··· 0.178··· 0.155··· 0.186··· 0.167··· 0.168··· 0.188··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Operator 0.204··· 0.21\"· 0.220··· 0.230··· 0.234··· 0.213··· 0.169 ... • 0.214"· 0.201"· 0./75··· 0.207··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Labourer -0.077··· -0.066··· -0.084··· -0.043··· -0.052"· -0.056··· -0.04"· -0.014··· -0.06··· -0.021··· -0.0/0··· 
. (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(frban type: 
Budapest 0.178··· 0.143··· 0.121··· 0.051··· 0.100"· 0.056··· 0.093··· 0.059··· 0.083··· 0.086"· 0.056·" 0.078··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
I • 
County center 0.139··· 0.097··· 0.093··· 0.0%··· 0.060·" 0.052··· 0.044··· 0.039··· 0.022··· 0.04/··· 0.034··· 0.020··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
City 0.087·" 0.061··· 0.071··· 0.064··· 0.038··· 0.020"· 0.025··· 0.022··· 0.004··· 0.025··· 0.020··· 0.002·· 
. 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.00/) 23 ~ ~ (0.00/) 
Rural f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Firm size: 
Size 20-50 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Size 51-300 0.024··· o.on··· 0.158··· 0.191··· 0.211"· 0.211··· 0.196·" 0.200··· 0.198··· 0.188"· 0.193··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Size 301-1000 0.0970·" 0.239··· 0.284··· 0.319··· 0.351··· 0.388"· 0.359··· 0.349··· 0.324··· 0.339··· 0.339··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.00/) (0.00/) 
Size 1001-3000 0.163·" 0.281··· 0.334··· 0.381··· 0.440··· 0.474"· 0.416··· 0.379·" 0.420··· 0.390"· 0.353··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size> 3000 0.287··· 0.382··· 0.424··· 0.470··· 0.449·" 0.488"· 0.359··· 0.371··· 0.423··· 0.378··· 0.358··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Sector: -0.065··· -0.075··· -0.252··· -0.228··· -0.204··· -0.215··· -0.223··· -0.196··· -0.071.··· -0.202··· -0.199··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.00/) 
Constant: 10.55··· 10.42··· -10.22··· 10.27··· 10.24··· 10.32"· 10.49··· 10.65··· 10.77·" 5.509"· 5.607··· 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.405 0.455 0.468 0.460 0.476 0.473 0.483 0.513 0.538 0.490 0.523 
RoolMSE 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.42 
~ f \ I l I t i o n _ ~ ~ _64153 73365 64740 64078 64150 62613 60466 66501 65486 60466 66501 
Noles to Table A5.4: The samples used relate to full time employees, aged between 15 and 64. The depended variable is the log of real monthly and hourly gross 
earnings. Monthly gross earnings are defined as monthly gross wage in May plus regular premia and bonuses in May plus one twelfth of the sum of all other 
payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous year, denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual 
consumer price index. The gross hourly earnings calculated by dividing the gross monthly earnings with monthly hours and estimates in italics are obtained for 
2001, 2002 and 2003 years denoted by the letter h. All specifications include a set of regional dummies. The estimation procedure for the mean robust 
regressions is OLS and estimated robust standard errors calculated based on White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
significance level.idenotes category omitted in estimation. 
Data Source: Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS) from 1992 until 2003 
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0.196··· 
(0.00/) 
0.320··· 
(0.00/) 
0.411··· 
(0.002) 
0.409··· 
(0.002) 
-0.069··· 
(0.00/) 
5.686··· 
(0.003) 
0.548 
0.42 
65486 
I 
Table AS.S: Estimation of real monthly and hourly gross earnings in Hungary for women, 1992-2003 
1992 I 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 200lh 2002h 2003h 
Unconditional Model 
Public Sector: 0.037··· 0.032··· -0.068··· 0.009"· 0.028·" 0.020"· 0.047··· 0.114··· 0.289·" 0.078·" 0.112·" 0.298··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001} (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Conditional Model 
Experience: 0.028·** 0.024·" 0.022··· 0.019·" 0.018"· 0.020"· 0.017"· 0.015··· 0.015"· 0.018"· 0.015"· 0.015"· 
(0.000) (0.000) . (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) {D. 000) (0.000) 
Experience Sq: -0.038"· -0.030"· -0.024··· -0.018·" -0.017··· -0.024··· -0.022··· -0.018·" -0.017··· -0.023·" -O.OIS··· -0.016··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) {D. 000) {D. 000) (O.OOO) 
Education: 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Lowskilled 0.181··· 0.063··· 0.067··· 0.058··· 0.062··· 0.073··· 0.059··· 0.044··· 0.036"· 0.055"· 0.043··· 0.033··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (O.OOI) (O.OOI) 
Middleskilled 0.406··· 0.223··· 0.231··· 0.242··· 0.247·" 0.249··· 0.190·" 0.199··· 0.179··· 0.IS9"· 0.201··· O.ISO··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (O.OOI) (O.OOI) {D. 001) 
llighskilled 0.791··· 0.509··· 0.529··· 0.575··· 0.600··· 0.686"· 0.627··· 0.649··· 0.653"· 0.624··· 0.649··· 0.654··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Occupation.: w 
Manager 0.667··· 0.723··· 0.715··· 0.738··· 0.696··· 0.707··· 0.659··· 0.658"· 0.705··· 0.660"· 0.663"· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Professional 0.335··· 0.310··· 0.302··· 0.306··· 0.277··· 0.254··· 0.269"· 0.353··· 0.246··· 0.259·" 0.343··· 
(0.0020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) {D. 003) (0.002) 
Technician 0.252··· 0.296··· 0.291··· 0.316··· 0.316··· 0.340··· 0.329"· 0.325··· 0.337··· 0.332··· 0.334"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) {D. 001) (0.001) 
Clerk 0.152··· 0.194·" 0.208··· 0.214··· 0.222·" 0.196··· 0.174"· 0.171·" 0./95·" 0.177··· 0./S2"· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) {D. 002) (0.00/) I 
Service Worker f f f f f f f f f f f ·f 
Famler 0.086··· 0.035··· 0.017·" 0.070··· 0.042··· 0.061··· 0.030··· 0.088·" 0.045·" 0.025"· 0.OS2··· 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Minerindustrial 0.114··· 0.077··· 0.068··· 0.06··· 0.081··· 0.057··· 0.052"· 0.048"· 0.044··· 0.046"· 0.04S9·" 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (O.OOI) (0.001) 
Operator 0.199··· 0.191··· 0.163"· 0.189·" 0.189·" 0.139·" 0.124··· 0.095··· 0.124··· 0.112··· 0.092··· 
- (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (O.O02) {D. 002) 
Labourer -0.127··· . -0.107··· -0.096··· -0.081··· -0.070"· -0.058"· -0.037··· -0.054·" -0.060··· -0.035··· -0.046··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) {D. 00/) (O.OO/) 
(lrban ty(lt': 
Budapest 0.296··· 0.232·" 0.196··· 0.175··· 0.189··· 0.178··· 0.162··· 0.127··· 0.123··· 0.150··· 0.131·" 0./20··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) {D. 002) (O.O02) 
County center 0.142··· 0.137·" 0.101"· 0.090··· 0.077··· 0.074··· 0.040··· 0.025··· 0.040··· 0.034··· 0.026·" 0.03S··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) {D. 001) (0.001) (0.001) 
City 0.058··· 0.062··· 0.039··· 0.029··· 0.016··· 0.001 0.016··· -0.012··· 0.004··· 0.014··· -0.009··· 0.002" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) {D. 001) (0.001) (O.OOI) 
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Rural f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Firm size: 
Size 20-50 f f ·f f f f f f f f f f 
Size51-3oo -0.009··· 0.040··· 0.085··· 0.078··· 0.110··· 0.109··· 0.122··· 0.127··· 0.098··· 0.114··· 0.126··· 0.099··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 301-1000 0.018·" 0.112·" 0.147··· 0.160··· 0.204··· 0.217··· 0.245··· 0.205··· 0.168"· 0.227··· 0.201·" 0.168··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 1001-3000 0.035·" 0.1 10··· 0.173··· 0.177··· 0.221··· 0.227"· 0.216··· 0.175"· 0.175··· 0.197·" 0.168··· 0.175··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Size> 3000 0.139··· 0.232··· 0.224··· 0.225··· 0.213··· 0.261··· 0.202··· 0.182"· 0.177"· 0.197··· 0.178··· 0.169··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Public Sector: -0.077··· -0.052"· -0.184··· -0.156··· -0.150"· -0.183··· -0.191··· -0.130··· 0.005"· -0.163··· -0.133··· 0.015··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00/) (0.001) 
Constant: 10.43··· 10.29··· 10.19··· 10.25··· 10.27··· 10.27"· 10.46··· 10.68··· 10.83··· 5.463··· 5.588"· 5.682··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R-squared 0.440 0.522 0.527 0.504 0.503 0.514 0.508 0.529 0.598 0.510 0.532 0.602 
RootMSE 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.32 
Observations 65893 76785 78259 79440 77079 74327 73673 75407 72943 73673 75407 72943 
_. 
Notes to Table A5.5: See Notes to Table A5.4 
Data Source: Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS) from 1992 until 2003 
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Table A5.6: Annual Conditional Public Sector Pay premiums'/penaities in Hungary, 1992-2003 
"fean 1(/4 2 ~ ~ 5(/4 7S· 9(/· Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1992 -0.07··· -O.OS"· 0.06··· 0.05··· 0.01·· -0.02"· -0.05··· -0.07"· -0.11··· -0.12··· -0.17··· -0.17"· 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
1995 -O.OS··· -0.05·" 0.03"· 0.09··· 0.06"· 0.01··· -0.11·" -0.06··· -0.15"· -0.12··· -0.20·" -O.IS··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1996 -0.25"· -O.IS··· -0.09··· -0.01··· -O.lS··· -0.11·" -0.27·" -O.lS··· -0.35"· -0.26"· -0.40"· -0.34"· 
_(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
i997 -0.23··· -0.16"· -0.05··· 0.07··· -0.16··· -0.05··· -0.25··· -0.15··· -0.32"· -0.25··· -O.3S··· -0.33··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
I99S -0.20··· -0.15··· -0.02··· 0.09··· -0.\3 ••• -0.04"· -0.22·" -0.14··· -0.31··· -0.24··· -O.3S·" -0.33··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1999 -0.22··· -O.IS··· -0.02··· 0.07··· -0.14··· -0.07"· -0.22··· -0.17··· -0.32··· -0.27··· -0.36"· -0.37··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) 
2001 -0.22··· -0.19··· -0.05··· 0.03··· -0.13··· -0.05·" -0.22··· -0.14··· -0.31"· -0.25··· -0.35··· -0.35·" 
(0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
200lh -0.20··· -0.16··· -0.05··· 0.06··· -0.115"· -0.02"· -0.20"· -0.11··· -0.2S··· -0.23··· -0.33"· -0.33"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
2002 -0.20··· -0.13·" 0.00 0.03·" -0.10··· -0.02··· -O.IS··· -O.OS··· -0.25··· -0.15·" -0.33"· -0.24"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2002h -0.20"· -0.13··· -0.00·" 0.03··· -0.10·" -0.02··· -0.19··· -0.09··· -0.25··· -0.15··· -0.32··· -0.23··· 
(0.00l) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.00l) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
2003 -0.07··· 0.01··· 0.20·" 0.25··· O.OS··· 0.17··· -0.06"· 0.05··· -0.17··· -0.07··· -0.26··· -0.20··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) 
2003h -0.07··· 0.015··· 0.20·" 0.26··· O.OS··· O.IS"· -0.06··· 0.07··· -0.17··· -0.05··· -0.25··· -0.19··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00l) (O.OOJ) (0.00 I) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001 ) 
Notes to Table A5.6: The samples used relate to full time employees, aged between 15 and 64. The dependent variable is the log of real monthly and hourly gross 
earnings. h indicates that the dependant variable is log of hourly gross earnings and is used for 2001,2002 and 2003 years when the information on monthly paid 
hours is available. Monthly gross earnings are defined as monthly gross wage in May plus regular payments and bonuses in May one twelfth of the sum of all 
other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous year, denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual 
consumer price index. The hourly gross earnings are obtained by dividing the monthly gross earnings with monthly hours. The public sector dummy estimates 
are obtained conditional on worker's labour force experience and its squared term, educational qualification and occupational affiliation (except in 1992) 
dummies and employer's urban type, region and size dummies. The estimation procedure for the mean regression is OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are computed on the basis of White (1980) and reported in the parentheses. Quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for 
the selected percentiles. The estimated standard errors reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions are based on the bootstrapping procedure with 200 
replications in all cases. OLS and quantile regression analysis reported used STATA 10.0 .••• , •• , • denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1992-2003 
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Table A5.7: Estimation of real monthly gross earnings in Hungary for men, 1995-1999 
Mun 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Sector Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Experience 0.031··· 0.021··· 0.030··· 0.017··· 0.031"· 0.021··· 0.032··· 0.022··· 0.031·" 0.021··· 0.027··· 0.025··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ExperienSq -0.040··· -0.031"· -0.037"· -0.022··· -0.040··· -0.030··· -0.040··· -0.035··· -0.039··· -0.037··· -0.032··· -0.042·" 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
. Lowskilled 0.079··· 0.109··· 0.104··· 0.108··· 0.082·" 0.106·" 0.075··· 0.105··· 0.063··· 0.114·" 0.066··· 0.122·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001). 
Middleskill 0.180··· 0.252··· 0.154··· 0.200"· 0.167··· 0.227··· 0.180··· 0.249··· 0.178··· 0.277··· 0.192··· 0.308"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Highskilled 0.391··· 0.689·" 0.371··· 0.464·" 0.389··· 0.572··· 0.385··· 0.688··· 0.383··· 0.808··· 0.400··· 0.925··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Urban type 
Budapest 0.229"· 0.099··· 0.122··· 0.059"· 0.160··· 0.105··· 0.221··· 0.114··· 0.270··· 0.088··· 0.341·" 0.059·" 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Countyeent 0.172··· 0.076··· 0.06,··· 0.053··· 0.099··· 0.082··· 0.167··· 0.086··· 0.234··· 0.072··· 0.286··· 0.053·" 
. 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) 
City 0.036··· 0.058"· 0.014··· 0.047·" 0.008·" 0.062··· 0.032··· 0.059··· 0.042"· 0.050··· 0.079··· 0.038···· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Rural f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Firm size 
21-50 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
51-300 0.058··· 0.186··· 0.030··· 0.232··· 0.033"· 0.233··· 0.043··· 0.175··· 0.064"· 0.152"· 0.079··· 0.127··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) 
301-1000 0.1 52··· 0.346··· 0.110··· 0.480··· 0.131"· 0.424··· 0.130··· 0.328··· 0.159"· 0.269··· 0.162··· 0.217··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
1001-3000. 0.045··· 0.438··· 0.026··· 0.587··· 0.016·" 0.512··· 0.026··· 0.418··· 0.050··· 0.366··· 0.084··· 0.310··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Size> 3000 0.0130··· 0.506··· 0.084··· 0.713··· 0.048··· 0.608·" -0.005··· 0.486··· -0.016··· 0.407··· -0.050"· 0.334··· 
, (0.001) (0.001) (0'()01) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Occupation 
Manager 0.827··· 0.647··· 0.733··· 0.544··· 0.752··· 0.565·" 0.788··· 0.601··· 0.901··· 0.682··· 0.993"· 0.765··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
• Profession 0.354··· 0.358··· 0.328··· 0.394··· 0.323··· 0.353··· 0.333··· 0.339··· 0.372··· 0.338··· 0.416··· 0.349··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003). 
Technician 0.190·" 0.283··· 0.141··· 0.196··· 0.147··· 0.267··· 0.182··· 0.288··· 0.215··· 0.312··· 0.249"· 0.347·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Clerk 0.004 0.138··· -0.033··· 0.108··· -0.013··· 0.108··· 0.002··· 0.107··· 0.067··· 0.150··· 0.038··· 0.1 78··· 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) 
Service f f f f f f f f f f f f 
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Fanner. -0.136··· 0.119··· -O.OS4"· 0.061·" -O.l17"· 0.114·" -0.175··· 0.143··· -0.152··· 0.115··· -0.OS9"· 0.OS7··· 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (O.ool) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Industrial -0.039"· 0.200·" -0.001·· 0.17S"· -0.029··· 0.IS9··· -0.070··· 0.191··· -O.05S··· 0.193·" -0.020"· 0.217"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
• Operator 0.049··· 0.254··· 0.062··· 0.235··· 0.050··· 0.255··· 0.025·" 0.261··· 0.026··· 0.251··· 0.OS4··· 0.250··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Labourer -0.174··· -0.039··· -O.ISI··· -0.043··· -0.IS4··· -O.03S"· -0.IS8··· -0.044··· -0.168··· -0.046··· -0.142··· -0.048··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (O.ool) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (O.ool) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Year 
1995 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
1996 -0.111··· 0.034··· -0. I 03··· 0.007··· -0.106··· 0.009··· -0.106··· 0.020··· -0.114··· 0.039··· -0.125·" 0.041·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.000) (0.001) 
·1997 -0.082··· 0.031··· -0.072··· -0.026··· -0.077··· -0.013··· -0.074··· 0.015·" -0.077··· 0.047"· -0.098··· 0.062··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (O.ool) (0.001) (O.ool) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.000) (0.001) 
1998 -0.020··· 0.062··· -0.018··· 0.004"· -0.028"· 0.016··· -0.014··· 0.044·" -0.025··· 0.080··· -0.027··· 0.100··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
1999 0.013··· 0.110··· 0.012··· 0.042··· O.OOS··· 0.065··· 0.022··· 0.094·" 0.010··· 0.136··· -0.007··· 0.149··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (O.OOO) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 10.40··· 10.42··· 10.14·" 9.850··· 10.27··· 10.08·" 10.40"· 10.42·" 10.55··· 10.74··· 10.73··· 11.03··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (00.000) (0.003) 
Observation 56379 272567 56379 272567 56379 272567 56379 272567 56379 272567 56379 272567 
Rsq; 
0.33 ___ J Pseudo Rsq 0.669 0.445 0.42 0.21 0.44 0.23 0.46 0.26 0.45 0.29 0.42 
Root I\ISE 0.32 0.45 
Notes to TaMe A5.7: a) The samples used relate to full time employees, aged between 15 and 64. 
. b) The dependent variable is the log of real monthly gross earnings. This is defined as monthly gross wage in May plus regular payments 
and bonuses in May one twelfth of the sum of all other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous year, denoted in 
HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual consumer price index. . 
c) The public sector includes budgetary sector and civil servants, judge, prosecutor and public servants. The private sector includes all non-
public workers. Each earnings equation includes a full set of regional dummies. 
d) The estimation procedure for the mean regression is OLS. The estimated standard errors reported in parentheses are heteroskedasticity 
robust computed on the basis of White "( 1980). 
e) Quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates for the selected percentiles (l0'h, 25'h, 50th, 75 th and 90th). The· 
estimated standard errors reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions are based on the bootstrapping procedure with 200 replications in all cases. 
f) OLS and quantile regression analysis reported used STATA 10.0. **., •• , • denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level.fdenotes 
category omitted in estimation 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1995-1999 
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Table AS.8: Estimation of real monthly gross earnings in Hungary for men, 2001-2003 
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Sector Puhlic Private Puhlic Private Puhlic Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Experience 0.028··· 0.016··· 0.028··· 0.008**· 0.027··· 0.012··· 0.026··· 0.016·" 0.026"· 0.020·" 0.025··· 0.023··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ExperiencS -0.037··· -0.027··· -0.036·" -0.010··· -0.034"· -0.017··· -0.033··· -0.027··· -0.033··· -0.035"· -0.032··· -0.043··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
. Lowskilled 0.081··· 0.096··· 0.066··· 0.073··· 0.066··· 0.076··· 0.089"· 0.087·" 0.088··· 0.104··· 0.081··· 0.123··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Middleskill 0.135··· 0.228··· 0.088··· 0.\35··· 0.092··· 0.176··· 0.126"· 0.218··· 0.158··· 0.271"· 0.185··· 0.320··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Highskilled 0.503··· 0.704··· 0.432"· 0.420··· 0.495··· 0.566··· 0.542··· 0.707··· 0.521··· 0.829··· 0.530··· 0.937··· 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
{Jrhan type 
Budapest 0.220··· 0.074··· 0.100··· 0.018··· 0.135"· 0.049·" 0.206··· 0.070··· 0.237··· 0.072"· 0.269"· 0.056··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Countycent 0.120··· 0.036··· 0.065··· 0.030··· 0.078··· 0.044··· 0.121"· 0.043··· 0.157··· 0.028"· 0.186··· 0.015··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (O.OOO) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
City 0.012"· 0.023··· 0.018··· 0.033··· 0.001··· 0.033"· 0.019"· 0.025··· 0.015·" 0.006··· 0.035·" -0.013"· I 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Rural f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Firm size 
Size 21-50 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
. Size 51-300 0.086··· 0.210··· 0.027··· 0.124··· 0.058··· 0.197··· 0.075"· 0.224··· 0.097"· 0.213"· 0.117"· 0.190··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
S301-1000 0.247··· 0.351··· 0.113··· 0.299··· 0.166··· 0.370··· 0.219·" 0.367··· 0.270··· 0.330"· 0.337··· 0.272··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
S1001-3OOO 0.091··· 0.447··· 0.025··· 0.433··· 0.058··· 0.481··· 0.084··· 0.454··· 0.110"· 0.407··· 0.\37··· 0.348"· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Size> 3000 0.102··· 0.418··· 0.119··· 0.401··· 0.151··· 0.446··· 0.109··· 0.430"· 0.067··· 0.382··· 0.126··· 0.305··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
'Occupation 
Manager 0.731··· 0.749··· 0.633··· 0.449··· 0.655··· 0.604··· 0.691··· 0.740··· 0.783··· 0.869··· 0.850··· 0.973"· 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Profession 0.275··· 0.519··· 0.303·" 0.446··· 0.258··· 0.511··· 0.224··· 0.555··· 0.273··· 0.553"· 0.300··· 0.537··· 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
Technician 0.150··· 0.390··· 0.123··· 0.206··· 0.175··· 0.345"· 0.159··· 0.418·" 0.\39"· 0.452"· 0.131··· 0.483··· 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Clerk -0.042··· 0.209··· 0.018··· 0.080··· 0.018··· 0.139··· -0.038··· 0.209··· -0.050··· 0.255··· -0.065··· 0.311·" 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (O.OOO) (0.003) (O.OOO) (0.005) 
Farmer -0.167·" 0.112··· -0.120··· 0.064··· -0.127··· 0.101··· -0.160·" 0.126··· -0.200··· 0.107··· -0.193··· 0.090··· 
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(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
..Industrial -0.125··· 0.221·" -0.055··· 0.124·** -0.062"· 0.178·** -0.115"· 0.224"· -0.184··· 0.247··· -0.170·" 0.264**· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Operator -0.025··· 0.242··· 0.005··· 0.146··· 0.024··· 0.206··· -0.022·** 0.254··· -0.056··· 0.261··· -0.070"· 0.280··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Labourer -0.209··· -0.007"· -0.144··· 0.003·· -0.152"· 0.006··· -0.203··· -0.002· -0.247··· -0.022·" -0.241"· -0.029··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.002) 
Year 
2002 0.123··· 0.067·" 0.144·· .. 0.106·· .. 0.135·" 0.076 .. •• 0.134·· .. 0.061 .. • .. 0.141·" 0.048 .... 0.100 .. • .. 0.038 .. • .. 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
2003 0.312·· .. 0.122··· 0.427 .... 0.126·" 0.382··· 0.125 .. •• 0.342··· 0.125··· 0.274··· 0.107"· 0.198··· 0.089··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.00) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 10.54··· 10.71··· 10.2S**· 10.40··· 10.40·** 10.4S·** 10.53·" 10.67··· 10.74··· 10.95··· 10.93··· 11.23"· 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
Observation 30337 162116 30337 162116 30337 162116 30337 162116 30337 162116 30337 162116 
Rsq; 
Pseudo Rsq 0.689 0.49 0.43 0.17 0.47 0.23 0.48 0.28 0.48 0.33 0.45 0.39 
RootMSE 0.33 0.44 
Notes to Table A5.8 See Notes to Table A5.7 
Data Source: The Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 2001 -2003 
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Table A5.9: Estimation of real monthly gross earnings in Hungary for women, 1995-1999 
!\lean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Sector Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Experience 0.030· 0.015**· 0.028**· 0.015·· 0.030· 0.015"· 0.031··· 0.016·" 0.031··· 0.016·" 0.030· 0.017" 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ExperiencS -0.034·· -0.018·· -0.039·· -0.016·" -0.034** -0.017·" -0.037··· -0.020· -0.037·· -0.020· -0.033·· -0.022** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education . 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Lowskilled 0.115··· 0.055··· 0.121··· 0.067"· 0.116··· 0.053··· 0.111··· 0.046··· 0.102··· 0.053··· 0.104··· 0.064"· 
.' 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Middleskill 0.215··· 0.252··· 0.173··· 0.195··· 0.183·** 0.215·" 0.202··· 0.234··· 0.232··· 0.261·" 0.238··· 0.290"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.00) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
, Highskilled 0.451··· 0.720"· 0.372·" 0.504··· 0.389··· 0.619··· 0.422"· 0.739·" 0.476·" 0.817··· 0.513··· 0.858·" 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
.. 
Urban type 
Budapest 0.220··· 0.207··· 0.106"· 0.177··· 0.137··· 0.201··· 0.190··· 0.217"· 0.260··· 0.212··· 0.328"· 0.203·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
COllntycent 0.147··· 0.089·" 0.055··· 0.084··· 0.073··· 0.091··· 0.125··· 0.094··· 0.185··· 0.084··· 0.241··· 0.059"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
City 0.029··· 0.048··· 0.026··· 0.053"· 0.021··· 0.049··· 0.018··· 0.056··· 0.029··· 0.039··· 0.044··· 0.017·" 
- (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rural f f f - f f f f f f f f f 
Firm size 
. Size 21-50 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Size 51-300 0.059··· 0.109··· 0.024··· 0.139··· 0.032"· 0.142··· 0.046··· 0.109··· 0.058"· 0.077·" 0.079·" 0.065··· 
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
S301-IOOO 0.100"· 0.240··· 0.048··· 0.297··· 0.063··· 0.296··· 0.078··· 0.253··· 0.087··· 0.197··· 0.126··· 0.158·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
S1001-30oo 0.011··· 0.326··· 0.033··· 0.412··· 0.028"· 0.397··· -0.005··· 0.338··· -0.015··· 0.271"· -0.002 0.229·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size> 3000 0.009··· 0.327"· 0.033··· 0.504··· 0.033··· 0.437··· 0.013··· 0.340··· -0.016·" 0.239··· -0.016"· 0.174"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Occupation 
. 
Manager' 0.738"· 0.695··· 0.664"· 0.485··· 0.670··· 0.575··· 0.6%"· 0.657·" 0.759··· 0.771"· 0.902··· 0.884··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Profession 0.351··· 0.387··· 0.359"· 0.387··· 0.336·" 0.392··· 0.345··· 0.376"· 0.351··· 0.397·" 0.384··· 0.424··· 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Technician 0.269··· 0.309··· 0.179··· 0238··· 0.205··· 0.286"· 0.292··· 0.309··· 0.334··· 0.328··· 0.332"· 0.354··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
. Clerk 0.186··· 0.207··· 0.122··· 0.187··· 0.120··· 0.206··· 0.187··· 0.209··· 0.239··· 0.190··· 0.263··· 0.178··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
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Service f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Famler -0.026··· 0.138·" -0.022·" 0.009·" -0.107·" 0.083·" -0.019·" 0.160··· 0.022··· 0.17S·" 0.036··· 0.140··· 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) . (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
Industrial . 0.026··· 0.12S··· 0.028··· 0.061··· 0.012"· 0.110··· 0.010··· 0.137··· 0.047"· 0.144··· 0.069··· 0.\32··· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Operator -O.08S··· 0.21S··· -0.134"· 0.172··· -O,IS0··· 0.198··· ·0.21S··· 0.219··· ·0,043·" 0.227"· 0.034··· 0.213·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0,004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Labourer -O.IS9··· -0.070"· ·0.132·" ·0.102··· ·0.IS7··· -0.091··· -O.17S··· -0.071"· -0.168··· ·0.070··· ·0.146··· ·0.078··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Year 
. 1995 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
1996 -0.100··· 0.023··· -0.105··· -0.002·· -0.103··· 0.009··· -0.098··· 0.020··· ·0.101·" 0.027··· ·0.089··· 0.038·.·· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0,000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1997 -0.061··· 0.018··· -0.044··· -0.026··· -0,046·" -0.010··· ·0.OS2··· 0.008··· -0.066··· 0.028··· ·0.060··· 0.055··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0,000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1998 -0.012··· 0.056··· -0.007··· -0.002·· ·0,011··· 0.017·" -0.013"· 0.044·" -0.014··· O.072u • 0.011·" 0.105"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0,000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
)999 0.007··· 0.105··· 0.013··· 0.045··· 0.018··· 0.069··· 0.012··· 0.094··· -0.002··· . 0.116··· 0.010·" 0.142··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0·091) (0.001) (0,000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 10.22··· 10.37··· 10,04··· 9.889··· 10.14·" 10.08·" 10.22··· 10.34·" 10.34·" 10.66·" 10.46··· 10.94··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observation 192128 193762 192128 193762 192128 193762 192128 193762 192128 193762 192128 193762 
Rsq; 
Pseudo Rsq 0.629 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.43 0.26 0.42 0.29 . 0.4 0.32 0.38 0.36 
Root I\1SE . 0.29 0.41 
Notes to Table A5.9 See Notes to Table A5.7 
Data Source: The Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1995-1999 
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Table AS.I0: Estimation of real monthly gross earnings in Hungary for women, 2001-2003 
I'ercentile !\lean' 10 25 50 75 90 
Sector I'ublic Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
, Experience 0.024·" 0.012"· 0.027··· 0.027··· 0.025·" 0.022··· 0.021··· 0.007·" 0.008··· 0.010··· 0.012··· 0.014··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ExperiencS -0.027··· -0.020··· -0.033·" -0.033··· -0.030··· -0.023··· -0.019··· -0.010"· -0.012·" -0.015··· -0.019·" -0.022·" 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 
Unskilled f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Lowskilled 0.087"· 0.040·" 0.076"· 0.079··· 0.085··· 0.OS7··· 0.091··· 0.022··· 0.034"· 0.034"· 0.051··· 0.080··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Middleskill 0.167··· 0.204"· 0.121··· 0.132·" 0.147··· 0.179··· 0.197·" 0.085··· 0.136··· 0.190··· 0.247··· 0.284··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0:001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Highskillcd 0.526··· 0.699··· 0.453··· 0.486··· 0.508··· 0.574··· 0.607"· 0.370··· 0.563··· 0.722··· 0.814··· 0.864"· 
. (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
(lrban type 
Budapest 0.192··· 0.111·" 0.081··· 0.108··· 0.160"· 0.236··· 0.307··· 0.034··· 0.062··· 0.105··· 0.149·" 0.139"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Countycenter 0.071"· 0.030·" 0.020··· 0.023··· 0.047··· 0.094··· O.l3S··· 0.020··· 0.019"· 0.024··· 0.029"· 0.035"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
City 0.011··· 0.012··· 0.016··· 0.010··· 0.009·" 0.006··· 0.022··· 0.014··· 0.011··· 0.009··· 0.011··· 0.017"· 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Rural f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Firm size ~ ~
Size 21-50 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
Size 51-300 0.098"· 0.143··· 0.041··· 0.057··· 0.075··· 0.106··· 0.122··· 0.106··· 0.123··· 0.136··· 0.131··· 0.117"· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
S 301-1000 0.178··· 0.24S··· 0.068··· 0.098··· 0.142··· 0.196··· 0.227··· 0.202··· 0.241··· 0.248··· 0.226··· 0.205··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
S 1001-3000 0.089··· 0.280··· 0.041··· 0.059··· 0.070··· 0.\01··· 0.115··· 0.241··· 0.266··· 0.276··· 0.265··· 0.243··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Size> 3000 0.123··· 0.222··· 0.067··· 0.129··· 0.130··· 0.116··· 0.171··· 0.281··· 0.272·" 0.238··· 0.175··· 0.110··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Occupation 
Manager 0.667··· 0.694··· 0.525··· 0.55S··· 0.625"· 0.727"· 0.809··· 0.315··· 0.493··· 0.647··· 0.845··· 1.022··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Professional 0.272··· 0.520··· 0.255··· 0.254··· 0.266··· 0.247··· 0.273·" 0.435··· O.SOS··· O.5IS··· 0.5SI··· 0.642··· 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Technician 0.231"· 0.381··· 0.137··· 0.201··· 0.265··· 0.266"· 0.256··· 0.207··· 0.320··· 0.393··· 0.442··· 0.482··· 
(0.001) (0.001) ( 0 ~ 0 0 1 ) ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Clerk 0.078··· 0.225··· 0.014"· 0.058··· 0.086"· 0.099··· 0.110··· 0.109··· 0.170··· 0.223··· 0.260··· 0.281··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Service f f f f f f f f f f f f 
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Farmer -0.046··· 0.1 52··· -0.010· -0.020··· -0.005 -0.028··· -0.186··· 0.033··· 0.084··· 0.153··· 0.212"· 0.192"· 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Industrial -0.073··· 0.118··· -0.053··· -0.074··· -0.071··· -0.072··· -0.104··· 0.008··· 0.059"· 0.114··· 0.144··· 0.156··· 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Operator -0.184··· 0.175··· -0.116··· .-0.090··· -0.140"· -0.157··· -0.288··· 0.047··· 0.112"· 0.181··· 0.224··· 0.224·" 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Labourer -0.142··· -0.040"· -0.100·" -0.100··· -0.128"· -0.162··· -0.189·" -0.075··· -0.055··· -0.036·" -0.025··· -0.033··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0:001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year 
2001 f f f f f f f f f f f f 
2002 0.150··· 0.073··· 0.150··· 0.146··· 0.144"· 0.161··· 0.169·" 0.132··· 0.090"· 0.068··· 0.049"· 0.039··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2003 0.348·" 0.106··· 0.426··· 0.406"· 0.368"· 0.328··· 0.273··· 0.143·" 0.111··· 0.101··· 0.088··· 0.072··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 10.40··· 10.73··· 10.21··· 10.29"· 10.41··· 10.55·" 10.69··· 10.49··· 10.59··· 10.74··· 10.93··· 11.16"· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 106084 115939 106084 115939 106084 115939 106084 115939 106084 115939 106084 115939 
Rsq; 
Pseudo Rsq 0.655 0.518 0.43 0.17 0.45 0.24 0.45 0.31 0.44 0.37 0.43 0.36 
Root J\ISE 0.29 0.39 
Notes to Table A5.10 See Notes to Table A5.7 Data Source: The Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 2001-2003 
Table A5.11: Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different quantiles for men and women in 
H __ unf!ar:" 
1995-1999 2001-2003 
f\;len u, f\;len \Vnmen 
Total Effects of Total Effects of Total Effects of Total Effects of 
Percentile: differential Coefficients differential Coefficients differential Coefficients differential Coefficients 
10th 0.000 -0.001 0.072*" 0.034"* 0.141*" -0.002** 0.129*** . 0.046*** (0.000) (0.00)) (0.000) (0.00)) (0.005) (0.00)) (0.00]) (0.000) 
30th -0.097"*- -0.136*" 0.038*** -0.069*** 0.188*** -0.054*** 0.212*** -0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.0001 10.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
50 tb -0.098*" -0.204·" 0.033*" -0.143··* 0.233*** -0.160*" 0.235*** -0.122*** 
(0.00)) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.0001 (0.001) (0.004) 
70tb -0.109"* -0.289"* 0.000 -0.261*" 0.257*" -0.273*** 0.203"* -0.256*" (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00)) (0.001) (0.003) 
90th -0.225"* -D.472·" -0.117··* -0.443*** 0.176*** -0.406*** 0.039*** -0.439·** 
--, 
(0.002) (0.00)) (0.004) (0.002)_ (0.0031_ (0.003) (Q,OQ2l_ _ ( Q , 0 0 1 ) ~ ~
Noles 10 Table A5.11: See Notes to Figures A5.1 and A5.2. Dala Source: The Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1995-2003 
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Figure A5.I : Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different 
quantiles for men and women in Hungary, 1995-1999 
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Notes to Figure A5. !: a) The samples used relate to full time male and female employees, aged between 15 and 
64. The depended variable is the log of real monthly gross earnings. Monthly gross earnings are defmed as 
monthly gross wage in May plus bonuses and plus regular premia and bonuses in May plus one twelfth of the 
sum of all other payments and irregular incomes connected to the full-time job paid over the previous year, 
denoted in HUF and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual consumer price index. 
b) Decomposition estimation procedure implemented by estimating 100 traditional 
quantile regressions in each sector accounting for worker' s labour force experience, its quadratic form, 
educational qualification, occupational affiliation and employer' s urban type, region and size and year. The 
variance has been estimated by bootstrapping the results 100 times. Effects of coefficients presented with 95% 
confidence interval. 
Dala Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1995-1999 
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Figure A5.2: Decomposition of public-private sector earnings differential at different 
quantiles for men and women in Hungary, 2001-2003 
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Notes to Figure A5.2: See Notes to Figure AS.I. 
Data Source: The Hannonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 200 \-2003 
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A5.12: OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates of Public Sector Pay premia and 
pena If b H' h t Ed f I Q l'fi f d G d les, )y Ig, es uca IOna ua I lea IOn an en er 
!\len Women 
Monthly Gross Earnings Hourly Monthly Gross Earnings Hourly 
1992-1999 2001-2003 Change 2001-2003 1992-1999 2001-2003 Change 2001-2003 
(I) (2) (3)=(1 )-(2) (4) (S) (6) (7)=(5)-(6) (8) 
Unskilled 
Mean -0.146"· -0.059··· -0.087 -0.047··· -0.14S··· -0.022·" -0.123 0.002·· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
10111 0.025··· 0.064··· -0.039 0.071··· 0.066"· 0.081··· -0.0/5 0.100··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.00 
25m -0.089"· 0.028"· -0.061 0.034"· -0.071··· 0.062··· -0./34 0.078·" 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SOm -0.169·" -0.061"· -0./08 -0.041··· -0.195·" -0.035··· -0.160 -0.0\3··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
75111 -0.235··· -0.132··· -0.103 -0.114·" -0.244··· -0.084··· -0.160 -0.060··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
90m -0.277··· -0.165··· -0.1l2 -0.144··· -0.252··· -0.118··· -0.134 -0.090··· 
(0.001 ) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) 
Skilled 
Mean -0.167··· -0.100··· -0.067 -0.086·" -0.057"· 0.0\3··· -0.070 0.0290··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
10111 0.025··· 0.073··· -0.048 0.087··· 0.120··· 0.145"· -0.025 0.158·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
25m -0.123··· -0.012··· -O.ll I 0.003"· 0.007··· 0.111"· -0.104 0.132··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Som -0.228··· -0.107··· -0.121 -0.093··· -0.057··· 0.047··· -0.104 0.064··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
7Sm -0.254··· -0.215"· -0.039 -0.200··· -0.120··· -0.052··· -0.068 -0.037··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
90111 -0.265··· -0.269··· 0.004 -0.255··· -0.206··· -0.160··· -0.046 -0.151·" 
(0.001 ) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
High-
skilled 
Mean -0.338··· -0.293··· -0.045 -0.299"· -0.439··· -0.362··· -0.077 -0.362··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
lOth -0.014"· 0.152··· -0.166 0.152··· -0.046·" 0.119··· -0.165 0.126··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
25m -0.209··· -0.149··· -0.060 -0.157··· -0.311··· -0.204··· -0.107 -0.197·" 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
50th -0.372··· -0.362··· -0.010 -0.377"· -0.512·" -0.449··· -0.063 -0.462··· 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
75th -0.533··· -0.500··· -0.033 ·0.506··· ·0.669··· ·0.566··· -0.103 ·0.575··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
90th -0.614··· -0.605"· -0.009 -0.597··· -0.715··· -0.655··· -0.060 -0.649··· 
(0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0002) 
Notes to Table A5.12: 
a) The samples used relate to full time employees, aged between 15 and 64. The dependent variable is the log of 
real monthly and hourly gross earnings. 
c) The unskilled group includes workers with primary educational qualification or less. The skilled group 
includes workers with both vocational (low skilled) and high school degree (middle skilled). The high-skilled 
group includes workers with university degree. 
d) Public sector pay gap estimates obtained conditional on labour force experience and its quadratic form and a 
set of employer's urban type, region and year dummies. The estimation procedure for the mean regression is 
OLS and robust standard errors reported in the parentheses are computed on the basis of White (1980) .... 
denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Quantile regression procedures are used to obtain the coefficient estimates 
for the selected percentiles: loth, 25 th, 50th, 75 th and 90 th percentiles of the log earnings distribution. The estimated 
standard errors reported in parentheses for the quantile regressions are based on the bootstrapping procedure with 
200 replications in all cases. OLS and quantile regression analysis reported used STATAl 0.0. 
Data Source: The Harmonised Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), 1992·1999 and 2001.2003 
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Chapter 6 
6 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the effects of public sector restructuring by means of whole-
sale privatisations on the labour market in transition economies with a particular focus on 
Serbia and Hungary. The purpose of the thesis was to analyse the implications of different 
pay-setting arrangements between the private and public sectors on pay inequality. Labour 
market changes that took place during the economic transition in Eastern Europe seem to be a 
proper case study for this kind of research. This period was characterised by labour market 
conversion from public sector ownership domination to competitive market structure due to 
the wholesale privatisation of public sector activities. 
This thesis first set a theoretical framework to explain trends in pay inequality both 
• I 
within sectors and between the public and private sector. Empirically this thesis examined 
how individual groups of workers in the public sector have fared during the process of public 
sector restructuring in the context of the Serbian and Hungarian experience. This chapter 
summarises the key findings and merits of the thesis on each of these topics. 
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6.2 A Public Sector Monopsony Model 
Chapter Three developed a theoretical framework to explain differences in pay-
setting arrangements across the public sector and the emerging private sector during the 
process of economic transition. The chapter showed that a rationale for the public sector 
paying more equal wages to workers of differing productivity is that it was exploiting 
monopsony power rather than an 'egalitarian' wage policy as such. The former is more likely 
given the empirical evidence which showed the negative public sector pay gap across the 
whole earnings distribution. The main arguments are as follows. 
Since the' public sector was the dominant purchaser of labour in the pre-transition time 
it had some monopsony power, which could be exploited according to the varying elasticities 
of supply of different types of workers. However, unlike in the private' sector monopsony 
model, the public sector's objective function was not to maximise profit but to hire labour 
until its available budget is exhausted, assuming each sector faced a hard budget constraint. 
Hence, it was assumed that during pre-transition the objection function of the public sector 
was output maximisation subject to a budget constraint. This is equivalent to maximising total 
output where profit (or surplus) is zero. 
Given this context, the restructuring associated with transition took place against a 
background of a decline in public sector labour market monopsony power. Unlike under the 
public sector dominance, economic transition meant that although the government might 
initially continue to impose restrictions on pay, workers could opt to change the sector of 
employment as there was a private sector job alternative. 
It is important to acknowledge that incremental pay structure explained by the 
bureaucratic model also implies wage compression. B u ~ ~ the bureaucratic model does not 
necessarily predicts the same implications about the negative sign of the public-private sector 
pay gap as public sector monopsony model. The monopsony model presented in this chapter 
aimed to explain primarily the public sector pay compression as a result of 'exploitation' 
rather than the outcome of the government redistribution efforts or ideology. The model 
derived, therefore, demonstrated that the increase in the wage inequality associated with 
economic transition may be considered as effect of decline in public sector monopsony power 
rather than simply the erosion of an 'egalitarian' wage policy. 
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In particular, the chapter suggested that the differential elasticities of labour supply 
of skilled and unskilled workers as indicated by other studies on the supply of labour might be 
important for understanding public sector wage compression. The chapter argued that these 
factors are connected: low productivity workers have a more elastic supply and therefore, the 
ability of the public sector to exploit its monopsony power is less for low productivity (i.e. 
unskilled) workers than for high productivity (Le. skilled) workers. The chapter showed that 
public sector monopsony model implies different result than private sector monopsony model. 
In particular, whereas private monopsony decreases both wages and employment, the public 
monopsony faces a trade-off between wages and employment (i.e. decreases wages and 
increases employment). 
Based on these arguments, first, the chapter showed that the relative wage of skilled 
workers obtained under monopsony solution is lower than under competitive solution (i.e. 
more compressed pay structure); second, that the relative employment of skilled workers 
under monopsony solution was greater than under competitive solution (i.e. 'over-
employment'); and third, that a decline in the relative public sector monopsony power over 
skilled workers implied a decline in the relative employment and an increase in the relative 
wage of skilled workers in the public sector. 
All this was consistent with the qualitative and quantitative evidence on pay-
empoyment determination in transition economies. A final suggestion of the model where 
transition implies an erosion in the differential monopsony power of the state is that earnings 
inequality in the competitive private sector would be greater than in the public sector but this 
differential would decline over the course of economic transition. This is consistent with the 
empirical evidence surveyed in the literature review. Finally, this is found consistent with the 
evidence presented in subsequent empirical chapters which considered the evolution of public-
private sector wage differentials at greater length. 
6.3 Public-Private Sector Pay Differentials in Serbia 
The first empirical chapter estimated public-private sector earnings differentials during 
the economic transition in Serbia, from 1995 until 2008. The privatisation process during 
1990s was mainly. directed towards local investors and ownership' transfers by enterprises 
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were voluntary. Hence, the private sector mainly consisted of a large number of small (in 
terms of employment) newly established firms. These firms had been emerging in a 
'spontaneous' manner in small but profitable segments of a market (such as trade, services and 
processing industry) and determined wages by free market forces. Systematic economic 
reforms and large-scale privatisation programs were launched from 2001. The concept of 
privatisation changed radically from the insider's model to commercial sales. 
Given the different stages of economic transition as well as due to the break in Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) methodology in 2004 the empirical analysis in the chapter was based on 
annual estimates whereas the pooled estimates are obtained for the 1995-2003 and the 2004-
2008 periods separately. These periods also correlate with a change in sign of the estimated 
public sector pay gap which we argue was caused mainly by large-scale privatisation. The 
Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) data is used as an additional source of 
individual level data for 2002 and 2003 to show changes in the public sector pay gap relative 
to 2004-2008. Finally, administrative data from official statistics is explored as a third source 
of data. This dataset is only used for the purpose of instrumental variable creation which 
corrects for measurement error in public sector status arising from the large-scale 
privatisations during the 2004-2008 period. 
The chapter presented the public sector pay effects based on four analyses. F i r s ~ , , the 
cross-sectional differences in earnings between the public and private sectors are estimated by 
OLS using a 'dummy variable' approach. Second, the same estimation procedures are applied 
at the selected percentiles of the earnings distribution by using the bootstrapped quantile 
regressions. In addition, earnings equations are estimated for public and private sectors 
separately. Third, the differences in distributions are decomposed into a part explained by 
differences in characteristics and into a part explained by differences in returns to 
characteristics. Four, instrumental variable (IV) procedures are applied to estimate average 
public sector pay effects which are robust to measurement error. For this purpose, an 
instrument constructed from an employer-provided aggregated data is matched into a self-
r.eported individual level data. The instrument was b a s ~ d d on the changes in the proportions 
among industry branches in the public sector. The chapter argued that these changes were 
, caused, mainly by privatisation. The public sector pay effects are then estimated for groups of 
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workers according to their educational qualification by using two stage least squares (2SLS) 
and treatment effects instrumental variable procedures. The main results of interest are as 
follows. 
Conditional annual OLS estimates showed that increasing public sector penalties 
during the 1990s came down to zero by 2003. From 2004, the average sector pay gap 
translated into a significant and increasing public sector premia for both men and women. 
Hence, if the results are interpreted in terms of changes in the public sector wage 
determination, the chapter revealed a noteworthy improvement in the [mancial position of 
public sector workers once the systematic economic reforms and large-scale privatisation 
started. 
Similar to the mean, annual quantile regression estimates proved sensitive to stages of 
the economic transition. The sign of the public sector pay gap at most of the percentiles was 
n ~ g a t i v e e until 2003 and positive afterwards. Moreover, quantile regressions revealed that the 
public sector pay gap was related to a worker's position in the earnings distribution. In 
particular, conditional estimates across the pay distribution disclosed that public sector 
workers at the upper-end of the earnings distribution relative to their private sector 
counterparts tended to lose more during 1995-2003 and to gain less during the 2004-2008 
period. Therefore, quantile regression estimates suggested a compression of the conditional 
public sector earnings distribution in both periods. 
Estimates from 1995 until 2003 complemented an earlier research on public-private 
sector earnings differentials in Serbia. In particular, Reilly (2003) used the OLS and quantile 
regression methods on the same data sets but from 1995 until 2000 for male employees, aged 
between 18 and 64. Our replication indicated a possible measurement error in that study in 
relation to the definition of the hourly wage, thereby biasing the estimates of the conditional 
public sector wage gap. In particular, our estimator obtained by using a total pay 
compensation (regular wage plus non-wage benefits) is found to be lower by 14% on average. 
This fits broadly with the difference in the non-wage benefits share in total remuneration 
between the public and private sectors. 
Furthermore, the chapter applied a decomposition of differences across the earnings 
distribution. Removing differences in characteristics, the results from the decompositions 
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reinforced the previous finding that public sector workers received statistically significantly: 
lower earnings during 1995-2003 period and higher earnings during 2004-2008 period than 
workers in the private sector. Moreover, the estimated differences in returns to characteristics 
interpreted as the public sector pay effects indicated an increase in a public sector pay penalty 
with a higher percentile during 1995-2003 and a decrease in a public sector pay premium with 
a higher percentile during the 2004-2008 period. 
Finally, the chapter proposed an instrument for public sector status estimation in the 
case of measurement error. Given that the large-scale privatisations imply sectoral changes of 
jobs when people actually do not move jobs the measurement error in self-reported public 
sector status may loom large. The chapter argued that changes in the proportions among 
industry branches in the public sector are good indicator of the public sector status since these 
changes were caused mainly by privatisation. Since this instrument was constructed from an 
employer-provided aggregated data and matched into a self-reported individual level data the 
'noise' should be orthogonal to the difference between reported and actual public sector 
status. Moreover, the proposed instrument is also suitable to control for endogeneity in the 
public sector status arising from the large-scale privatisations given that changes in the 
proportions among industry branches in the public sector capture the effect of privatisation. 
The chapter applied the IV procedures on groups of workers according to their 
educational qualification and gender. The public sector pay gap estimated by both 2SLS and 
treatment effects indicated that OLS estimates obtained for the period of large-scale 
privatisations (i.e. 2004-2008 period) may be biased towards zero and that the public sector 
pay gap declines with the higher educational qualification. If the results are interpreted in the 
context of measurement error both IV methods indicated that the classical errors-in-variables 
(CEV) assumption holds. In addition, if the results are' interpreted in the context of 
endogeneity both IV methods indicated that workers in the public sector have lower 
unobserved earning potential than workers in the private sector. 
At the conclusion, drawbacks to the analysis of this chapter that are due to data 
availability should be acknowledged. Firstly, the self-reported datasets do not contain 
• t· 
instruments that would provide rational exclusion restrictions when identifying the individual 
worker's sector choice. It is a c k n o ~ l e d g e d d that correcting for workers' non-random selection 
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is important, but is only useful when meaningful instrumental variables that affect the sector 
selection but can be excluded from the wage equation are available. Furthennore in this 
context, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2003) tested a number of potential instruments from Serbian 
LFS data and found them insignificantly different from zero in the selection equation. Finally, 
a variable which they used to correct for self-selection was a number of jobholders in the 
household. This variable had a significant effect on sector choice of females but not of males. 
We argue that the number of jobholders in the household may pick up partially a tendency 
towards job security and associated benefits during the early stages of transition but these 
were not likely to be decisive during the major period of large-scale privatisations of the 
public sector. 
Secondly, the earnings are available only net of taxes and other contributions. Hence, 
the estimated public sector pay gap does not account for differences in pension and health 
insurance contributions between sectors. 
6.4 Public-Private Sector Pay Differentials in Hungary 
The second empirical chapter estimated public-private sector earnings differentials 
during the economic transition in Hungary, from 1992 until 2003. In contrast to Serbia, 
Hungary has been considered as one of the most successful countries in economic transition. 
The organised process of privati sing state enterprises started in 1991 and was mainly based on 
competitive tenders opened to foreign participation. The method of case-by-case privatisation 
although gradual, was completed earlier than in most other Eastern European countries. 
Hungary joined the EU in 2004. 
There are two distinct periods during the Hungarian economic transition which 
affected the public-private sector earnings differentials. In particular, during the 1990s the 
public sector earnings lagged behind the private sector earnings. In order to combat losses of 
highly skilled labour in the public sector due to the private sector selection the government 
increased nominally public sector wages by 50% on average between September 2002 and 
2003. In addition"the level of minimum wage increased in 2001 by 57% and in 2002 by 25%. 
The chapter illuminated changes in the public sector earnings inequality relative to the 
private sector based on employer-provided microdata from the Harmonised Hungarian Wage 
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Survey (WS). The data that relate to the period considered represent large cross-sections of 
around 150,000 observations per each year. The cross-sectional differences between public 
and private sectors are initially estimated by OLS and quantile regressions using a 'dummy 
variable' approach. The same estimation methods are also used to estimate earnings in public 
and private sectors separately. In addition, a method of decompositions of differences in 
distributions is applied. At the final point of analysis the public sector pay effects across 
groups differentiated by educational qualifications attained are estimated. The results of the 
chapter are summarised as follows. 
The chapter demonstrated statistically significant public sector pay penalties during 
economic transition in Hungary. In particular, annual conditional estimates showed that the 
gap was negative during most of the period of economic transition in Hungary but grew to 
zero by the end of the period reviewed in this chapter. The results from quantile regressions 
verified that the public sector pay distribution was more compressed than that of the private 
sector. Workers at and above the median fared statistically significantly worse having a public 
sector status even by the end of the period considered. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the public sector earnings distribution relative to the 
private sector is analysed for two distinct periods, pre-2000 and post-2000. This distinction is 
based on wage reforms initiated in the early 2000s. The pooled quantile regressions suggested 
that: (1) the public-private sector pay differential was greater for workers at higher percentiles 
for both men and women during both periods of economic transition; (2) the gap was higher 
for men than for women during both periods of economic transition; (3) the gap declined from 
earlier to later period of economic transition. Moreover, removing differences in 
characteristics, the decomposition results reinforced the previous finding that the earnings 
distribution was more compressed in the public than in the private sector. This difference in 
distributions declined in the second relative to the first period reviewed. 
Finally, the quantile regression estimates for each group defined according to highest 
educational qualification confirmed that the public sector compressed the pay in two 
d!mensions: by reducing between-group inequality and py reducing within-group inequality. 
Both public sector inequality-reducing features were especially pronounced among high-
skilled workers. 
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A disproportionately larger public sector pay penalty for Hungarian university 
graduates than for other educational groups is consistent with the results reported by Hamori 
(2007) which used the same dataset for full-time male employees. Although the pay gap 
declined during 2001-2003 (Le. the period of public sector wage reforms), the pay inequality 
reducing effect for graduates remained. If the estimates are compared to the international 
evidence, for example with estimates for UK graduates in Disney and Gosling (1998), the 
public sector pay compression was found to be three times greater for Hungarian graduates 
than it was for UK graduates. 
There are several advantages of the data used in this chapter. Firstly, the data is 
provided by employers. Hence there i.s less measurement error in the public sector status. 
Secondly, the information on gross earnings is provided. Hence, the estimated sector pay gap 
accounts for the differences in social contributions for health and pensions between sectors. 
Thirdly, large cross-sections (about 150,000 observations' per year) contain rich data on 
worker's and job characteristics on which the estimated sectoral gap is conditioned. 
However, there are two main data limitations. First, employer supplied data does not 
contain the instruments to control for differences in workers' unobserved heterogeneity 
between sectors. Moreover, the public sector includes only budgetary institutions and hence, 
unlike in the chapter 4, we were not able to use changes in the proportions of industry 
branches or occupations within public sector caused by large-scale privatisations as an 
instrument. However, we can refer to the conclusions of the chapter 4 which suggested that 
the public sector workers are more likely to have lower unobserved earning potentials than 
private sector workers. Second, the sample relates to private sector employers with more than 
20 employees. Therefore, both data limitations tend to over-estimate the public sector pay 
penalty. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Despite the data limitations outlined' in the previous section economic transition 
represents a fruitful case-study of the evolution of the wage structures between the private and 
public sectors. The two countries considered in this thesis differed significantly in speed and 
type of the privatisation process. Hungary has been considered as one of the most successful 
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countries in transition to a market economy. On the other hand Serbia was one of the very last 
countries of Eastern Europe to initiate a process of economic transition. 
However, a unified story consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model 
derived in this thesis can be drawn from both countries. In particular, the public sector 
monopsony model presented in the chapter 3 suggested that the earnIngs distribution is 
expected to be more compressed in the public sector than in the private sector given that the 
public sector exerts greater power over skilled than over unskilled workers. In addition, the 
public sector pay gap is expected to be negative initially but to close down due to decline in 
the public sector monopsony power over the period. 
Indeed, the public sector pay penalty in both countries considered in this thesis had 
been found first to increase and later to close down. Moreover, in both countries the public 
sector was found to compress the pay relative to the private sector. It is important to note that 
the public sector pay compression estimated in both transition economies has been found 
greater than in any other developed market economy (as given by the empirical literature 
review at the beginning of the thesis). 
The data available for Serbia showed that the decline in the public sector pay penalty 
was correlated to the size of the public sector in terms of employment. We argued that the 
public sector pay penalty transferred into a premium as a result of large-scale privatisations. 
The data available for Hungary allowed consistent analysis over the whole period of economic 
transition. The estimates showed that the unskilled workers were more similar in terms of pay 
between sectors than the skilled workers. In addition, the public sector pay compression has 
been found to increase with the skill level. Therefore, the empirical results in this thesis 
verified two main characteristics of the public sector explained by the theoretical model: 
greater wage equality than in the private sector and differeritial monopsony power over skilled 
and unskilled workers. 
6.6 Future Research 
At the conclusion of this thesis topics for further research are suggested .• This thesis 
has suggested three areas for further work. Firstly, on the elasticity of labour supply. The 
comprehensive surveys of the labour supply literature, such as Boal and Ransom's (1997) and 
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Bashkar, Manning and To's (2002) reveal a great deal of uncertainty in the estimates of the 
relevant elasticities. This is in part because the literature considers different approaches to 
measure the market power of employer, different time horizons (short and long run) as well as 
different types of workers. However, no attempts have been made so far to estimate the 
elasticity of labour supply in transition economies. This was largely due to data limitations, 
but future researchers may have access to suitable data. Secondly, this thesis has suggested 
several drawbacks for precise estimation of public-private sector pay differentials during. 
economic transition. One of the most important relates to a lack of good instruments to control 
for unobserved worker characteristics (e.g. risk aversion, ability) which may be decisive for a 
worker's sector choice. In this context, comparison of the results obtained by using the 
empirical methods in this thesis with panel data estimates would be useful. The literature on 
public-private pay differential will also benefit from data that are able to provide evidence 
based on 'treatments'. For this purpose, the case studies of privatisations of certain industry 
branches or occupations would be the most appropriate. Finally, it will be interesting to pursue 
a similar research jointly with other transition economies in order to disclose comprehensively 
the relationship between the post-transition process and the public-private sector pay 
differentials. The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) set 
to collect timely and comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional microdata 
offers a promising venue for this type of future research. 
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